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Aesthetics after the Speculative Turn
Ridvan Askin, Andreas Hägler, and Philipp Schweighauser
University of Basel
Origins
Any exploration of art and sensuous cognition from a speculative realist perspective 
must contend with the legacy of not only Kant’s first critique 
but also his third.1 For a speculative realist aesthetics, Kant’s 
legacy is a crucial foil for two related reasons: first (and this 
is the better-explored argument), because his radically anti-
metaphysical demand “that the objects must conform to our 
cognition” is the most prominent and influential manifesta-
tion of what Quentin Meillassoux calls “correlationism” in 
After Finitude; second, and more specifically, because Kant’s 
aesthetic theory is a theory not of objects but of the human 
response to natural and artistic beauty.2 That Kant’s aesthet-
ics is as unreservedly subject-centred as his first critique 
1 The editors of this special issue would like to thank Daniel Allemann for 
diligently proofreading the whole issue and his helpful feedback on this 
introduction. Ralf Simon, Paul J. Ennis, Jon Cogburn, and Sjoerd van Tuinen 
deserve special thanks for their incisive comments on the text that follows.
2 Immanuel Kant, “Preface to the Second Edition” in Critique of Pure Reason, 
trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), 110. Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity 
of Contingency, trans. Ray Brassier (London: Continuum, 2009), 5.
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becomes immediately clear if we consider that the central 
term in the Critique of the Power of Judgement is “taste.” In 
focusing on this most crucial notion of eighteenth-century 
reflections on art, Kant joins fellow aestheticians of the age 
in bidding farewell to onto-theological theories of beauty 
revolving around notions such as harmonia, consonantia, and 
integritas to develop experientially grounded accounts of the 
production and reception of art that employ a wholly different, 
subject-centred and sensually inflected vocabulary: aesthetic 
idea, aesthetic feeling, sensuous cognition, the imagination, 
genius, the sublime, and taste.3 If Kant’s Copernican revolu-
tion and its assertion that “we can cognize of things a priori 
only what we ourselves have put into them” relegated realist 
epistemology to the margins of philosophical inquiry for 
over two centuries, his theory of aesthetic judgment likewise 
shifts our attention away from real-world objects and towards 
the subject’s experience.4 In a related vein, Kant’s notion of 
beauty is explicitly anti-metaphysical in that it locates beauty 
neither in artworks’ correspondence with a divinely ordered 
cosmos nor in objects themselves. Instead, beauty is in the 
mind of the beholder; it is something we experience: we “speak 
of the beautiful as if beauty were a property of the object and 
the judgment logical (constituting a cognition of the object 
through concepts of it), although it is only aesthetic and con-
tains merely a relation of the representation of the object to 
the subject.”5 More precisely, the pleasurable experience of 
beauty is an effect of the harmonious interplay of the cogni-
tive faculties of understanding and imagination.6 Finally, if 
Hartmut Böhme is correct in considering eighteenth-century 
theories of the sublime as an integral part of the Enlighten-
3 For a good account of this shift, see Monroe C. Beardsley’s classic Aesthet-
ics from Classical Greece to the Present (New York: Macmillan, 1966), 140-208.
4 Kant, “Preface,” 111.
5 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric 
Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), §6, 97.
6 See Paul Guyer, “Beauty and Utility in Eighteenth-Century Aesthetics,” 
Eighteenth-Century Studies (2002), 35:3, 449-50.
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ment’s project of achieving mastery over unruly nature, of 
submitting le grand dehors under human beings’ cognitive 
control, then Kant’s reflections on the dynamical sublime, a 
feeling that grows out of the subject’s pleasurable recognition 
that its reason ultimately prevails over awe-inspiring nature, 
are an integral part of that project.7 Monroe C. Beardsley puts 
it aptly: “It is our own greatness, as rational beings, that we 
celebrate and enjoy in sublimity.”8
For all these reasons, then, Kant has emerged as specula-
tive realism’s most prominent foil. Yet any attempt to think 
metaphysics and aesthetics together must contend with a 
second, equally formidable opponent, a somewhat earlier 
philosopher greatly admired by Kant: Alexander Gottlieb 
Baumgarten. Kant based his own lectures on metaphysics on 
what was then the German-speaking world’s major treatise 
on that subject—Baumgarten’s Metaphysica (1739)—and he 
inherited Baumgarten’s understanding of aesthetic judgment 
as aesthetic (sensuous) cognition.
It was Baumgarten who coined the term “aesthetics” in his 
M.A. thesis Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis ad poema 
pertinentibus (1735).9 The brief definition he gives there, in 
§116 of his short treatise, will come as a surprise to many 
readers of these pages. In Karl Aschenbrenner and William 
B. Holther’s translation,
Therefore, things known are to be known by the superior faculty as the 
object of logic; things perceived [are to be known by the inferior faculty, 
as the object] of the science of perception, or aesthetic.10
7 Hartmut Böhme, “Das Steinerne: Anmerkungen zur Theorie des Erha-
benen aus dem Blick des ‘Menschenfremdesten’” in Das Erhabene: Zwischen 
Grenzerfahrung und Grössenwahn, ed. Christine Priess (Weinheim: VCH, Acta 
humaniora, 1989), 160-92.
8 Beardsley, Aesthetics, 219.
9 This text has been published in English translation as Reflections on Poetry/
Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus, trans. Karl 
Aschenbrenner and William B. Holther (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1954). 
10 Baumgarten, Reflections, §116, 78, original emphases. In the Latin/Greek 
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Baumgarten’s distinction between the superior faculty (reason) 
and the inferior faculty (the senses) corresponds to Gottfried 
Wilhelm Leibniz’s successive set of differentiations between 
obscure and clear, confused and distinct, inadequate and 
adequate, and symbolic and intuitive cognition. In Leibniz’s 
scheme, in which the second term of each pair is always the 
preferred one, reason allows for clear and distinct cognition 
while the senses allow only for clear and confused cognition.11 
In Baumgarten’s account, sensory perception allows us to 
know things with clarity but intuitively and thus without the 
conceptual distinctness of reason—without, in Baumgarten’s 
words, “clarity intensified by distinction.”12 What makes 
Baumgarten’s contribution exceptional in 1735 is that he not 
only joins Leibniz in refusing to follow Descartes’ outright 
dismissal of clear but confused perception but strives to give 
sensuous cognition its rightful place within the philosophical 
system of rationalism. This comes out clearly in his better-
known definition of “aesthetics” in his two-volume Aesthetica 
(1750/58), a work that can rightly be called the foundational 
text of modern aesthetics. In Jeffrey Barnouw’s translation,
Aesthetics, as the theory of the liberal arts, lower-level epistemology 
[gnoseologia inferior], the art of thinking finely [literally, beautifully, ars 
pulchre cogitandi], and the art of the analogy of reason [i.e., the associa-
original, “Sunt ergo νοητά cognoscenda facultate superiore objectum logices; 
αισθητά, ‘επιστήης. αισθητικης sive aesheticae.” Baumgarten, Reflections, 
§116, 39.
11 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, “Betrachtungen über die Erkenntnis, die 
Wahrheit und die Ideen” in Hauptschriften zur Grundlegung der Philosophie, 
Teil 1, trans. Artur Buchenau, Philosophische Werke: in vier Bänden, ed. Ernst 
Cassirer, vol. 1 (Hamburg: Meiner, 1996), 9-15. Leibniz’s set of distinctions 
further refine the Cartesian differentiation between the clear and distinct 
perceptions afforded by reason and the clear but confused perceptions af-
forded by the senses. See Descartes’ famous wax example in his Meditations 
on First Philosophy, trans. Ian Johnston, ed. Andrew Bailey (Peterborough: 
Broadview Press, 2013), 46-52. See also Ralf Simon, Die Idee der Prosa: Zur 
Ästhetikgeschichte von Baumgarten bis Hegel mit einem Schwerpunkt bei Jean 
Paul (Munich: Fink, 2013), 30-31.
12 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, Ästhetik [Aesthetica], trans. Dagmar Mir-
bach, 2 vols. (Hamburg: Meiner, 2007), §617, II: 604, our translation.
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tive or natural-sign-based capacity of empirical inference common 
to man and higher animals], is the science of sensuous cognition.13
Sensuous cognition, then, belongs to lower-level epistemol-
ogy in that it depends on the inferior faculty of the senses. 
But it is structured analogous to reason, is subject to the same 
truth conditions as reason (the principle of sufficient reason 
and law of noncontradiction),14 and accounts for such a great 
variety of human experience that the philosophical tradition 
from Descartes to Christian Wolff has disparaged it at its own 
loss. In Baumgarten’s words, “A philosopher is a human being 
among human beings; as such, he is ill-advised to believe that 
such a great part of human cognition is unseemly to him.”15
Baumgarten’s valorisation of the senses and of sensuous 
cognition was daring for its time, especially for a rationalist 
philosopher. Yet it is precisely that boldness which puts him 
at odds with the speculative realist project. Baumgarten’s aes-
thetics appears as subject-centred as Kant’s: both conceptualise 
aesthetics as a question of human consciousness, be it under 
the heading of “taste” or “sensuous cognition.” As such, both 
appear to be correlationist thinkers through and through.
The remainder of this first section of our introduction ar-
gues that this is a hasty judgment. Let us begin with Kant, for 
whose aesthetics the argument has already been made, and 
then turn to Baumgarten. Recently, one of the contributors 
to our special issue has made the suggestion that it is pre-
cisely Kant’s much maligned notion of disinterestedness that 
sketches a way out of the correlationist circle as it describes 
13 Jeffrey Barnouw, “Feeling in Enlightenment Aesthetics,” Studies in Eigh-
teenth-Century Culture (1988), 18, 324; the square brackets are Barnouw’s. In 
the Latin original, “AESTHETICA (theoria liberalium artium, gnoseologia 
inferior, ars pulchre cogitandi, ars analogi rationis) est scientia cognitionis 
sensitivae.” Baumgarten, Aesthetica, §1, I:10.
14 See Constanze Peres, “Cognitio sensitiva: Zum Verhältnis von Empfindung 
und Reflexion in A. G. Baumgartens Begründung der Ästhetiktheorie” in 
Empfindung und Reflexion: Ein Problem des 18. Jahrhunderts, ed. Hans Körner 
et al. (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1986), 31-39.
15 Baumgarten, Aesthetica, §6, I:14, our translation.
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a way for human beings to relate to the real world that does 
not subject it to conceptual thought. In Without Criteria: Kant, 
Whitehead, Deleuze, and Aesthetics (2009), Steven Shaviro writes,
When I contemplate something that I consider beautiful, I am moved 
precisely by that something’s separation from me, its exemption from 
the categories I would apply to it. This is why beauty is a lure, drawing me 
out of myself and teasing me out of thought … The aesthetic subject does 
not impose its forms upon an otherwise chaotic outside world. Rather, 
this subject is itself informed by the world outside, a world that (in the 
words of Wallace Stevens) “fills the being before the mind can think.”16
Kant distinguishes between three types of pleasurable experi-
ence: that of the agreeable, that of the good, and that of the 
beautiful. Only the last of these is disinterested; only “the 
beautiful” is “an object of satisfaction without any interest.”17 
Disinterestedness here means that the experience of the 
beautiful involves neither desire for sensual gratification 
(as would Emmentaler cheese, which we may find agreeable) 
nor the satisfaction granted by the conceptual mastery of an 
object in view of its pragmatic purpose (as would a multi-
functional bike tool, which we may find good because it is 
useful).18 Shaviro notes that, unlike the judgment of the good, 
the judgment of the beautiful involves no subsumption of 
the object under a determinate concept (the concept of an 
end in our example of the bike tool). And it is for this reason 
that aesthetic experience and judgment gesture beyond the 
correlationist mantra that, in Meillassoux’s words, “we only 
ever have access to the correlation between thinking and 
being, and never to either term considered apart from the 
16 Steven Shaviro, Without Criteria: Kant, Whitehead, Deleuze, and Aesthetics 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009), 4-5, 12, original emphasis.
17 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, §6, 96.
18 Of course, Kant distinguishes between two judgments of the good; our 
example does not cover the moral good, which is an end in itself. Our un-
derstanding of Kant’s notion of disinterestedness is indebted to Paul Guyer, 
“Disinterestedness and Desire in Kant’s Aestheticism,” The Journal of Aesthetics 
and Art Criticism (1978), 36:4, 449-60.
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other.”19 This is why, in Shaviro’s reading, the Kant of the 
third critique, the Kant who proposes that “the judgment of 
taste is not a cognitive judgment (neither a theoretical nor a 
practical one), and hence it is neither grounded on concepts 
nor aimed at them,” emerges as a potential ally of specula-
tive realism.20 In our volume, it is Francis Halsall who most 
explicitly engages with the Kantian notion of the judgment 
of taste and its relevance to today’s debates within specula-
tive realist circles.
More generally speaking, quite apart from either Kant’s 
reflections on disinterested pleasure or Graham Harman’s 
provocative declaration that “aesthetics becomes first phi-
losophy,” it may be in aesthetic thinking that we should look 
for a way out of the correlationist path laid out by Kant’s first 
critique.21 It is this supposition that prompted us to solicit 
papers for a special issue on speculative realist approaches 
to aesthetics in the first place. And it is that very same sup-
position that invites us to return to the origin of aesthetics in 
Baumgarten once more. True, the Baumgartian understanding 
of aesthetics as “the science of sensuous cognition” seems to 
lead us straight down the correlationist road. But it does so 
only if we disregard the provenance of Baumgarten’s think-
ing about sense perception. Baumgarten was a philosopher 
trained in the rationalist tradition of Descartes, Leibniz, and 
Wolff. As such, he belongs to the very history of ideas in which 
Meillassoux situates his claims concerning the necessity of 
contingency: “I’m a rationalist, and reason clearly demon-
strates that you can’t demonstrate the necessity of laws: so we 
should just believe reason and accept this point: laws are not 
necessary—they are facts, and facts are contingent—they can 
change without reason.”22 And yet, as we will see, Baumgarten 
19 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 5.
20 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, §5, 95.
21 Graham Harman, “On Vicarious Causation,” Collapse (2007), 2, 221.
22 Quentin Meillassoux, “Time Without Becoming,” Speculative Heresy, http://
speculativeheresy.files.wordpress.com/2008/07/3729-time_without_becom-
ing.pdf (accessed June 26, 2013).
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represents a rationalist tradition quite different from that 
evoked by Meillassoux (or Ray Brassier, for that matter).
In giving the senses their due, Baumgarten does not subscribe 
to the eighteenth-century empiricist (and thus by definition 
correlationist) creed of contemporaneous British aestheti-
cians such as Francis Hutcheson and David Hume. Instead, 
he strives to establish a science of sensuous cognition from 
within the bounds of rationalist thought. That Baumgarten’s 
aesthetics is ultimately metaphysical to the core becomes 
clearest in section xxxiv of the Aesthetica (“The Absolute 
Aesthetic Striving for Truth”). There, he writes, 
Indeed, I believe that philosophers can now see with the utmost clarity 
that whatever formal perfection inheres in cognition and logical truth 
can be attained only with a great loss of much material perfection. For 
what is this abstraction but loss? By the same token, you cannot bring 
a marble sphere out of an irregular piece of marble without losing at 
least as much material as the higher value of roundness demands.23
Four paragraphs later, Baumgarten adds a remarkable ob-
servation:
Above all, the aesthetic horizon delights in those particular objects that 
exhibit the greatest material perfection of aestheticological truth, in 
the individuals and the most specific of objects. These are its woods, 
its chaos, its matter [sua silva, Chao et materia] out of which it chisels 
the aesthetic truth into a form that is not entirely perfect yet beautiful, 
always in the attempt to lose as little materially perfect truth as possible 
and rub off as little of it for the sake of tastefulness.24
Baumgarten has a remarkably strong notion of truth, which 
we have learned to distrust in the wake of Nietzsche and his 
post-structuralist heirs (on potential Nietzschean ramifica-
tions for speculative realism, see Theodor Leiber and Kirsten 
Voigt’s contribution to this volume). As we will see in the second 
23 Baumgarten, Aesthetica, §560, I:538, our translation.
24 Ibid., §564, I:542, our translation.
Speculations V
14
section of this introduction, it took Alain Badiou to return 
aesthetics to the question of truth. For Baumgarten, sensuous 
cognition allows us to glimpse something of that which reason’s 
striving for abstraction and formal perfection denies us: the 
richness, multiplicity, plenitude, and particularity of things, 
the “woods,” “chaos” and “matter” of the real world.25 More 
precisely, not only sensuous but all cognition is ultimately 
based on what Baumgarten calls “fundus animae” (the dark 
ground of the soul), which is a repository for infinitesimally 
small pre-conscious, unconscious, and half-conscious sensu-
ous perceptions (Leibniz’s petites perceptions) that ensures the 
soul’s continuing activity even when we sleep and mirrors the 
plenitude of the universe.26 For Baumgarten, neither reason 
nor the senses can ever fully access the infinite universe, but 
the aestheticological truth of artworks approaches that ideal in 
that it gives form to the material perfection of things in their 
multiplicity and particularity: “Aestheticological truth brings 
the light of beauty into the fundus animae by working a beauti-
ful form out of the chaotic woods.”27 In his contribution to our 
25 See Peres, “Cognitio sensitiva,” 36.
26 Baumgarten puts it thus in the Metaphysica: “There are dark perceptions in 
the soul. Their totality is called GROUND OF THE SOUL [FUNDUS ANIMAE].” 
Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, Metaphysica, 7th, rpt. ed. (Hildesheim: Georg 
Olms Verlag, 1963), §511, 176, our translation. For good discussions of the 
fundus animae and its relation to Leibniz’s petites perceptions, see Hans Adler, 
“Fundus Animae—Der Grund der Seele: Zur Gnoseologie des Dunklen in der 
Aufklärung,” Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesge-
schichte (1988), 62:2, 197-220; Peres, “Cognitio sensitiva,” 39-40; Tanehisa 
Otabe, “Der Begriff der ‘petites perceptions’ von Leibniz als Grundlage für 
die Entstehung der Ästhetik,” JTLA (2010), 35, 46-49; and Simon, Die Idee 
der Prosa, 26-46. Note also that while the fundus animae seems akin to what 
Freud would later call “the unconscious,” Simon rightly insists that the two 
are categorically distinct (27-28).
27 Ralf Simon, Die Idee der Prosa, 50, our translation. Note that the resulting 
artwork is not just form; it is beautiful form because it manages to retain 
something of the plenitude of things instead of reducing them to the ster-
ile formulae of scholasticism (which Baumgarten disparages in §53 of the 
Aesthetica). See Baumgarten, Aesthetica, §§557-58, I:534-36; §§562-65, I:540-44. 
In Wolfgang Welsch’s words in “Ästhetische Grundzüge im gegenwärtigen 
Denken” in Grenzgänge der Ästhetik (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1996), 81: “Aesthet-
ics—which Baumgarten introduced as a Trojan horse into the fortress of the 
Introduction
15
volume, Sjoerd van Tuinen taps into this rationalist tradition 
to argue that artworks themselves can be speculative. Yet not 
even the aestheticological truth of art can capture the truth of 
the world in its totality; Baumgarten “liberates himself from 
the idea of total access, from the ideal of complete cognition 
and thus also from the traditional obsession with absolute 
assurance and certainty.”28 In this model, only God is able to 
cognise things simultaneously in their formal and material 
perfection; only he possesses metaphysical truth. Ultimately, 
then, Baumgarten turns out to be a rationalist quite different 
from Meillassoux: Baumgarten, too, aims at the real, but he 
does not presume that the absolute can be recuperated. In-
stead, he stresses human finitude, i.e., our ultimate inability 
to access the real. For that reason, even though Baumgarten 
is clearly no empiricist in its eighteenth-century sense, his 
thinking has the closest affinities not with Meillassoux’s work 
but with those speculative realists we describe as—rather 
unusual—empiricists in the third section of this introduc-
tion (Harman, Shaviro, Iain Hamilton Grant, Tim Morton). 
Baumgarten’s framing of aesthetics as a theory of experience, 
sensation, and sensuous cognition lays the ground for their 
expansion of aesthetic thinking into the non-human world.
Not unlike Kantian disinterested pleasure, sensuous cogni-
tion allows us to experience the real in its confused beauty 
rather than subjecting it to conceptual thought. Perhaps, it 
is in sensuous cognition and aesthetic experience that “in-
tuitions without concepts” are not “blind” after all.29 If, from 
the perspective of what N. Katherine Hayles in this issue 
calls the argumentative, philosophical variety of speculative 
aesthetics (an aesthetic theory born out of the spirit of specu-
lative realism), one of the thorniest questions concerning 
sciences—brings about a change in the concepts of science and cognition: 
henceforth, genuine cognition is aestheticological cognition, and genuine 
science cannot ignore its aesthetic determinants” (our translation).
28 Steffen W. Gross, “Felix Aestheticus und Animal Symbolicum: Alexander G. 
Baumgarten—die ‘vierte Quelle’ der Philosophie Ernst Cassirers?” Deutsche 
Zeitschrift für Philosophie (2001), 49:2, 285, our translation.
29 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 193-94.
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aesthetics is that of human access to the real, then both Kant’s 
and Baumgarten’s inquiries into forms of access that are not 
primarily conceptual in nature at the very least allow us to 
imagine non-correlationist ways of relating to the universe 
of things. For a speculative realism that does not follow Meil-
lassoux in trying to reclaim the absolute on purely rational 
grounds this is a crucial, though underexplored legacy. 
But let us not jump too quickly from eighteenth-century 
aesthetics to the new metaphysicians. As the following sec-
tion shows, the speculative realists are not alone among 
contemporary thinkers in returning to the original meaning 
of aesthetics as a theory of modalities of perception.30
Contemporary French and German Aesthetics
Aesthetic matters have generally witnessed a strong return 
in philosophy and other disciplines of the humanities in the 
last fifteen years.31 In this section, we briefly survey some of 
the influential positions in contemporary aesthetics in order 
to establish what it means to pursue aesthetics in the twenty-
first century and how these contemporary discourses in turn 
contribute to understanding the content, aims, and possible 
limits of speculative aesthetics. 
Let us begin with two thinkers whose work has been greatly 
responsible for the present resurgence of aesthetics in phi-
losophy, art history and criticism, media and literary studies: 
Alain Badiou and Jacques Rancière.
In the Handbook of Inaesthetics, Alain Badiou claims that 
what we lack today is a proper understanding of the relation 
between art, philosophy, and truth. In his view, three schemata 
have so far determined our understanding of this relation. 
30 For a similar assessment, see Ernst von Glasersfeld, “Farewell to Objectiv-
ity,” Systems Research (1996), 13:3, 279-86.
31 See John J. Joughin and Simon Malpas, eds., The New Aestheticism (Man-
chester: Manchester University Press, 1996); Isobel Armstrong, The Radical 
Aesthetic (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000); Jonathan Loesberg, A Return to Aesthet-
ics (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005); Thomas Docherty, Aesthetic 
Democracy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006).
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He terms these schemata the “didactic,” the “classical,” and 
the “romantic.” The didactic and the classical schemata have 
their origin in Greek philosophy, in Plato and Aristotle, while 
the third schema, as its name implies, was established in the 
Romantic age.32 According to the didactic schema, art produces 
a “semblance” of truth while truth is in fact “external to art” 
and only conceivable in philosophy. In the romantic schema, 
“art alone is capable of truth,” a truth that philosophy can only 
approximate. And in the classical schema, there is no truth 
to art at all—art is only cathartic, and “not at all cognitive or 
revelatory.”33
Badiou holds that the major schools of thought of the 
twentieth century were but continuations of these schemata: 
Marxism was a continuation of the didactic schema—we see 
this in the work of Brecht, for whom art makes manifest an 
external, philosophical truth, that of “dialectical materialism”; 
German hermeneutics was a continuation of the romantic 
schema—we see this in the work of Heidegger, where only 
the poet truly “maintains the effaced guarding of the Open,” 
meaning only art discloses the truth that philosophy can at 
best proclaim or register; and psychoanalysis was a continua-
tion of the classical schema—we see this in the work of Freud 
and Lacan, for whom art is mainly therapeutic and has no 
claim to truth outside of the “imaginary.”34
Crucially, Badiou holds that the twentieth-century continu-
ations of the inherited schemata led to a “saturation of these 
doctrines.” The major schools of thought in the twentieth 
century, while unable to establish a new schema for the rela-
tionship between art, philosophy, and truth, have all reached 
certain—political, quasi-theological, institutional—dead ends, 
ultimately relinquishing any claim to truth on the part of art. 
Badiou suggests that this is due to the fact that none of these 
schools of thought established a notion of artistic truth that 
32 Alain Badiou, Handbook of Inaesthetics, trans. Alberto Toscano (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2005), 1-5.
33 Badiou, Handbook of Inaesthetics, 2-4, original emphasis.
34 Ibid., 5-7.
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is proper to art itself. In his words, they missed out on articu-
lating a notion of artistic truth that is both “immanent” and 
“singular”—a truth that is manifest in art and, in the particular 
form in which it is manifest, only in art.35
In the didactic schema, the truth of art is singular yet not 
immanent: singular because art is a semblance and because 
semblance is unique to art; yet not immanent because truth 
ultimately belongs to philosophy. In the romantic schema, 
the truth of art is immanent yet not singular: immanent be-
cause art (and only art) makes truth manifest; yet not singular 
because this is a truth that philosophy also aspires to. In the 
classical schema, the truth of art is neither singular nor im-
manent: art is merely therapeutic, without any claims to truth 
whatsoever. Yet only through a singular and immanent notion 
of artistic truth can we find a way out of the dead ends of the 
predominant aesthetic discourses of the twentieth century.36
Badiou holds that we can only arrive at such a notion if we 
give up the idea that the work of art is “the pertinent unity of 
what is called ‘art.’”37 Any notion of artistic truth that proceeds 
from the work of art as the bearer of that truth must neces-
sarily fall back into the aporiae of the established schemata. 
Rather, Badiou suggests, we have to comprehend the pertinent 
unity of art as an
Artistic configuration initiated by an evental rupture … This configura-
tion, which is a generic multiple, possesses neither a proper name nor 
a proper contour, not even a possible totalization in terms of a single 
predicate. It cannot be exhausted, only imperfectly described. It is an 
artistic truth, and everybody knows that there is no truth of truth.38
Badiou’s evental notion of artistic truth cannot be exhaus-
tively discussed here.39 Yet what we can grasp from this brief 
35 Badiou, Handbook of Inaesthetics, 7-9, original emphases.
36 See Ibid., 9.
37 Ibid., 10. 
38 Ibid., 12.
39 For a more extensive discussion of Badiou’s inaesthetics and his evental 
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account is that Badiou perceives the major aesthetic discourses 
of the twentieth century to have reached certain historical 
limits, which in his view is based on their failure to properly 
comprehend the truth of art, that is, to establish a notion of 
artistic truth that is both singular and immanent, according 
to which art is “irreducible to philosophy,”40 and in which 
philosophical aesthetics becomes an “inaesthetics,” a think-
ing about art that “makes no claim to turn art into an object 
for philosophy.”41 And in order to achieve such a notion of 
artistic truth, we must first consider what we talk about when 
we talk about art: the author, the work, the recipient, or, as 
Badiou suggests, an event? 
In the Handbook of Inaesthetics, Badiou returns to an issue 
that centrally concerned Baumgarten at the inauguration 
of aesthetics as a discipline—the relation between art, truth, 
and philosophy. How does Baumgarten’s notion of this re-
lation fare in the schemata of Badiou? Baumgarten seems 
to firmly remain within their limits, yet a clear assignment 
of his notion of artistic truth to one of the schemata seems 
quite difficult. As stated earlier, aestheticological truth has 
the advantage over the truth procedures of reason that it 
provides us with a material, concrete kind of truth that reason 
alone—because of its necessary abstraction—cannot deliver. 
This might suggest that we are dealing with an immanent 
yet not singular kind of truth here, i.e., with the romantic 
schema: art (the aestheticological truth procedure) aspires to 
the same kind of truth that philosophy (the truth procedure 
of reason) does, but whereas philosophy’s truths are purely 
formal, art retains something of the plenitude of the universe 
in giving form to matter and thereby presenting a perhaps 
even more comprehensive form of truth. Yet one could also 
argue that this more material form of truth is in fact merely 
complementary: while art does bring forth a special kind of 
notion of artistic truth, see Peter Hallward, Badiou: A Subject to Truth (Min-
neapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 193-208.
40 Badiou, Handbook of Inaesthetics, 9.
41 Ibid., epigraph.
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truth, this kind of truth, because it is not strictly based in the 
procedures of reason, remains subordinated to philosophi-
cal truth—Baumgarten is a rationalist after all. This would 
then suggest the didactic schema: art is singular in that it 
produces a concrete, material kind of truth, yet truth in its 
highest form is not immanent to art, but only to philosophy. 
The exact position of Baumgarten in the schemata of Ba-
diou appears ultimately undecidable—it oscillates between 
the romantic and the didactic—but what is clear is that he 
certainly does not present a notion of artistic truth which is 
both singular and immanent, i.e., a kind of truth which in 
Badiou’s view would do justice to a contemporary aesthetics 
that manages to overcome the dead ends of the major schools 
of thought of the twentieth century. 
Since Badiou’s schemata shed light on both the historical 
and the contemporary landscapes of aesthetics, relating 
speculative realism to them should prove illuminating with 
respect to its position vis-à-vis other contemporary currents. 
Given that speculative realism does not denote a unified 
doctrine, such juxtaposition should also shed some light on 
internal differences within the movement. This is a thread 
we will take up again in the third and last section of our essay. 
For now, let us continue with our brief and selective survey 
of contemporary positions by turning to another prominent 
French thinker: Jacques Rancière.
Whereas Badiou’s work invites us to think about the rela-
tion between art, philosophy, and truth, with Jacques Rancière 
we are given the opportunity to address matters of politics 
and aesthetics. Arguably, the relation between politics and 
aesthetics is one of the central issues of Rancière’s oeuvre. 
For the purpose of our brief survey, we will focus on Ran-
cière’s The Politics of Aesthetics—a book that nicely sums up 
his aesthetico-political project.
One obvious way to think about the relation between aesthet-
ics and politics would be to think about the avant-garde, yet 
Rancière holds that “avant-garde thinking” has today turned 
into a form of “nostalgia”—a form of thought that only still 
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claims the utopian in its absence.42 This is best perceived in 
the work of Jean-François Lyotard, in which art becomes “wit-
ness to an encounter with the unrepresentable that cripples 
all thought” as a means to accuse or prevent the “arrogance 
of the grand aesthetic-political endeavour to have ‘thought’ 
become ‘world’”—an endeavour that has become ideologi-
cally dubious, and must hence be rejected, which means for 
art to reject thought, or rather, to present that which cannot 
be attained by thought.43 This however renders such an avant-
garde thinking politically powerless.
Rancière’s aim is not to proclaim, once more, “the avant-
garde vocation of art or … the vitality of modernity that 
links the conquests of artistic innovation to the victories of 
emancipation.”44 Rather, he wants to develop a basic terminology 
by which we can properly understand the particular relation 
of aesthetics and politics. In order to achieve this, Rancière 
holds that we must first acquire a clearer conception of the 
term aesthetics.45 Crucially, Rancière suggests that aesthetics 
must not be understood in its more narrow definition, as the 
philosophy of art, but more broadly and fundamentally, “in a 
Kantian sense … as the system of a priori forms determining 
what presents itself to experience.”46 Aesthetics in this sense 
is concerned with what Rancière famously calls “the distri-
bution of the sensible”: “the system of self-evident facts of 
sense perception that simultaneously discloses the existence 
of something in common and the delimitations that define 
the respective parts and positions within it.”47 
Rancière returns here to the very origins of aesthetics—
and not only Kant’s notion of aesthetics, but also to that of 
42 Jacques Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics, trans. Gabriel Rockhill (London: 
Continuum 2004), 9.
43 Ibid., 10.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid., 13.
47 Ibid., 12.
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Baumgarten as the science of perception. Yet Rancière gives 
this notion an emphatic political twist that both Kant and 
Baumgarten lack. With Rancière, a pleasurable experience 
can never be disinterested, but is always already interested, 
shaped by and in turn shaping the distribution of the sensible 
in pre-discursive—because it pertains to the very basic acts 
of perception—ways; likewise, whatever is formed out of the 
plenitude of the universe strives not after an absolute truth, 
but an ideological one: the aesthetic is not metaphysical, but 
political. 
Rancière’s The Politics of Aesthetics presents a fundamental 
rethinking of the relation between politics and aesthetics, 
which is, crucially, based on a general redetermination of 
what aesthetics is concerned with: not just with art practices, 
but more fundamentally with modes of sense perception. 
Only through such a return to the origins of aesthetics can 
we finally understand the political import of artistic prac-
tices. Rancière’s point is that at its very core, the aesthetic 
act is political: sense perception is always an act that is itself 
structured and structures that which is perceived, granting 
the visibility of some objects and rendering others invisible 
(which affirms the power of some social groups at the cost 
of others), promoting some genres of art and disqualifying 
others. Aesthetics means the distribution of the sensible. 
This very claim—that aesthetics cannot be separated from 
politics, but is, at its core, entwined with it—is a particularly 
interesting one to consider with regard to speculative real-
ist thought. Like Rancière, some of the representatives of 
speculative realism also return to the origins of aesthetics as 
the science of perception and sensuous cognition in order 
to newly determine its basic character and thereby general 
import for philosophy and adjacent disciplines. Yet whereas 
this redetermination in Rancière suggests that the aesthetic 
is essentially political, in speculative realism it leads to a 
marginalisation, if not erasure, of the political. Of course, 
the basic non-human approach of speculative aesthetics 
might necessitate this: in its establishment of an aesthetics 
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that goes beyond the human scope of things and addresses 
relations of objects regardless of our investment in them, 
the political—arguably an essentially human realm—gets 
dropped from its list of concerns.
Such an assessment of aesthetics after the speculative turn 
might make one assume that it is an apolitical project that at-
tempts to re-establish a newly purified aesthetics, which from 
a partisan position would render it potentially problematic 
on ideological terms. Yet such an assumption would be quite 
short-sighted. For even though the non-human aims of specu-
lative aesthetics disengage it at its core from any political 
relations, this must not mean that political issues might not 
re-enter the discussion. It might even be that precisely such 
a program might help us gain a new understanding of how 
political action takes place, which is what one of our contribu-
tors, Thomas Gokey, suggests. Gokey’s essay is interesting 
for a further reason, because he conceives the speculative 
possibilities of political action in terms of an avant-garde 
practice—precisely the practice that is declared obsolete by 
both Rancière and Badiou.48 Furthermore, the fact that Har-
man in his essay engages with the question of what the next 
avant-garde might look like solidifies our assumption that 
a speculative aesthetics might pose not just one but several 
challenges to other popular aesthetic discourses of our time. 
We will now move from France to Germany for our last 
discussion of a contemporary position, and consider the 
recent developments in aesthetics there. Very helpful in this 
respect is the collection of essays titled Falsche Gegensätze: 
Zeitgenössische Positionen zur philosophischen Ästhetik. This 
book brings together essays by some of the major figures in 
contemporary German aesthetics—Andrea Kern, Jens Kulen-
kampff, Christoph Menke, Martin Seel, Ruth Sonderegger, and 
48 See Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics, 9-10. Badiou holds that the avant-
garde, despite its attempt of being a proper twentieth-century aesthetic, did 
not manage to overcome the obsolete schemata, but rather formed a com-
bination of two of them: the avant-garde was “didactico-romantic.” Badiou, 
Handbook of Inaesthetics, 8.
Speculations V
24
Albrecht Wellmer—and in the editors’ introduction contains 
a concise statement of their common pursuit.
The basic gesture of recent German aesthetics is similar to 
that of Badiou and Rancière: it presents a fundamental chal-
lenge to some of the persistent premises of modern aesthetic 
theory. In this, it is specifically concerned with the relation 
of aesthetics to theoretical and practical philosophy (accord-
ing to the modern division of philosophy). As Andrea Kern 
and Ruth Sonderegger claim in their introduction to Falsche 
Gegensätze, we are confronted today with two problematic 
understandings of this relation.
The first understanding claims that aesthetics assesses a 
kind of experience which is autonomous and therefore stands 
in no relation whatsoever to a “theoretical and practical 
experience of the world,” because to argue that there is such 
a relation would undermine the distinctiveness of aesthetic 
experience and thereby also of the discipline of aesthetics. 
The authors hold that such a view implies a “marginalisation” 
of aesthetic experience for our everyday life, and of aesthet-
ics for philosophy. Aesthetic experience thus at best ends up 
being just a form of “relief from the ordinary, a diversion, a 
distraction.”49 
The second understanding assesses the relation between 
aesthetic, theoretical, and practical experience in a diametri-
cally opposed way. Here, aesthetic experience is no longer 
conceived as autonomous, “irreducible to the ordinary expe-
rience of the world,” but conversely represents “the highest 
form of precisely those experiences that theoretical and prac-
tical philosophy also want to comprehend.” For in aesthetic 
experience, the world appears to us “in the whole fullness 
and variety of possible interests and purposes,” rather than 
being approached under particular aspects, as in practical 
or theoretical philosophy. Such an understanding however 
implies that aesthetics, which assesses this experience, is no 
49 Andrea Kern and Ruth Sonderegger, “Einleitung” in Falsche Gegensätze: 
Zeitgenössische Positionen zur philosophischen Ästhetik, ed. Andrea Kern and 
Ruth Sonderegger (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp 2002), 7-8; this and all sub-
sequent translations are ours.
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longer just one of the major disciplines of philosophy, but 
rather attains the status of “the only true philosophy.”50 
The main problem that Kern and Sonderegger perceive here 
is that these positions are often assumed to be “mutually ex-
clusive”—that it seems impossible to conceive of an aesthetic 
experience which is both autonomous and informative for 
our everyday lives and the other domains of philosophy. Yet 
this is the view that the contributors to Falsche Gegensätze 
want to establish. Even more emphatically, they argue that 
“precisely through the particular way by which it is related to 
ordinary, everyday experience,” aesthetic experience “turns 
into an autonomous one.”51 
Kern and Sonderegger suggest three central concepts for 
determining this particular relation of aesthetic experience 
to other experiences: “reflection, aporiae, and play.” The terms 
themselves already suggest why aesthetic experience is not 
congruent with ordinary experience—not because it has 
no relation to it at all, but because it “relates itself to it” in a 
special way—reflectively, aporetically, playfully. The authors 
hold that this is a crucial point, for it implies that there is a 
close link between aesthetic experience and the basic gesture 
of philosophy itself: in philosophy, as in aesthetic experience, 
“we relate ourselves … to our relation to the world.”52
Such a reconception of aesthetic experience leads to a 
fundamental redefinition of the position aesthetics takes 
among the other domains of philosophy: aesthetics is no 
longer either marginal nor of the highest significance to 
practical and theoretical philosophy, but now instead stands 
in a “reciprocal relation” to them. Yet the status of aesthetics 
does remain special. Because of the philosophical character of 
aesthetic experience, aesthetics transcends the status of being 
merely one of the major disciplines in philosophy, but rather 
becomes the discipline for the contemplation of philosophy: 
in its reflection of aesthetic experience, aesthetics “cannot 
50 Kern and Sonderegger, “Einleitung,” 8-9, original emphasis.
51 Ibid., 9-10.
52 Ibid., 10, our emphasis in second quote, original emphasis in third quote.
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forbear to reflect the relation of its subject to philosophy and 
with that to reflect philosophy itself.”53
We register here a further attempt to fundamentally rene-
gotiate some of the central terms of traditional aesthetics, in 
this case the relation of aesthetics to practical and theoretical 
philosophy. Importantly, the contributors to Falsche Gegensätze 
put forward not only that we need a new understanding of 
this relation, but also that such a new understanding might 
imply that the discipline of aesthetics claims a special status 
inside philosophy. Such a diagnosis is reminiscent of Har-
man’s already quoted assertion that aesthetics become “first 
philosophy.” Yet Kern and Sonderegger’s assessment is of a 
markedly different character: whereas in Harman’s program, 
aesthetics becomes metaphysics, in Kern and Sonderegger it 
attains a metaphilosophical status.
Summing up our survey of recent French and German 
contributions to aesthetics and their relation to speculative 
realist concerns, we can say that one of the fundamental 
gestures of contemporary aesthetics, by which it attempts to 
reinvigorate debates about art, is to reconnect such debates 
to the original concerns of the discipline—to the questions 
of sensation, sense perception, and sensuous cognition that 
already occupied Baumgarten and, subsequently, Kant. Con-
necting again these two divisions of aesthetics—the philoso-
phy of art and the science of sensuous cognition—seems to 
be one distinctive characteristic of the current writings on 
aesthetics that creates new valences and yields prolific new 
ways by which to renegotiate both the relation of aesthetics 
to the other domains of philosophy and the more specific 
matters of aesthetics itself. It comes as no surprise, then, that 
several of the contributions to this issue straddle this divi-
sion as they ask some of the most fundamental questions 
about aesthetics and sensuous cognition even as they engage 
with specific works of art: Roberto Simanowski on digital 
art, Magdalena Wisniowska on Samuel Beckett’s television 
53 Kern and Sonderegger, “Einleitung,” 10-11, original emphasis.
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plays, van Tuinen on mannerist painting, Robert Jackson on 
the modernist legacy in contemporary video and sculpture 
work, Harman, Bettina Funcke, and Gokey on avant-garde art. 
Together with Halsall’s reflections on Kant’s third critique, 
these essays make up the second part of our volume, “The 
Theory of Art,” where we bring together those texts that en-
gage most directly with artistic concerns.
Where precisely contemporary reformulations of aesthet-
ics should lead us is a matter of dispute, and the various ap-
proaches apparent in aesthetics today vary greatly in terms 
of their specific aims. Yet they all seem to share something 
in their pursuits, namely that they all attempt to re-establish 
the aesthetic in its distinctiveness. This means to establish the 
aesthetic as something specific, as in Badiou’s claim that art 
has its own proper truth that is irreducible to other discourses 
and can never be appropriated by them (which consequently 
turns any truthful philosophy of art into an inaesthetics); 
and also as something of special importance, as in Rancière’s 
suggestion that politics is always (also) grounded in aesthetics, 
and in Kern and Sonderegger’s claim that aesthetics is the 
exceptional discipline of philosophy in which philosophy 
and its other disciplines can be reflected.
Like the other contemporary aesthetic discourses, speculative 
aesthetics also lays claim to the distinctiveness of the aesthetic, 
putting forward equally programmatic statements about the 
particularity of its status precisely by bringing together matters 
of sensation with matters of art, which consequently enables 
an extensive re-evaluation of the proper matters of aesthetics, 
which, as in Claire Colebrook’s contribution to our volume, 
might very well turn out to be the inherent aestheticism of 
matter itself. The first part of our issue, entitled “The Art of 
Theory,” assembles these more programmatic interventions 
featuring, besides Colebrook’s essay, the contributions of 
Shaviro, Leiber and Voigt, Matija Jelača, Hayles, Jon Cogburn 
and Mark Allan Ohm, and Miguel Penas López. 
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Aesthetics and Speculative Realism
Having traced the historical origins and, by means of paradig-
matic examples, the contemporary landscape of the discipline 
of aesthetics and the attendant problems and questions it 
grapples with, we will now try to determine the place of the 
recent speculative turn in continental philosophy within this 
field.54 In order to do so, both historically and systematically, 
let us first return to the beginnings of aesthetics and its early 
eighteenth-century prehistory in the discourse on taste. 
In his entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, James 
54 Of the original four speculative realists, Graham Harman has undoubtedly 
been the most explicit advocate of aesthetics. His claim that aesthetics has 
to be viewed as first philosophy and his theory of allure are well known by 
now. In addition to the already mentioned “Vicarious Causation” see also 
his “Aesthetics as First Philosophy: Levinas and the Non-Human,” Naked 
Punch (2007), 9, 21-30 and particularly his Guerrilla Metaphysics: Phenomenol-
ogy and the Carpentry of Things (Chicago: Open Court, 2005), 101-44. Quentin 
Meillassoux in turn has recently given us his reading of Mallarmé’s Coup 
de dés in Quentin Meillassoux, The Number and the Siren: A Decipherment of 
Mallarmé’s Coup de Dés, trans. Robin Mackay (Falmouth: Urbanomic, 2012). 
And while Iain Hamilton Grant has not explicitly written on aesthetics per se 
yet, given his Deleuzo-Schellingian dynamic process philosophy, it is safe to 
say that aesthetics plays a crucial role in his metaphysical project. One need 
only remember that Schelling pronounced “aesthetic intuition” as “merely 
transcendental intuition become objective” and art thus consequently “at 
once the only true and eternal organ and document of philosophy” (F. W. J. 
Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, trans. Peter Heath (Charlottesville: 
The University Press of Virginia, 1978), 231), and that for Deleuze aesthetics 
is the “apodictic discipline” (Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. 
Paul Patton (London: Continuum, 2004), 68). From the original four, only 
Ray Brassier has voiced his disdain for aesthetics (“Against an Aesthetics of 
Noise,” Transitzone, nY, http://ny-web.be/transitzone/against-aesthetics-noise.
html (accessed September 18, 2013)). To these four thinkers, one should add 
Steven Shaviro and Reza Negarestani, the latter engaging aesthetic form 
directly by means of theory fiction. See Steven Shaviro, Without Criteria 
and Reza Negarestani, Cyclonopedia: Complicity with Anonymous Materials 
(Melbourne: Re.press, 2008). In addition, Timothy Morton just published his 
Realist Magic: Objects, Ontology, Causality (Ann Arbor: Open Humanities Press, 
2013) that takes up Harman’s philosophy in order to develop an aesthetic 
account of causality. Finally, one should mention Armen Avanessian’s project 
of a speculative poetics and the book series related to this project: Spekula-
tive Poetik, http://www.spekulative-poetik.de/ (accessed September 18, 2013).
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Shelley emphasises the antagonistic stance theories of taste 
adopt vis-à-vis rationalist theories of beauty. He describes 
the situation thus:
Rationalism about beauty is the view that judgments of beauty are 
judgments of reason, i.e., that we judge things to be beautiful by rea-
soning it out, where reasoning it out typically involves inferring from 
principles or applying concepts … It was against this … that mainly 
British philosophers working mainly within an empiricist framework 
began to develop theories of taste. The fundamental idea behind any 
such theory—which we may call the immediacy thesis—is that judgments 
of beauty are not (or at least not primarily) mediated by inferences 
from principles or applications of concepts, but rather have all the 
immediacy of straightforwardly sensory judgments; it is the idea, in 
other words, that we do not reason to the conclusion that things are 
beautiful, but rather “taste” that they are.55
In this vein, if one were to paint a broad-brush picture of 
speculative realism, one could maintain that what we are wit-
nessing today, what is discernible now that the very first wave 
of the speculative turn has hit the shore and the ripples have 
subsided, is a new struggle between rationalism and empiri-
cism within contemporary speculative philosophy in general 
and its take on aesthetics in particular. In fact, aesthetics is 
the domain that brings to light precisely this divide. Devoting 
a special issue to speculative realism and aesthetics thus not 
only provides an opportunity to survey what the speculative 
turn in all its variety might bring to the discourse on aesthetics, 
but comes with the added value of sharpening the focus on 
this variety itself. In analogy to Shelley’s account, one could 
thus say that for the contemporary rationalists, mathematics 
(Meillassoux) and science (Brassier) dictate the discourse 
on and the place of aesthetics within the larger framework 
of epistemology with the concomitant intent to hunt down 
any manifestation of the, in their view, illusory “immediacy 
55 James Shelley, “The Concept of the Aesthetic,” The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy (Fall 2013 Edition), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/
entries/aesthetic-concept/ (accessed September 23, 2013), original emphasis.
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thesis.” The empiricists (Harman and Grant, but also Shaviro 
and Morton) in turn insist upon “immediacy” and a theory of 
taste in disguise holding that we immediately taste something 
before we conceptually know it. Brassier voiced this divide 
within speculative realism precisely along these lines in a 
2009 interview, where he said that he is 
Very wary of “aesthetics”: the term is contaminated by notions of 
“experience” that I find deeply problematic. I have no philosophy of 
art worth speaking of. This is not to dismiss art’s relevance for philoso-
phy—far from it—but merely to express reservations about the kind of 
philosophical aestheticism which seems to want to hold up “aesthetic 
experience” as a new sort of cognitive paradigm wherein the Modern 
(post-Cartesian) “rift” between knowing and feeling would be overcome 
… Some recent philosophers have evinced an interest in subjectless 
experiences; I am rather more interested in experience-less subjects.56
This passage indeed seems to suggest that aesthetics is the 
domain where the differences among the speculative realists 
are most acutely on display. In addition, Brassier’s juxtaposi-
tion highlights the inverse importance accorded to experience 
(empiricism) on the one hand and the subject (rationalism) on 
the other, thus confirming our labelling of the two opposing 
camps as empiricists and rationalists respectively. Resuming 
our genealogical recovery of the empiricist notion of taste from 
a contemporary point of view, let us emphasise that we spoke 
of a theory of taste in disguise since this traditional expres-
sion is barely ever mentioned in the respective speculative 
realist writings.57 Furthermore, these theories of taste would 
56 Brassier, “Against an Aesthetics of Noise,” n.pag.
57 Morton, while not discussing it in detail, does refer to it in passing several 
times in his latest monograph. Morton, Realist Magic, 77, 89, 131, 168, 201. 
Shaviro in turn discusses taste more extensively, particularly throughout 
the first chapter of his Without Criteria. Shaviro, Without Criteria, 1-16. Both 
treat taste in the context of Kant’s analytic of the beautiful precisely, as al-
ready indicated in our first section, because 1) Kantian judgments of taste 
are not regulated by concepts, and 2) because Kantian judgments of taste are 
disinterested. This moment in the discourse on taste is attractive to these 
thinkers because it seems to offer a potential entryway to things as they are, 
that is, reality itself.
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have to be de-humanised as they apply to the fabric of reality 
as such, not just the realm of the human faculty of judgment. 
It becomes clearer what we are trying to say if we complement 
taste with intuition, sensation, and perception (as it actually 
happened in the history of aesthetics itself, as Baumgarten’s 
aesthetics qua sensuous cognition followed on the heels of 
early British reflections on taste).58 Thus, in Harman’s (and 
Morton’s) object-oriented framework, aesthetics, as manifested 
in the theory of allure, refers to one object tasting, intuiting, 
sensing, perceiving another object; in Grant’s Schellingian 
transcendental naturalism, aesthetics concerns the tasting, 
the intuition of nature’s forces and potencies; and in Sha-
viro’s Whiteheadian cosmology, which he further develops 
in his contribution to this volume, it adequately describes 
the domain of prehension, that is, the domain of relational-
ity per se. For all these thinkers, any encounter whatsoever 
is always the site of aesthetic experience (and the emphasis 
rests on both of these terms equally). In these philosophies, 
aesthetics is other to conceptual knowledge, and prior to it. 
Given the expansion of aesthetics into the non-human realm, 
this is also the moment when aesthetics is pushed from the 
domain of human epistemology into that of general ontol-
ogy. Ceasing to be a particular kind of human relation to the 
world, it becomes a general descriptor of relationality of/in59 
the world. As López argues in his contribution to this volume, 
Gilbert Simondon’s relational ontology has ventured into 
this terrain half a century before the speculative realists. It 
is in exploring that same space, albeit under the banner of a 
substance ontology, that Harman has ventured to call aesthet-
58 One would have to mention Joseph Addison and Richard Steele, The Spectator, 
with Notes, and a General Index, 2 vols. (New York: Printed by Samuel Marks, 
1826), Anthony Ashley Cooper (Third Earl of Shaftesbury), Characteristics of 
Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, ed. Lawrence E. Klein (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), and Francis Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Origin of 
Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, ed. Wolfgang Leidhold (Indianapolis: Liberty 
Fund, 2004), all of which were published between 1711 and 1725 and thus 
well before Baumgarten coined the term “aesthetics” in 1735.
59 The choice of the preposition depends on whether one favours a relational 
ontology (of) or a substance ontology (in).
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ics first philosophy: in this framework, human epistemology 
only builds on and comes after the general aesthetic structure 
of/in being. Indeed, “subjectless experience” underlies and 
comes to determine cognising subjects.
It is this centrality of aesthetic experience that the rationalists 
dispute. They view such a hypostatisation of aesthetic experi-
ence beyond the human realm as illegitimate and unfounded. 
Why use terms such as perception or intuition for describing 
non-human relations? According to the rationalists, this not 
only confuses a very human trait for a trait of reality in gen-
eral; much worse, it actually impedes and hinders the rational 
inquiry into human and non-human relations, just as Jelača 
argues in staging a face-off between Sellars and Deleuze in 
his contribution. Thus, for the rationalists, epistemology qua 
rational inquiry governs and determines aesthetics. By their 
lights, any immediate “tasting” of anything is but a human 
fiction. Consequently, they do not have much to say in this 
regard, as Brassier himself makes unmistakably clear in the 
passage quoted above. All they have to offer for this discourse 
is to call it out for its “irrationalism.”
Our neat dichotomy of rationalists vs. empiricists is too neat, 
though, and needs to be complicated. After all, the advent of 
Kant’s transcendental philosophy separates this older debate 
from everything that came afterwards. Nothing remained 
the same after Kant’s invention of the transcendental. His 
Copernican revolution marks the decisive turning point in 
the history of modern philosophy as it intervenes precisely 
in this debate between rationalism and empiricism. It is in this 
context that Meillassoux’s diagnosis of correlationism, a di-
agnosis all speculative realists agree on, needs to be located. 
As Paul J. Ennis has convincingly shown,60 the charge of 
correlationism is precisely directed against transcendental 
philosophy.61 Thus, we have to add transcendental philosophy 
60 Paul J. Ennis, Continental Realism (Winchester: Zero, 2010).
61 This is also the reason why Meillassoux has ventured to propose the term 
subjectalism as a complement to the earlier correlationism in one of his 
recent essays, Quentin Meillassoux, “Iteration, Reiteration, Repetition: A 
Speculative Analysis of the Meaningless Sign,” http://oursecretblog.com/
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to the mix. What we are witnessing in speculative realism is 
to a large extent a reworking of the transcendental. What all 
of the speculative realists retain from the Kantian invention 
of the transcendental is its immanence.62 All speculative real-
ists are firmly concerned with this world and their respective 
philosophies are thisworldly. What they all reject is Kant’s 
Copernican revolution, which Meillassoux in After Finitude 
denounced as a “Ptolemaic counter-revolution.”63 What is 
rejected is thus the centrality of human experience and its 
conditions of possibility. However, while one part of speculative 
realism particularly rejects the human in human experience, 
the other side rejects precisely the experience. On the one side, 
what results is an ontological recasting of the transcendental 
as it applies to reality per se: a transcendental empiricism 
(Grant, Harman, Morton, Shaviro); on the other side, we have 
an epistemological account of the powers of human thought 
to pierce this very same reality: a transcendental rational-
ism (Brassier, Meillassoux). As such, both of these strains of 
thought are to a certain extent already present in Kant. This 
is why Kant, harking back to the very beginning of this article, 
is both speculative realism’s worst enemy and best friend.
With respect to aesthetics, we could also recast this divide 
in terms of Badiou’s tripartite division discussed above. In 
this vein, the transcendental empiricist camp of speculative 
txt/QMpaperApr12.pdf (accessed October 24, 2013). A revised version is 
forthcoming in Genealogies of Speculation: Materialism and Subjectivity since 
Structuralism, ed. Armen Avanessian and Suhail Malik (London: Bloomsbury, 
2015). The neologism serves to recuperate and subsume within his sweep-
ing critique both idealist and vitalist philosophies whose point of origin 
Meillassoux ultimately traces to the pre-transcendental idealism of Berkeley.
62 Already Gilles Deleuze acknowledged and emphasised this point in his 
own critique of Kant: “Kant is the one who discovers the prodigious domain 
of the transcendental. He is the analogue of a great explorer—not of another 
world, but of the upper or lower reaches of this one.” Gilles Deleuze, Difference 
and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (London: Continuum, 2004), 171.
63 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 119. It is perhaps worth noting that this is not 
Meillassoux’s coinage and has been in use at least since Bertrand Russell’s 
original publication of Human Knowledge in 1948. See Bertrand Russell, Hu-
man Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits (London: Routledge, 2009), 1. Of course, 
discussions of Kant’s “revolution” date to even earlier.
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realism would be engaged in a radical reworking of the Ba-
diouian romantic schema, while the transcendental rationalist 
camp could be said to either propose a renewal of the clas-
sical schema or a development of Badiou’s own inaesthetics. 
The lack of publications that explicitly take up aesthetics 
makes it difficult to assess Brassier and Meillassoux on this 
point. Risking a judgment, it seems to us that Brassier could 
be said to endorse the classical schema, while Meillassoux 
seems to be more in line with Badiou. Admittedly, we are on 
very thin ice here. These diagnoses are based on Brassier’s 
rejection of the category of experience on the one hand, and 
Meillassoux’s following remarks from “Iteration, Reiteration, 
Repetition” on the other:
My materialism is so far from being hostile to empiricism, that in fact 
it aims to found the absolute necessity of the latter. My only disagree-
ment with the empiricist is that I affirm that he [sic] is absolutely correct: 
If you want to know or think what is, you must necessarily (from my 
point of view) do so by way of a certain regime of experience: scientific 
experimentation (the sciences of nature), historical and sociological 
experience, but also literary and artistic experience, etc. And here, my 
role is to prevent a certain philosophical regime from contesting the 
sovereignty of those “disciplines of experience” I have enumerated.64
Meillassoux, like Badiou, defends the disciplines’ autonomy 
both from one another and from philosophy. As a result, it 
seems to us that Meillassoux should be sympathetic to Ba-
diou’s inaesthetics project. Also, note that while Meillassoux 
thus carves out a space of truth pertaining to art, this space 
remains purely empirical—it is given (“what is”) and thus a 
manifestation of facticity. Meillassoux, however, is interested 
in founding the absolute necessity of the contingency of such 
facts—the “speculative essence” or “factiality” of facticity 
which itself is not a fact.65 This is why Meillassoux is not 
an empiricist. It is also the reason why he is not that much 
64 Meillassoux, “Iteration, Reiteration, Repetition,” 12, original emphases.
65 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 79.
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interested in art.66 He is happy to leave discussions about art 
to the experts in the respective “disciplines of experience,” 
that is, aesthetics and theory of art. 
This is consistent with the fact that Meillassoux just pub-
lished an extensive reading of Mallarmé’s Coup de dés: the 
truth of the poem is intrinsic to literary (or artistic) practice, 
but this intrinsic truth it produces is indicative of another, 
philosophical, truth—and this is where Meillassoux’s interest 
lies. According to Meillassoux, Badiou reads the uncertainty 
and hesitation in Mallarmé’s poem as congruous with his 
own notion of the event. In this vein, the word “perhaps” as 
employed in the poem points to a future to come, “awaiting a 
truth that would come to complete it in the same time as abol-
ish it, replacing its hypotheticity with an effective certitude.”67 
Meillassoux thinks that this leads to “devaluing or relativizing 
the interest of [Mallarmé’s] poetry” as it integrates and cuts 
down to size the function of the “perhaps,” which, accord-
ing to Meillassoux’s own reading, lies in its hypostatisation: 
the absolutisation of chance.68 Such diagnosis, of course, is 
not very far from Meillassoux’s “necessity of contingency” 
thesis—hence his interest in Coup de dés.69 In the context of 
66 The same holds true of Meillassoux’s relation to the sciences—this goes 
a long way towards explaining the lack of actual scientific discourse in 
After Finitude despite its initial appeal to the sciences in its discussion of 
the arche-fossil.
67 Quentin Meillassoux, “Badiou and Mallarmé: The Event and the Perhaps,” 
trans. Alley Edlebi, Parrhesia (2013), 16, 38.
68 Ibid., 38.
69 How the aesthetic is to be situated in relation to contingency in Meil-
lassoux’s overall philosophical system is hinted at in the excerpts from 
L’inexistence divine included in Harman’s study of Meillassoux. There, Meil-
lassoux employs the notion of beauty as the indicator of the justness of a 
possible future world of justice and thus, in Kantian fashion, inextricably ties 
the aesthetic to the moral. Where in Kant the experience of beauty parades 
the world before our eyes “as if [it] had been created in conformance with 
… moral ends” and thus opens up the possibility of God, in Meillassoux, as-
suming that a perfect just world were incarnate at some future point in time, 
it would—in accordance with his principle of unreason and the necessity 
of contingency—reveal “the emergence without reason of an accord between 
reason and the real.” The experience of beauty would thus be an indicator 
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our discussion, what is remarkable in Meillassoux’s account 
is that he castigates Badiou for not being faithful enough 
to the truth of the poem, that is, for failing to live up to his 
own inaesthetics. Meillassoux then proceeds to out-Badiou 
Badiou himself. 
A similar picture to that drawn from Badiou’s tripartite 
classification of aesthetic discourse emerges from Kern and 
Sonderegger’s introductory survey. When Kern and Sondereg-
ger contest both the notion that aesthetics is the “only true 
philosophy” and the idea that it is but philosophy’s servant,70 
they reject the romantic and classical schemata of art. In turn, 
their recasting of aesthetics as metaphilosophical could pos-
sibly even be seen as a reworking of the didactic schema as 
aesthetics thus provides philosophy with the mirror to observe 
itself as it is engaged in its epistemic project.71 If we take these 
recent trends into account, it seems that Badiou’s diagnosis 
of the death of the three aesthetic schemata is ill-fated as all 
three seem to be well and alive. A Badiouian might of course 
maintain that these strands are helplessly lost as they are 
caught in their dead ends and that only a proper inaesthetics 
provides the royal road of escape. Whatever the repercus-
sions, it seems to be clear that speculative realism is divided 
between a retrieval (in the Harmanian sense elaborated in 
his contribution to this issue) of romantic aesthetics and its 
complete dismissal (Brassier); or, minimally, a profuse lack 
of interest towards it (Meillassoux). 
of the contingency of justice incarnate, and only a world that offers this 
experience would be a just world. Quentin Meillassoux, “Excerpts from 
L’inexistence divine,” trans. Graham Harman in Quentin Meillassoux: Philosophy 
in the Making by Graham Harman (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2011), 218-19, original emphasis.
70 Kern and Sonderegger, “Einleitung,” 8-9.
71 It is telling that Kern and Sonderegger do not have a word to say about 
ontology and only evoke ethics (practical philosophy as concerned with the 
good) and epistemology (theoretical philosophy as concerned with truth) 
as the other central disciplines of philosophy besides aesthetics. Equating 
theoretical philosophy with epistemology, their understanding of philosophy 
is very much in line with twentieth century’s anti-metaphysical outlook. 
Philosophy is indeed reduced to an epistemic project.
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The speculative realist retrieval of romantic aesthetics as 
expounded by its transcendental empiricist wing also goes a 
long way towards explaining the lack of an explicit discourse 
on politics. A short juxtaposition with Rancière’s position 
should prove illuminating in this respect. From the point of 
view of the speculative realist retrieval of romanticism, Ran-
cière’s socio-political notion of the distribution of the sensible 
has to be recast in metaphysical terms. It is due to speculative 
realism’s larger metaphysical outlook that aesthetics becomes 
divorced from the political; or, rather, the political becomes 
just one tiny field within being where the aesthetic plays out 
and politics can thus not assume a central role in its deter-
mination. Against advocates of a politics of being who argue 
for an inherently political structure of being and thus might 
object to such an argument, we agree with the speculative 
realists that politics needs some rudimentary form of polis 
to take place, and a mere congeries of things—what object-
oriented thinkers call Latour Litanies—does not make a polis. 
Thus, distribution has to be recast as a neutral ontological, not 
partial socio-political activity (or occurrence; or process—pick 
your favourite term). 
With this observation, we have reached the end of our short 
foray into the historical and systematic ramifications of the 
contemporary aesthetic landscape. As a means to conclude 
this survey, let us return once more to the heyday of aesthetics 
that started with Kant and continued through all of German 
Idealism. We have stated that speculative realism in large parts 
amounts to a retrieval of just this tradition, an argument that 
Cogburn and Ohm present in much more detail in their Whig 
history of speculative realism, which serves to introduce their 
own concerns with truth and fiction in their contribution to 
this special issue. In this vein, aesthetics in the twenty-first 
century, at least in its speculative guise, amounts to either a 
radical reworking of German Idealism (the speculative realist 
transcendental empiricists) or it amounts to nothing much at 
all (the speculative realist transcendental rationalists). Strik-
ingly, the latter position comes close to Jens Kulenkampff’s 
diagnosis in his contribution to Falsche Gegensätze. Having 
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dismissed both Kant’s and Hegel’s metaphysical commitments 
as obsolete, Kulenkampff closes his essay with the following 
provocative remark:
European aesthetics before Kant is in truth but a prehistory to philo-
sophical aesthetics, and philosophical aesthetics from Hegel onwards 
is nothing but a variant of either Kantian or Hegelian aesthetics. If, 
however, Kant and Hegel are no longer available as reference figures 
for a philosophical aesthetics, then aesthetics might indeed survive as a 
sub-discipline within academic philosophy, and the label “Philosophi-
cal Aesthetics” continue to exist, but a philosophical aesthetics worthy 
of the name is long dead.72
Contra Kulenkampff (and contra the transcendental rationalist 
wing of speculative realism), however, speculative realism’s 
transcendental empiricists testify to the ongoing relevance 
of the Kantian and post-Kantian tradition as can be witnessed 
in their central reworking of the transcendental and the im-
portance of figures such as Schelling and Kant himself. Let 
us be clear on this point, then, and state it as succinctly as 
possible: speculative aesthetics in the twenty-first century is 
German Idealism redux.
72 Jens Kulenkampff, “Metaphysik und Ästhetik: Kant zum Beispiel” in 
Falsche Gegensätze, 80, our translation.
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Non-Phenomenological Thought
Steven Shaviro
Wayne State University
Quentin Meillassoux, who invented the term correlationism, initially defines it as “the idea 
according to which we only ever have access to the correla-
tion between thinking and being, and never to either term 
considered apart from the other.”1 This would seem at first to 
be an entirely symmetrical formulation. Subject and object, 
or more generally thought and being, are regarded by the 
correlationist as mutually co-constituting and co-dependent: 
“not only does it become necessary to insist that we never 
grasp an object in itself, in isolation from its relation to the 
subject, but it also becomes necessary to maintain that we 
can never grasp a subject that would not always-already be 
related to an object.”2 Described in this manner, the correla-
tion would seem to move indifferently in either direction, 
from thinking to being or from being to thinking.
However, this turns out not to be the case. Meillassoux’s 
formulation is not symmetrical or reversible, but rather 
unidirectional. When thought and being are correlated, 
thought is always the active and relational term, the one that 
actually performs the correlation. Being, on the other hand, 
just is; this makes it the dumb and passive term, the one that 
merely suffers being apprehended by, and thereby correlated 
to, some sort of consciousness or subjectivity outside of itself. 
1 Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, 
trans. Ray Brassier (New York: Continuum, 2008), 5.
2 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 5. 
Steven Shaviro – Non-Phenomenological Thought
41
In other words, subjectivity implies intentionality: which is to 
say, a primordial orientation towards an object beyond itself. 
Objectivity, in contrast, is supposed to be able to stand alone. 
In Meillassoux’s account, thought always refers to being, 
while being in itself remains indifferent to thought. Think-
ing per se is correlational, insofar as it necessarily implies a 
“relation-to-the-world.” Anti-correlationism therefore comes 
to be equated with positing “an absolute that is at once ex-
ternal to thought and in itself devoid of all subjectivity.”3 We 
can only escape correlationism by affirming “the pure and 
simple death, with neither consciousness nor life, without 
any subjectivity whatsoever, that is represented by the state 
of inorganic matter.”4
In his critique of correlationism, therefore, Meillassoux 
seems very nearly obsessed with purging thought and subjec-
tivity altogether from the universe of things. In order to step 
outside of the self-confirming “correlationist circle,” Meillas-
soux says, we need to step outside of thought altogether.5 We 
must reach a position “which takes seriously the possibility 
that there is nothing living or willing in the inorganic realm,” 
and for which “absolute reality is an entity without thought.”6 
Beyond the correlation, existence is “totally a-subjective.”7 If 
“ancestral” reality does not exist for us, this is because it does 
not exist in thought at all: it is “anterior to givenness” and 
refuses any sort of “manifestation” whatsoever.8
For Meillassoux, correlationism, no less than naive com-
mon sense, begins with a radical “decision”: the assertion 
“of the essential inseparability of the act of thinking from 
its content.” Once this decision has been made, it is already 
3 Quentin Meillassoux, “Iteration, Reiteration, Repetition: A Speculative 
Analysis of the Meaningless Sign,” talk at Freie Universität Berlin, 20 April 
2012, oursecretblog.com/txt/QMpaperApr12.pdf (accessed 11 April, 2013), 2.
4 Meillassoux, “Iteration,” 6, original emphasis.
5 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 5.
6 Ibid., 38, 36.
7 Ibid., 38.
8 Ibid., 14.
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too late: “all we ever engage with is what is given-to-thought, 
never an entity subsisting by itself.”9 Meillassoux, as Graham 
Harman has noted, takes seriously the sophism according 
to which thinking of something means transforming that 
something into an object of thought. The paradoxical task of 
speculative philosophy, for Meillassoux, is therefore to think 
against the very “decision” that inaugurates thought. The aim 
is to attain a thought that turns back upon and erases itself. 
Meillassoux seeks to operate the dialectical reversal by means 
of which “thought has become able to think a world that can 
dispense with thought, a world that is essentially unaffected 
by whether or not anyone thinks it.”10
Such a position can easily be aligned with scientific reduc-
tionism or eliminativism. Meillassoux argues that “empirical 
science is today capable of producing statements about events 
anterior to the advent of life as well as consciousness.”11 That 
is to say, science literally and objectively presents us with a 
reality that cannot be in any way correlated with thought: a 
world that is “anterior to givenness itself” and “prior to givenness 
in its entirety.”12 Empirical science and mathematics intimate 
to us “a world crammed with things and events that are not 
the correlates of any manifestation, a world that is not the 
correlate of a relation to the world.” The “primary qualities” 
disclosed by science are entirely nonrelational, and not for 
us.13 Meillassoux therefore claims that “the mathematization 
of nature” performed by the physical sciences allows us, as 
other modes of understanding do not, “to know what may be 
while we are not ... What is mathematizable cannot be reduced 
to a correlate of thought.”14 Indeed, “all those aspects of the 
object that can be formulated in mathematical terms can be 
meaningfully conceived as properties of the object in itself” 
9 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 36.
10 Ibid., 116.
11 Ibid., 9.
12 Ibid., 20-21.
13 Ibid., 26, 1.
14 Ibid., 115, 117.
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rather than being “secondary qualities” that are added to the 
object by our own mental activity in perceiving it.15
I would like to compare this, for a moment, with Ray 
Brassier’s position. Brassier, much like Meillassoux, rejects 
the privilege that traditional philosophy has accorded to 
subjectivity, experience, and thought. And Brassier, again 
like Meillassoux, turns to the physical sciences as a way to 
escape from correlationism. But where Meillassoux takes 
correlationist logic seriously, and thinks that he can only 
defeat it by emptying it out from within, Brassier is altogether 
dismissive of this logic. Brassier scornfully denounces what 
he describes as the “fatal non-sequitur at the root of every 
variant of correlationism”: its slippage from the “trivially 
true” claim “that my thoughts cannot exist independently of 
my mind” to the entirely unsupported claim “that what my 
thoughts are about cannot exist independently of my mind.”16 
To the contrary, Brassier argues, thought never coincides 
with its intentional content; it never corresponds with the 
thing that it is about. Correlationism is therefore ludicrous a 
priori. Indeed, Brassier insists that “thought is not guaranteed 
access to being; being is not inherently thinkable”; we live 
in “a world that is not designed to be intelligible and is not 
originarily infused with meaning.”17 Consequently, there is 
always a “gap,” or a “discrepancy,” between “what our concept 
of the object is and what the object is in itself.”18
This very gap or discrepancy grounds Brassier’s robust and 
thoroughgoing scientism. Neither science nor metaphysics 
can overcome the non-coincidence between things themselves, 
and the ways that these things are represented in our thought. 
But for Brassier, even philosophies that affirm this funda-
mental non-coincidence—like that, most notably, of Gilles 
15 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 3.
16 Ray Brassier, “Concepts and Objects” in The Speculative Turn: Continental 
Materialism and Realism, ed. Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek, and Graham Harman 
(Melbourne: Re.press, 2010), 63.
17 Ibid., 47.
18 Ibid., 55.
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Deleuze—remain idealist and correlationist, to the extent that 
they posit this originary difference as a difference for thought 
itself.19 Against this, Brassier’s “transcendental realism” makes 
the case that this inevitable difference—the one between a 
concept and that to which it refers—can never be conceptu-
alised itself, but itself always remains nonconceptual.20 For 
science, Brassier says, “the reality of the object determines the 
meaning of its conception”; whereas metaphysics argues the 
reverse.21 The difference of reality from how it is thought “is at 
once determining for thought and irreducible to thinking.”22 
Science, therefore—unlike metaphysics—actually “allows the 
discrepancy between that reality and the way in which it is 
conceptually circumscribed to be measured.”23 The world is 
meaningless; but through science “it is possible to understand 
the meaninglessness of existence.”24 That is to say, science is 
able to understand this meaninglessness without turning 
it into yet another source of meaning. For Brassier, “this 
capacity to understand meaning as a regional or bounded 
phenomenon marks a fundamental progress in cognition.”25
Through the progress of scientific knowledge, therefore, 
thought is increasingly compelled to recognise its own ir-
relevance and impotence. Once it is no longer correlated 
to being, “thought becomes the locus for the identity of 
absolute objectivity and impersonal death.”26 This means 
that scientific knowledge, achieved through thought, leads 
ultimately to the extinction of thought—or, more precisely, 
19 Ray Brassier, Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillian, 2007), 203.
20 Ibid., 118.
21 Brassier, “Concepts and Objects,” 55.
22 Ibid., 203.
23 Ibid., 55.
24 Ray Brassier, “I am a nihilist because I still believe in truth,” Kronos (2011), 
http://www.kronos.org.pl/index.php?23151,896 (accessed September 17, 2013), 
original emphasis.
25 Ibid.
26 Brassier, Nihil Unbound, 204.
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to thought’s recognition of its own extinction. Not only is 
the philosopher mortal; “the subject of philosophy must 
also recognize that he or she is already dead.”27 When “the 
absence of correlation” itself becomes “an object of thought,” 
it thereby “transforms thought itself into an object,” so that 
“extinction indexes the thought of the absence of thought.”28 
For Brassier, the consequence of rejecting correlationism is 
to confront a universe that is not only irreducible to thought, 
but fatally inimical to thought.
The contrast between Brassier and Meillassoux is telling. 
Brassier sees critical and rational thought—embodied in 
mathematics and science—as inevitably precipitating its own 
demise. Meillassoux, in contrast, recruits positivistic science 
and mathematical formalisation in order to turn them op-
portunistically against thought. That is to say, mathematical 
formalisation is not really the last word for him. Indeed, science 
and mathematics are arguably not important to Meillassoux 
at all. The physical sciences give Meillassoux the argument 
that ancestral objects exist, prior to any sort of manifestation 
for a subject. And Cantor’s theory of transfinites provides the 
basis for his demonstration (following Badiou) that the set of 
possible future events does not constitute a totality and there-
fore cannot be understood probabilistically. But once these 
arguments have been established, science and mathematics 
no longer play a crucial role. Meillassoux himself concedes (or 
more accurately, boasts) that his own speculative materialism 
“says nothing as to the factual being of our world.”29 When 
Meillassoux praises Badiou for “us[ing] mathematics itself 
to effect a liberation from the limits of calculatory reason,” 
he is saying something that applies even more fully to his 
own philosophy.30
Indeed, Meillassoux’s major claim—that the “laws of na-
ture” are entirely contingent, and that at any time they “could 
27 Brassier, Nihil Unbound, 239, my emphasis.
28 Ibid., 229-30.
29 Meillassoux, “Iteration,” 13.
30 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 103.
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actually change for no reason”—would seem to undermine 
scientific rationality altogether.31 Science cannot work without 
assuming the validity of relations of cause and effect—which 
is to say, without some degree of confidence or faith (however 
attenuated) in the “principle of sufficient reason” that Meil-
lassoux rejects.32 We can therefore conclude that Meillassoux 
does not embrace mathematisation because it helps to give us 
scientifically valid and objective (non-correlational) results. 
Rather, the point of mathematisation for Meillassoux is to 
get rid of subjective experience altogether, by giving us an 
account of nature “stripped of its sensible qualities.”33 The 
point is to abstract the world away from everything that our 
minds might add to it. This is why Meillassoux is so con-
cerned with reinstating Descartes’ doctrine of primary and 
secondary qualities, in order to separate the former from the 
latter. Meillassoux admits “those aspects of the object that 
can give rise to a mathematical thought (to a formula or to 
digitization),” while rejecting those that give rise, instead, “to 
a perception or sensation.”34
Today, scientistic eliminativism no longer uses the terminol-
ogy of “primary” and “secondary” qualities. But it still seeks 
to dismiss subjective impressions as illusory, and to explain 
them as mere effects of underlying physical processes. Daniel 
Dennett tells us, for instance, that “qualia,” or the intrinsic 
phenomenal characteristics of subjective experience, do 
not really exist.35 The only real difference between Dennett 
and Brassier is that Dennett refuses to follow through and 
acknowledge the radically nihilistic vision of extinction that 
Brassier rightly deduces as the inevitable consequence of 
scientistic reductionism and the bifurcation of nature.
But Meillassoux—unlike Brassier, and unlike most analytic 
31 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 84.
32 Ibid., 60 et passim.
33 Ibid., 124.
34 Ibid., 3.
35 Daniel Dennett, “Quining Qualia,” http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/dennett/
papers/quinqual.htm (accessed September 17, 2013).
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philosophers of science—is not interested in demystifying and 
naturalising our theories of mind, nor in reducing subjectivity 
to its ostensible microphysical causes. He rejects what he calls 
“naturalism,” or the grounding of philosophy upon a “state 
of science that has no more reason to be thought definitive 
today than it did yesterday.”36 Far more radically, Meillassoux 
seeks to achieve a total purgation of thought from being. In 
other words, Meillassoux does not value the physical sciences 
and mathematics for their own sakes, but only because—and 
to the extent that—they allow us to reject the categories of 
subjectivity and experience. Science and mathematics, in 
other words, are tools that Meillassoux uses in order to get 
rid of phenomenology. Where Nietzsche fears that we are 
not getting rid of God because we still believe in grammar, 
Meillassoux fears that we are not getting rid of correlationism 
because we still believe in phenomenal experience.
But do we really need to eliminate experience, and sentience, 
in order to get away from correlationism? The problem, I think, 
is with the asymmetry that I have been discussing. Consider 
another one of Meillassoux’s formulations. The problem 
with correlationism, he says, is that “we never, according to 
this type of philosophy, have access to any intended thing 
(understood in the most general sense) that is not always-
already correlated to an act of thinking (understood, again, 
in the most general sense).”37 What I would like to do is to try 
a small experiment. I will invert Meillassoux’s statement, in 
order to create a complementary proposition, as follows: the 
problem with correlationism is that we never, according to 
this type of philosophy, have any act of thinking (understood 
in the most general sense) that is not always-already corre-
lated with access to an intended thing (understood, again, in 
the most general sense). But we cannot imagine Meillassoux 
saying any such thing. This is because he has already defined 
“access” and “correlation” as operations of thought, and of 
thought alone.
36 Meillassoux, “Iteration,” 11.
37 Ibid., 2.
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This is why the particular pretensions of human thought 
have (justifiably) been the target of speculative realist critique. 
And yet, in the very act of rejecting one side of the Cartesian 
duality, we have tended to reaffirm the other side. Nobody 
believes in res cogitans any longer, but we largely continue 
to accept Descartes’ characterisation of res extensa. Despite 
the admonitions of Henri Bergson, Alfred North Whitehead, 
Deleuze, and (today) Jane Bennett, our default ontology still 
insists that, in the absence of transcendent mind, the world 
is composed of nothing but passive, inert, and indifferent 
matter. Whitehead calls this the “misconception” of “vacuous 
actuality, devoid of subjective experience.”38 Such a doctrine 
of “vacuous actuality” lies behind much analytic philosophy, 
as well as behind Meillassoux’s and Brassier’s assumption 
that the “great outdoors” must be entirely devoid of life and 
thought. And, despite Harman’s rejection of “undermining” 
reductionism and of “smallism,” he still echoes this logic 
when he declares that objects only “have psyches accidentally, 
not in their own right.”39
Meillassoux’s purgation of subjectivity and experience al-
lows him to posit an altogether different notion of thought. 
For Meillassoux, true philosophical thought has no empirical 
basis whatsoever, and no relation to the body. It has no ties to 
sensibility or to affect. Rather, this thought is purely rational 
and theoretical; it provides us with a “veritable intellectual 
intuition of the absolute.”40 In order to be extricated from 
correlationism, thought must achieve an entirely exceptional 
status. It must be absolutely disconnected from the physical 
world. In accordance with this, Meillassoux claims that thought 
cannot be grounded in physical matter, nor even in life. Not 
only must we reject the panpsychist claim that thought is an 
38 Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York: The Free Press, 
1978), 29.
39 Graham Harman, “Intentional Objects for Nonhumans,” talk at Pour une 
approche non-anthropologique de la subjectivité conference, 18 November 
2008, http://www.europhilosophie.eu/recherche/IMG/pdf/intentional-objects.
pdf (accessed September 17, 2013).
40 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 82, original emphasis.
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inherent quality of matter, we also cannot explain the origin 
of thought, or its seeming greater complexity as we move from 
single-celled organisms to human beings, in continuist or 
evolutionary terms. Rather, Meillassoux separates thought 
from life as radically as he separates life from nonliving 
matter. He claims that human beings acquired thought ex 
nihilo, for no reason, without any prior basis, and out of sheer 
contingency.41 Meillassoux celebrates the sheer gratuitousness 
of a mode of thought that is non-experiential, and beyond 
any correlation with being. This thought becomes the basis 
for a new sort of hyper-Platonism: “humans acquire value 
because they know the eternal ... Value belongs to the act of 
knowing itself; humans have value not because of what they 
know but because they know.”42
More recently, Meillassoux has refined his analysis; he 
now modifies his formulations from After Finitude by more 
clearly distinguishing what he calls subjectalism, which in-
cludes vitalism, from correlationism strictu sensu.43 Where 
correlationism disallows the absolute, subjectalism is the 
philosophy that Meillassoux characterised in After Finitude 
as “absolutizing the correlation.”44 Life, thought, or some 
other subjective term becomes the new absolute. Meillas-
soux claims that, in subjectalism, “thought thinks thought 
as the absolute.”45 According to Meillassoux, the claim of 
subjectalism is that “we always experience subjectivity as a 
necessary, and hence eternal, principle from which no one 
can escape.”46 But is not Meillassoux still wrongly assuming 
that any such subjective term is necessarily both intentional/
(cor)relational, and unified rather than plural or multiple? 
41 Quentin Meillassoux, “Excerpts from L’inexistence divine,” trans. Graham 
Harman in Quentin Meillassoux: Philosophy in the Making by Graham Harman 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011), 175-238. 
42 Ibid., 211.
43 Meillassoux, “Iteration,” 3.
44 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 60.
45 Meillassoux, “Iteration,” 3-4.
46 Ibid., 8.
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Meillassoux is wrong to maintain that, in so-called subjectal-
ism, “everything is uniformly subject, will, creative becoming, 
image-movement, etc.”47
It is because he assumes the identity of thought with inten-
tionality that Meillassoux does not even dismiss, but altogether 
ignores, the prospect of uncorrelated thought. For Meillassoux, 
thought in its essence is relational or correlational, while 
mere being need not be. To do away with correlationism then 
means to eliminate all thinking about the object, in order to 
allow the object just to be, in and of itself. Heidegger’s sense 
of being as unveiling is maintained, even as his ruminations 
on the co-appurtenance of thought and being are rejected. A 
non-correlated entity is not manifested to any consciousness 
whatsoever. It “withdraws” from contact, and escapes any 
possibility of being captured by thought. For Harman and 
Meillassoux alike, the “great outdoors,” the world beyond 
correlation, can therefore only consist in a-subjective objects. 
Meillassoux simply takes for granted the phenomenological 
doctrine of intentionality: thinking is always about something.
We might say, therefore, that Meillassoux’s entire program 
is to enforce, as radically and stringently as possible, the 
very “bifurcation of nature” that Whitehead denounced as 
the most serious error of modern Western thought.48 For 
Whitehead, the bifurcation of nature arises precisely out of 
the very distinction that Meillassoux seeks to rehabilitate in 
the opening pages of After Finitude: the Cartesian and Lockean 
distinction between “primary” and “secondary” qualities.49 
The bifurcation of nature consists in radically separating 
sensory experience from the physical causes that generate that 
experience. Thus, Whitehead says, we divide “the perceived 
redness and warmth of the fire” on the one hand, from “the 
agitated molecules of carbon and oxygen” and “the radiant 
47 Meillassoux, “Iteration,” 15.
48 Alfred North Whitehead, The Concept of Nature (Amherst: Prometheus 
Books, 2004), 26-48.
49 Ibid., 27; Meillassoux, After Finitude, 1-3.
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energy from them” on the other.50 The first is said to be a 
subjective illusion, while only the second is objectively real.
But at this point in Meillassoux’s analysis, there is a slight, yet 
crucial, slippage. Meillassoux claims that a non-correlationist 
philosophy—or what he also calls “speculative material-
ism”—rejects “the closure of thought upon itself” and instead 
“acced[es] to an absolute that is at once external to thought 
and in itself devoid of all subjectivity.”51 The slippage comes 
in the way that Meillassoux implicitly moves from an object, 
or a world, that is independent of anything that our subjec-
tivity imposes upon it, to one that is also devoid of thought 
in itself, devoid of any subjectivity of its own. The objects 
that are not correlated with our thought must also, in and of 
themselves, “have no subjective-psychological, egoic, sensible 
or vital traits whatsoever.”52 Meillassoux “absolutizes the pure 
non-subjective—the pure and simple death, with neither 
consciousness nor life, without any subjectivity whatsoever, 
that is represented by the state of inorganic matter.”53 This 
slippage in Meillassoux’s account would seem to result from 
the assumption that thought and subjectivity are exclusively 
human attributes.
I want to suggest that this one-sidedness is not really justi-
fied. The derogation of thought in Meillassoux and Brassier 
is itself a reaction against older ideas. Correlationism itself 
has generally assumed, not just the co-dependency of thought 
and world, or of subject and object, but also the priority of 
the former element of each pair over the latter. It has always 
taken for granted the supremacy of the mental, or the prior-
ity of the act of perception over the things perceived. We can 
trace this tendency back, beyond Kant’s transcendental logic, 
to our very habit of (in the words of Whitehead) “decisively 
separating ‘mind’ from ‘nature,’ a modern separation which 
50 Whitehead, The Concept of Nature, 32.
51 Meillassoux, “Iteration,” 2.
52 Ibid., 2.
53 Ibid., 6.
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found its first exemplification in Cartesian dualism.”54 Ever 
since Descartes, we “moderns” (to use this term in the manner 
suggested by Bruno Latour) have divided the world between 
mentalities, which actively think and perceive (res cogitans), 
and bits of matter in homogeneous space, which make up the 
passive objects of all their acts of perception (res extensa).55 
The speculative realist rejection of the privileges of thought 
is therefore a necessary, and unsurprising, reaction against 
the traditional modernist and humanist exaltation of thought. 
There are few philosophers today who would actually accept 
Cartesian substance dualism; yet the legacy of this dualism 
still persists in our everyday “common sense” approach to 
the world.
In order to get away from this deadlock, we need to recognise 
that thought is not, after all, an especially human privilege. 
This is one of the driving insights behind panpsychism. Also, 
recent biological research indicates that something much like 
thinking—an experiential sensitivity, at the very least—goes on 
in such entities as trees, slime mould, and bacteria, even though 
none of these organisms have brains. I have also mentioned 
George Molnar’s claim that even inanimate things display a 
sort of “intentionality.” If things have powers (or dispositional 
properties) at all, as Molnar argues that they do, then by this 
very fact they exhibit a certain aboutness.56 Salt has the power 
to be dissolved in water; and this is a real property of the salt, 
even if it never encounters water, and therefore never actually 
gets dissolved. A kind of intentional orientation, or prospect 
of “aboutness,” exists even in the absence of any actual cor-
relation between subject and object. For all these reasons, we 
can draw the conclusion that thought is not as grandiose, or 
as unique, as Cartesianism and correlationism have led us to 
54 Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas (New York: The Free Press, 
1967), 210.
55 Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, trans. Catherine Porter (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).
56 George Molnar, Powers: A Study in Metaphysics (New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2007), 72.
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suppose. We should reject both the inflated, idealist notion 
of thought, and the “misconception” of “vacuous actuality” 
which is all that remains behind, once thought has been 
evacuated.57 We need to affirm values, meanings, and thought, 
but see these in a deflationary way.
What is the alternative to the “misconception” denounced 
by Whitehead? I do not wish to embrace outright idealism 
any more than I wish to return to correlationism. Nor can 
I imagine simply inverting Meillassoux’s formula of being 
without thought into some notion of thought without being—
since I have little idea of what this latter phrase could possibly 
mean. But I still maintain that if, in spite of the paradoxes of 
reference, we can posit “an object in itself, in isolation from 
its relation to the subject,” standing apart from whatever we 
might think about it, then we should also be able to posit a 
non-correlational subject, one that “would not always-already 
be related to an object,” but would instead exist independently 
of any object whatsoever.58 In order to do this, we need to 
grasp thinking in a different way; we need, as Deleuze might 
put it, a new “image of thought.”59
This new image of thought would maintain that aisthesis, or 
precognitive feeling, precedes noesis, or cognitive apprehen-
sion. In Whitehead’s language, “sense-reception” is more basic 
than “sense-perception.”60 In sense-reception, Whitehead 
says, “the sensa are the definiteness of emotion: they are 
emotional forms transmitted from occasion to occasion.”61 
This means that “sensa”—Whitehead’s term for what today are 
more commonly called “qualia”—are felt noncognitively, as 
singular aesthetic impressions. They are not referred beyond 
themselves, and do not have the status of representations. 
Particular things are not understood and identified as such. 
57 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 29.
58 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 5.
59 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1994), 129-67.
60 Whitehead, Process, 113.
61 Ibid., 114.
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Rather, under these conditions, “the feeling is blind and the 
relevance is vague.”62 It is only in some rare and subsequent 
instances of what Whitehead calls “adequate complexity” 
that these bursts of feeling are transmuted into cognitions, 
so that sense-reception is supplemented by sense-perception 
as it is commonly understood.63
In his first of his two Cinema volumes, Deleuze proposes a 
contrast, arising in the very heart of modernity, between two 
crucial images of thought. He writes of the “historical crisis 
of psychology” that arose at the turn from the nineteenth to 
the twentieth century, at the very moment of the invention 
of cinema.64 The crisis concerned the relation between mind 
and body, or between thought and matter; it had to do with 
the “duality of image and movement, of consciousness and 
thing.”65 Everyone recognised that this dualism had come to 
a “dead end.”66 Everyone realised that, as William James put 
it at the time, “there is only one primal stuff or material in 
the world, a stuff of which everything is composed.”67 This 
meant, James went on, that “consciousness ... does not denote 
a special stuff or way of being.” Indeed, James concludes 
that “thoughts in the concrete are made of the same stuff as 
things are.”68 But how can we render this identity? Deleuze 
does not cite James directly in his account of philosophical 
psychology. But he notes that efforts were made by “two very 
different authors,” Husserl and Bergson, “to overcome” the 
“duality” of thought and matter.69 “Each had his own war cry: 
62 Whitehead, Process, 163.
63 Ibid., 113-14.
64 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press), 56.
65 Ibid., 56.
66 Ibid., 56.
67 William James, Essays in Radical Empiricism (Lincoln: University of Ne-
braska Press), 4.
68 Ibid., 25, 37.
69 Deleuze, Cinema 1, 56.
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all consciousness is consciousness of something (Husserl), or 
more strongly, all consciousness is something (Bergson).”70
The first of these solutions leads to a phenomenological 
aesthetics: one that is concerned with sensible experience “as 
an embodied and meaningful existential activity.”71 Phenom-
enological criticism not only works to overcome the duality 
of Kant’s two senses of aesthetics; it also effectively counters 
the excessively formalist and cognitivist tendencies both of 
much twentieth century modernism and avant-gardism, and 
of late-twentieth century structuralist approaches to aesthet-
ics. It returns aesthetics from conceptual and epistemologi-
cal concerns back to the lived reality of the flesh. However, 
the price that phenomenological aesthetics pays for these 
achievements is to remain embedded within correlationism.
But Deleuze, following Bergson’s alternative, offers an anti-
phenomenological account of consciousness. As Deleuze 
puts it elsewhere, “it is not enough to say that consciousness 
is consciousness of something”;72 rather, we must reach the 
point where “consciousness ceases to be a light cast upon 
objects in order to become a pure phosphorescence of things 
in themselves.”73 Deleuze’s suggestion that “all conscious-
ness is something”74 offers a powerful response, not just to 
turn-of-the-twentieth-century anxieties about the relation of 
mind and matter, but also to turn-of-the-twenty-first-century 
anxieties about the nature of the real. Just as the invention 
of the phonograph and the cinema coincided with worries 
about the material and the immaterial, so our contemporary 
elaborations of digital technologies coincide with worries about 
whether the real even exists, and whether we have access to it.
70 Deleuze, Cinema 1, 56.
71 Vivian Carol Sobchack, The Address of the Eye: A Phenomenology of Film 
Experience (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), xvii.
72 Deleuze, Difference, 220.
73 Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, trans. M. Lester and C. Stivale (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1969), 311.
74 Deleuze, Cinema 1, 56.
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To follow these clues from Whitehead and Deleuze (and 
through them, James and Bergson) would mean to posit a 
sort of thought that is nonrelational—or even “autistic.” This 
means developing a notion of thought that is pre-cognitive 
(involving “feeling” rather than articulated judgments) and 
non-intentional (not directed towards an object with which 
it would be correlated). Such a non-phenomenological (but 
also non-intellectual) image of thought can be composed on 
the basis of Whitehead’s notion of prehension as an alternative 
to Husserlian intentionality. Such a thought is nonreflexive, 
probably nonconscious, and even “autistic”; it is not cor-
relative to being, but immanently intrinsic within it. At this 
primordial (or better, humble) level, thought just is, without 
having a correlate.
In this way, noncorrelational thought is an immanent at-
tribute or power of being. It involves what Whitehead calls 
“feelings,” rather than articulated judgments or Heideggerian 
implicit preunderstandings.75 It is non-intentional in that 
it is not directed towards, or correlated with, particular ob-
jects—though it may well be entwined or implicated with such 
objects. It experiences singularities that are, as Kant says of 
aesthetic sensations, “intrinsically indeterminable and inad-
equate for cognition.”76 And it apprehends a “beauty” that, in 
the words of Thomas Metzinger, “is so subtle, so volatile as it 
were, that it evades cognitive access in principle.”77 In all these 
ways, noncorrelational thought is aesthetic. And under such 
circumstances—to agree at least in this point with Graham 
Harman—“aesthetics becomes first philosophy.”78
75 Whitehead, Process, 40-42
76 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing, 1987), 213.
77 Thomas Metzinger, Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004), 73.
78 Graham Harman, “On Vicarious Causation,” Collapse (2007), 2, 221.
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1 Introduction1
Speculative2 philosophy, as it is understood in this essay, or “de-scriptive generalisation,”3 moves 
forward under the perspective of the whole—the observable and 
the non-observable; the measurable and the non-measurable; 
matter/energy and mind; object and subject; concept and 
intuition etc.—which is methodically most often excluded by 
the special sciences. Speculative philosophy works (more) on 
the basis of imagination and intuition without, however, ne-
glecting the epistemological importance of conceptualisation 
and concept-based reflection. At the same time, speculative 
philosophy is not confined to metaphysics in a narrow sense 
of the term, namely to radically transcending (or apriorising) 
the phenomenological physical world. Instead, a moderate 
1 The authors would like to thank the referees for their very helpful com-
ments. One of the authors (KV) would like to thank the Gerda Henkel Foun-
dation, Düsseldorf (Germany) for a research grant on the aesthetic models 
of Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche and Joseph Beuys.
2 Etymologically, speculari (from the Latin) means: to spy, or to look out for.
3 Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology (New 
York: The Free Press, 1978), 10.
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realist stance is taken which comprises in the first place that 
real entities are not just given to us in a mode of (absolute) 
reality per se, i.e., without bilateral interaction between the 
perceiving and the perceived. Quite to the contrary, the real 
entities perceived and measured happen to be perceived and 
measured via and by other real processes which are thus (to 
a certain amount) co-con sti tu tive and co-formative. That is, 
the distinction between the perceiving entities, perception 
processes and the perceived entities rests on the factual 
(though, sub specie aeternitatis, hypothetical) possibility of 
real processes (or processual entities).4
It will be shown that such a speculative realist point of 
view is adopted by both Alfred North Whitehead and Fried-
rich Wilhelm Nietzsche.5 On the one hand, they are both 
4 Thereby it is assumed that real entities are not absolutely stable but of 
gradually different material–energetic stability over time.
5 It is neither the intention of this paper nor is it the place to put forward 
a detailed analysis of speculative realist approaches found in the current 
literature. In that sense we confine ourselves to a few remarks reflecting 
on considerations which have been presented by Graham Harman very 
recently in Graham Harman, “The Current State of Speculative Realism,” 
Speculations (2013), 4, 22-28. Unlike Harman, we do not endorse Manuel De 
Landa’s assertion and “grant reality full autonomy from the human mind, 
disregarding the difference between the observable and the unobservable.” 
Manuel De Landa qtd. in Harman, “The Current State,” 23. According to 
Harman all speculative realist philosophies reject correlationist positions, 
where “correlationism is the doctrine that we can only speak of the human/
world interplay not of human or world in their own right.” Harman, “The 
Current State,” 23. Neglecting for the moment the impression of vagueness 
concerning the terms world and human we agree with Harman (and Socrates) 
that we have to draw a “line of separation between reality and my knowledge 
of it.” In that sense, speculative realism for Harman means that real objects 
are not directly accessible but only by (the relation of) “sensual translation,” 
so that “inanimate objects fail to exhaust each other during collision just as 
human perception or knowledge of those objects fails to know them. Real 
objects do not encounter each other directly, but only encounter sensual 
objects, or images of real objects. All contact between real objects is indirect, 
mediated by sensual reality … The real is precisely that which can never 
be perfectly translated.” Harman, “The Current State,” 26, 24-26, original 
emphasis. While we agree with most of that despite the perhaps too strong 
(Whiteheadian) accentuation of the similarities between the sensual and 
the non-sensual part of the world, we do not believe in things-in-themselves 
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rejecting any type of (strong) anti-realism because it would 
make a deep and, from an ontologically monistic point of 
view, insurmountable cut between our factual experiential 
life and our means of apprehending and valuing it.6 On the 
other hand, Whitehead’s and Nietzsche’s philosophies are 
obviously in need of speculation because they oppose the 
doctrine of “vacuous actuality”7 (i.e., reality without qualities); 
the trust in the power of language (natural and logical) to give 
adequate expression to feelings and thoughts; the (ontologi-
cal) distinction of subject and object, and the often correlated 
Substanz-Denken; the sensualistic conception of perception 
(e.g., assuming an atomistic structure of the sensible outside 
world); naïve scientific realism (i.e., mistaking scientific 
abstractions and approximate models for comprehensive de-
scriptions and explanations of reality as such); giving everyday 
experience and the lifeworld no distinct place of their own in 
relation to the scientific perspective. Moreover and above all, 
Whitehead and Nietzsche conceive aestheticist perspectives 
as constitutive for all judging and valuing, instead of having 
a merely regulative function.8 In that sense it will be argued 
that Nietzsche’s and Whitehead’s philosophies imply rich 
concepts of beauty, conceive the world as a network of real, 
experiential processes which cannot be grasped by absolute 
dogmatic (non-hypothetical) epistemology, and interpret 
human life as (a work of) art.
Our analysis will also show that the two thinkers differ in 
some important respects which are relevant for the concepts 
as Harman does. 
6 Of course, it seems possible to assume no real (experiential) processes at 
all. Such an assumption would imply a strong anti-realist stance, and thus 
either a strong idealism or radical constructivism. Counterarguments to such 
positions—which are not explicated here—would be based on considerations 
about conceptual and explanatory coherence and simplicity, and perhaps 
performative contradictions.
7 Whitehead, Process and Reality, xiii.
8 Covering the broad semantic spectrum of “aesthetics” ranging from the 
Greek “aisthesis” (sensory perception, feeling) to the modes of perception 
of (works of) art and emotional as well as cognitive reactions to it.
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of beauty, culture and civilisation. In particular, a notion cor-
responding to Whitehead’s important force counterbalanc-
ing the ubiquitous striving for intensity, namely “harmony,”9 
seems to be missing in Nietzsche’s conception of the will(s) to 
power. The most prominent difference between Whitehead and 
Nietzsche, however, lies in their approach to eternal entities, 
in particular God. It is only in this context that Whitehead 
seems to adopt more of an idealist position which is neither 
shared by Nietzsche nor easily compatible with Whitehead’s 
otherwise realist approach.
As a further basis of the considerations of this paper, we 
adopt the thesis that Whitehead delivers a metaphysically 
speculative—intuitive as well as conceptual—framework 
for Nietzsche’s and, of course, his own basic perspectives.10 
This framework implies that our approach to the world is 
basically emotional (or aestheticist), that the meaning and 
purpose of all life, or of all sentient being, is to be creative, 
and that the fundamental creation is creative self-design and 
self-overcoming.11
9 Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas (New York: The Free Press, 
1967), 252, 275.
10 This is an interpretive extension of a proposal one can find in Forrest 
Wood, “Creativity: Whitehead and Nietzsche,” Southwest Philosophical Stud-
ies (1983), 9:2, 49–59.
11 It might be noted that Nietzsche seems to phenomenologically focus on 
the human being, while Whitehead’s systematicity and explanatory approach 
is (much more) open to “selves” of various complexities and organisational 
levels. This does, however, not imply that there is no space for a Whitehead-
ian cosmological and physiological approach in Nietzsche since, e.g., his talk 
of “wills to power” is not categorically restricted to the forces humans (as 
particular species of animals and types of nexus of prehensions) are driven 
by. At the same time we do not share Whitehead’s conception of building 
up the universe from bipolar sentient/non-sentient actual entities all the 
way down to the smallest (observable) ones.
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2 Philosophical Methodology and
Aesthetico-Speculative Realism
The three most important basic concepts of his “complete 
cosmology”12 Whitehead calls “actual entities” or “actual oc-
casions,” “prehension,” and “nexus.”13 Whitehead replaces the 
traditional terms of substance, soul or spirit by the concept 
of “actual entity”: actual entities are receiving-sentient (valu-
ing) organisms,14 and they are “the final real things of which 
the world is made up,” i.e., “there is no going behind actual 
entities to find anything more real.”15 “Prehensions” comprise 
all sorts of experiences of the world of “actual entities” and 
are characterised as bipolar, mental-physical “feelings.” A 
Whiteheadian “nexus is a set of actual entities in the unity of 
the relatedness constituted by their prehensions of each other, 
or—what is the same thing conversely expressed—constituted 
by their objectifications in each other.”16
By means of these basic concepts, Whitehead is attempt-
ing to “base philosophical thought upon the most concrete 
elements in our experience.”17 Together with the “ontological 
principle” that without actual entities there is no reason,18 
they comprise the basic elements of Whitehead’s specula-
tive pan-experientialist systems theory—and therefore of 
his specu lative realism.
It is our assumption that Nietzsche’s notions correspond-
ing to Whitehead’s “actual entities” and “societies”19 of actual 
entities are the “wills to power”20 and “useful ‘under-wills’ 
12 Whitehead, Process and Reality, xii.
13 Ibid., 18.
14 Ibid., 161. 
15 Ibid., 18.
16 Ibid., 24.
17 Ibid., 18.
18 Ibid., 18, 19. 
19 Ibid., 34.
20 “Only where life is, is there also will; but not will to life, instead—thus 
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or under-souls” since “our body is, after all, only a society 
constructed out of many souls.”21 Nietzsche describes “will-
ing” as “something complicated,” the ingredients of which are 
a plurality of sensations.22 Moreover, for him, willing is an 
emotion but “in every act of will there is a commandeering 
thought,”23 i.e., willing is a bipolar emotion. Such bipolarity 
of feelings is also typical for Whitehead’s approach.
Whitehead’s conception of actual entities, which are po-
tentially influenced by all past occasions and potentially 
do influence all future occasions, also comprises the thesis 
that the whole of reality is empirically inexhaustible for any 
actual entity.24 This corresponds to Whitehead’s approach 
to perspectivism, which is of central importance also for 
Nietzsche who criticises the idea and conceptions of com-
prehensively lucid and transparent (philosophical) systems 
designed from a singular—the one and only—perspective.25 In 
contraposition to such system philosophies, Nietzsche thinks 
that perspectivism is a fundamental aesthetic-epistemological 
condition of all living beings because all of them do have 
access only to specific sections of the world (although, very 
often but erroneously, they do take this for the whole world). 
According to Nietzsche we cannot get rid of perspectives: we 
are bound to a certain perspective and there is no absolute 
I teach you—will to power.” Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A 
Book for All and None, ed. Adrian del Caro and Robert B. Pippin (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 90. The Nietzschean “will to power” 
does not indicate an individual, egoistic will but the ongoing striving for 
self-design and self-overcoming.
21 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Fu-
ture, ed. Rolf-Peter Horstmann and Judith Norman (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 19.
22 Ibid., 19, original emphasis. 
23 Ibid., 18.
24 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 18, 106.
25 See Donald A. Crosby, “Two Perspectives on Metaphysical Perspectivism: 
Nietzsche and Whitehead,” The Pluralist (2007), 2:3, 57–76. Such hypotheses of 
empirical inexhaustibility and perspectivism do have further far-reaching 
consequences, e.g., for (the limitations of) our understanding of the human 
psyche.
Leiber and Voigt – Beauty, Will to Power, and Life as Artwork
63
super-perspective achievable: “We cannot look around our 
corner: it is a hopeless curiosity to want to know what other 
kinds of intellects and perspectives there might be.”26
According to Whitehead’s speculative realism, each pre-
hension process includes three action items: (a) the “‘subject,’ 
which is prehending, namely, the actual entity in which that 
prehension is a concrete element,” (b) the “‘datum’ which is 
prehended” and (c) the “‘subjective form’ which is how that 
subject prehends that datum.”27 The prehension process is 
always mutual, a bilateral interaction (between a subject and 
a datum).28
Furthermore, there are different “species of subjective 
forms,” that is different ways how a sensing subject may cap-
ture data, or different modes in which data may be detected: 
Whitehead mentions “emotions, valuations, purposes, adver-
sions, aversions, consciousness, etc.”29 Accordingly, there are 
sentient detecting, evaluative, purpose-setting, conscious, or 
unconscious prehensions which set up a pluralistic ontology 
of types of subjects.30
Prehending systems of actual entities—such as living cells, 
brains, or people—are what Whitehead calls “societies,” that 
is, they are nexus constituted by the networking of actual enti-
ties, which is realised by their mutual sentient prehending of 
each other. Actual occasions exist, i.e., they are generated, only 
26 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science: With a Prelude in German Rhymes and an 
Appendix of Songs, ed. Bernard Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001), bk. 5, aph. 374, 239, original emphasis.
27 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 23, original emphasis.
28 Alfred North Whitehead, Modes of Thought (New York: The Free Press, 
1968), 111.
29 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 24.
30 On the one hand, postulating these species of bipolar feelings sets White-
head free from typical problems of mind-matter dualism(s) or emergence 
theories. On the other hand, Whitehead’s assumptions will presumably not 
stand the empirical test of primordial physics (e.g., is it arguable that quarks 
are bipolar?). This in turn sets obvious limits to the force of his descriptive 
generalisation and shows that his cosmological approach is not so much 
different from Nietzsche’s focus on the metaphysics of the will and the 
human perspective.
Speculations V
64
within the structures of such societies; they cannot be isolated 
in reality but only in the sense of a conceptual abstraction.31
According to Whitehead as well as Nietzsche speculative 
metaphysics—which for an empirical realist implies specula-
tive realism—is inevitable, i.e., epistemically unavoidable and 
methodically indispensable for several reasons. A prominent 
one is their mistrust in the power of language (natural and 
logical) to give adequate expression to feelings and thoughts 
(and, in particular, to the experience of works of art). In 
Whitehead’s own words: 
But no language can be anything but elliptical, requiring a leap of the 
imagination to understand its meaning in its relevance to immediate 
experience. The position of metaphysics in the development of culture 
cannot be understood without remem bering that no verbal statement 
is the adequate expression of a proposition.32
Nietzsche would have agreed with this—primarily because 
linguistic statements and, in particular, formal logical ab-
stractions always remain semantically inadequate, i.e., non-
exhaustive. Nietzsche says: 
The things we have words for are also the things we have already left 
behind. There is a grain of contempt in all speech. Language, it seems, 
was invented only for average, mediocre, communicable things. People 
vulgarise themselves when they speak a language.33 
Thus, both Nietzsche and Whitehead believe in immediate 
31 “But there are no single occasions, in the sense of isolated occasions. 
Actuality is through and through togetherness—togetherness of otherwise 
isolated eternal objects, and togetherness of all actual occasions.” Alfred 
North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (Glasgow: Fontana Books, 
1975), 208. Also: Whitehead, Process and Reality, 11-12.
32 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 13, 12.
33 Friedrich Nietzsche, “Twilight of the Idols, or How to Philosophise with a 
Hammer” in The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings, 
ed. Aaaron Ridley and Judith Norman (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), “Skirmishes of an Untimely Man,” aph. 26, 205.
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(intuitive) aesthetic experience which cannot be (completely) 
grasped by our conceptual capabilities.
Moreover, for both thinkers speculative metaphysics, or 
descriptive/imaginati ve generalisation is not just inevitable, 
but is in fact the veritable method of the search for and dis-
covery of generalities: 
The true method of discovery is like the flight of an aeroplane. It starts 
from the ground of particular observation; it makes a flight in the 
thin air of imaginative generalisation; and it again lands for renewed 
observation rendered acute by rational interpretation … Metaphysical 
categories are not dogmatic statements of the obvious; they are tenta-
tive formulations of the ultimate generalities.34
Yet as the last two citations do already make obvious, there 
seems to be a main (meta-) episte mo logical difference between 
Nietzsche and Whitehead, which concerns the latter’s striv-
ing for a comprehensive and coherent philosophical system. 
According to Whitehead “the true method of philosophical 
construction” consists in framing “a scheme of ideas, the 
best that one can, and unflinchingly to explore the interpre-
tation of experience in terms of that scheme.”35 The design 
of the optimal scheme of ideas Whitehead conceived as 
“speculative philosophy,” “a method productive of important 
knowledge.”36 Such speculative philosophy “is the endeavour 
to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas 
in terms of which every element of our experience can be 
interpreted.”37 “Metaphysics” is for Whitehead thus “nothing 
but the description of the generalities which apply to all the 
details of practice.”38
It is well known that Nietzsche’s aphoristic style is one of 
the means for expressing his critical attitude towards systems 
34 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 5-8.
35 Ibid., xiv.
36 Ibid., 3.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid., 13.
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of generalities. However, since Whitehead believes only in 
approximations to such systems39 and because Nietzsche, of 
course, uses concepts, and any concept transcends the imme-
diate sensual presence of impressions, the difference between 
Whitehead and Nietzsche with respect to system-thinking is 
not so big (and surely not insurmountable).
According to Whitehead’s conviction, the speculative per-
spectives, concepts and models are essentially justified by 
their hermeneutic interpretive applicability and adequacy.40 
Although Nietzsche most of the time formally rejects the ideas 
of comprehensiveness and systematicity,41 because he takes the 
idea that the world is inexhaustible for us very seriously (this 
is Nietzsche’s perspectivism), he would agree on Whitehead’s 
hermeneutics. Especially because Nietzsche’s hermeneutics 
is not conceived as a methodology specific to the humanities 
(Geistes- und Kulturwissenschaften) based on a sharp distinction 
between the humanities and the (natural) sciences. Quite to 
the contrary, his “experimental philosophy”42 denies such a 
sharp distinction—in full agreement with Whitehead who 
also does not believe in distinguishing the two cultures.43
For Whitehead “philosophy is the criticism of abstractions 
which govern special modes of thought.”44 Thus, his philo-
sophical core objective is to counteract (the epistemologi-
cal dominance of) abstractions (in the sense of conceptual 
analytical classifications)45 by means of (re-)specifications 
39 “No metaphysical system can hope entirely to satisfy these pragmatic tests. 
At the best such a system will remain only an approximation to the general 
truths which are sought.” Whitehead, Process and Reality, 13.
40 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 3.
41 “I mistrust all systematisers and avoid them. The will to a system is a 
lack of integrity.” Nietzsche, “Twilight of the Idols,” “Arrows and Epigrams,” 
aph. 26, 159.
42 See Friedrich Kaulbach, Nietzsches Idee einer Experimentalphilosophie (Köln: 
Böhlau, 1980). 
43 See, e.g., Whitehead, Science and the Modern World.
44 Whitehead, Modes of Thought, 48-49.
45 Ibid., 15, 157.
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of abstractions46 and interpretive syntheses, in order to ad-
equately grasp the systemic and quasi-holistic networks of 
the procedural and gradualistic nature of things. In particu-
lar, Whitehead thinks that “there is no groove of abstraction 
which is adequate for the comprehension of human life.”47 
Such an attitude is fully shared by Nietzsche when he says 
that what “we have words for are also the things we have 
already left behind.”48
Despite the systems-theoretic features of his philosophy, 
Whitehead (now even more obviously in full accordance 
with Nietzsche) suggests a phenomenological perspective: 
Philosophy can exclude nothing. Thus it should never start from 
systematisation. Its primary stage can be termed assemblage ... All that 
can be achieved is the emphasis on a few large-scale notions, together 
with attention to the variety of other ideas which arise in the display 
of those chosen for primary emphasis.49
In this sense, for Whitehead the “useful function of phi-
losophy is to promote the most general systematisation of 
civilised thought,”50 i.e., philosophy should promote a (more) 
comprehensive, holistic-systemic way of understanding. The 
thesis may be ventured that, irrespective of the systematic 
attitude and the goal of approaching and approximating a 
comprehensive system, this is definitely still in line with 
Nietzsche’s views, e.g., when he says that “the honest naked 
goddess philosophy” is the “most truthful of all sciences.”51
Nietzsche would also agree with Whitehead’s view that the 
most basic prehensions and experiences show up in the mode 
46 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 15.
47 Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, 233.
48 Nietzsche, “Twilight of the Idols,” “Skirmishes of an Untimely Man,” aph. 
26, 205.
49 Whitehead, Modes of Thought, 2, original emphasis.
50 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 17.
51 Friedrich Nietzsche, “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life” 
in Untimely Meditations, ed. Daniel Breazeale (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1997), 5, 85.
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of self-evidence or intuition. According to both Whitehead 
and Nietzsche, such basic experiential (self-)evidence “can-
not be proved,” i.e., it cannot be deduced analytically from 
“abstraction[s].”52 Nietzsche tries even the scholastics to make 
his argument: 
This relation [between self-evident intuitions and concepts] may be 
very well expressed in the language of the scholastics by saying, the 
concepts are the universalia post rem, but music [i.e., intuition] gives the 
universalia ante rem, and the real world the universalia in re.53
Linguistically—within predicate logic—such intuitive pre-
hending or experiencing can only be approximated. In that, 
philosophy is similar to poetry.54 At the same time, however, 
Whitehead holds that the “clarity of intuition” is “limited, and 
it flickers,” so that we cannot, in our understanding, refrain 
from language-based inference and from proofs “as tools for 
the extension of our imperfect self-evidence.”55
Thus, in Whitehead philosophising, among other things, 
means to try to phenomenologically grasp the self-evident 
pre-conditions of all relationships of understanding (and 
52 Whitehead, Modes of Thought, 49.
53 Friedrich Nietzsche, “The Birth of Tragedy Out of the Spirit of Music” in 
Basic Writings of Nietzsche, ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: The Modern 
Library, 2000), sect. 16, 102-03.
54 “Philosophy is either self-evident, or it is not philosophy. The attempts of 
any philosophical discourse should be to produce self-evidence. Of course it 
is impossible to achieve such aim … The aim of philosophy is sheer disclo-
sure.” Whitehead, Modes of Thought, 49. “In fact, self-evidence is understand-
ing … Language halts behind intuition. The difficulty of philosophy is the 
expression of what is self-evident. Our understanding outruns the ordinary 
usages of words. Philosophy is akin to poetry. Philosophy is the endeavour 
to find a conventional phraseology for the vivid suggestiveness of the poet.” 
Whitehead, Modes of Thought, 47, 49-50.
55 Whitehead, Modes of Thought, 50. In particular, this is true for scientific 
methodology where abstractions (e.g., in the sense of approximate models) 
are unavoidable and indispensable for such restricted, factually non-holistic 
experiential beings as we are.
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explaining).56 According to him, this power “makes the 
content of the human mind manageable,” “adds meaning to 
fragmentary details,” “discloses disjunctions and conjunctions, 
consistencies and inconsistencies.”57 In a similar attitude 
Nietzsche identifies the epistemic basis of his aestheticism in 
immediate and reliable intuition: “We shall have gained much 
for the science of aesthetics, once we perceive not merely by 
logical inference, but with the immediate certainty of vision.”58 
3 Aesthetic Categories of Importance
Richard M. Millard has identified six “categories of importance” 
of Whitehead’s process philosophy as “modes of aesthetic 
complementation”:59
(1) Harmonious Individuality, 
(2) Endurance, 
(3) Novelty, 
(4) Contrast, 
(5) Depth, 
(6) Vividness or Intensity.
We think that these six categories represent a model of an 
aesthetic epistemology which is also of relevance for (un-
derstanding) Nietzsche’s philosophy.
For Whitehead, these categories correspond to his con-
ception of actual entities continually striving for (more) 
intensity and mutual adaptation. These processual entities 
are of a certain endurance but there are no eternal (actual) 
substances. Of central importance is the category of novelty, 
56 Whitehead, Modes of Thought, 48-49.
57 Ibid., 48.
58 Nietzsche, “The Birth of Tragedy,” sect. 1, 33.
59 Richard M. Millard, “Whiteheads’s Aesthetic Perspective,” Educational 
Theory (1961), 11:4, 255-68, 258. Whitehead developed these categories in 
Science and the Modern World and Religion in the Making. Four of them became 
(minimal) conditions of existence of occasions, and “contrast” became one 
of the Categories of Existence.
Speculations V
70
which reflects the creative potentials of real processes. In 
summary, Whitehead’s categories of importance of concrete 
experience or actual entities are the conditions of harmonised 
intensity, i.e., the conditions of (forever) intensifying aesthetic 
individuality, which is the real and justificational basis of all 
processes and activities in the universe.60 Moreover, White-
head’s philosophy and epistemology are aesthetic-ontological 
from the outset, since the six categories of importance are the 
basics of an aestheticist realist epistemology starting from 
intuitive phenomena, which is fundamentally different from 
an epistemology that is erected on concept-based judgements:
The metaphysical doctrine, here expounded, finds the foundations of 
the world in the aesthetic experience, rather than—as with Kant—in 
the cognitive and conceptive experience. All order is merely certain 
aspects of aesthetic order, and the moral order is merely certain aspects 
of aesthetic order. The actual world is the outcome of the aesthetic order. 61
For the following reasons the above mentioned aesthetic cat-
egories of importance can also be ascribed to Nietzsche—with 
the (partial) exception of the first one, harmonious individu-
ality. First of all, these categories are basic epistemological 
elements which are pragmatically unavoidable: e.g., any 
epistemology has to adopt some conception of endurance 
in time and contrast in the sea of chaos in order to deal with 
a universe of becoming. The concepts of novelty, depth and 
intensity are also basic for and present all over Nietzsche’s 
writings—they are encountered in concepts such as, e.g., “will 
to power,”62 “depth,”63 and “self-overcoming.”64 In the end, even 
60 Maybe, according to Whitehead, this is even true for God.
61 Alfred North Whitehead, Religion in the Making (New York: World Publish-
ing Company/The New American Library, 1960/74), 101.
62 E.g., Nietzsche, The Gay Science, bk. 5, aph. 349, 208.
63 E.g., he speaks of “people of depth.” Nietzsche, The Gay Science, bk. 3, aph. 
256, 150.
64 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 88ff. Friedrich Nietzsche, Writings from 
Leiber and Voigt – Beauty, Will to Power, and Life as Artwork
71
“harmonious individuality”65 could be ascribed to Nietzsche, 
although he might have resisted the literal notion of harmony. 
But without doubt the conception of structured, concrete 
individuals, or aesthetic individuality, is foundational for 
Nietzsche, e.g., when he explicates his understanding of an 
autonomous person.66 
4 A Table of Phenomenological Values
and the Outstanding Role of Beauty
The doctrine of the primacy of aesthetic categories, and par-
ticularly the dominance of beauty in the system of values are 
basic elements of both Nietzsche’s and Whitehead’s philoso-
phy. Whitehead’s (rather abstract) definition of beauty reads: 
“Beauty is the mutual adaptation of the several factors in an 
occasion of experience.”67
On many occasions in his writings Whitehead makes it 
clear that underlying this statement is a concept of harmony, 
or, at least, optimality of mutual adaptation. At first glance, 
such an assumption would seem to be unacceptable for 
Nietzsche, because he adopts the Heraclitean idea that war, 
conflict or quarrel is the “father of all things.” On closer in-
spection, however, the difference between the two authors is 
not so big: on the one hand, Whitehead, within his process 
philosophy, conceives harmony as the ongoing process of 
mutual adaptation of real events (instead of characterising 
a static state), and on the other hand, Nietzsche adopts the 
Heraclitean understanding of the world as an eternal becom-
ing and perishing of individual entities—Nietzsche’s “Eternal 
Recurrence of the Same”: 
the Late Notebooks, ed. Rüdiger Bittner (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), 131, 138, 176, 228 et passim.
65 Millard, “Whiteheads’s Aesthetic Perspective,” 258.
66 See Volker Gerhardt, Friedrich Nietzsche (München: Beck, 1999), 207. See 
also the discussion of the phenomenological value of freedom below.
67 Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, 252.
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Behold, we know what you teach: that all things recur eternally and we 
ourselves along with them; and that we have already been here times 
eternal and all things with us … I will return to this same and selfsame 
life, in what is greatest as well as in what is smallest, to once again teach 
the eternal recurrence of all things.68
But joy does not want heirs, not children—joy wants itself, wants eternity, 
wants recurrence, wants everything eternally the same.69
Yet one remaining—and crucial—difference is that while 
Whitehead relies on a developmental trans-human telos 
(which, in the end, cannot be understood as a completely 
innerworldly issue), Nietzsche radically denies such pos-
sibility when he is insulting any teleological scholasticism 
in philosophy. For him the only aims in the world are those 
that we generate and construct ourselves.
Whitehead’s definition of beauty implies that it is more fun-
damental than any other type of value, because all occasions 
by their very nature of bipolarity and permanent bilateral 
interaction do realise mutual adaptations of the factors that 
constitute them. In this basic sense “the Universe is directed 
to the production of Beauty.”70 Moreover, for Whitehead the 
most general notion of beauty comprises almost all other 
types of value, which he conceives as types and gradations 
of beauty.71
Nietzsche mentions a number of features of the concept 
of beauty, thereby delivering an implicit definition: the “Ue-
bermensch” is representative of the concept of perfect beauty, 
and beauty can only be recognised by “the most awakened 
souls.”72 For Nietzsche being a beautiful person means to 
live the attitude of superior serenity (e.g., without jealousy, 
68 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 178; see, e.g., also Nietzsche, The Gay 
Science, bk. 4, aph. 341, 194.
69 Ibid., 262.
70 Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, 265.
71 Millard, “Whiteheads’s Aesthetic Perspective,” 260.
72 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 67, 72.
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endowed with humour, etc.),73 while we can find beauty only 
in self-overcoming and self-abandonment: “Where is beauty? 
Where I must will with my entire will; where I want to love and 
perish.”74 Thus, similar to Whitehead, Nietzsche thinks that 
beauty is the goal to be pursued by humans. However, we also 
immediately recognise that Whitehead’s concept of beauty 
is of broader scope, and that Nietzsche’s understanding is 
much more emphatically focused on self-overcoming—while 
Whitehead, in general, is content with mutual adaptation.
A further inspection of the phenomenological values 
Whitehead advocates makes it possible to specify in more 
detail the similarities and differences between Whitehead 
and Nietzsche. For that purpose we build on an analysis of 
Richard M. Millard who proposes to order the value types that 
Whitehead discusses75 hierarchically according to “progres-
sive aesthetic enrichment, individually and communally.”76 
The corresponding list of phenomenological values reads: (1) 
minor beauty, (2) survival, (3) freedom, (4) moral goodness, 
(5) understanding, (6) holiness, (7) truth, (8) major beauty, 
(8a) adventure, (8b) civilisation, and (8c) peace.77
(1) Minor Beauty
Whitehead distinguishes major and minor types of beauty 
in correspondence to the ends aimed at: if the goal is only 
the avoidance of mutual inhibitions among the various 
prehensions—e.g., the absence of a painful clash, or vulgar-
ity—we speak of “minor beauty.” According to Whitehead, the 
minor form of beauty is a sort of pre-condition for the major 
form (which is one of the highest types of value realisable).
It must be assumed that Nietzsche would not differentiate 
“minor beauty” because the minimalist approach of mere 
73 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 72, 91–92.
74 Ibid., 96.
75 Predominantly in his Adventures of Ideas.
76 Millard, “Whiteheads’s Aesthetic Perspective,” 260.
77 Ibid.
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avoidance of harm would be too unpassionate and unemphatic 
for him, in the sense that he would not distinguish between 
avoiding obstacles of beauty and actively striving for beauty.78
(2) Survival
For Whitehead the phenomenological value of survival cor-
responds to endurance as a category of importance and is 
accepted as a basic—though lower level—value. In contrast to 
Whitehead, Nietzsche would accept survival as a value only 
for the “last human beings,” who are “blinking” contently, 
stuck in their pleasant habits79—but not for the Uebermensch 
striving for self-overcoming.
(3) Freedom
According to Whitehead, the value of freedom corresponds to 
novelty as a category of importance. For him, freedom is the 
indispensable core condition and “the supreme expression 
of individuality” above and beyond survival: “freshness, zest, 
and the extra keenness of intensity arise from it.”80
In close agreement, for Nietzsche freedom does not exist 
as absolute trans-empirical freedom, but rather is an expres-
sion and means of complex forms of life that are capable of 
making evidence-based decisions and carrying out actions. 
In that sense, throughout his writings Nietzsche develops and 
advocates an ideal of a sovereign person with a free mind—
thus positioning himself in the tradition of philosophical 
enlightenment since antiquity. Remarkably, according to him, 
such a concept of a (free) person is not conceivable without 
the set of virtues of antiquity (see, e.g., Aristotle) like honesty, 
truthfulness, courage, bravery, justice, wisdom and others.81 
78 However, it does not seem to be decidable whether minor beauty may be 
a tacit assumption of Nietzsche, or not.
79 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 10.
80 Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, 258.
81 See Gerhardt, Friedrich Nietzsche, 207.
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In summary, for Nietzsche human freedom comprises self-
determination, self-design and self-transcendence of a pro-
active and creative person proper—thus meeting Whitehead’s 
core condition of individuality. 
(4) Moral Goodness 
For both Whitehead and Nietzsche, moral values are instru-
mental rather than intrinsic or (metaphysically) objective, i.e., 
in the first place their obligation and reliability originate from 
their functionality. The reason for this is that moral values are 
derived from aesthetic ones because the most basic activities 
of our access to the world are valuing prehensions, or aesthetic 
preferences. In other words, the achievement of beauty in the 
case of Whitehead, or the fulfilment of the will(s) to power 
in the case of Nietzsche, imply aesthetic-pragmatic concepts 
of truth and goodness (in contradistinction to approaches 
which are solely based on conceptual judgements). Roughly 
speaking, true and good is what serves the aesthetic goals or 
complies with them. For Whitehead and Nietzsche when a 
statement is called true or a value is called morally good, this 
unavoidably implies that these epistemic and ethical judge-
ments are not only in agreement with our (evidence-based) 
aesthetical preferences but originate from them.82 
(5) Understanding (Wisdom)
For pragmatic process thinkers like Nietzsche and White-
head, wisdom and understanding are not characterised by 
absolute (metaphysical) standards or very specific (cognitive) 
goals. Quite to the contrary, “wisdom” (as a process and not 
a state) is characterised as “persistent pursuit of the deeper 
understanding.”83 For both philo sophers, “the fruit of wisdom 
82 For example, we first feel that a certain event is hurting us or hindering 
our development before we try to explicate (moral feelings) and (then pos-
sibly) define moral values corresponding to this experience.
83 Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, 47.
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or understanding is not certainty but the opening up of new 
perspectives.”84 This is clear from the prominent status of 
creation, perspectivism, and self-design in their philosophies.
Moreover, in both authors wisdom requires some amount 
of speculation. For Whitehead, wisdom emerges from the 
moral and rational reflection of (the options of) freedom so 
that the “whole determines what it wills to be, and thereby 
adjusts the relative importance of its own inherent flashes of 
spontaneity.”85 In a quite similar manner, Nietzsche makes 
it clear that with the insights of a critical and moderate con-
structivist—speculative—realism 
a culture is inaugurated that I venture to call a tragic culture. Its most 
important characteristic is that wisdom takes the place of science as the 
highest end—wisdom that, uninfluenced by the seductive distractions 
of the sciences, turns with unmoved eyes to a comprehensive view of 
the world, and seeks to grasp, with sympathetic feelings of love, the 
eternal suffering as its own.86
(6) Holiness
First of all, it must be clearly stated that Nietzsche’s under-
standing of holiness—implicit, dialectic and ironic as it is—
can only be conceived as a secularised one—since, according 
to him, God is dead (although his remnants are still there): 
“God is dead; but given the way people are, there may still for 
millennia be caves in which they show this shadow.—And 
we—we must still defeat his shadow as well!”87 Therefore, it 
seems that holiness, in any non-ironic religious sense, does not 
designate a value for Nietzsche. However, in his discussion of 
the meaning we might give to our lives, Nietzsche maintains 
that such a meaning “ought to heighten our feeling of power 
84 Millard, “Whiteheads’s Aesthetic Perspective,” 261.
85 Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, 47.
86 Friedrich Nietzsche, “The Birth of Tragedy,” sect. 18, 112.
87 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, bk. 3, aph. 108, 109.
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and give us a sense of reverence for ourselves.”88
This view is coherent with Whitehead’s conception that 
“fundamental religious experience is a direct intuition of the 
unity of three concepts—the value of the individual for him-
self, of individuals for each other, and of the objective world 
as a community of value realising mutually interdependent 
individuals”89—which issues into a “concept of the rightness 
of things.”90 For Whitehead, “this is the intuition of holiness, 
the intuition of the sacred, which is at the foundation of all 
religion.”91 It is quite clear that this abstract aesthetic-ethical 
concept of religion is compatible even with a secularised ap-
proach to ethics like Nietzsche’s.92
(7) Truth
In accordance with the type of speculative realism that is as-
cribed to Nietzsche and Whitehead here, they both maintain 
a relaxed attitude towards the concept of truth: they advocate 
a pragmatic, aesthetically creative and coherentist concept of 
truth (and meaning), and not an absolute, transcendent(al) 
correspondence-theoretic one. 93 Accordingly, both phi-
losophers reject narrow verificationist concepts of truth. In 
Whitehead’s own words, “Truth is the conformation of Ap-
pearance to Reality.”94 For him, it is clear that “Truth derives 
88 J. Thomas Howe, Faithful to the Earth: Nietzsche and Whitehead on God and 
the Meaning of Human Life (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), 78.
89 Whitehead, Religion in the Making, 59.
90 Ibid., 66.
91 Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, 342–43; Millard, “Whiteheads’s Aesthetic 
Perspective,” 262.
92 At the same time, since it seems to be very difficult to interpret White-
head’s concept of God in a completely innerworldly manner, there remains 
a distinctive difference between the two authors in this respect.
93 “We do not consider the falsity of a judgment as itself an objection to a 
judgment.” Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 7. “It is more important that a 
proposition be interesting than that it be true.” Whitehead, Adventures of 
Ideas, 244.
94 Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, 241, see also 250–51, 266. By the way, this 
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this self-justifying power from the services in the promotion 
of Beauty. Apart from Beauty, Truth is neither good, nor bad.”95 
Further, “Beauty is a wider, and more fundamental, notion 
than Truth.”96 It is obvious that Nietzsche would have agreed 
with that, in particular because for him truth is a “play of 
interpretation” (Gianni Vattimo).97 Nietzsche vehemently 
rejects the idea of truth as the most basic, absolute principle 
of metaphysics from which the categories of being may be 
deduced.
Moreover, in close accordance with Whitehead Nietzsche 
strongly opposes to treat truth and knowledge as a priority, 
because this would inevitably express contempt for all direct 
expressions of life, and because all human perception and 
recognition “merely slide[s] across the surface of things.”98 
What, then, is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, an-
thropomorphisms, in short a sum of human relations which have 
been subjected to poetic and rhetorical intensification, translation, 
and decoration, and which, after they have been in use for a long time, 
strike a people as firmly established, canonical, and binding; truths are 
illusions of which we have forgotten that they are illusions, metaphors 
which have become worn by frequent use and have lost all sensuous 
vigour, coins which, having lost their stamp, are now regarded as metal 
and no longer as coins.99
Furthermore, for Nietzsche truth must be redefined as 
experiential truth which denotes a conceptual abstractum 
subsuming all our perspectivist and interpretative relations 
statement again corroborates Whitehead’s realist position.
95 Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, 267.
96 Ibid., 265.
97 Wiebrecht Ries, Nietzsche und seine ästhetische Philosophie des Lebens 
(Tübingen: Francke, 2012), 14.
98 Friedrich Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense” in The 
Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings, ed. Raymond Geuss and Ronald Speirs 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1, 142.
99 Ibid., 1, 146.
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we may experience in the quarrel with other bearers of in-
terpretation and agency.
(8) Major Beauty 
According to Whitehead, “Major Beauty” is “the one aim 
which by its very nature is self-justifying” in the sense 
that all actual entities are striving for that process state of 
experiential (quasi-)perfection, which, of course, may be 
realised in uncounted individual variants.100 The key to 
major beauty is “prehension of individuality,” which “is the 
feeling of each objective factor as an individual ‘It’ with its 
own significance.”101 Nietzsche would certainly agree—if we 
were to replace “major beauty” by “fulfilment of the will(s) 
to power.” This is quite obvious if we remind ourselves that 
Whitehead’s idea of the process of experiential perfection is 
in close agreement with Nietzsche’s idea of will(s) to power 
which, during their process of self-overcoming—momentarily 
and tentatively—achieve their (partial) empirical fulfilment. 
Consequently, for Whitehead,
any part of experience can be beautiful. The teleology of the Universe is 
directed to the production of Beauty. Thus any system of things which 
in any wide sense is beautiful is to that extent justified in its existence.102 
With the above mentioned replacement this passage is in 
full accordance with Nietzsche’s aestheticism, which finds its 
expression in the statement that “it is only as an aesthetic phe-
nomenon that existence and the world are eternally justified.”103
Whitehead describes the major form of beauty as follows:
This form presupposes the first form [i.e., minor beauty], and adds to 
it the condition that the conjunction in one synthesis of the various 
100 Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, 266.
101 Ibid., 262, original emphasis.
102 Ibid., 265.
103 Nietzsche, “The Birth of Tragedy,” sect. 5, 52, original emphases.
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prehensions introduces new contrasts of objective content … the parts 
contribute to the massive feeling of the whole, and the whole contributes 
to the intensity of the feeling of the parts.104
According to Whitehead, such beauty can be described as 
“the perfection of Harmony.”105 However, major beauty, for 
Whitehead, is still a preliminary culmination of aesthetic 
values, which in turn gives rise to the highest values—adven-
ture, civilisation, and peace.
Yet Nietzsche would agree with Whitehead’s concept of major 
beauty only to a certain extent. In this context the (perspec-
tivist and gradual) difference between the two philosophers 
is rooted in the incompatibility of Whitehead’s concepts of 
harmony and teleology with Nietzsche’s ideas of chaos and 
aimlessness (of life per se). For example, in contradistinction 
to Whitehead, Nietzsche believes that “the total character of 
the world ... is for all eternity chaos.”106 Moreover, while in 
Whitehead’s cosmology a pragmatically perfect harmony of 
the whole universe is assumed to be achievable, in Nietzsche’s 
existentialism the aesthetic perspective is a self-produced 
way out of absurdity, and it is the only one that is feasible (for 
us). In contrast to Nietzsche the escapist or healing function 
in Whitehead’s system is realised by his understanding of 
eternal entities, teleology and God (which are empirically 
empty concepts for Nietzsche). At the same time, however, 
Nietzsche’s superior serenity107 can be related to Whitehead’s 
harmony, since the serenity of a human individual, possibly 
an exemplar of the Uebermensch, can in fact be understood 
as a process of harmonisation of their will(s) to power in 
confrontation with other wills and interests.
104 Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, 252.
105 Ibid., 252.
106 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, bk. 3, aph. 109, 109.
107 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 72, 91–92.
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(8a) Adventure
According to Whitehead, because of the process character 
of all reality all valuable situations, including major beauty, 
are perishable (and all actual occasions will perish). However, 
in his view this also creates new possibilities for optimised 
fulfilment, for fuller beauty, i.e., occasions of adventure. For 
Whitehead, adventure is the general name for the value type of 
freedom and self-overcoming under the condition of (striving 
for) major beauty. Accordingly, adventure is constitutive for 
art, civilisation and peace.108 Moreover, creative speculation 
is but one concretion or realisation mode of adventure.
These considerations are in complete compliance with 
Nietzsche’s philosophy of life characterised by self-designing 
and self-overcoming which cannot be tackled or achieved 
without taking risk. Without doubt, the following state-
ments by Whitehead could also have been written down by 
Nietzsche: “Without adventure civilisation is in full decay,”109 
and “Advance or Decadence are the only choices offered to 
mankind.”110 In accordance with that, Zarathustra, in the 
section “On Self-overcoming,” says that “this secret life itself 
spoke to me: ‘Behold,’ it said, ‘I am that which must always 
overcome itself. To be sure, you call it will to beget or drive to 
a purpose ....’”111 
(8b) Civilisation
Whitehead’s “general definition of civilisation” is “that a 
civilised society is exhibiting the five qualities of Truth, 
Beauty, Adventure, Art, Peace.”112 In other words, science and 
108 Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, 271ff.
109 Ibid., 279.
110 Ibid., 274.
111 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 89, original emphasis.
112 Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, 274. Based on what we have learned about 
the commonalities between Nietzsche and Whitehead, we can assume that 
Nietzsche would agree on Whitehead’s concept of civilisation—with the 
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art, conceptual knowledge and aesthetics in combination 
with creative enhancement realised under peaceful condi-
tions represent the pre-conditions of human civilisation. 
Although Nietzsche does not literally talk about civilisation, 
he certainly advocates a conception of a higher developed 
culture, the ingredients and basics of which are science and 
art based on an aesthetic access to and perspective of the 
world. We have already mentioned, however, that peace from 
Nietzsche’s Heraclitean perspective is not as important as it 
is for Whitehead.
(8c) Peace
Whitehead says, “I choose the term ‘Peace’ for that Harmony 
of Harmonies which calms destructive turbulence and com-
pletes civilisation.”113 Peace “is broadening of feeling due to 
the emergence of some deep metaphysical insight, unver-
balised and yet momentous in its coordination of values.”114 
At first glance, this gives the impression that Whitehead 
advocates a rather transfigured or romanticised concept of 
peace. However, he further specifies that peace is “primarily 
a trust in the efficacy of Beauty. It is a sense that fineness 
of achievement is, as it were, a key unlocking treasures that 
the narrow nature of things would keep remote.”115 Still, up 
to that point it seems that Whitehead’s understanding of 
peace is just harmonic—and therefore in contraposition to 
Nietzsche who again and again stressed (basically since “The 
Birth of Tragedy”) that life is a permanent struggle and even 
war, an ongoing process of delimiting oneself at the expense 
of others. But then Whitehead adds that:
exception of “peace.” In this respect, Nietzsche has much more affinity 
with the Heraclitean conception of polemos (controversy; quarrel; war) as 
the origin of reality.
113 Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, 285.
114 Ibid., 285.
115 Ibid., 285.
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As soon as high consciousness is reached, the enjoyment of existence 
is entwined with pain, frustration, loss, tragedy. Amid the passing of 
so much beauty, so much heroism, so much daring, Peace is then the 
intuition of permanence. It keeps vivid the sensitiveness to tragedy; 
and it sees the tragedy as a living agent persuading the world to aim 
at fineness beyond the faded level of surrounding fact. Each tragedy is 
the disclosure of an ideal:—What might have been, and was not: What 
can be. The tragedy was not in vain.116
With such an existentialist statement, perhaps unexpectedly, 
Whitehead again very much closes up to Nietzsche. We have 
finally learned that Whitehead’s “peace” does not denote a 
situation of harmonious harmony of harmonies, but unavoid-
ably comprises a dialectics of the unavoidable interweaving 
of harmonic and tragic (real) events. 
5 The Aesthetic Justification of Existence
and Life as (a Work of) Art
Nietzsche’s and Whitehead’s conceptions of epistemic pro-
cesses (broadly construed) are axiological—which for them 
means aesthetic in the first place—and realist from the 
outset and across all levels of reality processing or types of 
prehensions.117 In other words, for them the basic values are 
unavoidably aesthetic values (and not moral or epistemic 
ones) because all constituents of reality (in whatever sense 
and of whatever level of constitutive complexity) originate 
from basic processes of mutual prehending and perceiving 
of actual occasions or wills to power, respectively. For both 
Whitehead and Nietzsche, there is no concrete or real expe-
rience without valuing because all experience, i.e., all actual 
relationships of any occasion or occurrence or event to any 
other occasion, concerns self-actualisation and happens as a 
type of “feeling.”118 Whitehead repeatedly stresses this point: 
116 Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, 268.
117 In particular, human valuing is a real empirical process (and not a non-
scientific, purely subjective one). 
118 “Feeling … as a synonym for ‘actuality.’” Whitehead, Religion in the Mak-
ing, 100.
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Remembering the poetic rendering of our concrete experience, we see 
at once that the element of value, of being valuable, of having value, 
of being an end in itself, of being something which is for its own sake, 
must not be omitted in any account of an event as the most concrete 
actual something. ‘Value’ is the word I use for the intrinsic reality of 
an event. Value is an element which permeates through and through 
the poetic view of nature!119 
Value experience ... is the very essence of the universe. Existence, in its 
own nature, is the upholding of value intensity.120 
An actual fact is a fact of aesthetic experience. All aesthetic experience 
is feeling arising out of the realisation of contrast under identity.121 
Overall, for Whitehead the developmental telos (goal) of the 
universe is beauty and therefore striving for beauty—becom-
ing or being beautiful—justifies existence.122 However, White-
head does not tie beauty to (mesoscopic) sensory perception; 
rather, he thinks that beauty “involves conformal feelings in 
self-actualisation, the individuality of every experimental 
occasion.”123 As a consequence, the general concept of art is by 
no means restricted to the fine arts but comprises art as “a way 
of life, a mode of existence, the goal of communal process.”124
According to Whitehead, art is the optimal refinement of 
nature, it is the optimised form of civilisation. Further, art 
heals and (somehow) transcends the finiteness of our lives. 
Thus, Whitehead holds that art, in its broadest sense, is civili-
119 Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, 117.
120 Whitehead, Modes of Thought, 111.
121 Whitehead, Religion in the Making, 111.
122 Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, 265. In contradistinction to Nietzsche, 
Whitehead suggests that the aesthetic order (which by itself is the generative 
basis of the real world) “is derived from the immanence of God.” Whitehead, 
Religion in the Making, 101, also 96.
123 Millard, “Whiteheads’s Aesthetic Perspective,” 255.
124 Ibid., 255.
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sation, “for civilisation is nothing other than the unremitting 
aim at the major perfections of harmony.”125 
[Art] exhibits for consciousness a finite fragment of human effort 
achieving its own perfection within its own limits. Thus the mere toil 
for the slavish purpose of prolonging life for more toil or for mere 
bodily gratification, is transformed into the conscious realisation of 
a self-contained end, timeless within time … Thus Art heightens the 
sense of humanity.126
Art and science are core activities of an optimally develop-
ing human kind.127 Since for Whitehead, however, beauty is 
more highly valued than truth, art is more highly valued than 
science. Art is the way actual entities like humans realise the 
ubiquitous striving for major beauty. Art is also the expres-
sion of “felt meaning” that cannot be expressed otherwise, 
and it culminates in the idea of homo ludens:
Art expresses depths of felt meaning which cannot be formulated in 
any other way. The need for expression of these gives rise to ritual, 
dance, play, the primitive arts and finally the more developed arts. In 
its ability to crystallise, to bring to vivid individuality the range of hu-
man experiences with their deep emotional roots but divorced from 
necessity, lies the freedom and the therapeutic as well as the formative 
function of art.128
On the level of the original design of the world and the 
meaning of human life, Nietzsche also strongly advocates 
a priority of the artistic over the scientific when stating the 
following about the belief of science in its ability—by “using 
the thread of causality”—to reach out to the “deepest abysses 
125 Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, 271.
126 Ibid., 270-71.
127 “Science and Art are the consciously determined pursuit of Truth and of 
Beauty.” Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, 272.
128 Ibid., 348.
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of being” which it might not only know but also correct: 
“This sublime metaphysical illusion accompanies science 
as an instinct and leads science again and again to its limits 
at which it must turn into art.”129 Moreover, Nietzsche also 
holds “that through art nature comes to language and thus 
life to its symbolic expression.”130 In the words of Volker 
Gerhardt, for Nietzsche this means that “the human being 
who despairs of his meaningless existence is hindered by art 
to give himself up. Viewed in isolation, human existence has 
no appeal and no value, but through art, it becomes ‘possible 
and worth living.’”131
Here, when the danger to his will is greatest, art approaches as a sav-
ing sorceress, expert at healing. She alone knows how to turn these 
nauseous thoughts about the horror or absurdity of existence into 
notions with which one can live: these are the sublime as the artistic 
taming of the horrible, and the comic as the artistic discharge of the 
nausea of absurdity.132
Moreover, Nietzsche interprets and idealises human life as a 
whole as a work of art: “Wild life brings out a fantastic variety 
of forms, in its vast production only obeys its own law and 
everything seems like a great play133 to run.”134
Furthermore, Nietzsche describes the “world as a work of art 
giving birth to itself,”135 and Zarathustra unmistakably states: 
“Creating—that is the great redemption from suffering, and 
129 Nietzsche, “The Birth of Tragedy,” sect. 15, 95-96, original emphasis.
130 Gerhardt, Friedrich Nietzsche, 91, this and all subsequent translations are ours.
131 Ibid., 85. Gerhardt is quoting Nietzsche, “The Birth of Tragedy,” sect. 1, 
35 here.
132 Nietzsche, “The Birth of Tragedy,” sect. 7, 60, original emphasis.
133 In the aesthetic sense of “play(ing)” that has been introduced by Kant 
and Schiller.
134 Gerhardt, Friedrich Nietzsche, 88.
135 Friedrich Nietzsche, “Notebook 2, autumn 1885–autumn 1886” in Writ-
ings from the Late Notebooks, 2[114], 82.
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life’s becoming light.”136 In his later works Nietzsche explicates 
the idea that the dynamic expression and self-realisation of the 
wills to power ultimately can only be viewed according to the 
manner of a work of art. In that sense, that which gives unity 
to the processes we call world and life has to be considered 
art. This is how Nietzsche’s early dictum that art is actually 
“the highest task and the truly metaphysical activity of this 
life”137 has to be understood.138
6 Summary and Conclusions
Friedrich Nietzsche and Alfred North Whitehead have many 
philosophical subjects in common.139 One of their very basic 
commonalities is the rejection of the idea that the world is 
composed of (eternally stable) substances. In contradistinc-
tion, their philosophies represent a comprehensive processual 
view of the universe and conceive centres of dynamicity as 
constituents of any empirically real process. These processual 
entities are the respective building blocks of the universe as 
centres of power, which are characterised by their creative 
mutability, activity and reactivity: Nietzsche introduces the 
wills to power while Whitehead declares actual occasions, 
or real prehending entities, as “the primary actual units of 
which the temporal world is composed.”140
Both thinkers also “reject absolutism as a characteristic 
of philosophy.”141 A further attitude they share is their com-
mon starting point for any metaphysical speculation: it must 
commence—and prove its reliability—in our experience; 
136 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 66.
137 Nietzsche, “The Birth of Tragedy,” “Preface to Richard Wagner,” 31-32.
138 See Gerhardt, Friedrich Nietzsche, 88–89.
139 These commonalities are not a consequence of direct influence since 
it seems to be a “fact that Whitehead’s published writings give only scant 
evidence that he had read or even thought about Nietzsche.” Howe, Faithful 
to the Earth, 8-9. 
140 Whitehead, Religion in the Making, 88.
141 Wood, “Creativity: Whitehead and Nietzsche,” 50.
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this is what we have called their speculative realism. At the 
same time, they both disapprove of: the idea that language 
is an adequate expression of judgements; a faculty psychol-
ogy; the subject-predicate form of statements; sensualist as 
well as extensionalist epistemologies. All of these rejections 
are reasons for why we are in need of rationally controlled 
speculation—controlled by checking its empirical adequacy 
and relevance as well as logical consistency and conceptual 
coherence. Concerning speculative realism it should be added 
that Whitehead’s philosophy transports a gradually stronger 
realism or objectivism and a more harmonious optimism as 
regards (aesthetic) values: for him they are somehow intrinsic 
to the universe out there. However, Whitehead attempts an 
“imaginative construction” which “must have its origin in the 
generalisation of particular factors discerned in particular 
topics of human interest” 142 and conceives of speculative 
philosophy as an “experimental adventure.”143
On a rather general level, Janusz Polanowski has already 
stated that the 
commonalities that link Whitehead’s philosophy with Nietzsche’s 
thinking about the world can be summed up in their mutual exaltation 
of novelty, complexity, creativity, multiplicity, and adventurousness, and 
at the same time their incontrovertible rejection of ontological duality, 
essentiality, finality, certainty, simplicity, and sterility.144 
To this (rather extensive) list one may add the topics of epis-
temological gradualism and perspectivism—meaning that 
our understanding of the world comes and only functions in 
gradual terms, and that the world seems to be epistemically 
inexhaustible for humans and for other societies of prehen-
sions of an appropriate organisational complexity.
142 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 5.
143 Ibid., 9.
144 Janusz A. Polanowski, “Points of Connection in Whitehead’s and Ni-
etzsche’s Metaphysics” in Whitehead’s Philosophy: Points of Connection, ed. 
Janusz A. Polanowski and Donald W. Sherburne (New York: State University 
of New York Press, 2004), 144–45.
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For Whitehead and Nietzsche, (sufficiently complex) 
aesthetic prehensions—perceptions, intuitions and judge-
ments—are indispensable ingredients of the quality of (hu-
man or animal) life because they are the most basic activities 
of self-fulfilment and self-transcendence. Art, Whitehead 
says, “transforms the soul into the permanent realisation 
of values extending beyond its former self”145—a statement 
that could easily be ascribed to Nietzsche, since he believes 
that nature comes to language and life to its symbolic expres-
sion in (a work of) art, which is the stimulant of life. More 
than that, art is “a metaphysical supplement of the reality of 
nature, placed beside it for its overcoming.”146 In that sense, 
art inspires us to discover new ways of being in the world. It 
provides us with options and means for attaining experi-
ences of greater contrast, depth and intensity. And it helps 
us to come to grips with absurdity and horror—to heal the 
absurdity of (human) life, in the case of Nietzsche without 
an external telos and guarantor.
Moreover, for both thinkers conducting one’s life and doing 
philosophy are creative activities—leading one’s life accord-
ing to relevant standards of reflection and, more importantly, 
aesthetic values, generates a work of art. Among other things, 
this comprises, at least for Nietzsche, that we create our own 
values because only that way can we give meaning to our lives. 
Whitehead’s view that the universe is a creative advance is com-
patible with Nietzsche’s conception of continuously striving 
for a fulfilment of the will(s) to power, for the self-design and 
self-conquest of life—the most prominent symbol of which 
is the Uebermensch. Neither Nietzsche nor Whitehead claim 
(absolute) finality; for them, the creative process of the world 
is an ongoing one. At the same time, it must be made clear 
that the scope of the two approaches as well as their balancing 
of forces is somehow different.
Some of the few—though important—aspects their opinions 
differ on is Whitehead’s fundamental and strong commitment 
145 Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, 240.
146 Nietzsche, “The Birth of Tragedy,” sect. 24, 114.
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to philosophy as (metaphysical) system and his tendential 
(quasi-)transcendentalism147 with respect to the concepts of 
God148 and “eternal objects.”149 Concerning the systematicity 
of philosophy the two authors, however, do not differ so much 
since Whitehead conceives all systems as hypothetical in the 
first place. Yet, in contradistinction to Nietzsche Whitehead 
believes that God is foundationally important.150 The main 
difference between Nietzsche and Whitehead in this respect 
can be illustrated by the following statements. Nietzsche says: 
The total character of the world, by contrast, is for all eternity chaos, not 
in the sense of a lack of necessity but of a lack of order, organisation, 
form, beauty, wisdom, and whatever else our aesthetic anthropomor-
phisms are called.151
And he continues that the “universe … is neither perfect, 
nor beautiful, nor noble, nor does it want to become any of 
these things.”152
We suggest contrasting these quotes of Nietzsche with 
a fictitious statement that Whitehead could have uttered, 
which—in our opinion—is in complete accordance with his 
“complete cosmology”:153
The total character of the world, by contrast, is for all eternity beauty—
harmony of harmonies—in the sense of the processual order, organisation, 
form, freedom, moral goodness, understanding, truth, adventure and 
civilisation (which, finally, are guaranteed by the immanence of God). 
147 See James Bradley, “Transcendentalism and Speculative Realism in 
Whitehead,” Process Studies (1994), 23:3, 155-91. 
148 “The actual world is the outcome of the aesthetic order and the aesthetic 
order is derived from the immanence of God.” Whitehead, Religion in the 
Making, 101.
149 Whitehead, Religion in the Making, 40 et passim. 
150 Ibid., 115.
151 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, bk. 3, aph. 109, 109.
152 Ibid.
153 Whitehead, Process and Reality, xii.
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For Whitehead, the products of art, like all achievements of 
beauty, are enduring individualities which at least symbol-
ise—or maybe even realise—a sort of transcendental immor-
tality in a processual universe.154 In other words, for him the 
universe-in-itself—as God’s universe—is intrinsically striving 
for beauty and nobleness. However, even in Whitehead’s view 
this universe is unavoidably tragic because of the presence 
of all those disharmonic elements and suffering.155 While 
both authors share the conviction of the ambivalences and 
the tragic character of the universe, Nietzsche’s existential-
ist and nihilist approach is conceivably different: coming to 
grips with the absurdity of human life is only possible—and 
strictly speaking: possible only to some extent—by our ac-
tive anthropomorphic innerworldly intervention, i.e., by 
self-designing our lives under the framework condition of 
permanently striving for self-overcoming.156 In that sense, 
Zarathustra teaches—and Whitehead would agree so far—that 
we must “remain faithful to the earth.”157 However, in contra-
distinction to Whitehead, Nietzsche’s Zarathustra makes it 
very clear that one should “not believe those who speak … of 
extraterrestrial hopes.”158
To summarise, according to Whitehead the ultimate and 
only aim in itself of the (development of the) world is beauty 
and harmony, i.e., maximising individual experiential in-
tensity while minimising the hindrance of other individual 
entities’ intensities. In a similar vein, Nietzsche argues that 
the only justification of human existence—in the sense of self-
design on the basis of the will(s) to power, and not just as 
self-conservation—is the aesthetic one.
154 “A great civilisation interfused with Art presents the world to its members 
clothed in the Appearance of immortality.” Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, 364.
155 Thus confronting Whitehead again with Leibniz’s theodicee problem.
156 But again, the difference is not so big, because Whitehead’s rather abstract 
philosopher God lives in the background.
157 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 6, original emphasis.
158 Ibid.
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Sellars Contra Deleuze
on Intuitive Knowledge
Matija Jelača
University of Pula
The spectre of intuitive knowl-edge has haunted philosophy since the beginning of philosophical 
time.1 It appeared under various guises, and took on many 
different names. But its essence remained the same: it was 
always supposed to be some kind of immediate knowledge 
defined explicitly in opposition and as an alternative to con-
ceptual knowledge. Depending on the general framework in 
which it was invoked, it either proclaimed a higher form of 
knowledge capable of attaining the absolute (rationalism), 
or a more basic/fundamental kind of knowledge necessary to 
ground all knowledge claims (empiricism). 
1 I am deeply indebted to Ray Brassier and Pete Wolfendale without whom 
most of this would not even have been intuited. Apart from their ideas, I 
am just as grateful for their continual support, encouragement, generosity 
and patience. I would also like to thank the organisers of the Aesthetics in 
the 21st Century conference for the opportunity to present my views in front 
of such an esteemed audience, and all the participants for making it such 
a memorable event. This version of the paper benefited immensely from 
the discussions that followed my talk, especially the ones I had with Steven 
Shaviro, Vijak Haddadi and Ridvan Askin. Finally, a special thanks is in order 
to Ridvan for being such an attentive reader and discerning interlocutor. 
The final version of this text is certainly much better for all his questions, 
interventions, and suggestions. 
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Kant was the first to denounce the spectral nature of intuitive 
knowledge. But although Kant’s critical injunction against its 
possibility, both in its rationalist (“thoughts without content 
are empty”) and empiricist (“intuitions without concepts are 
blind”) guises, certainly put the spectre on the defensive, it 
was by no means enough to vanquish it.2 Kant’s attack was 
followed by numerous others, but always with the exact same 
results: no sooner had one of its incarnations been laid to 
rest, the spectre would rise from the dead almost instantly, 
each time in a slightly different form. And to this very day, 
it continues to haunt us still. 
Gilles Deleuze and Wilfrid Sellars, two major representa-
tives of the continental and analytic philosophical traditions 
respectively, are the best testaments to the claim that the 
spectre of intuitive knowledge is pretty much alive and well 
on both sides of the philosophical divide. While the former 
developed his whole philosophical system around an incred-
ibly rich and sophisticated (and all the more insidious for it!) 
account of intuitive knowledge, the latter devoted the greatest 
part of his philosophical adventure to sharpening the weap-
ons necessary to haunt this spectre down and exorcise it in 
whichever form it takes. Confronting the two with regards to 
their opposing views on intuitive knowledge presents a per-
fect opportunity not just for testing their respective claims to 
knowledge, but also, and more importantly, for posing again 
the question of the nature and justification of knowledge, a 
question almost completely forgotten by recent trends in 
continental philosophy. 
Ray Brassier, one of the very few contemporary continental 
philosophers unwilling to join in on this collective forget-
ting of the question of knowledge, expressed his perplexities 
about one particular variant of this trend: 
I am very wary of “aesthetics”: the term is contaminated by notions of 
“experience” that I find deeply problematic. I have no philosophy of 
2 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. 
Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 193-94, A51/B75. 
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art worth speaking of. This is not to dismiss art’s relevance for philoso-
phy—far from it—but merely to express reservations about the kind of 
philosophical aestheticism which seems to want to hold up “aesthetic 
experience” as a new sort of cognitive paradigm wherein the Modern 
(post-Cartesian) “rift” between knowing and feeling would be overcome.3
Although it has recently been taken up again by certain fac-
tions of contemporary continental philosophy, the tendency 
that Brassier describes here is nothing new. In fact, it has a 
long and noble heritage dating back all the way to the early 
Romantics. Deleuze’s critique of discursive reason and his 
appeal to intuitive knowledge, on the one hand, coupled with 
the strong alliance he has forged with art and aesthetics, on 
the other, reveal him as a direct successor to the philosophical 
legacy of early Romanticism. What better way to challenge 
Deleuze’s Romantic attempt at overcoming the dualism of 
knowing and feeling than to contrast it with Sellars’s rational-
ist upholding of its necessity and irreducibility?
This essay is divided into three parts. The first part attempts 
to demonstrate that Deleuze was in fact a firm believer in 
the powers of intuitive knowledge. To this end, I will present 
Deleuze’s accounts of three important notions that appeared 
throughout his early work: the ideas of mathesis universalis, 
Bergsonian intuition as a method, and the transcendent ex-
ercise of the faculties. The second part of the essay is devoted 
to Sellars and attempts to show that his famous myth of the 
given is nothing else than intuitive knowledge itself. Three 
different accounts of this myth are presented, namely the 
ones found in “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,”4 
“The Structure of Knowledge,”5 and “The Carus Lectures of 
3 Ray Brassier, “Against an Aesthetics of Noise,” Transitzone, nY, http://ny-
web.be/transitzone/against-aesthetics-noise.html (accessed July 15, 2013).
4 Wilfrid Sellars, “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” in Science, Per-
ception and Reality (Atascadero: Ridgeview, 1991).
5 Wilfrid Sellars, “The Structure of Knowledge,” http://www.ditext.com/
sellars/sk.html (accessed January 22, 2013). Published in: Action, Knowledge 
and Reality: Studies in Honor of Wilfrid Sellars, ed. Hector-Neri Castañeda 
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1975), 295-347; originally presented as The 
Matija Jelača – Sellars Contra Deleuze
95
Wilfrid Sellars.”6 The third and final part concludes the essay 
by staging a confrontation between these two formidable 
opponents. 
Deleuze: Mathesis Universalis, Intuition,
Transcendental Empiricism
For Deleuze, “the world of representation” is not a philoso-
pher’s world.7 It might be a scientist’s world, it certainly is a 
technician’s, politician’s, journalist’s, and bureaucrat’s world, 
but the only engagement with it worthy of a philosopher’s 
time is learning how to escape it. The main reasons for De-
leuze’s philosophical distrust in this world are neither new 
nor particularly original, and neither is his plan of escape. 
Possibly the clearest and most straightforward expression 
of Deleuze’s views on this account can be found in his first 
published text on Bergson:
One says that science gives us a knowledge of things, that it is therefore 
in a certain relation with them, and philosophy can renounce its rivalry 
with science, can leave things to science and present itself solely in a 
critical manner, as a reflection on this knowledge of things. On the 
contrary view, philosophy seeks to establish, or rather restore, an other 
relationship to things, and therefore an other knowledge, a knowledge 
and a relationship that precisely science hides from us, of which it 
deprives us, because it allows us only to conclude and to infer without 
ever presenting, giving to us the thing in itself.8
To understand this passage fully, it is best to supplement it 
Matchette Foundation Lectures for 1971 at the University of Texas.
6 Wilfrid Sellars, “Foundations for a Metaphysics of Pure Process: The Carus 
Lectures of Wilfrid Sellars,” The Monist (1981), 64:1, 3-90.
7 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1994), xix.
8 Gilles Deleuze, “Bergson, 1859–1941” in Desert Islands and Other Texts, 1953-
1974, ed. David Lapoujade, trans. Michael Taormina (New York: Semiotext(e), 
2004), 23, original emphasis.
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with another quote from one of Deleuze’s earliest published 
writings, “Mathesis, Science and Philosophy”: 
Scientific method is explanation. To explain is to account for a thing 
through something other than itself … At the other extreme, philo-
sophical method is description in the widest sense of the word; it is 
that reflexive analysis whereby the sensible world is described as the 
representation of the cognizing subject—that is to say, here once again, 
it receives its status from something other than itself.9
Deleuze’s argument is seductively simple: science and phi-
losophy (of representation) give us a knowledge of things 
only through something other than the thing itself. Therefore, 
they cannot give us the knowledge of the thing itself. An other 
kind of knowledge is necessary in order to get us at the thing 
itself. Other to representational or mediated knowledge is 
immediate knowledge. Therefore, only immediate knowledge 
can give us knowledge of the thing itself. This is the general 
structure of Deleuze’s argument against representational and 
in favour of intuitive knowledge. Depending on the context, 
the terms may vary, but its basic structure remains the same 
throughout Deleuze’s entire opus.
To confirm this claim and dispel the possible objection that 
the quotes above come from Deleuze’s early texts, which do 
not necessarily express his own views, it will suffice to take 
a closer look at one important and well known passage from 
Difference and Repetition, considered by many to be Deleuze’s 
single most important philosophical work, and also the first 
book in which Deleuze expressly speaks in his own name. By 
the end of chapter one, entitled “Difference in Itself,” Deleuze 
famously claims:
 
We have contrasted representation with a different kind of formation. 
The elementary concepts of representation are the categories defined 
9 Gilles Deleuze, “Mathesis, Science and Philosophy,” trans. Robin Mackay, 
Collapse (2007), 3, 147. Deleuze’s text was originally published as an introduc-
tion to Jean Malfatti de Montereggio’s Études sur la Mathèse ou anarchie et 
hiérarchie de la science (Paris: Editions Du Griffon D’Or, 1946).
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as the conditions of possible experience. These, however, are too general 
or too large for the real. The net is so loose that the largest fish pass 
through … Everything changes once we determine the conditions of 
real experience, which are not larger than the conditioned and which 
differ in kind from the categories.10
It does not take much effort to notice the similarity with the 
previous argument: representation can give us knowledge of 
the real only through the categories. Categories are by defini-
tion general, while the real is singular. Therefore, representa-
tion cannot give us knowledge of the real. An other kind of 
knowledge is necessary. Other to general concepts are singular 
concepts, and only the latter can give us knowledge of the real.
Deleuze, then, has staged pretty much the same argument 
against representation that he has staged in favour of im-
mediate knowledge from his earliest writings up to Difference 
and Repetition. Let us briefly analyse the structure of this 
argument. It consists of two parts: the first, critical part lays 
the basis for the second, constructive part. Although it might 
be interesting to question the critical part of the argument, 
it will be best to leave that aside for now and focus instead 
on its constructive part, which is much more important for 
my present purpose. 
Deleuze’s conclusion of the critical part of the argument 
presents the first premise of the second, constructive part: in 
order to get at the knowledge of the thing itself/the real, an 
other kind of knowledge is necessary. This other knowledge 
is supposed to be immediate and to consist of the creation 
and application of some kind of singular concepts, concepts 
appropriate to the thing itself/the real. In order to learn more 
about this other knowledge, it is necessary to return to the texts 
mentioned above. 
Although it was one of Deleuze’s earliest published writ-
ings, later explicitly disowned by him along everything else 
published before 1953, “Mathesis, Science and Philosophy” 
might very well be the most revealing text by Deleuze when 
10 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 68.
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it comes to the question of what this other knowledge is sup-
posed to be. The short answer would be mathesis universalis. 
But then, what is mathesis universalis? According to Deleuze, 
the opposition of science and philosophy has opened up 
a fundamental dualism within knowledge, the Cartesian 
dualism between res extensa and res cogitans.11 Mathesis uni-
versalis (universal knowledge or universal science) names 
the desire to overcome this dualism and accomplish a “unity 
of knowledge.”12 This unity is “the unity of life itself”: “Life 
is the unity of the soul as the idea of the body and of the 
body as the extension of the soul.”13 Accordingly, “mathesis 
deploys itself at the level of life, of living man: it is first and 
foremost a thinking of incarnation and of individuality.”14 But 
how does mathesis attain this knowledge of incarnation and 
individuality? As we have seen, both science and philosophy 
reduce the sensible object to an object of thought. In order 
to overcome this duality of the object of thought and the 
sensible object, the method of mathesis must reduce “this 
object of thought back to the sensible, quantity to quality.”15 
It achieves this through the deployment of the symbol, which 
presents precisely “a sensible object as the incarnation of 
an object of thought,” this sensible object being “the very 
incarnation of knowledge.”16 And finally, “the symbol is the 
identity, the encounter of the sensible object and the object of 
thought. The sensible object is called symbol, and the object 
of thought, losing all scientific signification, is a hieroglyph 
or a cipher. In their identity, they form the concept.”17 
Without getting into all the details that a complete account 
of this text would require, this short and condensed exposition 
11 Deleuze, “Mathesis, Science and Philosophy,” 142.
12 Ibid., 142.
13 Ibid., 143.
14 Ibid. my emphasis.
15 Ibid., 150.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid., 150–51.
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of only a few of its aspects is more than enough to clearly show 
that mathesis universalis indeed is Deleuze’s other knowledge. 
Defined as a knowledge of incarnation and individuality, 
mathesis universalis responds perfectly to our earlier descrip-
tion of Deleuze’s other knowledge as an immediate knowledge 
of the thing itself. Furthermore, this text provides a clue as 
to how this singular knowledge might be possible: by way of 
concepts formed through the deployment of symbols. 
In his various writings on Bergson, this other knowledge 
figures under the name of intuition. In “Bergson, 1859–1941,” 
Deleuze explicitly pits intuition against science: contrary 
to science, which “allows us only to conclude and to infer 
without ever presenting, giving to us the thing in itself,” it 
is “in and through intuition that something is presented, is 
given in person, instead of being inferred from something 
else and concluded.”18 But, in Deleuze’s reading of Bergson, 
intuition is not to be understood in the ordinary sense of the 
word. That is, intuition is “neither a feeling, an inspiration, 
nor a disorderly sympathy, but a fully developed method, 
one of the most fully developed methods in philosophy,” a 
method capable of establishing philosophy as an “absolutely 
‘precise’ discipline, as precise in its field, as capable of being 
prolonged and transmitted as science itself is.”19 A question 
immediately springs to mind, one that Deleuze certainly 
acknowledges: “How is intuition—which primarily denotes 
an immediate knowledge (connaissance)—capable of forming 
a method, once it is accepted that the method essentially 
involves one or several mediations?”20 As an answer to this 
question, Deleuze first states that although Bergson often does 
present intuition “as a simple act,” this simplicity “does not 
exclude a qualitative and virtual multiplicity,” following which 
he formulates “three different sorts of acts that determine 
the rules” of intuition as a method: “The first concerns the 
18 Deleuze, “Bergson, 1859–1941,” 23.
19 Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam 
(New York: Zone Books 1991), 13-14, original emphasis.
20 Ibid., 13-14.
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stating and creating of problems; the second, the discovery 
of genuine differences in kind; the third, the apprehension 
of real time.”21 The most interesting aspect is addressed in 
the second rule, which presents intuition as a method that 
“rediscovers the true differences in kind or articulations of 
the real.”22 The most concise account of this crucial aspect of 
intuition as a method is to be found in Deleuze’s text “Berg-
son’s Conception of Difference”: 
Intuition suggests itself as a method of difference or division: to divide 
whatever is composite into two tendencies. This method is something 
other than a spatial analysis, more than a description of experience, 
and less (so it seems) than a transcendental analysis. It reaches the 
conditions of the given, but these conditions are tendency-subjects, 
which are themselves given in a certain way: they are lived. What is 
more, they are at once the pure and the lived, the living and the lived, 
the absolute and the lived. What is essential here is that this ground is 
experienced, and we know how much Bergson insisted on the empirical 
character of the élan vital. Thus it is not the conditions of all possible 
experience that must be reached, but the conditions of real experience. 
Schelling had already proposed this aim and defined philosophy as 
a superior empiricism: this formulation also applies to Bergsonism. 
These conditions can and must be grasped in an intuition precisely 
because they are the conditions of real experience, because they are 
not broader than what is conditioned, because the concept they form is 
identical to its object … Reason must reach all the way to the individual, 
the genuine concept all the way to the thing, and comprehension all 
the way to “this.”23
The first thing to note with regard to this quote is that it un-
equivocally reveals that, despite being a method, and therefore 
involving various mediations, intuition still remains an es-
21 Deleuze, Bergsonism, 13-14.
22 Ibid., 21.
23 Gilles Deleuze, “Bergson’s Conception of Difference” in Desert Islands and 
Other Texts 1953-1974, ed. David Lapoujade, trans. Michael Taormina (New 
York: Semiotext(e), 2004), 35-36.
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sentially immediate faculty. Let us summarise: as a method of 
difference and division, that is, a method capable of dividing 
the composites into two tendencies, intuition is able to reach 
the conditions of the given or real experience. These condi-
tions are variously named by Deleuze “tendency-subjects,” 
“pure,” “the living,” “the absolute” and “the ground.” Deleuze’s 
claim that these conditions “can and must be grasped in 
intuition” simply reiterates his previous claims that these 
conditions are “themselves given in a certain way,” “lived” and 
“experienced.” Therefore, proclaiming it to be a method in no 
way excludes the immediacy of intuition. As Deleuze puts it 
himself: “Intuition has become method, or rather method has 
been reconciled with the immediate.”24 Secondly, this quote 
confirms once more that for Deleuze the aim of philosophy 
is the knowledge of the thing itself or the individual, and 
that this knowledge is attainable by constructing a singular 
or “unique” concept “identical to its object.”25 Finally, the 
quote above reveals not only that Deleuze’s philosophical 
project as explicated in Difference and Repetition is best read 
as a continuation of Bergson’s own project, but also in which 
respects Deleuze departs from it. To demonstrate both these 
claims, it is necessary to turn our attention to Difference and 
Repetition itself.
With regard to the first claim, some of the most important 
passages in Difference and Repetition are stated in virtually 
the exact same terms as those found in the quote above. One 
well-known passage in particular stands out in this respect:
Empiricism truly becomes transcendental, and aesthetics an apodictic 
discipline, only when we apprehend directly in the sensible that which 
can only be sensed, the very being of the sensible: difference, potential 
difference and difference in intensity as the reason behind qualitative 
diversity. It is in difference that movement is produced as an “effect,” 
that phenomena flash their meaning like signs. The intense world of 
differences, in which we find the reason behind qualities and the being 
of the sensible, is precisely the object of a superior empiricism. This 
24 Deleuze, Bergsonism, 32.
25 Deleuze, “Bergson’s Conception of Difference,” 36.
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empiricism teaches us a strange “reason,” that of the multiple, chaos 
and difference (nomadic distributions, crowned anarchies).26
If we add to this quote the already cited claim from the ending 
of the first chapter of Difference and Repetition that philosophy 
should search for the conditions of real experience, and not 
merely possible experience, it becomes quite obvious that 
Deleuze makes in his own name virtually the very same claims 
as those he attributes to Bergson in the passage quoted above 
from “Bergson’s Conception of Difference.” What, then, does 
Deleuze retain from Bergson? First and foremost, Deleuze 
clearly has not relinquished Bergson’s belief in the power of 
intuition to immediately apprehend the conditions of real 
experience: “Empiricism truly becomes transcendental, and 
aesthetics an apodictic discipline, only when we apprehend 
directly in the sensible that which can only be sensed” (my 
emphasis). Likewise, Deleuze retains the idea that intuition 
is a method of difference, i.e., that which intuition directly 
apprehends is difference: “that which can only be sensed,” or 
“the very being of the sensible” is “difference, potential dif-
ference and difference in intensity,” or simply “the intense 
world of differences.” It is in this world of differences that
we must find the lived reality of a sub-representative domain. If it 
is true that representation has identity as its element and similarity 
as its unit of measure, then pure presence such as it appears in the 
simulacrum has the ‘disparate’ as its unit of measure—in other words, 
always a difference of difference as its immediate element.27
 
Add to this Deleuze’s earlier equation of “the immediate” 
with the “sub-representative”28 and there can be no more 
doubt: for Deleuze, “the intense world of differences” or 
“sub-representative domain” is “a pure presence,” “a lived 
reality,” or simply “the immediate.” 
26 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 56-57.
27 Ibid., 69.
28 Ibid., 56.
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Let us now address the second question: in which respect 
does Deleuze depart from Bergson? The passage from 
“Bergson’s Conception of Difference” quoted earlier is of 
great assistance here. In a seemingly offhand remark at 
the beginning of the passage, Deleuze makes the following 
claim: intuition as a method is “more than a description of 
experience, and less (so it seems) than a transcendental analysis” 
(my emphasis). It is my contention that Deleuze’s account 
of the transcendent or superior exercise of the faculties as 
presented in Difference and Repetition’s central chapter “The 
Image of Thought” is precisely the transcendental version of 
Bergson’s intuition as a method that Deleuze invokes in this 
quote. In order to confirm this claim, let me briefly outline 
the basic contours of Deleuze’s account of the transcendent 
exercise of the faculties.
Deleuze famously states, “Something in the world forces us 
to think. This something is an object not of recognition but 
of a fundamental encounter.”29 The first characteristic of the 
object of this encounter is “that it can only be sensed.”30 Fol-
lowing this, Deleuze variously refers to “that which can only 
be sensed” as “the sign,” “the being of the sensible,” “that by 
which the given is given” and the “sentiendum.”31 Furthermore, 
it is important to highlight that this object of the encounter 
is “imperceptible (insensible) from the point of view of an 
empirical exercise of the senses in which sensibility grasps 
only that which could also be grasped by other faculties, and 
is related within the context of a common sense to an object 
which also must be apprehended by other faculties.”32 Con-
trary to its empirical exercise thus defined, “sensibility, in 
the presence of that which can only be sensed (and is at the 
same time imperceptible) finds itself before its own limit, the 
sign, and raises itself to the level of a transcendent exercise: 
29 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 139, original emphasis.
30 Ibid., 139.
31 Ibid., 139-40.
32 Ibid., 140.
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to the ‘nth’ power.”33 Once sensibility has been raised to its 
transcendent exercise by its encounter with the sentiendum, it 
“forces memory to remember the memorandum, that which can 
only be recalled,”34 thereby raising memory to a transcendent 
exercise of its own. Finally, memory in its turn
forces thought to grasp that which can only be thought, the cogitandum 
or noeteon, the Essence: not the intelligible, for this is still no more than 
the mode in which we think that which might be something other than 
thought, but the being of the intelligible as though this were both the 
final power of thought and the unthinkable.35
According to Deleuze, what is revealed by this “transcendent, 
disjointed or superior exercise of the faculties” is precisely 
their “transcendental form.”36 For, in order to avoid tracing 
the transcendental form of the faculties from their empirical 
exercise, as Kant does, Deleuze claims that
each faculty must be borne to the extreme point of its dissolution, at 
which it falls prey to triple violence: the violence of that which forces 
it to be exercised, of that which it is forced to grasp and which it alone 
is able to grasp, yet also that of the ungraspable (from the point of view 
of its empirical exercise).37
It is at this point that each faculty “discovers its own unique 
passion,”38 or its transcendental form. 
As I have emphasised, thought always begins with an 
encounter with the sentiendum. But what is this paradoxi-
cal element that can only be sensed yet is imperceptible at 
the same time? This element which forces sensibility to its 
transcendent exercise is
33 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 140.
34 Ibid., 141.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid., 143.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
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intensity, understood as pure difference in itself, as that which is at once 
both imperceptible for empirical sensibility which grasps intensity only 
already covered or mediated by the quality to which it gives rise, and 
at the same time that which can be perceived only from the point of 
view of a transcendental sensibility which apprehends it immediately 
in the encounter.39 
Thus, for Deleuze, thought always begins with an immediate 
apprehension of difference in itself. Deleuze could hardly 
be any more explicit about his belief in the idea of intuitive 
knowledge. The notion of the transcendent exercise of the 
faculties represents nothing less than Deleuze’s attempt to 
give a properly transcendental account of this age-old philo-
sophical ideal.
One last remark is in order. It might be objected that I am 
equivocating by eliding the distinction between thought 
and knowledge. As the objection might go, not only does 
Deleuze take over the Kantian distinction between thought 
and knowledge, but he is also expressly critical of the notion 
of “knowledge” throughout the book. This is, of course, true. 
But it is also quite obvious that “thought” in Difference and 
Repetition has almost the exact same function as “mathesis 
universalis” and “an other knowledge” have in his earlier 
texts. If the account given above of the transcendent exercise 
of the faculties were not enough by itself, this claim could be 
further reinforced by highlighting the fact that on various 
occasions throughout the book, Deleuze explicitly invokes 
both “an esoteric knowledge”40 and “mathesis universalis”41 
itself. To establish even stronger ties between Deleuze’s earlier 
texts and Difference and Repetition in this regard let me quote 
from the preface of the book:
Empiricism is by no means a reaction against concepts, nor a simple 
appeal to lived experience. On the contrary, it undertakes the most 
39 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 144.
40 Ibid., 15, 242.
41 Ibid., 181, 190, 199.
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insane creation of concepts ever seen or heard. Empiricism is a mysti-
cism and a mathematicism of concepts, but precisely one which treats 
the concept as object of an encounter, as a here-and-now, or rather as 
an Erewhon from which emerge inexhaustibly ever new, differently 
distributed “heres” and “nows.”42
Similar to his earlier work, Deleuze here explicitly invokes 
the creation of concepts identical to their objects as the goal 
of philosophy. Furthermore, his identification of empiricism 
with “a mysticism and a mathematicism of concepts” further 
encourages the conclusion that “transcendental empiricism” 
itself is, for Deleuze, just another name for mathesis universalis 
or intuition as a method.
Sellars: The Myth of The Given
Around the same time as Gilles Deleuze was invoking the 
mythical powers of mathesis universalis, Bergsonian intuition, 
and transcendental empiricism, Wilfrid Sellars was waging 
his lifelong battle against “the myth of the given” on the other 
side of the Atlantic. By no means was Sellars the first, nor 
will he be the last philosopher to face this mythical creature 
in an open field of battle. But he may very well be its most 
tenacious opponent to date. What made Sellars’s attack on the 
myth of the given so powerful was his recognition of its highly 
protean nature. As he famously states at the very beginning 
of “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,”
Many things have been said to be “given”: sense contents, material 
objects, universals, propositions, real connections, first principles, 
even givenness itself. And there is, indeed, a certain way of construing 
the situations which philosophers analyze in these terms which can 
be said to be the framework of givenness. This framework has been a 
common feature of most of the major systems of philosophy, includ-
ing, to use a Kantian turn of phrase, both “dogmatic rationalism” and 
“skeptical empiricism.” It has, indeed, been so pervasive that few, if any, 
42 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, xx.
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philosophers have been altogether free of it; certainly not Kant, and, 
I would argue, not even Hegel, that great foe of “immediacy.” Often 
what is attacked under its name are only specific varieties of “given.” 
Intuited first principles and synthetic necessary connections were the 
first to come under attack. And many who today attack “the whole idea 
of givenness”—and they are an increasing number—are really only at-
tacking sense data … If, however, I begin my argument with an attack 
on sense-datum theories, it is only as a first step in a general critique 
of the entire framework of givenness.43 
Sellars clearly realises that the various instances of the given 
are only different instantiations of the same general frame-
work of givenness. He also realises that if we are to have any 
success in vanquishing this myth once and for all, it will 
be necessary to formulate a general critique of this entire 
framework of givenness. Unfortunately, due to the nature of 
Sellars’s philosophising, heavily oriented as it was towards 
specific debates with his contemporaries, Sellars himself never 
presented either a systematic account of the framework of 
givenness, or the announced general critique of it. What he 
did leave behind, though, was a whole host of specific attacks 
on various different varieties of the given. Although all of 
these various critiques of different forms of the given were 
presented by way of debates with his analytic peers, the pas-
sage quoted above clearly shows that Sellars’s intended target 
was much wider in scope. In light of this, our later attempt at 
a Sellarsian critique of the Deleuzian “given” should seem 
a little less unlikely than it probably appears at first glance. 
However, if we are to stage this confrontation, it will first be 
necessary to briefly outline Sellars’s account of the myth of 
the given and his main arguments for rejecting it. And it will 
be paramount to do so in terms general enough so that this 
confrontation does not turn into a missed encounter. Three 
texts will be of particular assistance to us with regard to this 
task: “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” “The Struc-
ture of Knowledge,” and “Foundations for a Metaphysics of 
Pure Process: The Carus Lectures of Wilfrid Sellars.”
43 Sellars, “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” 127.
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Let us start with “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” 
(EPM). Of the various different formulations of the myth 
of the given, the one found in chapter eight, entitled “Does 
Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?,” in many ways the 
central chapter of the book, is definitely the most appropriate 
for our present purposes:
The idea that observation “strictly and properly so-called” is constituted 
by certain self-authenticating nonverbal episodes, the authority of 
which is transmitted to verbal and quasi-verbal performances when 
these performances are made “in conformity with the semantical rules 
of the language,” is, of course, the heart of the Myth of the Given. For 
the given, in epistemological tradition, is what is taken by these self-
authenticating episodes. These “takings” are, so to speak, the unmoved 
movers of empirical knowledge, “knowings in presence” which are 
presupposed by all other knowledge, both the knowledge of general 
truths and the knowledge “in absence” of other particular matters of 
fact. Such is the framework in which traditional empiricism makes 
its characteristic claim that the perceptually given is the foundation 
of empirical knowledge.44
First and foremost, this passage reveals which specific ver-
sion of the given is under attack, not just in this chapter, but 
in the book as a whole: it is, of course, the given as conceived 
by traditional empiricism. Secondly, the passage possibly 
presents the most concise account provided by Sellars of the 
empiricist given. To summarise, the empiricist given consists 
in taking certain self-authenticating nonverbal episodes given 
in perception as the foundation of empirical knowledge, and 
by extension as presupposed by all knowledge. Clearly, the 
key term here is “self-authenticating nonverbal episodes.” 
What Sellars denies is neither that these “observings are 
inner episodes, nor that strictly speaking they are nonverbal 
episodes.”45 Contrary to ill-informed popular belief, Sellars is 
not a reductionist, and especially not with regard to notions 
like “inner episodes,” “impressions,” or “immediate experi-
44 Sellars, “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” 169-70.
45 Ibid., 170, original emphasis.
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ence.” In fact, the later parts of EPM are explicitly devoted 
to devising an account of these very notions. What Sellars 
does deny, though, is the idea that these episodes are to be 
taken as self-authenticating, that is, that they have epistemic 
authority or the status of knowledge solely in virtue of their 
being perceptually given. This is the crucial point of Sellars’s 
critique of the given. 
The main reasons for Sellars’s denial of the given thus con-
strued is to be found in his famous definition of knowledge:
The essential point is that in characterizing an episode or a state as that 
of knowing, we are not giving an empirical description of that episode 
or state; we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying 
and being able to justify what one says.46
Add to this Sellars’s earlier denial that there is “any awareness 
of logical space prior to, or independent of, the acquisition of 
a language,”47 and the main contours of his argument slowly 
begin to emerge. If awareness of the logical space of reasons 
is impossible without the acquisition of a language, and if to 
know something is to place it in the logical space of reasons, 
then it follows that only that which is linguistically structured 
can lay claim to the status of knowledge.48 Finally, insofar as 
what is perceptually given is not linguistically structured, it 
obviously cannot lay claim to the status of knowledge.
In order to present Sellars’s argument in its entirety, though, 
it will be necessary to return once more to his formulation 
of the myth of the given. Let us recall: the claim made by 
traditional empiricism was not only that what is perceptually 
given is self-authenticating, but also, and just as importantly, 
that it can serve as a foundation of empirical knowledge, 
46 Sellars, “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” 169.
47 Ibid., 162.
48 Or as Robert Brandom famously put it: “only what is propositionally 
contentful and conceptually articulated can serve as (and stand in need) of 
justification, and so ground or constitute knowledge.” Robert Brandom, “Study 
Guide” in Wilfrid Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1997), 122.
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and by extension all knowledge. The first thing to note with 
regard to this claim, and as Sellars emphasises himself, is that 
by rejecting it, Sellars does not imply “that empirical knowl-
edge has no foundation.”49 On the contrary: “There is clearly 
some point to the picture of human knowledge as resting on 
a level of propositions—observation reports—which do not 
rest on other propositions in the same way as other proposi-
tions rest on them.”50 In other words, by rejecting the myth 
of the given, Sellars does not reject the idea that inferential 
judgments are grounded in some way on non-inferential 
judgments. His notion of “observation report” is precisely 
this kind of non-inferential judgment. But, on the other 
hand, Sellars does insist “that the metaphor of ‘foundation’ 
is misleading in that it keeps us from seeing that if there is 
a logical dimension in which other empirical propositions 
rest on observation reports, there is another logical dimen-
sion in which the latter rest on the former.”51 Without giving 
a complete account of Sellars’s term “observation reports,” 
the following will have to suffice for our present purposes: 
according to Sellars, even the simplest observation report like 
“this is green” implies “that one can have the concept of green 
only by having a whole battery of concepts of which it is one 
element.”52 Moreover, “there is an important sense in which 
one has no concept pertaining to the observable properties 
of physical objects in Space and Time unless one has them 
all—and, indeed ... a great deal more besides.”53
Returning to Sellars’s suspicion of the metaphor of “foun-
dation,” his beautifully written concluding remarks on 
this topic will also be the best possible way to conclude this 
short presentation of his views on the myth of the given as 
presented in EPM:
49 Sellars, “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” 170.
50 Ibid., original emphasis.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid., 148
53 Ibid.
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Above all, the picture is misleading because of its static character. One 
seems forced to choose between the picture of an elephant which rests 
on a tortoise (What supports the tortoise?) and the picture of a great 
Hegelian serpent of knowledge with its tail in its mouth (Where does 
it begin?). Neither will do. For empirical knowledge, like its sophisti-
cated extension, science, is rational, not because it has a foundation but 
because it is a self-correcting enterprise which can put any claim in 
jeopardy, though not all at once.54  
If making a knowledge claim consists of placing it in the 
logical space of reasons, then any and every such claim can 
never be safe from challenge, and therefore cannot serve as 
the firm ground of knowledge as a whole. But by the same 
token, if this is the only kind of knowledge available to us—by 
refuting the myth of the given, Sellars believes he has suffi-
ciently demonstrated this—then there is no way to challenge 
this framework as a whole. The only thing there is is a slow, 
arduous, hazardous, and never-ending process of testing each 
and every claim put forth. This is the inglorious venture of 
rational knowledge.  
Let us now move on to Sellars’s second text under consid-
eration here, “The Structure of Knowledge.”55 Interestingly 
enough, neither the notion of “the given,” nor that of “the 
myth of the given” are to be found in these lectures; at least 
not explicitly. But it is precisely because of this terminological 
peculiarity that this text is of particular interest. For while 
Sellars may not invoke the given explicitly, it is quite obvious 
that what he is in fact discussing is precisely another version 
of the myth of the given. And what makes this particular 
account of the myth especially interesting for our present 
purposes is the fact that Sellars here explicitly invokes “in-
tuitive knowledge,” thereby unequivocally confirming that 
the myth of the given indeed refers to this age-old notion.
The third and final lecture of the series, entitled “Epistemic 
Principles,” is crucial in this regard. After briefly conveying 
54 Sellars, “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” 170, original emphasis.
55 Sellars, “The Structure of Knowledge.”
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the traditional arguments for the necessity of non-inferential 
judgments, Sellars goes on to state,
We are clearly in the neighbourhood of what has been called the “self-
evident,” the “self-certifying,” in short, of “intuitive knowledge.” It is in 
this neighbourhood that we find what has come to be called the foun-
dational picture of human knowledge. According to this picture, beliefs 
which have inferential reasonableness ultimately rely for their author-
ity on a stratum of beliefs which are, in some sense, self-certifying.56
By using here almost the exact same terms to refer to intui-
tive knowledge (“self-evident” and “self-certifying”), as when 
referring to the given in EPM (“self-authenticating”), this 
passage clearly demonstrates that “the myth of the given” 
and “intuitive knowledge” are virtually synonymous for Sel-
lars. Likewise, by being almost identical to the discussions of 
the myth of the given in EPM, it surely dispels any possible 
doubts left. But only a few paragraphs later, an even more 
interesting passage appears:
Now many philosophers who have endorsed a concept of intuitive 
knowledge are clearly committed to the position that there is a level 
of cognition more basic than believing. This more basic level would 
consist of a sub-conceptual—where “sub-conceptual” is far from being 
used as a pejorative term—awareness of certain facts. In terms of the 
framework sketched in the preceding two lectures, there would be a 
level of cognition more basic than thinkings or tokenings of sentences in 
Mentalese—more basic, in fact, than symbolic activity, literal or analogi-
cal. It would be a level of cognition unmediated by concepts; indeed it 
would be the very source of concepts in some such way as described by 
traditional theories of abstraction. It would be “direct apprehension” 
of facts; their “direct presence” to the mind.57
Sellars here clearly presents a somewhat different version 
of the myth of the given to the one provided in EPM. But 
56 Sellars, “The Structure of Knowledge,” lecture 3, section 3, paragraph 14.
57 Ibid., lecture 3, section 5, paragraph 21, original emphases.
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there is little doubt that it still is the same mythical creature 
we have learned to recognise so very well. Here again the 
claim is that there is some kind of non-conceptual and non-
inferential knowledge that has the status of knowledge simply 
by virtue of being directly present, apprehended, or given 
to the mind. Given that this kind of knowledge essentially 
depends on the idea of “direct apprehension,” Sellars asks, 
how is this notion to be understood? To begin to answer this 
question, Sellars notes that “‘apprehend’, like ‘see’ is, in its 
ordinary sense, an achievement word.”58 This clearly implies 
that the act of apprehending might not be successful, that 
is, that it might occur without anything being apprehended. 
The consequences of this seemingly simple observation are 
spelled out in the next paragraph:
Many who use the metaphor “to see” in intellectual contexts over-
look the fact that in its literal sense “seeing” is a term for a successful 
conceptual activity which contrasts with “seeming to see.” No piling 
on of additional metaphors (e.g., “grasping,” which implies an object 
grasped) can blunt this fact. Now the distinction between seeing and 
merely seeming to see implies a criterion. To rely on the metaphors of 
“apprehending” or “presence of the object” is to obscure the need of 
criteria for distinguishing between “knowing” and “seeming to know,” 
which ultimately define what it means to speak of knowledge as a cor-
rect or well-founded thinking that something is the case.59
To put it in the simplest possible terms, knowledge necessarily 
implies some criteria by which it is to be distinguished from 
ostensible knowledge. Therefore, invocations of direct appre-
hension, which obviate this simple fact, cannot lay claim to 
the status of knowledge. Finally, Sellars concludes:
In short, I suspect that the notion of a non-conceptual “direct appre-
hension” of a “fact” provides a merely verbal solution to our problem. 
The regress is stopped by an ad hoc regress-stopper. Indeed, the very 
58 Sellars, “The Structure of Knowledge,” lecture 3, section 5, paragraph 23, 
original emphasis.
59 Ibid., lecture 3, section 5, paragraph 24, original emphases.
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metaphors which promised the sought-for foundation contain within 
themselves a dialectical moment which takes us beyond them.60
The last sentence is worth highlighting. Instead of providing 
a non-conceptual foundation for conceptual knowledge, as 
they are supposed to do, metaphors of direct apprehending, 
grasping, seeing and the like, allow us to arrive at the exact 
opposite conclusion: if something is to lay claim to the status 
of knowledge, there has to be an explicit (or implicit) criterion 
by which this claim is to be adjudicated.
To conclude this second part of my essay, let me briefly 
address one last account of the myth of the given, the one 
presented by Sellars in his Carus Lectures.61 In the first lecture 
of the series, given under the title “The Lever of Archimedes,” 
Sellars states this:
If a person is directly aware of an item which has categorial status C, 
then the person is aware of it as having categorial status C.
This principle is, perhaps, the most basic form of what I have castigated 
as “The Myth of the Given” ... To reject the Myth of the Given is to reject the 
idea that the categorial structure of the world—if it has a categorial struc-
ture—imposes itself on the mind as a seal imposes an image on melted wax.62
Thus, “the most basic form” of the myth of the given consists 
in the idea that the “categorial structure of the world” is in some 
way directly available or given to the mind. To understand why 
this might be problematic for Sellars, we have to take a look 
at his conception of the categories. In Sellars’s functionalist-
nominalist Kantian interpretation, categories are defined as 
“the most generic functional classifications of the elements 
60 Sellars, “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” lecture 3, section 5, 
paragraph 25.
61 Sellars, “Foundations for a Metaphysics of Pure Process.”
62 Ibid., 11-12, original emphasis.
Matija Jelača – Sellars Contra Deleuze
115
of judgments.”63 This definition of the categories makes it 
obvious that, for Sellars, the categorial structure of the world 
is not something that can be simply read off of the world. On 
the contrary, we can arrive at the categorial structure of the 
world only as a result of that long, slow, and arduous self-
correcting rational enterprise described earlier. This might 
in fact be one of the most important lessons to be learned 
from Sellars: knowledge of the world is indeed possible; but 
it will most certainly not come by some miraculous insight. 
Hard work is still our best bet.
Sellars Contra Deleuze: Normativity versus Creativity
Now that we have assembled all their weapons, let us follow 
these two formidable opponents onto the field of battle. The 
stakes of this confrontation are high indeed! Nothing less 
than their respective claims to knowledge are on the line, 
possibly even the nature of knowledge itself. But before we 
let them engage each other in battle, one last effort is in order. 
If we are to confront these two great philosophers in their 
guises of major representatives of two opposing philosophical 
camps, some common ground has to be found upon which 
this confrontation is to be staged. The problem of universals 
might very well be just what we are looking for. For it could 
be argued that both Sellars and Deleuze fashioned their re-
spective philosophies in general, and accounts of knowledge 
in particular, precisely in response to this ancient and well-
travelled philosophical problem.
Traditionally, three types of answers were given to the ques-
tion of the existence of universals. Platonic realism affirmed 
it, nominalism denied it, and conceptualism (or idealism) 
acknowledged the existence of universals but merely as 
concepts or ideas in the mind. While Deleuze could arguably 
be classified in the first, realist camp, Sellars is to be situated 
63 Wilfrid Sellars, “Toward a Theory of the Categories” in Kant’s Transcendental 
Metaphysics, ed. Jeffrey F. Sicha (Atascadero: Ridgeview Publishing, 2002), 329.
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firmly in the second, nominalist one.64 Let us start once more 
with Deleuze.
As Deleuze, following Nietzsche, famously stated, the 
overturning (or reversal) of Platonism is the principal task 
of modern philosophy.65 Deleuze’s solution to the problem 
of universals, and possibly even his philosophy as a whole, is 
best read in light of this often repeated pronouncement of 
his. The first thing to note in this regard is that this operation 
of overturning is not to be confused with a simple denial of 
Platonism. Quite the contrary, “that this overturning should 
conserve many Platonic characteristics is not only inevitable 
but desirable.”66 Therefore, in order to understand Deleuze’s 
stated ambition to overturn Platonism it is necessary to de-
termine which aspects of Plato’s system Deleuze retains, and 
in what form, and which ones he discards.
It could be argued that Plato’s whole philosophical enterprise 
is a response to the problem of universals. And his solution 
is very well known. To put it in the simplest possible terms, 
in order to account for the existence of universals, Plato 
found it necessary to postulate an Other world: beyond the 
sensible world of appearances (individuals, becoming, im-
ages, copies, simulacra, differences) existing in time, there is 
an intelligible world of essences (Universals, Being, Forms, 
Ideas, the One) outside of time. The task of philosophy, then, 
is to think this Other world. In order to accomplish this, Plato 
also had to postulate an Other kind of knowledge: beyond 
the discursive intellect capable of providing knowledge of 
the sensible world, there is an intuitive intellect capable of 
immediately apprehending the intelligible world. 
Interestingly enough, Deleuze’s overturning of Platonism 
retains virtually all of Plato’s dualisms listed above. But it does 
64 With regard to Deleuze’s solution to the problem of universals, I am fol-
lowing Pete Wolfendale’s account provided in his paper “Ariadne’s Thread: 
Temporality, Modality, and Individuation in Deleuze’s Metaphysics,” http://
deontologistics.files.wordpress.com/2011/03/deleuze-mmu.pdf, (accessed 
July 15, 2013).
65 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 58.
66 Ibid.
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so with the intent to abolish the fundamental Platonic dual-
ism of the sensible world of appearances and the intelligible 
world of essences. For Deleuze, there simply is no Other world: 
the world we live in is the only world there is. And, as Deleuze 
and Guattari put it, “it may be that believing in this world, in 
this life, becomes our most difficult task today.”67 In order to 
accomplish this difficult task, Deleuze recruits the help of a 
whole host of figures from the entire history of philosophy. 
Arguably, Immanuel Kant is the most important of these. For 
as the one who discovered “the prodigious domain of the 
transcendental,” Kant is hailed by Deleuze as the “analogue 
of a great explorer—not of another world, but of the upper 
and lower reaches of this one.”68 It is Kant’s discovery of the 
transcendental that allows Deleuze to solve the problem of 
universals. Ideas (or universals) do exist, but not as eternal 
essences in an Other world; rather, they are to be conceived 
of as the conditions of experience to be found in the lower 
reaches of this world. But contrary to Kant, who conceived of 
the transcendental in epistemological terms, that is, as condi-
tions of possible experience, Deleuze famously reconceives 
the transcendental in ontological terms, that is, as conditions 
of real experience. 
Deleuze’s world therefore truly is a reversed version of Plato’s 
dualist universe. While Deleuze retains Plato’s dualism of the 
intelligible and the sensible he, instead of opposing them as 
two distinct worlds, conceives of them as two complementary 
aspects of this world. The intelligible domain of Ideas is to 
be conceived as the condition of the sensible domain of 
real experience. In a similar inversion and contrary to Plato, 
for whom the intelligible world is to be thought in terms 
of the One and the Same, and the sensible world in terms 
of the multiple and the different, the intelligible realm of 
Deleuze’s world is populated by Ideas defined as differential 
multiplicities, which are then to be actualised in the sen-
67 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, trans. Hugh Tomlin-
son and Graham Burchill (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 75.
68 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 135.
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sible realm as self-identical individuals. Furthermore and 
again contra Plato, for whom only the intelligible world of 
essences is real, Deleuze draws on Duns Scotus’s doctrine of 
the univocity of being in order to affirm the reality of both 
the intelligible and the sensible domains. “Being is said in a 
single and same sense of everything of which it is said, but 
that of which it is said differs: it is said of difference itself.”69 
Finally, if the overturning of Platonism is to be complete, 
Deleuze has to find a principle of immanence which will al-
low him to demonstrate that the intelligible and the sensible 
indeed are to be conceived as two domains of the same world. 
Contrary to Plato’s relegation of time to the sensible world 
of appearances, and the upholding of the eternal nature of 
the intelligible world of essences, Deleuze affirms precisely 
time as the unifying principle. These are the basic contours 
of Deleuze’s ontology. 
In order to think this world, Deleuze will, once again, follow 
in Plato’s footsteps. If we are to think the immediate unity 
of the intelligible and sensible, discursive reason with all its 
mediations simply will not do. What is needed is an other 
knowledge capable of going beyond the sensible. But this time, 
contrary to Plato, this beyond is not situated up and above this 
world, but down and below in its lower reaches. Thought is to 
apprehend directly the intelligible, the being of the sensible 
or the conditions of real experience. As we have seen in the 
first part of this essay, thought begins with an encounter with 
the sentiendum (the being of the sensible, or that which can 
only be sensed), and proceeds to think the cogitandum (the 
being of the intelligible, or that which can only be thought). 
Interestingly enough, in his quest for this other knowledge, 
Deleuze will once again find an unlikely ally in Kant. For it 
is precisely Kant’s account of the sublime that Deleuze takes 
as a model for his account of the transcendent exercise of 
the faculties.
The consequences of Deleuze’s overturning of Platonism 
for philosophy were revolutionary indeed. Ever since Plato 
69 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 36.
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and up until Kant’s Copernican or epistemological turn, 
metaphysics was proverbially considered to be the queen of 
all sciences. After almost two centuries of various attempts 
in the wake of Kant to disprove its possibility, Deleuze was 
one of the first contemporary philosophers to give back to 
metaphysics the pride of place it deserves. But in Deleuze’s 
world of overturned Platonism, metaphysics will find itself 
allied with the most unlikely of allies. In contrast to both 
Plato’s denial of the reality of the sensible realm, on the one 
hand, and Kant’s denial of the reality of the intelligible realm, 
on the other, Deleuze’s affirmation of the univocity of being, 
affirming as it does the reality of both the sensible and the 
intelligible domains, breeds a new philosophical alliance 
between metaphysics and aesthetics. In this regard, Deleuze’s 
famous pronouncement on aesthetics, castigating Kant and 
his transcendental conditions of possibility for introducing 
the familiar schism between the two senses of the term, is of 
a particular significance: 
No wonder, then, that aesthetics should be divided into two irreducible 
domains: that of the theory of the sensible which captures only the 
real’s conformity with possible experience; and that of the theory of 
the beautiful, which deals with the reality of the real in so far as it is 
reflected. Everything changes once we determine the conditions of real 
experience, which are not larger than the conditioned and which differ 
in kind from the categories: the two senses of the aesthetic become one, 
to the point where the being of the sensible reveals itself in the work of 
art, while at the same time the work of art appears as experimentation.70 
This quote expands on the already cited claim made by Deleuze: 
“Empiricism truly becomes transcendental, and aesthetics an 
apodictic discipline, only when we apprehend directly in the 
sensible that which can only be sensed, the very being of the 
sensible.”71 Whether we want to call Deleuze’s philosophy 
an aesthetical metaphysics or a metaphysical aesthetics, it 
70 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 68.
71 Ibid., 56-57, original emphasis.
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is quite obvious that for Deleuze aesthetics and metaphysics 
are virtually interchangeable terms. But what the first quote 
also reveals is the importance that Deleuze attributes to art. 
Add to this Deleuze’s earlier equation of the work of art with 
transcendental empiricism or the science of the sensible,72 
and it becomes clear that Deleuze has forged an equally 
strong bond between art and philosophy itself. Never since 
the early Romantics has there been such a grand alliance 
of aesthetics and metaphysics on the one hand, and art and 
philosophy on the other.
Let us now turn to Sellars. There is little doubt that Sellars 
was a scientific realist. As he famously put it in EPM, “in the 
dimension of describing and explaining the world, science 
is the measure of all things, of what is that it is, and of what 
is not that it is not.”73 But Sellars’s commitment to scientific 
realism is to be interpreted in terms of his deeper commit-
ment to naturalism. To be is to exist in nature, nature being 
understood here as the spatiotemporal causal domain. Science 
is the measure of all things simply because it has proven itself 
time and again as the best and most reliable way for exploring 
this spatiotemporal causal realm. Sellars’s nominalism, in 
turn, follows from his naturalism. Being causally impotent, 
universals or abstract entities cannot be said to exist in any 
meaningful way. Individuals are all there is.74
It might seem tempting to read Sellars as a reductive or even, 
as some have done, an eliminative materialist. But nothing 
could be further from the truth. If there is one thing Sellars 
was always unequivocal about, it is his insistence that the 
greatest challenge facing modern philosophy today is how 
“to take both man and science seriously.”75 The clash of the 
scientific and manifest images of man in the world is to be 
72 Ibid., 56.
73 Sellars, “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” 173.
74 I am here following Willem A. deVries’ characterisation of Sellars as pre-
sented in his study Wilfrid Sellars (Chesham: Acumen, 2005).
75 Wilfrid Sellars, Science and Metaphysics (Atascadero: Ridgeview, 1967), 1.
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resolved not by reducing one to the other, or by eliminating 
one altogether, but by fusing these two images into one ste-
reoscopic vision.76 If philosophy is to meet this challenge, it is 
imperative to acknowledge both the authority of the scientific 
image over the natural space of causes (the order of being, or 
the real order), as well as the authority of the manifest image 
over the normative space of reasons (the order of knowing, or 
the conceptual order). Defining the nature of the complicated 
relationship between the natural and the normative has been 
the central problem of Sellars’s entire philosophical enterprise. 
Sellars’s response to this predicament is ingenious to say 
the least. The normative space of reasons is to be understood 
as causally reducible, but logically (conceptually) irreducible to 
the natural space of causes.77 Insofar as conceptual thought 
or the logical space of reasons has a material substrate from 
which it arises, there is nothing, in principle, preventing the 
natural sciences from exploring it. This is why, for Sellars, the 
normative is causally reducible to the natural. On the other 
hand, insofar as the space of reasons is essentially normative 
in character there is nothing, in principle, that the natural 
sciences can teach us about it. Given that they are empiri-
cal, descriptive and concerned with what is the case, natural 
sciences cannot by definition provide an account of the 
transcendental, the prescriptive and what ought to be the case. 
This is why, for Sellars, the normative is logically (conceptually) 
irreducible to the natural. 
There is another sense in which the normative can be said 
to be ineliminable. Following Kant, Sellars defines thought as 
essentially conceptual, that is, as a rule-governed activity. The 
rules governing thought, as Pete Wolfendale puts it, are to be 
conceived as “the fundamental norms of rationality—those 
norms by which we are bound simply in virtue of making 
claims at all, or those norms that provide the conditions of 
76 See Wilfrid Sellars, “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man” in Sci-
ence, Perception and Reality (Atascadero: Ridgeview, 1991), 4-5.
77 Cf. James O’Shea, Wilfrid Sellars: Naturalism with a Normative Turn (Cam-
bridge: Polity Press, 2007), 21.
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the possibility of rationality itself.”78 Insofar as the natural 
sciences are essentially rational, they are bound by these same 
fundamental norms of rationality. This is why, for Sellars, the 
normative is to be construed not only as irreducible to, but 
as constitutive of the transcendental conditions of empirical 
knowledge that the sciences provide of the natural domain. 
In claiming that the norms of reasoning are to be construed 
as the transcendental conditions of knowledge of the natu-
ral world, Sellars clearly sides with Kant. But on the other 
hand, in upholding that the knowledge which the natural 
sciences attain is a knowledge not of appearances, but of 
the real order or the in-itself, Sellars obviously rejects Kant’s 
injunction against the possibility of such a knowledge. By 
the same token, Sellars certainly does not shy away from af-
firming the possibility of metaphysics. Yet, once again siding 
with Kant, Sellars clearly believed that if metaphysics is to be 
anything more than a flight of fancy, it needs to be coupled 
with epistemology. Or as Ray Brassier puts it: “just as episte-
mology without metaphysics is empty, metaphysics without 
epistemology is blind.”79
The time for confrontation has finally come. Let us start it 
by foregrounding the single most important conviction that 
Deleuze and Sellars both share: they both firmly believe not 
just in the possibility, but the necessity of metaphysics—if 
philosophy is to be anything at all, it has to be a metaphysics. 
To describe and explain the fundamental structure of the 
world has always been and always will be the ultimate goal 
of philosophical thinking. But with regards to answering the 
question of how philosophy is to achieve this formidable 
goal, Deleuze and Sellars could not be further apart from 
one another. 
78 Pete Wolfendale, “Essay on Transcendental Realism,” http://deontologis-
tics.files.wordpress.com/2010/05/essay-on-transcendental-realism.pdf, 38 
(accessed July 15, 2013).
79 Ray Brassier, “Concepts and Objects” in The Speculative Turn: Continental 
Materialism and Realism, ed. Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek, and Graham Harman 
(Melbourne: Re.press, 2011), 49.
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Deleuze’s epistemology, insofar as he can be said to have one, 
follows from his ontology. In his attempt to overturn Platonism, 
Deleuze affirms a one world ontology. This world is the only 
world there is. Yet Deleuze retains Plato’s distinction of the 
sensible and the intelligible. Only this time, these distinct 
realms are to be conceived as two aspects of this world: the 
intelligible, universal, virtual, transcendental Ideas constitut-
ing its lower reaches, and the sensible, singular, actual, and 
empirical individuals the upper ones. If we are to know this 
world, Deleuze insists, conceptual, representational knowledge 
will not do. An other knowledge is necessary, a knowledge 
supposedly capable of apprehending directly the intelligible 
Ideas, but also of creating the concepts identical to the sen-
sible individuals. These two dimensions of knowledge, the 
intuitive and the creative, are not to be conceived as distinct, 
but as two sides of the same coin, or two aspects of a single 
principle governing thought. Once again, Deleuze’s account 
of thought follows from his account of being. In line with his 
affirmation of the univocity of being, Deleuze believes that if 
we are to affirm the being of thought, being has to be said of 
thought in the same sense in which it is said of everything 
else. And, as is well known, the sense of being, for Deleuze, 
is productive or creative difference. This is why Deleuze af-
firms that “to think is to create.”80 Finally, following the early 
Romantics, Deleuze finds the model for this other knowledge 
in aesthetic experience (for its intuitive aspect) on the one 
hand, and artistic practice (for its creative aspect) on the 
other. By the same token, Deleuze will proclaim aesthetics to 
be the greatest ally of metaphysics, and art that of philosophy. 
Sellars, on the other hand, unequivocally upholds the 
distinction between epistemology and ontology. But this dis-
tinction itself is to be conceived in epistemological, and not 
ontological terms.81 By construing thought as a rule-governed, 
80 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 135.
81 For a much more detailed and precise account of this aspect of Sellars’s 
philosophy, see Daniel Sacilotto’s paper “Realism and Representation: On 
the Ontological Turn,” Speculations (2013), 4, 53-62.
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normative activity, Sellars is able to affirm both the episte-
mological difference and ontological indifference of thought 
from being. Insofar as it is an activity, that is, something that 
we do and not something that is, thought, strictly speaking, 
has no being. But by the same token, precisely because it is 
an activity, it is not to be conceived as something otherworldy 
or supernatural, but as firmly rooted in this world and in 
the order of natural causality. Therefore, and in contrast to 
Deleuze’s program, Sellars clearly shows that upholding the 
distinction between being and thought need not imply a com-
mitment to an ontological dualism of some sort. That is, the 
difference between thought and being is not an ontological 
but an epistemological difference. Sellars’s ontological com-
mitment to naturalism and scientific realism follows from 
his epistemological commitment to the distinction between 
being construed as the natural space of causes, and thought 
construed as the normative space of reasons. To be, for Sel-
lars, is to be causally efficacious, and thus only a naturalism 
willing to take seriously the advances of the natural sciences 
can explore the natural space of causes. Yet, if this natural-
ism is to provide a complete account of this world, it has to 
acknowledge its normative dimension, that is, the specificity 
of the normative space of reasons. Sellars’s philosophy indeed 
is a “naturalism with a normative turn.”82
Deleuze and Sellars both affirm the univocity of being. And 
they both attempt to devise an account of thought that would 
not go against this basic ontological principle. For Deleuze, 
this means that if the distinction between being and thought 
is not to be construed as an ontological dualism, thought is to 
be said in the same sense as that in which being is said, that 
is, as creative difference. But by construing thought purely in 
ontological terms, Deleuze collapses the very distinction he 
is trying to explain, making it thereby unintelligible. By the 
same token, Deleuze’s failure to acknowledge the specificity 
of thought in its difference from being leaves him without a 
proper epistemology, making it thereby impossible for him to 
82 O’Shea, Wilfrid Sellars, 3.
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justify his ontology. Finally, by erasing the difference between 
being and thought, Deleuze might have escaped the need to 
construe thought as an ontologically distinct domain, but he 
has accomplished this at a steep price indeed, the price being 
nothing less than idealism. Ironically enough, Deleuze’s at-
tempt to overturn Platonism ends up affirming Plato’s worst 
idealist excesses.
In order to provide an account of thought that does not 
violate the principle of the univocity of being, Sellars takes the 
exact opposite route to the one travelled by Deleuze. For Sellars, 
thought is expressly not to be construed in ontological terms. 
If we are to avoid the dangers of collapsing the distinction 
between being and thought on the one hand, and of turning 
it into an ontological dualism on the other, it is imperative 
to conceive thought both in its difference from but also in its 
relation to being. As we have seen, Sellars achieves this by 
conceiving thought in normative terms, as a rule-governed 
activity. Thought is at the same time different from (logically 
irreducible to) and in relation to (causally reducible to) being. 
By securing the rights of thought in its distinction from be-
ing, Sellars simultaneously secures the rights of being from 
the idealist incursions of thought. This way, Sellars is able to 
uphold a decidedly realist ontology. Finally, insofar as the 
normative space of reasons can be construed in transcendental 
terms, as consisting of the very conditions of the possibility 
of rationality, Sellars’s ontology can be said to be a properly 
transcendental realism.
Let us conclude. Ultimately, the confrontation between 
Deleuze and Sellars revolves around their contrasting views 
on normativity. While Sellars’s entire philosophical edifice is 
built upon his normative conception of thought and knowl-
edge, Deleuze’s philosophical adventure is best described as 
an attempt to escape the norm-bound world of judgment 
and representation. In fact, Deleuze’s quest for an other 
knowledge is nothing but such an attempt. But what Deleuze 
fails to realise, and what Sellars makes so perfectly clear, is 
that the choice to leave the normative space of reasons is 
not ours to make in the first place. To reiterate once again 
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Wolfendale’s pronouncement: insofar as we make any claims 
at all, we are bound by the fundamental norms of rationality, 
the very norms that provide the conditions of the possibility 
of rationality itself. Unless one is willing to leave behind the 
claim to rationality itself, there simply is no way out of the 
normative space of reasons.
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Not Kant, Not Now
Another Sublime
Claire Colebrook
Pennsylvania State University
I
It started clearly enough, per-haps: speculative realism announced itself handily with a collective voice, 
in the form of a conference and then an edited collection.1 
Unlike other movements that are not quite unified or even 
vaguely coherent (postmodernism, post-structuralism, new 
historicism, thing theory), speculative realism seemed to 
gain in focus as it gained numbers. There are differences 
voiced among the party faithful, and it might not be entirely 
accurate to align speculative realism with object-oriented 
ontology tout court, but there is one thing that can be said 
for certain: speculative realism and deconstruction are not 
the same thing.2 I would justify this claim (even if it might 
1 The inaugural conference took place at Goldsmiths, University of London 
in 2007 the transcript of which can be found in Ray Brassier, Iain Hamilton 
Grant, Graham Harman, and Quentin Meillassoux, “Speculative Realism,” 
Collapse (2007), 3, 307-449. This first collective outing was followed by a far 
broader volume in 2011, The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and 
Realism, ed. Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek, and Graham Harman (Melbourne: 
Re.press, 2011).
2 Focusing on the following quotation from Of Grammatology Peter Gratton 
argues that nothing can be referred to in full presence but only as mediated 
through the temporality of difference: “there have never been anything but 
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seem not to require any such justification) by way of three 
points. First, if we take the term “speculative realism” seri-
ously then its embedded claim goes against two Derridean 
strategies: the critique of speculation and the deconstruction 
of realism. In his discussion of Lacanian psychoanalysis, the 
very possibility of speculation, of surveying a scene and then 
accounting for its possibility, must leave out of consideration 
the point of view from which that scene is viewed.3 One can 
purvey a field only by way of an already established distance. 
What is left out of play is the mise-en-scène, or distribution, 
that enables speculation (or what Jacques Derrida refers to 
as the “scene of writing”). The economy of this visual sense 
of speculation is therefore exorbitant: it cannot be the case 
that one takes account of a scene and then emerges with a 
greater degree of insight, for there must have been (already 
and without retrieval) some spending of force that enabled 
the relation of speculator to scene to unfold. Deconstruction 
would be anti-speculative. Second, once one ties speculation 
to realism things only get worse: speculation or the stepping 
outside of the given in order to account for the real must 
necessarily be distanced from the real that is its supposed end. 
For Derrida, empiricism or any attempt to close the gap and 
find a proximity with what is has always been metaphysics’ 
most spontaneous gesture:
the profundity of the empiricist intention must be recognized beneath 
the naiveté of certain of its historical expressions. It is the dream of a 
purely heterological thought at its source. A pure thought of pure differ-
ence. Empiricism is its philosophical name, its metaphysical pretension 
supplements, substitutive significations which could only come forth in 
a chain of differential references, the ‘real’ supervening, and being added 
only while taking on meaning from a trace and from an invocation of the 
supplement, etc.” Peter Gratton, “Post-Deconstructive Realism: It’s About 
Time,” Speculations (2013), 4, 84. My argument is slightly different; all the 
features that we use to describe textual mediation—such as dispersal, un-
thinking automaticity and decaying matter—are at the heart of anything 
we deem to be a thing.
3 Jacques Derrida, The Post-Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond, trans. Alan 
Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).
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or modesty. We say dream because it must vanish at daybreak, as soon 
as language awakens.4 
If speculation claims to be realist then it loses the recognition 
of the difference, distinction and unfolding of our relation 
to what is. From a deconstructive point of view what this, in 
turn, yields is a diminished responsibility: it is because there 
is no direct access to the real, and because any speculation 
is necessarily unable to give an account of itself and its pos-
sibility, that any of our decisions are ultimately undecidable. 
Any decision we make emerges from this undecidability and 
is necessarily haunted by the sacrifice of not following the 
other potential decisions.
Third, speculative realism relies on a certain diagnosis of 
deconstruction and post-Kantianism in order to make its 
own claims. The Kantian Copernican turn rejects the project 
of speculation that would step beyond the limits of finite 
human understanding: to know is to be given what is other 
than oneself, and therefore requires a relation to the known. 
Knowledge is essentially, and not just contingently, finite. Our 
knowledge is always our knowledge, and the only claims we 
can make that are not subject to the contingencies of finite 
knowledge are drawn from the conditions of our knowing.
Deconstruction, for all its rejection of foundations and 
transcendental conditions is, nevertheless, an acceptance of 
finitude and conditions; there can only be quasi-transcendentals 
precisely because any condition that we posit for knowledge 
(such as language, trace, the subject, culture or history) is itself 
given after the event of the differential dispersal that makes 
knowing and experiencing possible. It might seem that the 
epitome of this deconstructive abandonment of speculative 
thought that would go beyond the given could be found in 
the more literary versions of deconstruction, such as Paul 
de Man. Derrida, at least, thought that the abandonment of 
foundational or speculative knowledge would open to a future 
4 Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1978), 151, original emphasis.
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beyond any of the calculations and conditions of the present. 
But no such dimension seems present in de Man’s work, and 
if one can charge deconstruction with limiting thought to its 
conditions then de Man’s emphasis on tropes would seem to 
limit his use of the term “materiality” to a linguistic material-
ity. I want to argue that this is not the case, and my counter 
narrative would go like this: Derrida increasingly turns to 
a more Kantian or hyper-Kantian conception of the future, 
where the very differential condition of language generates 
a promise beyond any actualised context. When matter is 
conceptualised after deconstruction it is either as that which 
the text gestures towards but can never comprehend; or, as 
in speculative realism, matter is that which ought to be our 
concern once we have rid ourselves of deconstructive bad con-
science. I would argue that there is another text and another 
matter: not matter as outside the text, but text as matter and 
text as dead. All the features that we have used to differenti-
ate text from matter and things (such that texts operate in a 
viral manner, repeated beyond their point of genesis, without 
comprehension, without intent, circulating and having force 
without sense)—all the rogue features of texts mark what we 
think of as things, just as texts are things. This is the great de 
Manian deconstructive claim: a text is a thing. We may read 
the text as a living presence, as the opening onto a world of 
sense, soul, meaning, contexts and relations—but the text 
itself is an inscribed and finite thing. By the same token, if 
we strive to be purely literary and see the text as nothing 
more than text, if we strive to rid ourselves of the illusion 
that texts open out or gesture towards presence we are once 
again creating yet one more narrative and one more relation 
that becomes the relation of all relations: all we are given is 
text—the rogue detachment and dispersal of matter—and yet 
all we do is read, positing a real that is, in itself, a presence as 
such free from all our projections: 
the relationship and the distinction between literature and philoso-
phy cannot be made in terms of a distinction between aesthetic and 
epistemological categories. All philosophy is condemned, to the extent 
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that it is dependent on figuration, to be literary and, as the depository 
of this very problem, all literature is to some extent philosophical.5 
I would argue that it does no one any good either to save 
deconstructive mediation or to return to the matter that de-
construction vanquished. I would suggest that what has been 
expelled from deconstruction for the sake of realism—the 
literary or textual deconstruction that was tied to de Man 
and rejected in favour of a philosophical and futural decon-
struction—offers a more radical materialism. That is, realism, 
the real and reality are effects of what de Man referred to as 
materiality; that materiality is textual, rhetorical and literary 
not because it is tied to some form of human construction 
or speech but because it is dispersal that effects a relation 
between interior and exterior, before and after, real and ideal.
II
The uses of the term “matter,” since deconstruction, have tended 
to be increasingly semiotic or—worse perhaps—performative. 
For Judith Butler, “matter” is that which gives itself in terms 
of effects; her materialism is certainly not a form of realism:
materiality will be rethought as power’s most productive effect. And 
there will be no way to understand “gender” as a cultural construct 
which is imposed upon the surface of matter, understood either as 
the body or its given sex. Rather, once sex itself is understood in its 
normativity, the materiality of the body will not be thinkable apart 
from the materialization of that regulatory norm. “Sex” is thus not 
simply what one has or a static description of what one is: it will be 
one of the norms by which the “one” becomes viable at all, that which 
qualifies a body for life within the domain of cultural intelligibility.
At stake in such a reformulation of the materiality of bodies will be 
the following: (1) the recasting of the matter of bodies as the effect 
of a dynamic of power, such that the matter of bodies will be indis-
5 Paul de Man, Aesthetic Ideology, ed. Andrzej Warminski (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 50.
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sociable from the regulatory norms that govern their materialization 
and the signification of those material effects; (2) the understanding 
of performativity not as the act by which a subject brings into being 
what she/he names, but, rather, as that reiterative power of discourse 
to produce the phenomena that it regulates and constrains; (3) the 
construal of “sex” no longer as a bodily given on which the construct 
of gender is artificially imposed, but as a cultural norm which governs 
the materialization of bodies; (4) a rethinking of the process by which a 
bodily norm is assumed, appropriated, taken on as not, strictly speaking, 
undergone by a subject, but rather that the subject, the speaking “I,” is 
formed by virtue of having gone through such a process of assuming 
a sex; and (5) a linking of this process of “assuming” a sex with the 
question of identification…6
Butler is by no means coterminous with deconstruction, and 
certainly not deconstruction of the de Man mode. However, 
one might say that if the various new materialisms have any 
force, it is at least in large part because deconstruction had the 
effect, after phenomenology, of problematizing any supposed 
or posited “outside” to the forces or powers of textuality, and 
that Butler was one of the most formidable voices in nego-
tiating the problem such a suspension of any simple matter 
would have for feminist politics that could not be purely 
constructive, or anti-materialist in any simple sense. The 
self-proclaimed new materialisms that have followed Butler 
and post-structuralism have not sought to turn back to matter 
so much as see matter as more dynamic than any theory of 
cultural construction or linguistic mediation would allow.7 
That said, it might be worth noting—despite interconnec-
tions—that there is a difference between the self-presentation 
of new materialism and the claims of speculative realism or 
6 Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex” (London: 
Routledge, 1993), 2-3, original emphasis.
7 New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics, ed. Diana Coole and Sa-
mantha Frost (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010); Material Feminisms, ed. 
Stacey Alaimo and Susan Hekman (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2008); Rick Dolphijn and Iris van der Tuin, New Materialism: Interviews and 
Cartographies (Michigan: Open Humanities Press, 2012).
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object-oriented ontology. To a great extent the latter has not 
had all that much to say about sexual politics, and certainly 
not about feminist sexual politics.
For the new materialists, matter thought in this new dy-
namic mode allows for a re-theorisation of the body and 
sexual identity, thereby avoiding some naïve appeal to sexual 
essence, while nevertheless allowing for material forces as 
tendencies irreducible to the norms, regulations and per-
formances that marked Butler’s account. By contrast, most 
of the force of object-oriented ontology has—as the name 
indicates—relied upon exiting from the concerns of identity, 
gender and subject formation, even to the point of having 
less to do with questions of biology and more with the forces 
of the non-living. Not surprisingly, while materialism gets 
a great deal of attention in feminist and queer scholarship, 
the same cannot be said about object-oriented ontology, even 
if—as Timothy Morton claims—OOO will render everything 
essentially queer.8 One explanation might be that objects are 
not sexed, and do not have political identities. The harder 
end of the OOO spectrum does not have that much to say 
about humans, so ignoring the woman question (if there is 
one) is hardly a glaring or guilty omission. So if deconstruc-
tion allows OOO to have purchase by acting as a foil against 
which a post-linguistic, post-correlationist position might be 
articulated, and if deconstruction itself always spoke of the 
real—if at all—in terms of matter (which is how the real is 
given), then perhaps the clearest mark of a divide between 
the two critical tendencies comes from the critical voices 
directed against Meillassoux in The Speculative Turn includ-
ing objections from Peter Hallward, Adrian Johnston, Alberto 
Toscano and Martin Hägglund. Despite the complexity of 
the respective objections and their differences, the overall 
problem is still one of conditions, or the problem of insisting 
on a real without falling back into some mode of condition: 
how, Toscano argues, can Meillassoux really be materialist, 
if speculative reason remains sovereign? Johnston, similarly, 
8 Timothy Morton, “Queer Ecology,” pmla (2010), 125:2, 273-82.
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argues that there is an inconsistency between the aim for 
absolute contingency and “real empirical data,” while Peter 
Hallward’s critique focuses on the inability for speculation to 
detail the conditions of genuine political thought.9 What all 
these objections share, though they are by no means aligned 
with Derrida or deconstruction, is nevertheless some insis-
tence that thinking bears a relation to the world, and that this 
relation is problematic.
For Martin Hägglund (and in the more recent essay by Peter 
Gratton) there is a problem with the insistence on contingency, 
and this problem lies in the very condition for thinking the 
contingent. In order for there to be contingency there must be 
the ongoing destruction of any possible framing order, ground, 
essence, schema or transcendental horizon; but it is just that 
process of the ever-new of contingency that must be temporal. 
There can only be the new or the absolutely ungrounded if 
what has preceded has been destroyed, or at the very least if 
what has preceded cannot in any way be seen as the condi-
tion for what comes after: “since there can be no contingency 
without the succession of time, which entails irreversible 
destruction and rules out the possibility of resurrection a 
priori.”10 Such a thought of the contingent, or the radically 
new and unfounded, is therefore within a frame of temporal 
synthesis that—for Hägglund—is not subjective, precisely 
because any supposed subject would itself be effected from 
a synthesis or tracing that is the condition for both grounds, 
and the un-grounding required by contingency. (I actually 
do not think this objection to Meillassoux is cogent: could 
one not imagine change and destruction as contingent; could 
there not be an absence of change, an absence of coming into 
being and passing away?)
9 Alberto Toscano, “Against Speculation, or, A Critique of the Critique of 
Critique: A Remark on Quentin Meillassoux’s After Finitude (After Colletti)” 
in The Speculative Turn, 91; Adrian Johnston, “Hume’s Revenge: À Dieu, Meil-
lasoux?” in The Speculative Turn, 112; Peter Hallward “Anything is Possible: A 
Reading of Quentin Meillassoux’s After Finitude” in The Speculative Turn, 139.
10 Martin Hägglund, “Radical Atheist Materialism: A Critique of Meillas-
soux,” in The Speculative Turn, 116.
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If Butler and her emphasis on a materiality given through 
relations of power, norms, possible identity and what counts as 
mattering cannot be seen as exhaustive of deconstruction and 
post-structuralism (for there are other deconstructions that aim 
to think a materiality that is not appropriately spoken of in 
terms of normativity or temporality, which for de Man is what 
comes “after” tropes, after an inscriptive marking out of before 
and after), then even less can we identify Hägglund’s critique 
with what Derrida or deconstruction would say in response 
to an ontology without humans, knowledge, conditions, or 
transcendental inquiry. So here is a genealogy that I would 
like to outline primarily also as a gnoseology and nosology: 
deconstruction begins with an anarchic, counter-ethical and 
radically material conception of the trace. It is anarchic pre-
cisely because it is not some transcendental condition of time 
so much as that which can only be occluded when thought 
of as temporal, as some prior condition from the point of 
view of human knowing. Such a trace is also counter-ethical 
because it is not spatial, not thinkable in terms of ethos or 
that which would be the condition for our “world” lived as 
here and now. In short, the deconstructive trace is not a con-
dition precisely because the thought of conditions is always 
dependent upon a before and after, which would place the 
condition as a ground. If Hägglund replies to Meillassoux 
that the thought of an utterly contingent and non-cognitive, 
non-human object of thought already presupposes tempo-
rality and therefore the trace, this is because Hägglund has 
defined the trace via a conditional logic: the trace is that 
which marks out the sequence through which something 
like a contingency that is destructive of the given might be 
thought. But this prompts two questions: is it not legitimate 
to ask about contingency as such, as that which can be thought 
and not a contingency which can only be known as thought 
(as traced out, temporalized and therefore after a condition-
ing trace?) Second, is it possible to think the trace as a radical 
materiality that is itself contingent and not rendered into 
some form of condition for matter? Here is where we return 
to genealogy, gnoseology, and nosology: genealogically, let us 
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posit an early deconstruction—a thought of the trace that 
would not be some type of condition for thinking—that was 
then domesticated by a series of philosophical manoeuvers 
that justified, legitimated and rendered rigorously unavoid-
able a concept of trace as condition. Deconstruction would 
then have been divided from itself, set at war with itself: one 
mode would be a properly transcendental form of inquiry 
in which phenomenology’s conception of the grounds of 
knowledge as ultimately temporal would then require a 
thought of the constitution of time, which in turn could not 
be located in the human subject, but might include material 
processes such as writing, language systems, technological 
extensions of the living body and so on. It is this Derrida and 
this deconstruction—a rigorous, responsible and ethical Der-
rida—who is defended against notions of play, and is aligned 
with an inescapable philosophy of temporality. There would 
be a direct line from Husserl’s inquiry into the conditions of 
appearing and the absolute character of the transcendental 
subject, to Heidegger’s critique of all vulgar modes of clock 
time that did not confront the time of appearing and disclos-
ing, to Derrida’s insistence that any thought of time is always 
already vulgar, and dependent upon a prior field of inscrip-
tion. It would follow, then, that a logic of the conditions of 
time would yield an ethics of the future; and this, indeed, is 
precisely where deconstruction started to develop in its ethi-
cal mode. Any present or now is only possible because of a 
retained past and an anticipated future—and so the now is 
never fully present to itself. Any decision undertaken in the 
now—because of its traces of the past—cannot command or 
control a future: the future is necessarily open. On the one 
hand, this seems to heighten responsibility, precisely because 
I may undertake a decision with the best of intentions but 
there will always be an anarchic force that takes the decision 
into territory and potentiality beyond my command. On the 
other hand, this very undecidability that enables and demands 
a genuine decision (because the future cannot be known or 
calculated) promises a future that is not ours and that may 
come to us as a gift in the form of a democracy or justice “to 
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come.” We are at once compelled to make a decision, and yet 
given the thought and promise of that which may—for all 
our limits—arrive beyond the decision no decision could 
be ethical or closed. One can see the ways in which here a 
certain relation between time and knowledge yields a healing 
future: our decisions—our modes of knowing—are never fully 
our own but are marked by traces that will make our future 
never reducible to the limits of our now. Thought’s calculative, 
and even speculative faculty (or the power to determine the 
future from the present) has as its condition the very means 
of its own cure. The contingency that will cure us from our 
calculative command of the future, and our attempts to master 
non-human reality, is thought’s own contingency. The future 
is unknowable and open because any thought of the future 
and any decision of the future are invaded by traces that will 
be incalculable.
The open future is a future of open justice and open 
democracy: those forces of “democracy” and “justice” that 
cannot be contained by the very thought that is their par-
tial author. It is not surprising that this deconstruction of 
decisions, promise and an open future has come under fire 
from a certain sobering recollection of materialism. There 
has been both the environmental criticism of David Wood 
that questions the ethics of an open future in a time when 
human decisions have contracted rather than expanded both 
justice and promise, and several attempts to think outside 
human futures by way of the concept of the anthropocene.11 
It is not surprising that some writers originally associated 
with deconstruction, such as Timothy Morton, have—by way 
of writing on ecology—started to shift towards speculative 
realism. From the speculative realist point of view there is 
an even more profound criticism than that which has been 
generated from environmental philosophy; the thought of 
time, far from being that which takes us back to conditions 
and demands something like a transcendental logic, should 
11 David Wood, “On Being Haunted by the Future,” Research in Phenomenol-
ogy (2006), 36:1, 274-98; see also the special issue of Oxford Literary Review 
(2012), 34:2, ed. Timothy Clark.
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annihilate the primacy of thinking, conditions and a contin-
gency that would be a contingency of the trace. That is, whereas 
an ethical deconstruction introduces undecidability into the 
very possibility of a decision, because decisions are traced 
and made possible by inscriptive systems, speculative realism 
wants to think a far more material contingency.
If it is possible to make statements about a time before 
humans and life—and Meillassoux demonstrates that we 
do in fact do this—then we already acknowledge that we can 
think of that which is unconditioned by the rules of thinking, 
unconditioned by the logic of conditions. Either, then, we 
take the now common move of aligning deconstruction with 
textualism and a dependency on human inscriptive systems 
and move on to a post-deconstructive materialism, or we argue 
that deconstruction was neither human nor textual and that 
concepts such as “trace” actually referred to real and material 
processes outside of the human altogether. The trace could be 
aligned either with a Darwinism of proliferating living dif-
ference, or a proto-neuro-materialism of dynamic networks 
without centre. One saves Derrida, smuggles him back into 
heaven, by reading him as neo-Darwinist or proto-neural.12 
The last thing one would want to do would be to ask about 
the other deconstruction—the deconstruction of literary play 
and rhetoric. For those who would defend deconstruction 
against speculative realism, such as Hägglund, contingency 
is a temporal notion and is therefore dependent on the trace 
that allows the thought of a destructiveness to emerge—for 
destruction is always destruction of some presence and is 
therefore traced out, marked, synthesised and cannot be 
said to be. For those who would want to smuggle Derrida 
back into heaven, deconstruction’s “writing” or “text” were 
neither linguistic nor literary; rather, those features that were 
consigned to the linguistic—such as the capacity to operate 
beyond intent—were the very same that marked evolving and 
dynamic life. It would seem then that the present’s series of 
12 Colin Nazhone Milburn, “Monsters in Eden: Darwin and Derrida,” MLN 
(2003), 118:3, 603-21; Ellen Spolsky, “Darwin and Derrida: Cognitive Literary 
Theory as a Species of Post-Structuralism,” Poetics Today (2002), 23:1, 43-62.
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proclaimed new, radical or speculative materialisms merely 
repeats an already offered but never fully acknowledged mate-
rial deconstruction. It is not surprising, then, that Hägglund 
finds himself constantly berating Derrideans for betraying 
the properly godless nature of deconstruction: just because 
our immanent conditions of experience leave us without 
any full presence and only the marks and traces from which 
presence would be posited, this does not mean that we can 
then legitimately argue from the non-presence of this world 
to some transcendent divinity. The failure for the given world 
to secure an exhaustive account of presence—the absence of 
all knowable grounds—does not only not entail some non-
worldly other, but positively precludes any form of theism. 
The problem with materialism, for Hägglund at least, and 
those Derrideans who are not keen to argue for Derrida as 
an object-oriented ontologist avant la lettre, is that matter is 
something that cannot be thought without some form of 
immateriality or absence. Either matter operates as yet one 
more posited metaphysical ground from which all relations 
would be generated, in which case the thinking of matter is 
unethical and irresponsible unless it includes some consid-
eration of the mise en scène through which matter is given 
as matter (which is why Judith Butler will play on matter as 
verb, and how something comes to matter). Or, matter needs 
to be defined in the same way as one might use terms such as 
“writing,” “trace,” “différance,” or “plasticity”:13 these terms at 
once seem to refer to actual things within the world, but are 
also non-things insofar as they might be thought less as nouns 
and more as markers or place-holders for an attempt to think 
about that which can never be given precisely because it is the 
disturbing, destructive and disinterring movement through 
which any givenness or thing is possible. When Graham 
Harman writes about things as withholding themselves then 
the thing, far from being a materiality or foundation from 
which the world and relations might be explained, becomes 
13 Catherine Malabou, Plasticity at the Dusk of Writing: Dialectic, Destruction, 
Deconstruction, trans. Carolyn Shread (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2010).
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a quasi-transcendental: “a” way of thinking the generation of 
the world and relations, while also being given as something 
already worldly and effected from relations. It seems then 
that what is at stake between deconstruction and speculative 
realism is the “quasi” nature of the transcendental: either we 
posit the thing, matter or the real as the inhuman condition 
from which thinking emerges (in which case ethics might 
consist of a “turn” to the inhuman and aesthetics would be 
less about formal conditions and more about objects), or we 
maintain some form of deconstructive ethical responsibility 
by declaring that any thing, matter or real is always given as 
real to us, with the “us” also bound up with the processes of 
givenness that can never be mastered.
I would suggest, though, that we reject this seeming excluded 
middle of either proclaiming the real to be that which can 
be thought as such, or a deconstructive ethics of necessary 
impossibility. Another form of deconstruction that was set 
aside in favour of an ethical deconstruction was generated 
precisely through an institutional binary set up between a 
Derrida who was genuinely concerned with an (impossible) 
relation to the ethical other, and a Paul de Man whose theo-
risation of materiality bore neither the mediated caveats of 
Derridean deconstruction nor the affirmative exit strategy 
from the human that appears to be offered by speculative 
realism. De Man’s was a deconstruction of rhetoric, tropes and 
a marking out of aesthetic ideology: not ideology as what we 
think, but the ideology that something like thinking is what 
characterises time and reading.
III
In all its varied forms, perhaps speculative realism can at 
least be defined against what it is not: Kantian correlation-
ism. If it is the case that the only world we can know is given 
through the synthesising forms of the subject, then it follows 
that aesthetics would not be about the beautiful as such, nor 
sensation as such, but the givenness of sensation, and the 
beautiful harmony that is felt when the subject is once again 
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drawn back to the forming power that they contribute to the 
world. If correlationism has dominated knowledge claims 
well beyond Kant—carrying over to all forms of social con-
struction and even pragmatic relativisms that abandon any 
claims to knowledge beyond our own vocabularies—then 
correlationism has been just as powerful in ethics/politics 
and aesthetics. Because we cannot know things in themselves 
there can be no moral law or political imperative that would 
provide a foundation for action; but for this very reason we 
are required to give a law to ourselves, and this law—because 
self-constituted—cannot legislate over other selves.14 I cannot 
claim to know better, cannot claim authority or expertise 
or any form of exceptionalism: that which I choose as a law 
should therefore be a law that would be chosen by any subject 
whatever. Not only does this lead to the dominant tradition 
of liberal theory—where a just society allows maximal free 
deliberation and decision without any imposition of the 
good—it also dominates most forms of what passes for post-
structuralist ethics. If Derrida can claim that deconstruction 
is justice, this is precisely because of the heightened respon-
sibility that follows from undecidability: because no ground 
offers itself outside the play of differences, any decision 
proceeds only from itself and can only appeal to a justice to 
come rather than any given or intuitable justice.15
Even though I would argue against Deleuzian philosophy 
as akin to any form of ethical Kantianism (and the political 
work of Manuel de Landa and John Protevi grounded in 
materialism would certainly be counter-Kantian)16 a more 
general celebration of Deleuzian “becoming” and self-creation 
would be in line with a Kantian tradition that allows the self 
to be nothing other than its own act of free self-constitution, 
forming a style of its own without submission to any tran-
14 Onora O’Neill, Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant’s Practical 
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
15 Elisabeth Weber, “Deconstruction is Justice,” SubStance (2005), 34:1, 38-43.
16 Manuel De Landa, A New Philosophy of Society: Assemblage Theory and Social 
Complexity (London: Continuum, 2006); John Protevi, Political Affect: Connecting 
the Social and the Somatic (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009).
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scendent authority. It is not that easy to find a space outside 
the liberalism and anti-foundationalism that follow from 
Kantian correlationism, but there was at least—before specu-
lative realism—the Aristotelian claim to communitarianism, 
with more substantive and culturally embedded conceptions 
of the good life. However, it is in aesthetic theory, practice and 
criticism that the Kantian heritage seems, to me at least, to 
be indomitable. Modernist formalism has been the default 
norm in aesthetics since Kant, and truly defines—again—what 
passes for post-structuralist aesthetics. If it is the case that the 
world is given through mediating systems—whether those 
differentiating structures be transcendental or cultural—then 
the value of art would lie in allowing us once again to feel the 
form we give to the world. This is why what came to be known 
as “theory” worked in tandem with modernist aesthetics: all 
art is self-reflexive, not about content but about the ways in 
which content is given. Again, we can think of Derrida, for 
whom literature is democratic in its capacity to “say anything” 
precisely because what is said is detached from voice and 
reference; it is in the literary texts that the word is given as 
word.17 More recently we can think of the vogue for Giorgio 
Agamben’s work and his celebration of poetic language as 
rendering communication and reference inoperative, thereby 
disclosing that there is language.18 In all cases—ranging from 
liberalism to modernist formalism and postmodern irony 
and meta-fiction—Kantian correlationism leads to anti-
foundationalism, which in turn leads to the imperative for 
self-reflexivity. All art is directed less towards what is said or 
presented, and more towards the mode or style of articulation. 
This is so much so that in high modernism form is content, 
and in high postmodernism all art becomes quotation—the 
repetition of the already given structures through which the 
world is given, never the world as such.
17 Derek Attridge, The Singularity of Literature (London: Routledge, 2004).
18 Colby Dickinson, “The Poetic Atheology of Giorgio Agamben: Defining 
the Scission between Poetry and Philosophy,” Mosaic: A Journal for the Inter-
disciplinary Study of Literature (2012), 45:1, 203-17.
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Graham Harman, noting the many philosophical differ-
ences and disputes that mark speculative realism, neverthe-
less argues that what follows from anti-correlationism is an 
insistence that we recognise the autonomy of art objects—such 
as poems. He astutely notes that this places the implications 
of object-oriented ontology close to American New Criticism, 
in which the poem is not a mere epiphenomenon that might 
allow us to grasp either reference, feeling, political force or 
something equally communicable or translatable. Harman 
ups the ante by arguing that it is not only poems that possess 
this autonomy: all verbal or visual objects (science textbooks 
and diagrams as much as poems and canvases) are distinct 
beings that by virtue of being cannot be reduced to the relation 
they bear to us. Harman’s second claim for distinction is the 
being of the poem itself; whereas New Criticism (and prob-
ably the practice of criticism since the New Criticism) defines 
the poem organically as more than a collection of discrete 
parts, Harman does not want to concede that understand-
ing a poem requires a study of its internal relations. You can, 
Harman insists, add a few more chapters to Don Quixote or a 
few more lines to King Lear, and you still have other aspects 
of the whole that are not necessarily altered. They might be 
altered, but not necessarily. It follows that Harman will only 
feel even more hostile to later critical developments, such as 
New Historicism, in which the poem or art object loses its 
detachment from the world and instead becomes an aspect 
of one grand circulating system. Harman wants to grant a 
genuine force to the thing—any thing including the art ob-
ject, which (contra Cleanth Brooks) does not have a special 
autonomy and (contra the seemingly object-oriented thing 
theory) has an autonomy that goes beyond its capacity to 
unsettle us: “The problem that thing theory seems to share 
with the New Historicism lies in the assumption that ‘the real’ 
has no other function than to accompany the human agent 
and mold or disrupt it from time to time.”19 Harman also 
notes the extent to which deconstruction and the attention 
19 Graham Harman, “The Well-Wrought Broken Hammer: Object-Oriented 
Literary Criticism,” New Literary History (2012), 43:2, 193.
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to the trace and difference preclude any commitment to a 
reality outside systems of reference; just because we cannot 
have full presentation of things in themselves does not mean 
we should abandon realism tout court. Harman argues that 
Derrida “thinks that all ontological realism automatically 
entails an epistemological realism according to which direct 
access to the world is possible.”20
In the remainder of this essay I want to conclude by mak-
ing two claims, one critical and another (I hope) positively 
destructive. The first is to look at how Harman spells out the 
implications of object-oriented ontology for literary criti-
cism—which would not be a method that followed on from 
realism, precisely because realism would always be commit-
ted to the difference between whatever reading strategy we 
adopted and the reality towards which any method would be 
directed: “What object-oriented philosophy hopes to offer is 
not a method, but a countermethod. Instead of dissolving a 
text upward into its readings or downward into its cultural 
elements, we should focus on how it resists such dissolution.”21 
That is: it is the nature of things as things to be different and 
distinct from us. This means that for Harman there can be 
no privileged aesthetic autonomy—all verbal and visual 
objects have a force that operates beyond our world and our 
constituted relations. We can imagine real forces creating 
real changes that have nothing to do with human knowledge, 
even if they may (or may not) eventually have implications for 
our human and inhuman world. The cosmos acts and reacts 
largely without concern for us, and without our noticing it. 
In this respect, and Harman does not deny this, the Kantian 
“in-itself” remains, but the difference of the in-itself and the 
relations from the in-itself are not the privileged domain of 
human experience. Two forces—such as a weather system 
and a colony of bats—can come into relation, but there would 
also be a force in either of those terms not exhausted by the 
event of their encounter.
20 Harman, “The Well-Wrought Broken Hammer,” 198.
21 Ibid., 200.
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Here is my critical point: is this conclusion really anti-
Kantian, or more importantly, anti-correlationist, both in the 
objections it states to already practiced modes of criticism, 
and in its conclusion? I would suggest not. Let us say that 
there is an acceptance of the Kantian in-itself but that the 
importance for aesthetics would be the refusal of any subjec-
tive distinction granted to the relation to the in-itself. Even 
if we accept that one should not fetishise proper names, and 
even if we accept that philosophy is about problems rather 
than the authority of signatures, we can see “Kant” as a way 
of thinking about distance, relations and the given. Harman’s 
objection to aesthetic autonomy claims that all things—not 
just art objects—are, by virtue of being things not only given to 
us, but also have a force that exceeds the relation they bear 
to us and all other things. But is this not—as Heidegger’s 
reading of Kant would have it—just what Kant achieves in 
his insistence on the givenness of the thing: in being given 
the thing is at one and the same time relational (for us) and 
non-relational? The practice that would follow from Har-
man’s conclusion seems to be no different from (subjective 
formalist) business as usual. There are art objects that have a 
relative autonomy, and then there are those same objects as 
actualised in the many modes of reading as a form of relation. 
There would be no privileged relation, so one could not grant 
a specific meaning to a work based on an author’s statement, 
an account of the text’s genesis, or on the basis of a specific 
literary critical tradition. On the one hand, I would want to 
applaud and grant as distinct and revolutionary Harman’s 
claim for decontextualisation:
In contrast to the endless recent exhortations to “Contextualize, con-
textualize, contextualize!” all the preceding suggestions involve ways 
of decontextualizing works, whether through examining how they 
absorb and resist their conditions of production, or by showing that 
they are to some extent autonomous even from their own properties.22
22 Harman, “The Well-Wrought Broken Hammer,” 202.
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“Autonomous even from their own properties”: this, I would 
argue, is exactly what deconstruction in its Derridean form 
entails, and is still thoroughly in line with Kantianism and 
formalism. We know a thing as given through its properties, 
but that neither exhausts the thing’s being nor its capacity for 
producing other relations. From here it follows, as Derrida 
insisted in his debate on context with Searle: if I can read or 
apprehend what you say, what you do, or even what you pres-
ent to me as being a thing, then this is because our capacity to 
speak and experience in common (or our capacity to say that 
something is) already tears every event and presence from 
any putative “own” context.23 To see something as something, 
as having a proper identity, is to already mark out in the thing 
that which would be repeatable beyond the present.
In his work on Husserl and the formal sciences, Derrida 
describes this process of meaning, being and truth in a man-
ner that is captured by Harman’s notion of that which exists 
“autonomous even from [its] own properties”: if we can say 
something true about the world, then we make a claim for 
its presence beyond our own context, beyond any of the 
structures through which truth has been constituted. We may 
only know what is true via constituted sense and tradition, 
but once constituted, truth in its meaning or being transcends 
any local context.24 If Derrida grants a special status to the 
literary text, which he does, this is because of a certain realist 
materialism: the condition for any text to exist through time 
is that it take on some material support—printing, painting, 
digitalised media—and for that very reason a text can only 
operate within a context (or be a constituted thing) if it can 
be repeated and transported across other contexts. This is 
why deconstruction, as a reading practice, attended less to 
the author or a text’s emergence, and more to the capacity 
of the text to operate quasi-autonomously: attention to the 
23 Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc., trans. Samuel Weber (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1988).
24 Jacques Derrida, Edmund Husserl’s The Origin of Geometry: An Introduction, 
trans. John P. Leavey (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1977).
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inscription or matter that allows a text (or any thing) to exist 
through time, and therefore to have force beyond any pres-
ent. There is, however, an element in deconstruction that is 
far less Kantian than this commitment to the autonomy of 
a text (or any thing) and this lies in just the two dimensions 
that Harman objects to in new criticism. So to conclude my 
critical point I would say that Harman’s position remains 
Kantian insofar as the condition for correlation—that some-
thing be given to us—is that it bear some autonomy alongside 
the relations of being given. This is true of any thing, and it 
is why Kantian aesthetics stresses an attention to the condi-
tions through which we intuit what is not ourselves, with 
sublimity being the feeling of that which is inassimilable to 
our relational powers. But here is where Harman’s criticism 
starts to bite, for it seems as though sublimity—or the feel-
ing of the limits of our cognition—narrows the potential for 
art and politics. Do we value art or experience simply for its 
disturbance of our limits, in which case we are left with the 
goal of self-reflexivity: art makes us aware of the distance and 
mediation of all knowing. Is politics nothing more than liberal 
self-critique, where a certain not-knowing yields a chasten-
ing humility, but nothing positive or genuinely destructive?
It is just this problem—of relations beyond us that are 
not reducible to the force they present to us by way of dis-
turbance—that should take us beyond Kant and Derridean 
deconstruction. Where might resources be found?
First, I would offer Leibniz as the other (counter-Kantian) 
tradition that did not yield an aesthetic theory: any thing 
(and things go all the way down, such that my body is a thing, 
composed of other things including cells, organs, memories, 
scars and weaknesses) is related to everything else but in its 
own way. For Leibniz this means that my body—to be my 
body—bears a relation to everything, including the crossing 
of the Rubicon by Caesar and Adam’s eating of the fruit of 
the tree of knowledge. To quote Deleuze, “In short, every pos-
sible monad is defined by a certain number of preindividual 
singularities, and is thus compossible with all the monads 
whose singularities converge with its own, and incompos-
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sible with those whose singularities imply divergence or 
nonprolongation.”25 My world and relations of my body are 
distinct from the worlds (or perceptions) of the things that 
make up my body: my heart beats to its own world, perceiv-
ing the various events that compose my metabolism. For 
Leibniz it is God, and God only, who apprehends all relations 
fully and completely; all other things have a dim awareness, 
various degrees of clarity and distinction and confusion of 
all the other things that make up the infinite. If we do not 
have Leibniz’s God as the perceiver of all perceivers then we 
are left with infinite series of diverging relations; everything 
perceives the infinite, but perceives or unfolds the infinite 
from its own point of view. If there were a God, then all these 
relatively clear perceptions of the truth of the whole would 
be composed in a coherent unity. One would not just exclude 
the illogical (A and not-A), but also the incompossible: Adam 
either sins or does not sin, and the entire world that follows 
from one of these paths follows a series of choices resulting 
in the best possible totality. The Leibnizian universe is ulti-
mately compossible in its multiplicity. However, without God 
and the guarantee of the harmony of the whole, we would not 
just have a baroque aesthetic where every perception expres-
sive of the universe contributes to a contrapuntal unity, but 
there would be incompossible and diverging worlds. There 
would be no principle that excluded a world where—for ex-
ample—Cathy really does love Heathcliff and where Cathy 
really does despise Heathcliff. If this is so then the reading of 
a literary text (or any thing) takes part in a sublime unfolding 
in which the detachment of the text from a single privileged 
context ultimately results in the proliferation of relations. 
Commenting on Jorge Luis-Borges’s godless Leibnizian aes-
thetic, Deleuze writes:
It is clear why Borges invokes the Chinese philosopher rather than 
Leibniz. He wanted … to have God pass into existence all incompossible 
25 Gilles Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, trans. Tom Conley (Lon-
don: Continuum, 2006), 72.
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worlds at once instead of choosing one of them, the best. And probably 
it would be globally possible, since incompossibility is an original 
relation, distinct from impossibility or contradiction.26  
This is a different mode of sublimity, where the non-given 
extends to infinity and bears its own force of relations. And 
this makes a key difference to how we think first about the 
art object and then things as such. Harman says that we can 
alter the character of the fool in King Lear but the character of 
King Lear remains the same, and that is true—possibly—only 
if we have a knowledge of King Lear that is clear and distinct. 
How do we know what alterations to a literary text would or 
would not change another part? We can make a claim for the 
ongoing sameness of King Lear if and only if we think of an 
immaterial or ideal object that remains the same through time 
regardless of inscription. Harman’s argument requires us to 
think of an ideal or non-relational sameness of the thing—in 
this case the essential sameness of King Lear that is immune 
to minor variation—whereas a Leibnizian sublime prompts 
us to recognise that the smallest details of the thing (such as 
the difference between a comma and a semi-colon) would 
generate a thousand or more textual series. The positing of 
an ideal sameness to a text does have a pragmatic or opera-
tional value, and this mode of reading is what allows us to 
attribute constant functions to scientific objects. But literary 
reading is sublime in its practice because it entertains all the 
infinites that would unfold from the seemingly insignificant 
minutiae of textual matter.
It does not matter whether I read Einstein’s theory of relativity 
on paper or on screen, or in German or French, because the 
truth of theory transcends its material inscription: we know 
the principles of physics, geometry and logic independently 
of the inscriptive process that brings them to our knowledge. 
We could say the same about literary knowledge—and people 
do indeed grant a truth to fictions, such that Sherlock Holmes 
lives on Baker Street and that Tony Soprano lives in New 
26 Deleuze, The Fold, 71.
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Jersey. But it is the nature of literary objects (and art objects) 
to indicate a certain resistance or non-ideality (or what Paul 
de Man referred to as materiality) that cannot be willed away, 
unless we posit some “meaning” that would remain the same 
through time without relation to material inscription.
When we talk about scientific things, we grant them a dis-
tinction from their material inscription; but it is the nature 
of literary or aesthetic reading to keep everything in rela-
tion. We think some aspect of a text has no bearing on the 
central theme—that Hamlet is Hamlet regardless of what 
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern say to each other, and that the 
very minor mention of Robinson Crusoe’s wife at the end 
of Defoe’s novel could be deleted without altering the novel 
as a whole: but then Tom Stoppard writes Rosencrantz and 
Guildenstern are Dead and J. M Coetzee writes Foe. Hamlet’s 
indecision—if there is such an ideal thing that goes through 
time to be read and re-read—and the very sense of Crusoe 
as an autonomous individual (which are both aspects of the 
text) change in nature when another element is attended to. 
We may read Wuthering Heights for two hundred years focus-
ing on Cathy and Heathcliff, and we may feel quite confident 
that they exist as such, as fictional characters not alterable by 
accidental marks in the text; but then we look to the charac-
ter of Nelly and framed relation and suddenly Cathy is not 
Cathy any more. Here is the problem with aesthetic objects: 
they are radically material. No matter what we do in terms 
of isolation of their elements—ranging from the sense of 
events to single words to characters—those projections of 
meaning are distinct from the material object. It would be 
unscientific to attend to the binding, colours, penmanship 
and erasures of a mathematical manuscript, but even though 
we can read The Prelude or The Four Zoas in a reprinted po-
etry anthology, the material object can always open up new 
relations, rendering what we thought to be merely material 
and irrelevant into a part that (following Leibniz) opens an 
entirely divergent whole.
We could read all texts as literary texts, as material objects 
that remain beyond all reading and explication; we could read 
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all texts as scientific, as referring to what would be true and the 
same beyond articulation. These two possibilities of reading 
indicate two ways of thinking relations: one in which (as in 
literary texts) the object is what it is, and has its own force to 
produce relations that cannot be exhausted by reading and 
explication, and another in which we see the text as detached 
and irrelevant with a truth of relations that we posit as being 
real regardless of articulation. The former entails Deleuze’s 
reading of a Leibniz without God: there is a relativism, but 
it is not a relativism to us, because everything bears its rela-
tions to everything else, offering not the relativism of truth, 
but the truth of the relative.27
I would conclude by advocating—as genuinely materialist, 
object-oriented and wildly speculative—the deconstruction 
of Paul de Man. Here, it is a question of spelling out the 
implications of what we mean by text. For Derrida text does 
increasingly come to refer to the inextricably intertwined 
location of any presence in a network of difference, such that 
anything that we posit as having being can always be repeated 
into the future, opening a justice to come. To perceive some-
thing as something is to grant it an identity or property that 
exceeds the present, and therefore exceeds any already given 
actuality. This repeatability is what Derrida refers to as the 
“opening to infinity,” which relies on text for its inaugura-
tion, but exceeds its textual support. To read a text and grant 
it sense is therefore at once to posit what would be readable 
for any other subject, in any other context, thus opening the 
idea of context in general or truth. For de Man by contrast 
there is a quite different, material, inhuman non-relational 
understanding of text: to read a literary text is not to aim for 
some intended sense to come, but to attend to the detached 
deadness beyond intentionality:
The language of the poets therefore in no way partakes of mimesis, 
reflection, or even perception, in the sense that would allow a link 
between sense experience and understanding, between perception 
27 Deleuze, The Fold, 23.
Speculations V
152
and apperception. Realism postulates a phenomenalism of experience 
which is here being denied or ignored. Kant’s looking at the world just 
as one sees it (“wie man ihn sieht”) is an absolute radical formalism 
that entertains no notion of reference or semiosis.28
There is a deconstruction that radicalises correlation: to 
perceive a thing, as a thing, is to posit what it would be be-
yond its present sense, and this opens an infinite future. But 
there is also a deconstruction, de Manian deconstruction, 
that places a bet (and one that we always lose) on thinking 
the text just as it is, and then—from that non-meaning, inert, 
contingent and given matter (that is neither substance nor 
sense)—consider what it might be to look at nature with 
such a blank eye. This sublime is one that we might refer to 
as geological and Leibnizian, precisely because the striving 
of the reading or viewing eye is not that of comprehension 
that would include nature within our ordering gaze, but de-
struction: what might a thing be if no longer perceived by us, 
as ours, as intending a presence. For de Man there is another 
Kant, closer to Leibniz, in which the affect of the sublime 
(a sense but not a sensation of being overwhelmed) leads to 
what he refers to as architectonic, in which—far from feeling 
empathy and connectedness—something like a construction 
that would be amenable to a pure calculus emerges. To see 
in this manner is not to see into the life of things, but just to 
see; to see nature as architectonic, as a building, is to see it as 
a construction. (This is not a social, divine or ideal construc-
tion, just the elements that are put together):
the eye, left to itself, entirely ignores understanding; it only notices 
appearances (it is Augenschein) without any awareness of a dichotomy 
between illusion and reality—a dichotomy which belongs to teleological 
and not to aesthetic judgment. In other words, the transformation of 
nature into a building, the transformation of sky and ocean into vault 
and floor is not a trope. The passage is entirely void of any substitutive 
exchange, of any negotiated economy, between nature and mind; it is 
28 De Man, Aesthetic Ideology, 128.
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free of any facing or defacing of the natural world … The dynamics 
of the sublime mark the moment when the infinite is frozen into the 
materiality of stone, when no pathos, anxiety, or sympathy is conceiv-
able; it is, indeed, the moment of a-pathos, anxiety, or apathy, as the 
complete loss of the symbolic.29
The aesthetic or poetic—the text—is not living, mindful, but 
figural; for we are presented with a construction of elements. 
How would we read if we imagine the text not as that which is 
given to us, opening our world, but as bearing its own world, 
as though it were left behind, after humans, in our wake and 
no longer signed by us?  
IV
For all its talk of realism and things, very little has been said 
about sex in this world of new speculations, and yet this 
blind-spot helps to explain the lack of impact and attention 
with regard to the literary and aesthetics. Here I would want 
to mark a decisive difference between sex and sexes: there are 
sexes—or differences in kind, genders—because of sex. Sex, 
following a principle of life, might be defined as a coming 
into relation in which the force of each term exceeds the will, 
interest or maintenance of the relatively stable terms given 
through the relation. An organism may require sustenance, 
but when the pleasure or sensation of consumption takes 
over from the will or needs of the organism something like 
sex occurs. It is, if you like, architectonic or entirely devoid 
of teleology—a random assembling. The human species has 
extended itself through technology, consumption, produc-
tion and reproduction but when those processes take on a 
life of their own we have reached and surpassed the sexual 
threshold. There are genders—men and women—because 
there is sex, and not vice versa. This fundamental Freudian 
principle is counter-Kantian (or Kantian in de Man’s sense), 
Leibnizian, sublime, aesthetic and ultimately realist in the 
29 De Man, Aesthetic Ideology, 127.
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most speculative of senses. It commands us not to begin 
explanation from constituted things—but it also precludes 
us from dissolving things, terms, rigidities or points—back 
into some flourishing and transcendental principle of life. 
Instead, we are left with detached and wild—anarchic—forces 
that generate rogue relations that have no concern for the 
maintenance of identity.
Here we can think of reading not as the manoeuver of 
contextualisation, where texts are returned to their point 
of genesis, nor—as some strands of post-structuralism sug-
gest—opening texts to a radically proliferating and generative 
future (or a meaning to come). Instead we might read each 
element as destructive of the terms with which it is coupled. 
If two organisms are coupled and the relation is sexual, then 
what occurs is irreducible to the will, interest, maintenance 
and life of each. And this is because in a world without Kant, 
without God, without humans and without spirit (or let us say 
without future) we would have forces without internal rela-
tions, where coming into relation would be at once creative 
of new terms but also destructive of the plane from which 
forces were generated. The earth, or life as we know it, has at 
once destroyed itself, but also created new strata—has at once 
generated what has come to be known as the anthropocene, 
while at the same time annihilating various ecosystems.
Here, then is how we might read sexually, materially and 
with a nod to an inhuman sublime: the sublime would be 
sexual if the encounter with what cannot be assimilated 
or comprehended were not to draw back to the subject, but 
to destroy subjective coherence, and would be material if 
what were given were robbed of sense. It would, further, be 
realist in a speculative sense if it were presented not as that 
which would be given as meaningful for us, as furthering our 
world but—following a godless Leibnizianism—as a matter 
that generated relations beyond our sense. We can think of 
the material sublime as at once sexual—there are relations 
that have diverging effects that exceed those of any will and 
life—and that it is nevertheless this sexuality of the real, this 
autonomy of force, that generates the thing-like nature of 
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figures (such as gender), and art objects. Look at the way, just 
to take one example, images, phrases and art objects circulate: 
I would suggest that it is more and more the case that things, 
figures, characters, anthems, motifs and other fragments of 
what we might like to think of as art or meaning have their 
own worlds, open their own relations. Our sense of them as 
meaningful is, to use de Man’s terminology, aesthetic ideology: 
and nowhere is this more so than with gender. The figure of 
gender—woman as natural, caring, nurturing, fruitful, god-
dess—seems to be generative, seems to be ours and meaningful. 
Yet it is precisely the figural power of gender that operates 
without us, like a repetition compulsion, usually at those mo-
ments when thinking and connection is what is most required. 
Consider for example how the figure of woman operates in 
Cormac McCarthy’s The Road. Audaciously envisioning what 
it might be to witness the world’s end—where “world” stands 
for the world of meaning, ethics, coherence and human 
benevolence—a father and son journey through a wasteland 
of violence and destruction, haunted by memories of the boy’s 
mother, whose life and moral beauty signify all that has been 
lost.30 The novel’s conclusion avoids any confrontation with 
the dead-end of the species, and can be read as a fantasy of 
redemption in a mode of true post-apocalyptic therapy: after 
the end of the world there will be a brief period of mourning, 
and yet the figure of that lost plenitude—woman—will return 
at the end of The Road to carry the child into a new future. 
Far from McCarthy accidentally falling back into the trope of 
gender in order to avoid the more destructive architectonic 
of sex, we might note a certain recalcitrance or resistance 
to a genuinely material sublime of which McCarthy is just 
one of far too many instances. We read and see this over and 
over again: rather than look at things as things—as detached, 
void of sense and operating without us—figures intervene to 
create the lure of sense.
30 David R. Jarraway, “‘Becoming-Woman:’ Masculine ‘Emergency’ After 9/11 
in Cormac McCarthy,” Canadian Review of American Studies (2012), 42:1, 49-64.
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More positively, I would argue that certain manoeuvers 
in contemporary art production are better thought in these 
materially sublime/Leibnizian/De Manian terms: as trying 
to write as if humanity were absent, as though a world could 
be opened from a grain of sand. There is a long tradition of 
a poetry of the object that runs counter to the Kantian sub-
lime, whereby the resistance of the world would intensify the 
human striving for sense. In the powerful writing of Deryn 
Rees-Jones it is as though the separation of other worlds is 
at once silencing and intrusive, yielding questions that are 
also projections:
Slugs
Each night the slugs have found a way of getting in.
They slip through cracks, inhabiting corners, 
edging up table-legs, walls, or chairs. 
With their slug etiquette, slug gestures,  
are they silently dreaming of lettuces, hostas? 
Do they elegise greenhouses, commune with their dead?  
Or fantasize brethren on distant planets? 
What mistakes do they make, and how will they tell us?  
Do we ask their forgiveness? Do they imagine us saved? 
Of their psychobiographies will I ever be sure?
Occipital horns conduct in the darkness. 
They know nothing of envy, nothing of blame. 
In the gastropod inchings of their midnight séances, 
the slow rehearsals of molluscular dance, 
they’re themselves absolutely, beyond imitation. 
And their silvery cast offs Isadora’s  
just at the moment in the silvery moonlight 
when she sheds her scarves to a million stars.31
The poem’s conclusion is at once abandonment—“they’re 
themselves absolutely, beyond imitation”—alongside ironic 
concession; for all the striving to see what is absolutely itself, 
31 Deryn Rees-Jones, Burying the Wren (Bridgend: Seren, 2013), 32.
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the poem recalls the highly contingent reference to the dancer 
Isadora Duncan—who died when her scarf caught itself in 
the back wheel of a car: the accoutrements of art intrude, 
operate, kill—and yet for all that we anthropomorphise. The 
slug’s silvery trail becomes both a human dance, which in 
turn opens to the cosmos and “a million stars.” The poem is at 
once self-annihilation—the slugs in their sluggy world—and 
failure, with the final return to the humanisation of the inhu-
man, and then the rendering cosmic of that human-mollusk 
dance. The truth of the relative. 
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Speculative Aesthetics
and Object-Oriented Inquiry (OOI)
N. Katherine Hayles
Duke University
Throughout the long and varied tradition of aesthetics, one premise has always, implicitly 
or explicitly, remained unquestioned: that aesthetics has at 
its centre human perception. Indeed, this idea is embedded 
even in the etymology of the term, which derives from the 
Greek aisthetikos, meaning “esthetic, sensitive, sentient,” in 
turn derived from aisthanomai, meaning “I perceive, feel, 
sense.” To this premise, speculative realism issues a strong 
challenge. It endorses the idea that the centrality of the hu-
man should be displaced in favour of what Graham Harman 
calls an object-oriented philosophy,1 an approach in which 
everything—humans, nonhuman biological creatures, in-
animate objects, imaginary concepts—exists equally without 
privileging any viewpoint, especially the human, as the defin-
ing perspective for the others.2
1 Harman’s ideas were taken up by Levi Bryant, among others, who named 
the field object-oriented ontology (OOO), which designation Harman has 
retrospectively used to describe his work. Hereafter the field will be referred 
to as OOO. 
2 Graham Harman, Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects (New 
York: Open Court, 2002), 2, 16 et passim.
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This position immediately poses problems for aesthetic 
theory. Virtually all aesthetic theories to date, whether they 
ground the aesthetic experience in objective qualities, as 
William Hogarth and Edmund Burke maintained, in cul-
tural influences, as André Malraux argued, or as a “counter-
environment” designed to break cultural preconceptions, as 
Marshall McLuhan suggested, rely on the centrality of human 
sense experience. Even Eli Siegel, the American philosopher 
who in 1941 founded the Aesthetic Realism movement that 
maintained reality itself is aesthetic, relied on human per-
ception when he argued that art, self and the world are all 
interconnected and constitute an aesthetic oneness.3 What 
would it mean, then, to imagine an aesthetics in which the 
human is decentred and inanimate objects, incapable of 
sense perceptions as we understand them, are included in 
aesthetic experience?
One approach would be to define speculative aesthetics as 
the aesthetic techniques employed by speculative realism, 
for example, the wildly heterogeneous lists that populate 
the works of Bruno Latour and Graham Harman. In this case, 
however, speculative aesthetics could safely be relegated to a 
subset of rhetorical theory, and much of its explosive poten-
tial would be defused. A better approach would be to engage 
the ideas and arguments of speculative realism and extend 
them into the aesthetic regime. This is the strategy taken 
by Graham Harman in “Aesthetics as First Philosophy,” in 
which he notes commonalities between Levinas’s and his own 
approach.4 The essential move here is to identify aesthetics 
with “enjoyment” (Levinas’s term) or “allure” (Harman’s) so 
that the sensual qualities of objects in which other objects 
“bathe” is understood as an essentially aesthetic response. 
Thus aesthetics is generalised so that it applies not only to 
humans but to all objects, including inanimate ones.
3 Eli Siegel, Self and World: An Explanation of Aesthetic Realism (New York: 
Definition Press, 1981). 
4 Graham Harman, “Aesthetics as First Philosophy: Levinas and the Non-
Human,” Naked Punch (2007), 9, www.nakedpunch.com/articles/147 (accessed 
July 1, 2013).
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A problem with this approach is that we have no idea of 
what this “enjoyment” might consist; for instance, in Harman’s 
example of the cotton and the flame, what is the nature of the 
aesthetic “allure” each experiences in the other? An aesthetics 
based on this approach would, except for humans, be devoid 
of content, beyond the abstract conception of an object’s “al-
lure” for another. Moreover, this approach ties speculative 
aesthetics too tightly to speculative realism, constraining its 
expansive potential. My preferred approach, for which I argue 
here, is to put speculative aesthetics into conversation with 
speculative realism but without granting that speculative 
realist principles can contain all of the possibilities to which 
speculative aesthetics can rightfully lay claim. To flesh out 
this approach, I propose a concomitant methodology that I 
call object-oriented inquiry (OOI), which is indebted to OOO 
but also diverges from it in significant ways.
To develop this approach, I take as my tutor texts two works 
that partially overlap and partially diverge, namely Vilém 
Flusser’s Vampyroteuthis Infernalis, a treatise on the vampire 
squid, and Ian Bogost’s Alien Phenomenology: What It’s Like 
to Be a Thing.5 Whereas Bogost takes Harman’s version of 
speculative realism as his main inspiration, Flusser, writing 
his treatise in 1981, follows a method that could never draw 
assent from Harman or Bogost, because it involves project-
ing the human imagination into the nonhuman other and 
thus, far from trying to escape anthropomorphism, revels 
in it, although in a complex fashion that both reinforces 
and undermines it simultaneously. Bogost, for his part, tries 
faithfully to follow speculative realism’s precepts, but in the 
process develops a methodology that undermines at least 
part of its ideas. These deviations, however, are consistent 
with (and an important inspiration for) OOI.
First let us explore Flusser’s method. Here I must imme-
diately interject a qualification. At the time Flusser was writ-
5 Vilém Flusser, Vilém Flusser’s Brazilian Vampyroteuthis Infernalis, trans. 
Rodrigo Maltex Novaes (Dresden: Atropos Press, 2011); Ian Bogost, Alien 
Phenomenology, or What It’s Like to Be a Thing (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2012).
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ing, very little was known about the vampire squid, a species 
that lives in the deep ocean at about 3,000 feet underwater. 
Since then, robotic submarines and ultra-sensitive cameras 
capable of recording images with almost no light have been 
developed, and biologists now can give a much more de-
tailed account of the organism’s anatomy and behaviours. It 
would be easy to dismiss Flusser because of the assumptions 
he makes that have subsequently been shown not to be the 
case. For example, in correspondence he carried on while 
writing this manuscript, he describes the organism achiev-
ing a diameter up to 20 meters.6 In fact, however, the species 
that biologists recognise as Vampyroteuthis infernalis is doing 
good to achieve a diameter of 20 centimetres—a hundred-fold 
difference in size that makes Flusser’s description of the 
creature as “violent” and “ferocious” difficult to credit. I am 
at a loss to explain this discrepancy, short of suspecting that 
he somehow confused the giant squid (or its close cousin, 
the Humboldt squid), which can grow to that immense size, 
with its much more diminutive cousin. Moreover, many as-
pects of his descriptions of the vampire squid’s behaviours 
are clearly over-determined by its name—the vampire squid 
from hell—and this lends his interpretations an exaggerated 
romanticism not justified by the creature’s behaviours in 
themselves. Whatever mistakes Flusser made, however, are 
for my purposes more or less beside the point. What interests 
me here is his methodology and the claims that he makes for 
it. If the method has merit—and I believe it does—then it can 
make an important contribution, even if Flusser is mistaken 
about certain particulars.
Working from what he thinks he knows about Vampyro-
teuthis, Flusser constructs a binary relation with the human; 
Vampyroteuthis is the human inverted, as in a mirror. The 
purpose is two-fold: to understand Vampyroteuthis through 
the ways in which he encounters the world, and to use these 
discoveries to reveal the Vampyroteuthis hidden or repressed 
6 Flusser, Brazilian Vampyroteuthis Infernalis, 137.
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within human culture.7 Obviously, there is an agenda here 
that goes beyond reconstructing the worldview of the creature, 
and this may explain why Flusser wants him to be seen as 
one of the top predators in his aqueous environment, mak-
ing him parallel to humans as top terrestrial predators. He 
is unapologetic about drawing these parallels, writing that 
he studies, 
the zoology of cephalopods not because I am able to assume an objec-
tive point of view in relation to them but, on the contrary, in order 
to consider them as part of the vital tide that drags me along with it. 
I intend to understand them in order to orient myself in my world. 
Science is interesting precisely because it relates to me … an entirely 
objective science would be uninteresting, inhuman … the present es-
say demands that we give up the ideal of objectivity in favour of other 
intersubjective scientific methods.8  
The vampire squid, like other molluscs, uses the foot to grasp 
and to suck in water. The brain is arranged circularly sur-
rounding the foot, which is also the mouth. These facts lead 
Flusser to the following comparison: 
When we erected our body, we freed our eyes for the horizon and our 
hands for grasping objects. When Cephalopods erected themselves, 
their perception, locomotion and attack organs were relocated toward 
the ground, surrounded the mouth, and came into direct contact with 
the brain that surrounds the mouth.9  
He characterises these two postures towards the world as 
rational and passionate, respectively: “For man, knowing is 
a gesture that advances against the world, an active gesture,” 
while for Vampyroteuthis, “the world for him is an opposite 
pole that has to be sucked in passionately.”10 He is “sexually 
7 I follow Flusser’s usage in referring to the organism as “he” rather than “it.”
8 Flusser, Brazilian Vampyroteuthis Infernalis, 38.
9 Ibid., 39.
10 Ibid., 74.
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excited by the world,” making him “a passionate transcendent 
subject,” which Flusser identifies with “the Devil.”11 In a move 
reminiscent of Lakoff and Johnson (whom he does not cite),12 
he argues that the creature’s psychology can be inferred from 
his biology: “When the mouth and anus find themselves in 
the same organ, the foot, and when the two find themselves 
near the brain, the mouth and anus are cerebralized and the 
brain is sexualized.”13
Some of Flusser’s most interesting conjectures concern 
Vampyroteuthian culture and art, and here we see the pay-
off for his projective method. Noting that “every attempt to 
limit mentality to the human species is doomed to failure,” 
he does not doubt that the creature has a rich inner life.14 
Without verbal language, Vampyroteuthis communicates in 
part through the play of colours on his skin, made possible by 
the internal activation of chromatophores, which he uses to 
attract mates. Therefore “his language’s syntax ... is the logic 
of sex.”15 Living in a fluid medium, he is unable to construct 
durable stable objects, only fleeting ephemeral phenomena 
like the sepia ink cloud that he models into shapes as protec-
tion from predators. In his philosophy, consequently, “there 
cannot be for him an immutable form. He is not Platonic, 
he is organismic. It is not philosophical contemplation, but 
philosophical vertigo and its posture.”16 “From this point 
of view,” Flusser concludes, “the only material for informa-
tion storage that is worthy of trust is the egg,” that is, genetic 
information storage. This is in sharp contrast to humans, 
who as Flusser rightly observes, construct their history by 
manipulating objects and imprinting them with information. 
While humans “trust the permanence of objects,” Vampyro-
11 Flusser, Brazilian Vampyroteuthis Infernalis, 77.
12 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, 2nd ed. (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2003).
13 Flusser, Brazilian Vampyroteuthis Infernalis, 57.
14 Ibid., 48.
15 Ibid., 85.
16 Ibid., 79.
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teuthis “seeks his immortality in the other,” the seduction 
and camouflage that enables him to attract mates. “In sum,” 
Flusser concludes, “it effectively comes down to two differ-
ent types of art.”17 The comparison suggests that OOO may 
harbour an unrecognised anthropomorphic bias at its centre, 
namely the fascination with objects that is, if not a uniquely 
human trait, nevertheless far more prominent in humans 
than in any other species.
The human struggle to “inform” objects, that is, to imprint 
them with information, has gone on for millennia and has 
strongly influenced every field of human endeavour. To 
Flusser, this struggle is essentially aesthetic:
Human art is not, as the well-meaning bourgeoisie would have us believe, 
the fabrication of ‘beautiful’ objects. Human art is the gesture through 
which man imprints his experience upon the object of his vocation in 
order to realize himself in it, to immortalize himself in it. Every object 
that is informed is therefore a ‘work of art,’ be it a mathematical equa-
tion, political institution, or symphony.18  
For Vampyroteuthis, art is not the creation of objects but the 
seduction of the other: “That is why when he creates, Vampy-
roteuthis does not experience the resistance of the object but 
the resistance of the other.”19 Since the species sometimes 
attacks and eats its mate, it is necessary to seduce the other 
through “deliberate deception, artifice and lies.” “He seeks 
his immortality by means of violence exerted on the other. 
To him, science and politics are nothing but stratagems, 
nothing but traps.”20
In Flusser’s view, the “communication revolution” (by 
which he means primarily television, but which is even truer 
of the Web) 
17 Flusser, Brazilian Vampyroteuthis Infernalis, 106.
18 Ibid., 108.
19 Ibid., 109.
20 Ibid., 111.
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consists of a diversion of the existential interest stagnating in objects 
back toward the other. Our communicational structures are being 
fundamentally transformed, in the sense of becoming constituted by 
ephemeral and transient media that allow the other to be informed 
without the need of objects. It is as if humanity, after a multi-millennial 
turn through the objective world, has now reencountered the vampy-
roteuthian path.21 
Even as the two species come closer into alignment, however, 
the long struggle with objects has left a permanent mark 
on human culture and biology. We can never become like 
Vampyroteuthis, Flusser maintains, but we can recognise that 
he lurks in the depths of the human, even as the human is 
the repressed side of his culture and art.
Meditating on the evolution of communication technolo-
gies, Flusser suggests that the “informing” process has moved 
from objects to tools as they become more sophisticated. “The 
writer becomes toolmaker,” he remarks, a proposition that 
now seems prescient given contemporary works of electronic 
literature generated by algorithmic processes in which the 
writer creates the code (that is, makes the tool) and then the 
tool creates the textual output.22 A case in point is Mark Ma-
rino’s essay “Reading exquisite_code: Critical Code Studies of 
Literature,” in which he virtually ignores the “finished” novel 
and concentrates almost exclusively on the live coding sessions 
and algorithmic processes that created it.23 In Flusser’s view, 
“this inflationary tide of devalued objects leads to a disinterest 
in objects ... Society’s interest is increasingly diverted from 
objects towards information, which however is inaccessible 
21 Flusser, Brazilian Vampyroteuthis Infernalis, 114. For an excellent treatment of 
Flusser’s view of media in this text, see Melody Jue, “Reframing Photography 
through the Vampire Squid in Vilém Flusser’s Vampyroteuthis Infernalis,” 
unpublished ms.
22 Ibid., 113.
23 Mark Marino, “Reading exquisite_code: Critical Code Studies of Literature,” 
in Comparative Textual Media: Transforming the Humanities in the Postprint Era, 
ed. N. Katherine Hayles and Jessica Pressman (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2013), 283-310. 
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to consumers. It is stored in the memory of apparatus and is 
transmitted, diluted, not only by gadgets, but also and above 
all else by the ephemeral channels of mass communication.”24
Although Flusser (or anyone else) might have arrived at 
these insights without knowing anything about Vampyroteuthis 
infernalis, the path through the comparison has resulted in 
de-naturalising human presuppositions, enabling a critical 
stance towards assumptions about aesthetics, along with much 
else. In summary, the method here has been to extrapolate 
from a base of scientific evidence (Flusser says that “the 
present fable is more or less informed by biology”),25 using 
human imaginative projections to understand the alien 
creature not only in biological terms but in terms of its own 
phenomenological experience of the world. Moreover, for 
Flusser, it is precisely because of the mirror relation between 
the human and the Vampyroteuthis that these projections can 
succeed. This implies a double gesture of using the biologist’s 
knowledge but also going beyond it into what can be known 
only because of the deeply shared relationship: thus “the 
present fable hopes to be able to exorcise Vampyroteuthis, 
and to make him emerge alive.”26
On some points, Ian Bogost would agree with Flusser. For 
example, Flusser writes that “we must liberate ourselves above 
all from a model according to which existence is the meeting 
of a ‘transcendental’ subject (a mind) with objects; of a ‘self’ 
with a ‘world.’ According to this model, for example, knowl-
edge would be the meeting between the one-who-knows with 
what-is-to-be known.”27 This strongly resonates with Bogost’s 
pronouncement that “The philosophical subject must cease 
to be limited to humans and things that influence humans. 
Instead it must become everything, full stop.”28 Yet Bogost 
would certainly be uneasy with Flusser’s “intersubjective 
24 Flusser, Brazilian Vampyroteuthis Infernalis, 114.
25 Ibid., 123. 
26 Ibid., 124.
27 Ibid., 71.
28 Bogost, Alien Phenomenology, 10, original emphasis.
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scientific methods,” especially his determination to construct 
the Vampyroteuthis as the romanticised mirror “other” to 
the human, because it still leaves intact the human as an es-
sential reference point.
Bogost’s rejection of a human-centric position is evident 
in his comments on Thomas Nagel’s famous essay, “What Is 
It Like to be a Bat?”29 He emphatically endorses the distinc-
tion Nagel draws between experiencing one’s species-hood 
from the inside and inferring it from scientific evidence 
about a creature’s sense perceptions and behaviours. Here 
we might think of a similar distinction that Pierre Bourdieu 
draws between a tribal people’s habitus, the structures that 
organise their way of being in the world, and the inferences 
that an anthropologist may draw from observing their behav-
iours.30 For the people, the patterns that inform the layout of 
their villages, the architecture of their buildings, and their 
behaviours as they enact traditional ways of doing things, are 
not necessarily ever consciously considered; rather, they are 
absorbed unconsciously as the right and proper ways to live. 
Once abstracted into an anthropologist’s calendar, diagrams, 
and mythic structures, the habitus ceases to be a way of liv-
ing and instead becomes an abstraction, a different kind of 
knowledge altogether. Similarly, what it is like to know about 
a bat is altogether different than what it is like to be a bat.
The question of what kinds of knowledge are accessible to 
us is central both to Bogost’s argument and Harman’s OOO. 
Following Harman, Bogost accepts that “all objects recede 
interminably into themselves,” which implies that putting 
things “at the center of a new metaphysics also requires us 
to admit that they do not exist just for us.”31 Determined to 
avoid an anthropomorphic perspective and granting that we 
can never know objects in themselves, Bogost is nevertheless 
powerfully drawn to say something about objects in them-
29 Thomas Nagel, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” The Philosophical Review 
(1974), 83:4, 435-50.
30 Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1977).
31 Bogost, Alien Phenomenology, 10.
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selves. But how is this possible if objects always withdraw? 
Harman solves this problem by distinguishing between an 
object’s sensual qualities (its “allure”) and its essence; simi-
larly, Bogost’s solution is to emphasise that anything we can 
say about objects from an evidentiary basis is a “caricature,” a 
representation “in which the one is drawn into the distorted 
impressions of the other.”32 Quoting Harman, he identifies 
such a representation as a metaphor: “It’s a move that solves 
Nagel’s puzzle: we never understand the alien experience, we 
only ever reach for it metaphorically.”33 From here he goes on 
to develop “metaphorism” as his method of choice, deploying
 
metaphor itself as a way to grasp alien objects’ perceptions of one another. 
Metaphorism offers a method for alien phenomenology that grasps at 
the way objects bask metaphorically in each others’ ‘notes’ [Harman’s 
name for the sensual attributes of an object] by means of metaphor 
itself, rather than describing the effects of such interactions on the 
objects. It offers a critical process for characterizing object perceptions.34
Where I begin to depart from Bogost and Harman is on the issue 
of how objects manifest themselves. Whereas they emphasise 
an object’s allure, the attraction it emanates for other objects, 
more important in my experience is the resistance objects 
offer to human manipulation and understanding. During my 
days as a scientist, my experiences included such resistances 
on an everyday basis, from using spectrum analysis to identify 
an element to determining the composition of chemicals 
in a solution. Andrew Pickering writes eloquently about the 
importance of resistance in The Mangle of Practice, where the 
“mangle” is the cyclic process of a human prodding and prob-
ing a nonhuman object to answer some question.35 The object 
responds by resisting the human’s inquiry, in a continuing 
32 Bogost, Alien Phenomenology, 64.
33 Ibid., 66.
34 Ibid., 67.  Whether this ploy satisfactorily resolves the issue is a moot 
question, as the following discussion makes clear.  
35 Andrew Pickering, The Mangle of Practice: Time, Agency, and Science (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1995).
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dialectic in which the resistance forces the questions to be 
modified, and the modified questions uncover new forms 
of resistance. One could see this as the creative complement 
to Heidegger’s present-to-hand versus ready-to-hand. Here 
it is not the moment the hammer breaks that brings it into 
our awareness, but rather the continually transforming and 
morphing resistance that leads to expanding and deepening 
knowledge. Resistance is crucial because, although objects 
cannot tell us what they are, they can tell us what they are 
not. Resistance enables us to distinguish a rock from a tree, a 
Higgs boson from a quark. The difference between resistance 
and acquiescence is that acquiescence is always metaphoric, 
whereas resistance is decisive: “Whatever I am, I’m not that,” 
an object can respond to human probing. This distinction 
between positive and negative knowledge suggests that our 
knowledge of objects is always relative to other objects rather 
than to an object’s essence in itself, although negative answers 
do allow for increasingly fine distinctions. That this process 
has no necessary end coincides with Harman’s contention that 
an object’s reserve can never be exhausted. At times, Harman 
seems to recognise the importance of an object’s resistance, 
as in this passage from The Quadruple Object: 
A real object has no closer link with its own real qualities than with 
the sensual qualities that one would never dream of ascribing to it … 
a real object is real and has a definite character, but its essence is first 
produced from the outside through causal interactions.36  
“From the outside” here can be interpreted to mean precisely 
the kind of probing that is part of the mangle of practice.
Yet a significant difference emerges here as well, for Harman 
refuses to quantify the extent to which a real object withdraws, 
maintaining that it withdraws infinitely. According to him, 
then, there can never be an increase in knowledge; we can 
never know more or less about a given object. This seems 
to me contradicted by scientific, technical, and engineer-
36 Graham Harman, The Quadruple Object (Winchester: Zero, 2011), 106. 
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ing knowledge, as well as by everyday experience. Moreover, 
Harman also resists what he calls “scientific naturalism,” 
maintaining that it seeks to “undermine” objects by reducing 
them to their elementary components, such as sub-atomic 
particles.37 I think this fear is greatly exaggerated, as most 
scientists recognise there are emergent effects that appear at 
different levels of organisation. Effects not noticeable at the 
molecular level, for example, may appear at the cellular level; 
effects not noticeable at the cellular level may appear at the 
level of the organism, and so on. Few scientists believe that 
reductionist strategies can succeed in explaining everything.
Like Harman, Bogost also argues that “scientific natural-
ism,” which he matches up with social relativism, is deeply 
flawed. The case against social relativism is straightforward: 
it is rejected because it explains events “through the machi-
nations of human society—particularly the complex, evo-
lutionary forms of culture and language.”38 With “scientific 
naturalism,” however, the case is far from clear, and indeed 
is seemingly contradicted in Bogost’s wonderful account of 
the Foveon-equipped Sigma DP digital image sensor, which 
draws deeply on scientific and engineering knowledge. Bogost 
is interested in the differences between how the human eye 
perceives in situations of low light intensity and how the 
digital image sensor perceives. In exploring these differences, 
he importantly opens the possibility that an object-oriented 
approach can be fleshed out through meticulous accounts of 
how nonhuman objects experience the world—or to put it 
in more general terms, the ways nonhuman objects have of 
being in the world.
As mentioned earlier, Bogost is careful to say that his account 
is a caricature rather than an accurate representation, which 
is forbidden by the idea that objects withdraw infinitely from 
one another.39 The choice of terms, which he takes over from 
Harman, is significant: a caricature differs from a portrait or 
37 Harman, The Quadruple Object, 13-18. 
38 Bogost, Alien Phenomenology, 13.
39 Ibid., 13, 65-66.
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photograph precisely because it exaggerates selected features, 
in this way making clear that the object is represented in a 
distorted fashion, and that embodied in this distortion is a 
certain perspective. As noted earlier, he also refers to such 
accounts as “metaphors.” To his credit, he recognises that 
anthropocentrism may be unavoidable: 
we can find evidence for our speculations on perception … even if we 
are only ever able to characterize the resulting experiences as meta-
phors bound to human correlates … the answer to correlationism is 
not the rejection of any correlate but the acknowledgement of endless 
ones, all self-absorbed, observed by givenness rather than turpitude.40 
Expanding on this idea, I note that what is often called the 
“human perspective” is not singular but multiple, not only 
because of differences in language and cultures, but even 
more importantly, because the devices humans have invented 
to expand their sensory and perceptual ranges create a wide 
variety of different perspectives, from optical microscopes 
to particle accelerators, radiocarbon dating to seismic de-
tectors. If we accept Bogost’s proposition that “the answer 
to correlationism is not the rejection of any correlate but 
the acknowledgement of endless ones,” then humans as a 
species have developed ways to access far more perspectives 
than any other species.
Notwithstanding his allegiance to OOO, Bogost shows that an 
object-oriented account can be developed from an evidentiary 
basis. Otherwise, what possibilities are there for the develop-
ment of OOO, assuming that one is not a philosopher? One 
can imagine that philosophers will continue to argue about 
what constitutes OOO, modifying or contesting the framework, 
but for robust development and dissemination beyond the 
relatively narrow boundaries of speculative philosophy, there 
have to be ways to apply OOO that move beyond ontological 
questions to epistemological, social, cultural and political is-
sues. It is precisely this task that OOI undertakes by building 
40 Bogost, Alien Phenomenology, 78.
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bridges between evidentiary accounts of objects that emerge 
from the resistances and engagements they offer to human 
inquiry, and imaginative projections into what these imply 
for a given object’s way of being in the world.
How might this methodology work? First, one needs a 
substantial body of knowledge, usually gained from scientific, 
technical, or engineering sources. Then one extrapolates 
into perceptions or world views, speculating about how that 
object encounters the world. Implicit in this procedure is an 
assumption that scientists, technicians and engineers take 
so deeply for granted that it is not an assumption so much 
as a presupposition. To exist in the world, every object that 
does so must have a certain internal coherence; otherwise, it 
could not endure for even a nanosecond. This is obvious in 
the case of biological organisms, winnowed through evolu-
tionary dynamics. But it is also true of all real objects, from 
the tensile strength of their components to the stabilisations 
of the atomic orbits that hold them together. Because of this 
coherence, it is possible to develop accounts that have causal 
and predictive efficacy. This does not mean, however, that 
such accounts have exhausted (or can ever exhaust) all of an 
object’s way of being in the world.
Indeed, part of my attraction to speculative realism is its 
insistence that objects resist us knowing them completely, 
withdrawing their essence in an infinite regress while still 
sending out their “alluring” sensual qualities. I made a not 
unrelated distinction when I wrote about the difference 
between physicality and materiality.41 Physicality in my 
understanding is similar to an object’s essence; potentially 
infinite, it is unknowable in its totality. What we can know, 
however, are the physical qualities that present themselves 
to us, which I designated as materiality. What distinguishes 
my position from that of Harman and Bogost, however, is 
that for me objects do not passively present their qualities; 
rather, humans attend to certain qualities in specific contexts 
41 N. Katherine Hayles, My Mother Was a Computer: Digital Subjects and Literary 
Texts (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 103-04.  
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for motivated reasons. The same is true of a lion hunting a 
gazelle or an instrument perceiving the number encoded in 
an RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) tag.42 Qualities are 
never perceived in their totality but only within the frameworks 
and contexts that define the relation of one object to another. 
This is why I am sympathetic to Jane Bennett’s argument in 
Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things that relationality 
has to be part of the picture, for it is through relations that 
one object senses the specific parts of another object’s “allure” 
germane for the first object’s purposes and contexts.43
Does this mean that relations are confined to human per-
ceptions, or even more narrowly to human consciousness? 
Definitely not! Steven Shaviro, in a 2011 conference paper 
entitled “Panpsychism and/or Eliminativism,” argues that “if 
we accept that thought (or feeling or experience) need not be 
conscious, then we might well be led to abandon the demar-
cation between mind and matter altogether ... I propose that 
[panpsychism] gives us a good way to avoid the problematic 
baggage both of consciousness and of phenomenological 
intentionality.”44 He goes on to clarify that even if “everything 
is mindful, or has a mind ... this does not necessarily entail 
that everything is ‘given’ or ‘manifested’ to a mind.”45 Rela-
tions between objects need not and certainly do not imply that 
conscious thought is necessary for relationality. Conscious 
thought for humans represents only a small part of their 
processing of information from the environment, and for 
nonhuman objects such as the expert systems and RFID tags 
mentioned above, conscious thought does not operate at all.46 
42 For a discussion of how RFID tags work and their cultural implications, 
see my “RFID: Human Agency and Meaning in Information-Intensive 
Environments,” Theory, Culture and Society (2009), 26:2-3, 1-24.  
43 Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2010).
44 Steven Shaviro, “Panpsychism and/or Eliminativism,” The Pinocchio 
Theory, www.shaviro.com/Blog/p=1012 (accessed July 1, 2013).
45 Shaviro, “Panpsychism and/or Eliminativism,” 7.
46 This argument is developed more fully in my book How We Think: Digital 
Media and Contemporary Technogenesis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2012), 85-122.
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Nevertheless, these objects enter into relations with other 
objects and have their own ways of parsing another object’s 
qualities, encountering them (and sometimes acting upon 
them) within their own contexts and frameworks.
What speculative realism can learn from these accounts is 
an awareness that, despite an objects’ withdrawal, it is possible 
to say a great deal about a real object’s real qualities. What 
it can teach is that these accounts are always partial repre-
sentations of an object’s materiality rather than an accurate 
representation of the object in itself, and for entirely different 
reasons that a correlationist account would give. Over and 
above these lessons to and from speculative realism, there 
are other contributions that speculative aesthetics can make. 
Here Flusser is useful, for he is very clear on this issue: his 
“intersubjective scientific methods,” although originating 
in a biological basis of fact, go far beyond them by using his 
human imagination to project what art, culture, and language 
analogues would be for the Vampyroteuthis. If he sometimes 
blurs the line between metaphor (or analogy) and biologi-
cal fact, and if he also has a strong bias toward constructing 
Vampyroteuthis as the romanticised “other” to the human, he 
nevertheless achieves provocative interpretations that reveal 
by contrast assumptions that would otherwise remain opaque, 
such as our fascination with objects as durable substrates that 
can be “informed” by humans and thereby serve as a kind of 
immortality. By imaginatively projecting Vampyroteuthis’s 
art and culture, he enables us to see our own more clearly.
In Vibrant Matter, Bennett explicitly connects the human 
capacity to project imaginatively into other entities with 
aesthetics: she wants to use “arguments and other rhetori-
cal means to induce in human bodies an aesthetic-affective 
openness to material vitality.”47 Not surprisingly, in her recent 
essay “Systems and Things: A Response to Graham Harman 
and Timothy Morton,” she argues for a stronger role for 
relationality, pointing out that there may be “no need” to 
choose objects or their relations. “The project, then, would 
47 Bennett, Vibrant Matter, x.
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be to make both objects and relations the periodic forms of 
theoretical attention.”48
The issue of relationality is crucial, as the exchange in 
The Speculative Turn between Shaviro (“The Actual Volcano”) 
and Harman (“Response to Shaviro”) illustrates.49 In this 
exchange, I find myself more persuaded by Shaviro than 
Harman. I am confused by Harman’s assertion in The Qua-
druple Object and elsewhere that relations between objects 
can themselves become objects, and that relations can also be 
encapsulated within objects. In this case, what exactly is the 
difference between a relation and an object, if everything can 
be converted to (or already is) an object? Moreover, although 
Harman distinguishes between different categories of rela-
tions in his development of the four-fold object, within these 
categories he tends to refer to “relations” as undifferentiated 
black boxes. His criticism of holistic philosophies clearly 
shows this tendency. In his “Response to Shaviro,” he sharply 
criticises Whitehead’s view that everything is relational by 
arguing that “if an object could be identified with its current 
relations, then there is no reason why anything would ever 
change,” as objects would then have their reserves exhausted 
by the infinite web of relations in which they are caught.50 To 
have change, he asserts, new relations would have to emerge, 
but how would these relations develop if everything is already 
connected? To me, this makes no sense. According to Shaviro, 
Whitehead does assert that “every actual entity is present in 
every other actual entity,” but with the important qualification 
that this is so only “if we allow for degrees of relevance, and 
for negligible relevance.”51 For example, if we ask how a dust 
storm on Mars would affect the online issue in which this 
48 Jane Bennett, “Systems and Things: A Response to Graham Harman and 
Timothy Morton,” New Literary History (2012), 43, 225-33, especially 227.
49 See Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek, and Graham Harman, eds., The Speculative 
Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism (Melbourne: Re.press, 2011).
50 Harman, “Response to Shaviro,” 295.
51 Shaviro, “The Actual Volcano,” 287.
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essay appears, we would, according to Whitehead, conclude 
that it has “negligible relevance.”
My own view is that relations exist within systems, and 
the organisation of components within a system determines 
what relations it will have. Of course, the boundaries of 
systems are often fuzzy; they overlap and transform, not to 
mention that human perspectives determine what counts as 
a system boundary. Nevertheless, the dynamics of systems 
are clearly of different kinds. The effect of encapsulating 
relations within objects, as Harman does, is to mask the 
system’s dynamics and make it difficult to think about the 
dynamics at all. The black boxing of relations obliterates the 
specificity of how complex systems work. In chaotic, complex, 
and complex adaptive systems, multiple recursive feedback 
loops make such systems extraordinarily sensitive to small 
perturbations; something as small as the proverbial flapping 
of a butterfly’s wing can have cascading large-scale ripple 
effects. Change does not require, as Harman seems to think, 
the emergence of new kinds of relations; all it requires are 
systemic organisations that tend toward instability rather 
than stability. The more interconnected such a system is, the 
more liable it is to constant change, rather than an absence 
of change. A clear distinction between objects and relations 
would help to make complex dynamics visible and ensure 
that the reserves intrinsic to objects are strongly correlated 
to the kinds of relations in which they engage.
Putting relations back into the picture empowers the OOI 
methodology of imaginative projection into nonhuman oth-
ers as a theoretical possibility for speculative aesthetics that 
is either forbidden (in Harman’s case) or under-theorised 
(in Bogost’s argument). This leads to a strong paradox: hu-
man imagination is the best way, and perhaps the only way, 
to move beyond anthropocentrism into a more nuanced 
understanding of the world as comprised of a multitude of 
world views, including those of other biological organisms, 
human-made artefacts, and inanimate objects. Bennett makes 
a similar point:
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Maybe it’s worth running the risks associated with anthropomorphiz-
ing (superstition, the divinization of nature, romanticism) because 
it, oddly enough, works against anthropocentrism: a chord is struck 
between a person and thinking, and I am no longer above or outside 
a nonhuman ‘environment.’52 
Empowering the role that human imagination plays in al-
lowing us to go beyond anthropocentrism poses another 
challenge to OOO. Even if this is heresy within the frame-
work of speculative realism, one could argue that humans, 
among all the objects and species that exist on earth, can 
imaginatively project themselves into the worldviews of 
other objects along a greater spectrum of qualities than most 
other objects can do. We know that many other species are 
capable of constructing mental models of how others think 
and perceive. The evidence is especially strong in the case 
of other primates, but one could also include such computer 
programs as expert systems and inference engines, includ-
ing those constructed to create narratives. Nevertheless, one 
could concede that humans exceed all these in the scope and 
variety of imaginative projections. Does this then mean that 
human specialness must be reinstated after all? Along with 
the speculative realists and fellow travellers such as Timo-
thy Morton, I agree that humans need to be more humble 
about their abilities and more receptive toward the abilities 
of what Bennett calls “lively matter” to act in the world. The 
conundrum can be resolved by recognising that humans 
need this ability more than most objects because they are 
more inclined to think of themselves as special. In effect, the 
ability of humans to imaginatively project themselves into 
other objects’ experience of the world is necessary to combat 
the anthropocentrism and narcissism for which the human 
species is notorious. Without it, we would be in worse straits 
than we are; it is the silver lining that enables us to overcome 
the biases of specialness and reach out to understand other 
objects by analogy, although never (as Nagel, Harman and 
52 Bennett, Vibrant Matter, 120.
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Bogost point out) in the terms that the objects themselves 
experience. Perhaps this is what Bogost means by his enig-
matic pronouncement, italicised for emphasis: “all things 
equally exist, yet they do not exist equally.”53
What does all this mean for speculative aesthetics? I started 
with the observation that human perception has always been 
central to aesthetics and noted the strong challenge that 
speculative realism poses to that assumption. I ended by 
arguing that the way to escape anthropocentrism is precisely 
through an imaginative projection into the worldviews of 
other objects and beings, based on evidence about their ways 
of being in the world, although with the important caveat 
that these are analogies and should not be mistaken for an 
object’s own experience.
If speculative realism is modified in these arguments, so 
is aesthetics. The traditional division in aesthetics between 
those who hold that aesthetics is grounded in the object’s own 
qualities, and those who locate it in human perception, is in a 
certain sense fused into a single approach which holds that the 
object’s own qualities are expressed through the evidentiary 
bases, and that these are apprehended by human imagination 
and perception to create analogue projections of an object’s 
world view. At the same time, aesthetics is separated from its 
traditional basis in beauty and re-located in the endeavour 
to recognise that every real object possesses—or even more 
strongly, has a right to—its own experience of the world, in-
cluding biological, animate, and inanimate objects.
This approach, I conclude, has a strong claim to be called 
speculative aesthetics. Influenced by speculative realism, it 
does not slavishly follow its precepts but uses speculative 
realism’s best insights to re-define the aesthetic mission. What 
I have staged in this essay is a kind of Zen tennis match be-
tween speculative realism and speculative aesthetics, in which 
the two are positioned less as antagonists than as partners, 
each helping the other to perform at a higher level. Seen in 
this light, speculative aesthetics is not so much a derivative 
53 Bogost, Alien Phenomenology, 11.
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from speculative realism as a complementary perspective 
based in the methodology of OOI, potently suited to a post-
human world in which other species, objects, and artificial 
intelligences compete and cooperate to fashion the dynamic 
environments in which we all live. 
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Actual Qualities of Imaginative Thngs
Notes towards an Object-Oriented Literary Theory1
Jon Cogburn and Mark Allan Ohm
Louisiana State University
When considered against the context of dominant twentieth century meta-
philosophical tropes, speculative realism might appear first 
and foremost as an attempt to move away from textualism, the 
view that we must understand reality in terms of linguistic 
categories. While such a view is perhaps today most associ-
ated with deconstructionism’s 1980s heyday, it is actually a 
perennial temptation, arguably going back to Plato’s Socrates. 
Simply put, since philosophical discourse takes place via 
language it is very easy for one’s bad philosophy of language 
to leak out and corrupt one’s metaphysics.
Consider, for example, a representative passage by Robert 
Brandom.
A complementary order of semantic explanation, by contrast, begins 
with what discursive practitioners actually do, that is, with the practical 
discursive process of rectifying and amplifying their commitments. It 
seeks to make the notion of objective modal relations intelligible in 
terms of this process, via pragmatically mediated semantic relations.2
1 With apologies to Gilbert Sorrentino, Imaginative Qualities of Actual Things 
(London: Dalkey Archive Press, 2000).
2 Robert Brandom, Between Saying and Doing: Towards Analytic Pragmatism 
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Brandom justifies this by claiming that metaphysical posits 
such as “facts” and “objective modal relations” are “reciprocally 
sense dependent” upon linguistic entities such as “propositions” 
and “pragmatically mediated semantic relations.” Recipro-
cal sense dependence means that concepts of one domain 
are parasitic on concepts in the other domain. Thus, we are 
forced to understand reality in terms of linguistic categories.
We applaud Brandom’s non-caginess about this. However, 
as students of H.P. Lovecraft we of course find this mystify-
ing. If Lovecraft is successful, then one can use language to 
express an inexpressible reality. His entire corpus is to some 
extent an extended meditation on this very problematic. As-
suming that his stories are not nonsense, it follows that (pace 
textualism) our linguistic, mental, and worldly concepts do 
not a threefold cord make.3
Even though few defend textualism as explicitly as Brandom 
or 1980s deconstructionists, one might argue that something 
like a plurality of contemporary analytic and continental 
philosophy simply makes no sense unless something like 
textualism is understood as being presupposed. Certainly, 
speculative realism (and Lovecraft for that matter) irritates 
many academic philosophers because if it ends up being suc-
cessful much of the point might be robbed from textualist 
philosophies. In our Whig histories of speculative realism 
and object-oriented ontology (Sections I through III below) 
we make clear the precise nature of this threat.
But articulating a general Lovecraftian ontology is not 
sufficient for defeating textualism. One must also articulate 
a regional ontology of texts themselves. Barring this, one 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 195, original emphasis.
3 In “Expressing the Inexpressible” Jon Cogburn and Neal Hebert discuss 
this issue with respect to horror fantasy novels and fantasy role playing. 
In Weird Realism Graham Harman discusses the same issues, arguing that 
Lovecraft’s approach is not inextricably tied to horror. See Jon Cogburn and 
Neal Hebert, “Expressing the Inexpressible” in Dungeons and Dragons and 
Philosophy, ed. Jon Cogburn and Mark Silcox (Chicago: Open Court, 2012), 
133–50, and Graham Harman, Weird Realism: Lovecraft and Philosophy (Wash-
ington: Zero Books, 2012).
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could at best be accused of a radical dualism between text 
and world. Perhaps more importantly, it is our hope that a 
non-textualist ontology of texts might once and for all block 
the infiltration from bad philosophy of language to bad meta-
physics. While such a project is a lifetime’s labour, we hope 
that the suggestions that follow (in Sections IV through VIII) 
are enough to begin damming the seepage. If so, then from 
this point forward we could confidently declare metaphysics 
first philosophy, epistemology second, and the epistemology 
of linguistic understanding finally a distant third (though no 
less interesting for all that).
 
I. The Speculative Turn
Besides a deep fondness for Lovecraft, perhaps the only non-
trivial belief held in common by the original four speculative 
realists (Ray Brassier, Iain Hamilton Grant, Graham Harman, 
and Quentin Meillassoux) is the Hegelian conviction that 
metaphysics buries its own undertakers. In After Finitude 
Meillassoux argued trenchantly that the phenomenological 
tradition had, through Martin Heidegger and the French phi-
losophers of the 60s, degenerated into a naïve neo-Kantianism 
only plausible to those who have forgotten the lessons of the 
period between Kant and Hegel. Meillassoux coined the term 
“correlationism” (of which textualism is just one example) to 
name the neo-Kantian thesis that one cannot think being 
without simultaneously thinking of a subject cognising being. 
If true, correlationism prohibits us from claiming knowledge, 
or (in stronger forms) even talking meaningfully, of a reality 
independent of human minds cognising it.
Rather than discuss the speculative realist critique of 
correlationism,4 we concern ourselves here with very briefly 
4 For an explanation of how correlationism implodes from within, see 
Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, 
trans. Ray Brassier (London: Continuum, 2006) as well as Graham Priest, 
Beyond the Limits of Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). For 
an account of the history which had to be forgotten for correlationism to 
rise to the level of philosophical common sense, see Frederick Beiser, The 
Cogburn and Ohm – Actual Qualities of Imaginative Things
183
explaining how the position came to seem inevitable in 
continental philosophy.
First step. In Heidegger Explained Harman traces the gen-
esis of contemporary continental philosophy to Heidegger’s 
1919 emergency war lectures, translated now as Towards the 
Definition of Philosophy.5 At a crucial point in the first lecture 
series, Heidegger argues that even when we are presented 
with a completely novel object we never see it as mere object, 
but rather immediately perceive possible uses for it, even if 
we do not know the proper uses. Decades later Heidegger 
returned to this theme first in the lecture series that formed 
the rough draft of Being and Time (i.e. History of the Concept 
of Time), and then in Being and Time itself as the famed tool 
analysis.6 On the standard reading of this,7 Heidegger’s main 
Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1993) and Frederick Beiser, German Idealism: The Struggle 
Against Subjectivism, 1781-1801 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008). 
For an interpretation of Hegel understood correctly as both responding 
to the issues raised by Beiser and Priest and as (sadly, pace Beiser’s own 
Hegel—see Frederick Beiser, Hegel (London: Routledge, 2005)) defending 
metaphysical positions still worth taking seriously, see Robert Stern, Hege-
lian Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). In light of all this 
material, one can characterise speculative realism precisely in terms of two 
theses: (1) the “back to Kant” movements that birthed analytic and conti-
nental philosophy (Marburg and Southwest schools, respectively) resulted 
in the unwitting twentieth century triumph of academic Fichteanism, and 
(2) this is a bad thing. On Robert Brandom’s Fichteanism, see Paul Franks, 
“From Quine to Hegel: Naturalism, Anti-Realism, and Maimon’s Question 
Quid Facti” in German Idealism: Contemporary Perspectives, ed. Espen Ham-
mer (London: Routledge, 2007), 50-69. For relevant material on Brandom 
and the quid facti, see Jon Cogburn, “Review of Robert Brandom’s Reason in 
Philosophy,” The Journal of Value Inquiry (2011), 45, 465-76, and Jon Cogburn, 
“Critical Notice of Robert Brandom’s Between Saying and Doing: Towards an 
Analytic Pragmatism,” Philosophical Books (2010), 51:3, 160-74.
5 Graham Harman, Heidegger Explained (Chicago: Open Court, 2007). Martin 
Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy (London: Continuum, 2008).
6 Martin Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena, trans. 
Theodore Kisiel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009). Martin 
Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 2010).
7 In Section III below, we discuss (and endorse!) Harman’s critique of this 
traditional interpretation.
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point is an anti-reductionist one. The world in which we find 
ourselves is first and foremost full of alethic and deontic 
modalities, that is, replete (respectively) with possibilities 
and permissibilities. And these permissibilities only make 
sense relative to a teleological realm ordered by a rich set of 
referential relations. The podium refers to the papers that 
one ought to set upon it. The papers refer to the audience to 
whom they ought to be read, etc. etc. For Heidegger, we never 
experience objects merely as bare objects, nor as bundles of 
static properties, but rather first and foremost in terms of 
these normative modes.8
Good enough thus far. But then the second step concerns 
how Heidegger uses this bit of phenomenology to critique 
the philosophical tradition. For the orthodox Heideggerian, 
the phenomenological primacy of proprieties (the rela-
tional, teleological realm of alethic and deontic modalities) 
shades into a critique of explanations that try to reduce such 
proprieties to a realm of “objectively present” (non-modal, 
non-teleological) things that just are what they are in them-
selves. Heidegger thus sought to set on its head the standard 
model of metaphysical or scientific reduction that would 
try to reduce the proprietary to a non-modal realm. Rather, 
Heidegger suggests in Being and Time, this actually works in 
reverse. Supposedly foundational (“originary”) things such as 
Platonic forms or Aristotelian or Cartesian matter are actually 
themselves “founded,” arrived at by a process of abstraction 
where we take everyday objects and try to intellectualise away 
from all of the modal, normative proprieties that relate them 
to their broader world.
8 One might attribute this point to Kant originally, as it is one take on his 
quip that intuitions without concepts are blind. By attributing to Kant the 
view that concepts are first and foremost inferential proprieties, Jonathan 
Bennett, Kant’s Analytic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966) 
and Robert Brandom, Reason in Philosophy: Animating Ideas (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2009) both come close to doing so. However, Mark 
Okrent, “On Layer Cakes,” http://www.bates.edu/philosophy/files/2010/07/
onlayer.pdf (accessed January 8, 2013) shows that what is distinctive about 
Heidegger in this context is that the proprieties fundamentally concern 
the appropriateness of acting in certain ways, and that properly linguistic 
inferential propriety is founded on this.
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Understanding speculative realism and object-oriented ontol-
ogy requires grasping precisely how one can accept all of the 
above and still not fall prey to the correlationist equivocation 
of being with being for us. As Harman shows in Tool-Being, 
correlationism only follows from Heidegger’s critique if one 
maintains a traditional conception of the way human and 
non-human reality is divided.9 That is, correlationism only 
follows from Heidegger’s critique if one thinks (on the one 
hand) that a non-human world would have to be something 
like that described in Descartes’ metaphysical physics, and 
(on the other hand) that the modal and valuative dimension 
of reality must be a function of the human mind. It is only 
then that the idea that Cartesian objects are metaphysically 
founded on a more originary modal world would entail that 
we can have no concept of a human-independent reality. Para-
doxically then, the supposed correlationist overcoming of the 
Cartesian distinction between mind and reality only gets off 
the ground if one maintains a naïve (Cartesian!) view of that 
very distinction.10 If anything is constitutive of speculative 
realism it is a willingness to actually take the anti-Cartesian 
journey suggested by Heidegger, but upon which he never 
really managed to himself embark.
9 Graham Harman, Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects 
(Chicago: Open Court, 2002).
10 Again, we see speculative realism overcoming the Fichtean consensus: (1) 
one of the many ways in which correlationism required forgetting the lessons 
of the period between Kant and Hegel involves the forgetting of Schelling’s 
Naturphilosophie, which can be understood as reacting to precisely this dia-
lectic. See Iain Hamilton Grant, Philosophies of Nature after Schelling (London: 
Bloomsbury Academic, 2008). (2) The anti-correlationist must also respond 
to the Berkeley-Fichte conceivability argument (first articulated in George 
Berkeley, Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philanous (New York: Penguin 
Classics, 1988)) to the conclusion that to be is to be conceived. Reactions vary 
on this score, Meillassoux and Priest (op. cit.) take the argument to be valid, 
yet to paradoxically explode, since the person making it must transcend the 
very limits of conceivability entailed by the argument. Whereas Graham 
Harman, in Quentin Meillassoux: Philosophy in the Making (Edinburgh: Uni-
versity of Edinburgh Press, 2011), and Jon Cogburn, in “Moore’s Paradox as 
an Argument Against Anti-Realism” in The Realism-Antirealism Debate in the 
Age of Alternative Logic, ed. Shahid Rahman, Giuseppe Primiero, and Mathieu 
Marion (Heidelberg: Springer, 2011) take the argument to be simply invalid. 
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But it is not enough to just refuse to take this third step in 
the Heideggerian route to correlationism; speculative real-
ism is speculative precisely because all of the philosophers 
involved have taken up the task of articulating accounts of 
reality at variance with the correlationist’s Cartesian account 
of mind and world. 
II. Object-Oriented Ontology
Object-oriented ontologists such as Ian Bogost, Levi Bryant, 
Graham Harman, Tristan Garcia, Timothy Morton, and the 
authors of this paper get properly underway via another 
layer of critique, which can be seen as complementary to 
the Heideggerian phenomenological critique of objective 
presence. Heidegger’s initial critique naturally lends itself 
to the critique of attempts to reduce or explain away various 
aspects of human reality such as art, mind, language, and 
morality in terms of a supposedly more fundamental realm 
of objectively present objects. Harman calls such reductive 
explanatory strategies “undermining,” and notes that they all 
involve a philosophical degradation of objects.11
The first critical response to objects asserts that they are not funda-
mental. All of the dogs, candles, and snowflakes we observe are built 
of something more basic, and this deeper reality is the proper subject 
matter for philosophy. As the surf pounded the shores of Anatolia, 
Thales proposed water as the first principle of everything. Later came 
Anaximenes, for whom air rather than water was the root of the world. 
It is slightly more complicated with Empedocles, for whom things are 
composed not of one but of four separate elements: air, earth, fire, and 
water, joined and divorced through the forces of love and hate. And 
11 See the discussion of undermining and overmining in Graham Harman, 
The Quadruple Object (Washington: Zero Books, 2011), the meditation on 
reductionism throughout Graham Harman, Prince of Networks: Bruno Latour 
and Metaphysics (Melbourne: Re.press, 2009), as well as the discussion of 
“more than things” and “less than things” in Tristan Garcia, Form and Object: 
A Treatise on Things, trans. Mark Allan Ohm and Jon Cogburn (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2014).
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finally with Democritus, atoms of different shapes and sizes serve as 
the root element of all larger things. In present-day materialism one 
speaks instead of quarks or infinitesimal strings. In all such cases, the 
critical method is the same: what seems at first like an autonomous 
object is really just a motley aggregate built of smaller pieces. Only 
what is basic can be real.12
Rejecting the explanatory presumption of undermining is old 
hat to many philosophers working in both continental and 
analytic anti-reductionist traditions, and is part of traditional 
phenomenology preserved by most speculative realists.
Object-oriented ontologists are distinct in endorsing a 
parallel critique of what Harman calls “overmining,” which 
Harman and Garcia take to be the mirror image of undermin-
ing. Here is Harman again:
A different way of dismissing objects as the chief dramatis personae of 
philosophy is to reduce them upward rather than downward. Instead 
of saying that objects are too shallow to be real, it is said that they are 
too deep. On this view the object is a useless hypothesis, a je ne sais quoi 
in the bad sense. Rather than being undermined from beneath, the 
object is overmined from above. On this view, objects are important 
only insofar as they are manifested to the mind, or are part of some 
concrete event that affects other objects as well.13
If the pre-Socratics are the patron saints of undermining, then 
the British Empiricists, with their attempt to see objects as 
mere bundles of perceptible properties, are the patron saints 
of overmining. Much contemporary continental philosophy 
can only be seen as heir of this tradition, as overmining 
occurs whenever the nineteenth century “hermeneutics of 
suspicion” (e.g. Nietzsche, Marx, Freud) are married to phe-
nomenology14 in attempts to explain aspects of non-human 
12 Harman, The Quadruple Object, 8.
13 Ibid., 10-11.
14 Given the level of caricature, it pains us to admit this, but Luc Ferry and 
Alain Renaut, French Philosophy of the Sixties: An Essay on Antihumanism, trans. 
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reality such as atoms, quarks, numbers, and divinities in 
terms of relational networks such as discursive practices, 
social norms, class struggles, Freudian mechanisms, power, 
phallo-logocentrism, etc. etc. etc. Thus, object-oriented ontol-
ogy is a natural outgrowth of the speculative realist critique of 
correlationism. Overmining explanations are almost always 
instances of correlationism in action, tying the very being 
of some putatively non-human phenomenon to provincial 
human practices.
Let us be absolutely clear here. The object-oriented ontolo-
gist is not urging people to stop providing undermining and 
overmining explanations. Nor is she saying that such explana-
tions never yield important truths about objects. Successful 
undermining explanations tell us about the behaviour of 
objects’ constituents and how these relate to the behaviour of 
the object. Successful overmining explanations tell us much 
about how objects relate to other objects, including human 
ones. The epistemic project of object-oriented ontology con-
cerns how and when such explanations are successful, and 
when they wrongly shade into reductionism. The militant 
anti-reductionism of the object-oriented ontologists is not 
merely epistemic though. The metaphysical task is to char-
acterise objects such that it is a part of their being to resist 
complete characterisation by undermining and overmining.
Mary H. S. Cattani (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1990) had a 
point. It is impossible to really understand the soixante-huitard philosophers 
unless you at least initially apply the formula “= (late Heidegger + some 
combination of Nietzsche, Freud, and Marx).”
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III. Three Ontologies15
Harman’s “A Fresh Look at Zuhandenheit,” republished in 
Towards Speculative Realism, can be seen as the first cast of the 
die that would lead to the object-oriented wing of speculative 
realism.16 The main idea, developed at length in Tool-Being, 
is that the standard account of Heidegger’s tool analysis 
(presented in Section I above) contains two related mistakes. 
While explaining how speculative realism rose out of the 
ashes of phenomenology we touched on the first mistake. 
This was the Cartesian error of seeing the valuative, modal, 
15 Ontologies do not really individuate well enough to be so cleanly counted. 
In particular, we consider here neither Adrian Johnston’s recent specula-
tive labours in the service of a new materialism (the view is still being 
developed, though see footnote 23 for citations to important work), nor the 
Simondonian/Deleuzian metaphysical tradition. The latter clearly overlaps 
with various currents of object-oriented philosophy in essential ways: (1) the 
Simondonian/Deleuzian distinction between non-individuated/virtual and 
individuated/actual is replicated in the capacity metaphysics approach to 
object-oriented philosophy, (2) John Protevi’s Deleuzian explanatory mode 
of getting “above and below the subject” (and the object!) in Chapters I and 
II of Political Affect (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009) has 
resonances with Garcia’s differential model of objects, (3) a possible regress 
facing Simondon and Deleuze about the role of the seed/singularity with 
respect to individuation has similarities with a general issue about causation 
raised by Harman (albeit, biting the bullet with respect to the regress would 
arguably involve rejecting process ontology, and hence rejecting a central 
part of the Simondon/Deleuze project). For a preliminary discussion of this 
latter point, tying it to Harman’s work, see Jon Cogburn, “Review of Gilbert 
Simondon: Being and Technology, by Arne De Boever, Alex Murray, Jon Roffe, 
and Ashley Woodward, eds. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012),” 
Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, (2014), 07/28, n.pag., as well as Jon Cogburn 
and Graham Bounds, “Vicarious Causation as Generalized Affection,” in 
preparation. For a sustained discussion of Harman’s philosophy in light of 
Simondon’s, see Miguel Penas López’s essay in this volume.
16 Dialectical and temporal progress sometimes diverge. Note that Harman’s 
“A Fresh Look at Zuhandenheit” was written in 1999 while speculative real-
ism did not exist until 2007! Still, the authors of this paper are not alone 
in having been first moved by the fervour around Meillassoux’s critique of 
correlationism and then experiencing Harman’s radical reading of Heidegger 
as the decisive next step. Graham Harman, “A Fresh Look at Zuhandenheit” 
in Towards Speculative Realism: Essays and Lectures (Washington: Zero Books, 
2010), 44–66.
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relational world as somehow constituted by human beings. 
Harman shows how, in the context of Heidegger scholarship, 
this has often been articulated by taking Heidegger’s prag-
matist anti-representationalism as exhausting the entirety 
of the tool analysis.
For Heidegger, humans have a prelinguistic17 understanding 
of the valuative, modal, and relational properties of objects 
which is actually grounded in our ability to appreciate the 
appropriate and inappropriate uses of objects. Then, for the 
Heideggerian philosopher of mind and language, linguistic 
and conceptual understanding is parasitic on this prior 
understanding. This is a radical inversion of the Cartesian, 
representationalist philosophy of mind, and has deep and 
complicated ties to the sense in which objective presence is 
understood privatively by Heidegger.
The tendency then, among many Heidegger scholars, is to 
take this pragmatist philosophy of mind not to be a conse-
quence of the tool analysis, but rather to exhaust the entirety 
of the tool analysis.18 Here Zuhandenheit, or “readiness to 
17 Far, far too many commentators (paradigmatically Robert Brandom, Tales 
of the Mighty Dead: Historical Essays in the Metaphysics of Intentionality (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 2002)), try to foist an even more radical 
Cartesianism on Heidegger by claiming that for Heidegger understanding 
cannot be prelinguistic. This is a non-starter though. It is uncharitable both 
since the view itself is so implausible and because it only works as Heidegger 
exegesis via misunderstanding the German word “Rede.” See Okrent, “On 
Layer Cakes” for a definitive rebuttal on both counts.   
18 Strangely, even though their interpretations contradict, we think that 
Mark Okrent, Heidegger’s Pragmatism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991) 
has equal validity as a useful interpretation of Heidegger as does Harman’s 
account. It seems overwhelmingly clear to us (as it does to Herman Philipse, 
Heidegger’s Philosophy of Being: A Critical Interpretation (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1998)) that Heidegger contradicts himself over and over 
again on these very issues, and (here we depart from Philipse) that Okrent 
and Harman present the two most philosophically fruitful consistifications 
of Heidegger’s oeuvre. The most plausible and interesting Heidegger that ex-
perienced a great turn in thought is Okrent’s. The most plausible Heidegger 
that articulates one great idea is Harman’s. Though Okrent’s Heidegger is 
indispensable for the philosophy of mind, at the end of the day we do agree 
with Harman that the pragmatism must be seen as one instance of a broader 
metaphysical reality.
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hand,” simply is the modal serviceability of objects in the 
world for human manipulation and Vorhandenheit, “objec-
tive presence,” is the function of humans’ thinking of such 
objects as abstracted from their serviceability.
Harman examines the notion of privativity in Heidegger 
and argues that the pragmatist analysis is radically incomplete. 
First, the pragmatist reading ignores the fact that human prac-
tical engagement with the world is equally privative! When 
I pre-linguistically understand the Tupperware container 
in terms of the uses to which it should be put, I am equally 
abstracting away from all sorts of properties of the container. 
Harman shows that Heidegger’s discussion of “withdrawal” 
applies both to the way (some) practical, modal properties 
disappear when we intellectualise and to the properties that 
disappear when we take something as something via practi-
cal comportment.
Harman’s second point, the genesis of his speculative realist 
break from correlationist anthropocentrism, is that there is 
nothing unique about human beings in this regard. Just as 
another human might isolate a distinct set of properties of the 
container from those that become manifest when I interact 
with it, so too would a dog, match, ray of light, and neutrino. 
For all of these things too, the container presents a different 
face, actualising different properties as others withdraw.
The key point here is that Harman is not trying to under-
mine Heideggerian theories of perception and understand-
ing. His point is that the Zuhandenheit/Vorhandenheit reversal 
is not merely a model of understanding, but a model of the 
interaction of any two objects. In this manner one can (and 
should) be a non-correlationist phenomenologist.19
19 Just as correlationism only arose by forgetting the proper lessons of post-
Fichtean German Idealism, contemporary phenomenology only came to mirror 
logical positivism’s anti-metaphysical stance by forgetting the tradition of 
Austrian phenomenology. For a discussion, see Raphaël Millière, “Metaphysics 
Today and Tomorrow,” trans. Mark Allan Ohm, Workshop on Contemporary 
Metaphysics and Ontology at the École Normale Supérieure, http://atmoc.
files.wordpress.com/2012/06/milliere_metaphysics_today_and_tomorrow1.
pdf (accessed January 8, 2013).
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Harman’s guerrilla reading of Heidegger naturally sug-
gests a picture of objects in themselves as capacities (in The 
Democracy of Objects, called by Levi Bryant “virtual proper 
beings”) that are actualised in causal engagement with other 
objects.20 Undermining and overmining are avoided by giv-
ing a non-reductionist account of “ontological emergence,” 
as Cogburn and Silcox do in “The Emergence of Emergence: 
Computability and Ontology.”21 Cogburn and Silcox charac-
terise genuinely ontological emergence as happening when 
there is no algorithm for detecting instances of the proper-
ties that emerge upon an object’s interactions with others.22
Though capacity metaphysics23 versions of object-oriented 
ontology were developed in reaction to his insights into Hei-
degger and Bruno Latour, it is clear from Harman’s recent 
work that he himself would reject the views of Bryant, Cogburn, 
and Silcox. In 2005’s Guerrilla Metaphysics and elsewhere24 
20 Levi Bryant, The Democracy of Objects (Ann Arbor: Open Humanities 
Press, 2011).
21 Jon Cogburn and Mark Silcox, “The Emergence of Emergence: Comput-
ability and Ontology,” American Philosophical Quarterly (2011), 48:1, 63–74.
22 Though the theory presented in “The Emergence of Emergence: Comput-
ability Theory and Ontology” is motivated by Harman’s Tool-Being, it is built 
on some of Cogburn and Silcox’s earlier work. See Jon Cogburn and Mark 
Silcox, “Computing Machinery and Emergence,” Minds and Machines (2005), 
15:1, 73–89, and Jon Cogburn and Mark Silcox, “Computability Theory and 
Literary Competence,” The British Journal of Aesthetics (2006), 46:5, 369–86.
23 Just as we have recruited Graham Priest as a possibly unwilling speculative 
realist, we should note that Nancy Cartwright, Nature’s Capacities and their 
Measurements (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) should henceforth 
be taken as a key departure point for the capacity metaphysics approach to 
object-oriented ontology. In particular, those who wish to defend the approach 
from a Harmanian or Garcian critique will need to avail themselves of the 
debates surrounding Cartwright’s justly canonical text. We are encouraged and 
excited by Adrian Johnston’s recent interventions with respect to Cartwright. 
See Adrian Johnston, “Second Natures in Dappled Worlds: John McDowell, 
Nancy Cartwright, and Hegelian-Lacanian Materialism,” Umbr(a): A Journal 
of the Unconscious (2011), 71-91, and Adrian Johnston, “Points of Forced Free-
dom: Eleven (More) Theses on Materialism,” Speculations (2013), 4, 91-98.
24 Graham Harman, Guerrilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the Carpentry of 
Things (Chicago: Open Court, 2005). See also especially essays eight and nine 
from Towards Speculative Realism, as well as the entirety of The Quadruple Object.
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Harman presents a novel reading of Edmund Husserl just as 
significant as his earlier take on Heidegger. Harman begins 
with Husserl’s insight that we do not perceive objects as mere 
bundles of qualities. Then, analogously to his externalisation 
of Heidegger, Harman goes on to argue that objects themselves 
are not mere bundles of qualities for each other. And for 
Harman these sensual objects are not something that is cre-
ated merely when humans and the world interact, but when 
any two real objects interact. Put together with his account 
of Heidegger, this yields Harman’s fourfold ontology, where 
things split across two axes into real and sensual objects and 
real and sensual properties.25
So, minimally, Harman would hold that capacity metaphys-
ics neglects the impact that Husserl’s insight has for anti-
correlationists. But, in addition, Harman would likely see such 
approaches as instances of undermining and overmining,26 
25 This is a little misleading, as Harman’s sensual objects do a great deal of work 
with respect to the vicarious causation problematic, and this is independent 
of his reading of Husserl. See Jon Cogburn and Graham Bounds, “Vicarious 
Causation as Generalized Affection,” which understands Harman’s relation 
to the “affection argument” (with scheme-content problems one of the two 
engines of German Idealism) analogously to his relation with Heidegger. 
For Harman, an affection problem arises whenever any two objects interact, 
and the regress of sensual objects is the solution to this problem. So a real 
theoretical virtue of sensual objects is that they both answer to Husserl’s 
worry and the generalised affection argument.
26 This is clear from Harman’s discussion of Garcia in Graham Harman, 
“Object-Oriented France: The Philosophy of Tristan Garcia,” continent. (2012), 
2:1, 6–21. We should note that we find this criticism to be prima facie compel-
ling, and hope that it does not undermine the aspects of capacity metaphysics 
that we use throughout this paper (our picture of a text as an engine that 
creates interpretation is clearly to interpret texts as capacities). We think 
that the basic picture does not fall prey to Harman’s critique because we 
have attempted to state it in a way consistent with the regressive model of 
causality bruited in footnote 15. To be clear though, we are not certain exactly 
how this all will ultimately pan out. In addition, we still have reservations 
about Harman’s full four-fold metaphysics. One could interpret Husserl as 
just arguing that one directly perceives an object’s individuality, understood 
as a property of the object, not a new kind of object to be distinguished from 
the real one. Of course if trope theory is the correct metaphysics, then the 
property instance (“abstract particular”) might be an object of sorts, but again 
the object’s individuality would be no different from its colour or mass in 
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since the virtual proper being of an object is still determined 
by its capacity to actualise in different ways in response 
to different objects. Consider his analogous comments on 
materialism.
[According to the materialist, the] tiny bulk of the atom may be viewed 
as a substrate for unifying all of its qualities, but this very substrate is 
taken to be nothing more than a certain set of palpable qualities such 
as hardness and resistance. In other words, there is no need to regard 
the atom as an object at all … In this way, materialism both undermines 
and overmines objects by treating them as ultimate elements that are 
actually nothing but sets of qualities.27
One could, even without appeal to Harman’s reading of 
Husserl, make exactly this comment with respect to capacity 
metaphysics generally.
Very recently, in Form and Object, Tristan Garcia has presented 
a radically novel third approach to object-oriented ontology, 
one which, pace Harman, actually defines the objectivity of 
an object in terms of its active resistance to undermining 
and overmining. For Garcia an object just is the difference 
between that which composes that object and that which the 
object composes (including relations into which the object 
enters).28
These three approaches (Bryant, Cogburn, and Silcox’s 
capacity metaphysics, Harman’s fourfold, and Garcia’s dif-
ferential model) are all instances of what might be called 
pure ontology, in that they characterise the properties of any 
object whatsoever. But they readily lend themselves to regional 
this respect. This being said, it is not clear to us if abstract particulars (or 
the property of individuality more abstractly conceived) will do the work 
of solving the problem of vicarious causation.
27 Harman, The Quadruple Object, 14, original emphasis.
28 For Garcia’s own take on his divergences from Harman, see Tristan Garcia, 
“Crossing Ways of Thinking: On Graham Harman’s System and My Own,” 
trans. Mark Allan Ohm, Parrhesia (2013), 16, 14–25, and Harman’s response: 
Graham Harman, “Tristan Garcia and the Thing-in-itself,” Parrhesia (2013), 
16, 26–34. 
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ontology, where specific kinds of objects are characterised in 
terms of how the properties of the pure ontology are mani-
fested and affected by the kinds in question.29 After adding 
the category of intensity to his initial differential model, in 
Book II of Form and Object, Garcia provides uniformly il-
luminating regional ontologies of over a dozen such things, 
including time, art, value, adolescence, and death. Cogburn 
and Silcox actually developed their view while working on 
the ontologies of games. In works such as Alien Phenomenol-
ogy, Or What it is Like to be a Thing Ian Bogost has built on his 
expertise with video games to develop a much finer grained 
regional ontology.30 Timothy Morton has done likewise with 
respect to the ontology of the environment in works such as 
Realist Magic.31
The fecundity of object-oriented ontology for regional 
ontology is why there have been as of this writing dozens 
of conferences and meetings devoted to a wide panoply of 
applications, including architecture, visual arts, communica-
tion studies, technology studies, and environmental studies. 
All such investigations explore what a given kind of object 
must be like given that objects in general are as articulated 
by object-oriented ontology. Indeed, such is the task of this 
paper with respect to texts.
Some of the initial ideas concerning texts as engines to 
generate thought experiments were presented by Cogburn and 
Silcox in the paper “Against Brain-in-a-Vatism.”32 While this 
29 There is actually an important philosophical point here. For the object-
oriented ontologist, the pure ontology cannot itself overmine. As a result, 
regional ontology will always have a kind of autonomy.
30 Ian Bogost, Alien Phenomenology, Or What It Is Like to Be a Thing (Minne-
apolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012).
31 Timothy Morton, Realist Magic: Objects, Ontology, Causality (Ann Arbor: 
Open Humanities Press, 2013). Our impression is that we owe to Morton the 
insight that for object-oriented ontologists all objects are both aesthetic and 
interpreters (a view we characterise in Section VI below), but this impres-
sion comes merely from reading various internet blogs, so we are not at all 
certain that it is correct.
32 Jon Cogburn and Mark Silcox, “Against Brain-in-a-Vatism: On the Value 
of Virtual Reality,” Philosophy & Technology (November 2013), n.pag.
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was in context of their broader project of thinking through a 
capacity metaphysics with respect to games, we do not think 
that the theory is committed to the aspects of that view that 
Harman would find problematic. Moreover, the fact that we 
are now able to directly motivate the view in terms of how 
textual objects actively resist their own undermining and 
overmining strongly suggests a provisional affinity with 
Garcia’s metaphysics. We should note here that although we 
do not discuss in this paper the extent to which the mechan-
ics of Harman’s fourfold are needed for a full account of the 
textuality of a text, such a discussion (as well as engagement 
with Garcia’s own writings about art and representation) 
will prove fruitful for the further articulation of an object-
oriented literary theory.
IV. Text as Object
Until very recently nearly every literature major in the United 
States was subjected to a “theory” class where students worked 
through a text such as Terry Eagleton’s Literary Theory: An 
Introduction.33 Assignments invariably involved writing dif-
ferent interpretations of random texts according to whatever 
hermeneutic of suspicion was being covered at the time: 
Freudianism, Marxism, Structuralism, Deconstructionism, etc. 
Now that “theory’s empire” has begun a period of decline in 
literary study, the benefit of hindsight reveals what was lost 
during its ascent.
Simply put, such approaches systematically robbed their 
practitioners of the ability to say anything illuminating about 
specific texts. This is because the central idea of theory was 
to mine the hermeneutics of suspicion so as to give critics 
general procedures to unmask “what is really going on” in 
any given text. But when applied to works of art the effect is 
too often that of wearing blue tinted glasses and then saying 
that everything is blue, or evidence of class struggle, the will 
33 Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory: An Introduction, Anniversary Edition (Min-
neapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008).
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to power, castration anxiety, the failure of the metaphysics of 
presence, phallo-logocentrism, etc. etc. etc. And what really 
happened is that one too often either cherry picked works 
that could easily be read in terms of one’s hermeneutics, or 
one ignored everything about a work that did not validate 
the story. The end result is that there are no longer any tex-
tual objects, but rather just an encompassing inter-textuality 
equally present in Dr. Seuss and the Constitution of the United 
States. In the wake of such depredations, theory has largely 
been abandoned altogether, and textual objects are now usu-
ally reduced to their relative historical, cultural, sociological, 
empirical contexts, conditions of production, reception, or 
the correlation between the biography of the author and text 
à la Sainte-Beuve.
Again, there is nothing wrong with interpreting a literary 
text using one’s favourite hermeneutics of suspicion or (post-
theoretical) social science. What is wrong is identifying texts 
as mere vehicles for such a priori application of theory and 
social science. With all we have said above, it should be clear 
that this is the very pinnacle of overmining, and that there is 
a very clear sense in which the autonomy of the textual object 
has been attacked. When texts are overmined nothing can be 
learned from them, since the philosophy undergirding the 
critical method always already provides all of the answers. 
And perhaps the very pinnacle of perversity in this regard 
is Stanley Fish’s “reader response criticism,” which is the 
apotheosis of theory obliterating practice. If, as Fish claims, 
the individual artworks themselves have no meaning what-
soever, then there is no hope of anyone learning deep truths 
articulated in the artworks. Never in the history of thought 
has necessity so shamelessly been trumpeted as virtue.34
34 For an account of what is right about Fish, see the discussion in Cogburn 
and Silcox, “Computability Theory and Literary Competence.” We should 
probably also mention “post-modern” literary criticism of the type associ-
ated with John Fiske. For a proper excoriation of this tendency as well as 
the Frankfurt School type Marxist approaches that Fiske was attacking, see 
Noël Carroll, A Philosophy of Mass Art (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
Carroll shows that both approaches uncritically rely on a very implausible 
neo-Kantian account of judgments of taste.
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Contrast Fish’s nihilism with the traditional view, coming 
out of nineteenth century literary realism (and naturalism), 
that texts (even fictional ones) represent the actual world. 
Whatever its other problems, this view respects the autonomy 
of the text at least in the sense that it respects the fact that 
part of why we study texts, even fictional ones, is to learn about 
the actual world. Though we do not seek to revive literary 
realism (or naturalism), it will be clear from what we go on to 
say that we do think that this is the most important test case 
for a hermeneutics that avoids overmining and undermin-
ing. Can one’s hermeneutics make sense of the actual truth 
of fictional texts?
Given the discussion in the recent anthology Theory’s 
Empire, one would expect to be able to appeal to the analytic 
philosophy of art for some kind of material support in the war 
against overmining, but this is certainly not so with respect 
to our desiderata of understanding truth in fiction.35 That is, 
contemporary analytic philosophy of fiction, which (if taken 
to exhaust what one might say about texts) overmines just 
as badly as does traditional theory and contemporary post-
theoretic historicism.
Prior to the mid-seventies the issue of truth from fiction 
was a going concern, with giants such as Monroe Beardsley 
and Morris Weitz proposing mechanisms by which one could 
infer actual truths from fictional texts. However, after Mary 
Sirridge critiqued these views in her canonical article “Truth 
from Fiction?” the issue disappeared.36 Indeed, Sirridge’s 
arguments make it very doubtful that use of linguistic-turn 
standbys such as entailment, presupposition, and meta-lan-
guages could be of even minimal help in elucidating the way 
a good reader might infer actual truths from fictional texts.
Since Sirridge’s paper, analytic philosophers have followed 
continental hermeneuts of suspicion and largely given up on 
35 Daphne Patai and Will H. Corral, eds., Theory’s Empire: An Anthology of Dis-
sent (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005).
36 Mary Sirridge, “Truth from Fiction?,” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research (1975), 35:4, 453–71.
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the task of understanding truth in fiction, instead focusing on 
three main issues: (1) discerning a semantics for fiction that 
might aid metaphysical programs that take certain putatively 
non-fictional objects (e.g. numbers) to be ficta,37 (2) trying 
to understand the extent to which we are irrational when 
reacting emotionally to fiction,38 and (3) trying to discern the 
extent to which moral properties of artworks are relevant to 
their aesthetic properties.39 These are important tasks. But 
for our purposes what is interesting is that, as with theory’s 
empire, one can read thousands of pages about these debates 
and have no idea that actual truth in fiction ever even existed 
as a philosophical concern.
It is clear that a text is overmined in all three cases: (1) 
when (with continental aestheticians) one simply interprets 
it according to a priori hermeneutic principles, (2) (with 
post-theory historicists) one is only concerned with facets 
of the text’s historico-cultural milieu, and (3) (with analytic 
aestheticians) when one only examines texts to the extent 
that they provide test cases for broader philosophical debates 
such as the three from the previous paragraph.
Undermining is a bit more complicated on this score. For 
nobody, as far as we know, thinks that textual meaning can 
be derived from the material composition of the texts. But 
then what would it be to undermine a text? In this regard, it is 
important to realise that undermining can happen whenever 
putatively intrinsic properties are put forward as providing a 
total explanation of an object. From this perspective we take 
it that the relevant textual properties are the representational 
ones. This is a bit confusing because representation is a rela-
tion between a medium and the represented world. However, 
37 For a great overview of how extant theories of fiction contribute to meta-
physical debates about fictionalism, see Joseph Dartez, Ficta as Mentalia: 
Surveying Theories of Fiction in Search of Plausible Ontology (Louisiana State 
University Electronic Thesis & Dissertation Collection, 2009). 
38 See Eva Dadlez, What’s Hecuba to Him: Fictional Events and Actual Emotions 
(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997).
39 For the most recent word on these debates, see Berys Gaut, Art, Emotion, 
and Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
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this worry disappears once one realises that what the text 
represents in some sense depends solely upon the text, and 
is thus intrinsic. What is non-intrinsic then is whether the 
text’s representation successfully represents the actual world.
Thus, the canonical undermining strategy with regard to a 
text is the view that all of the modal and valuative properties 
of the text can be derived from its representational purport. 
In analytical philosophy one might understand this purport 
along the lines of David Lewis, as the set of possible worlds 
where the text is true.40 This is approximately fine as far as it 
goes.41 The problem occurs if one thinks that such representa-
tional properties are, to use the Heideggerian term, “originary.”
Two immediate problems. First, as Graham Priest convinc-
ingly both argues and shows in Towards Non-Being: The Logic 
and Metaphysics of Intentionality, fiction does not just represent 
non-actual but possible entities, but also impossible entities.42 
Thus, the representational purport of a text cannot be identified 
with a set of possible worlds. Second, texts do not just represent 
what is the case, but give us guidance concerning what ought 
to be the case. Unless one can explicate the normative facts 
being represented, it is not clear how one could derive such 
40 David Lewis, “Truth in Fiction,” American Philosophical Quarterly (1978), 
15:1, 37–46.
41 See Ruth Ronen, Possible Worlds in Literary Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994) for a wonderful application of Lewis’s ideas to lit-
erary theory. We should note here that Lewis’s own view is slightly more 
complicated than what we have presented above, as for Lewis the story has 
to also be told as true in the worlds in question. This actually causes serious 
problems in determining what the proper set of possible worlds is for a work 
where the proper understanding of the text requires recognising distance 
between author and narrator. 
42 Graham Priest, Towards Non-Being: The Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). In the appendix to Chapter 6, “Sylvan’s 
Box,” Priest actually tells a story that contains a metaphysical impossibility. 
It is important to realise that such worries are in no way “non-mimetic,” as 
they represent impossible states of affairs. One should note that Priest also 
argues that certain true contradictions are not just possible, but actual. In 
Beyond the Limits of Thought, some of these concern the limits of representa-
tion. Such cases are also clearly mimetic though, when one paradoxically 
represents the non-representable, one is still successfully representing.
Cogburn and Ohm – Actual Qualities of Imaginative Things
201
instructions from the mere set of possible worlds consistent 
with the factual propositions of the text.
The deepest problem for textual undermining is in fact 
the one articulated by Heidegger. Representation itself is 
not originary, but is rather founded upon a complex set of 
modal and normative phenomena. In his essay on truth, re-
printed in Basic Writings, Heidegger considers the face on a 
given unit of currency.43 With such cases humans naturally 
possess the ability to recognise that the face represents a real 
human. This is fine as far as it goes, but the mistake happens 
when this naturalness leads us to treat representation as an 
ultimate explainer of normative phenomena such as truth. 
Again, it is fine to say with the representationalist that P is 
true just in case the state of affairs that P represents is actual. 
But Heidegger notes that then knowing that P is true will 
require knowing both what state of affairs P represents and 
knowing that this state of affairs is actual. But then the ability 
to determine that states of affairs are actual is in some sense 
prior to the ability to know that a sentence is true. This prior 
ability is what Heidegger tries to articulate with his theory 
of truth as unconcealedness.
Let us return to the representational purport of individual 
words. Knowing what “money” represents requires knowing 
the representation of “money,” which requires being conver-
sant with the proprieties regarding how money ought to be 
treated. So the meaning of “money” cannot be like pieces 
of string connecting the representation to all of the bits of 
money in the world, or even all possible worlds. Instead, we 
only have a word for “money” because money already has 
normative force in the actual world. We are only able to use 
the word “money” correctly because of our sensitivity to this 
normative force.44
43 Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper 
Perennial, 2008).
44 We should note that the application of this key Heideggerian insight to 
representational accounts of mind and language was independently made 
by Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Brown and Blue Books (Mineola: Dover Books, 
1965) and Wilfrid Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge: 
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This is not a mere terminological quibble! The ideologies 
that support textual undermining have real world conse-
quences, perhaps most notably with respect to legal rea-
soning and our approach to religious texts. For the former, 
note that constitutional originalists absurdly hold that the 
representational purport of a document written hundreds of 
years ago could be sufficient to adjudicate issues such as how 
powerful a weapon individuals should be able to purchase or 
what kinds of software innovations are copyrightable. Taking 
representation to be originary is almost always a necessary 
step in not realising the sense in which textual meaning is 
often underdetermined.45 Contrariwise, once one realises that 
representation itself is founded on a background of modal 
proprieties, one realises that normative reality can change 
(minimally in the sense that radically novel kinds of objects 
such as video games bring new norms with them) and that 
as a result representational purport will not always clearly 
apply in novel situations.
The textual underminer is probably best represented in 
our culture by the biblical literalist, who is most concerned 
with claiming that the actual world is a member of the set of 
possible worlds consistent with the Bible. This is unfortunate 
for all sorts of reasons, mostly because biblical literalism 
brings with it so many other pernicious beliefs and actions. 
Consider literalist’s beliefs with respect to the text itself. Bibli-
cal literalists typically believe that the Bible is consistent and 
that Moses wrote the Pentateuch and Jesus’s disciples wrote 
the gospels. Or consider historical beliefs unrelated to the 
composition of the text, such as the belief that in the early 
Roman Empire people had to travel to areas where they did 
not work in order to register for a tax census. Or consider 
false, legalistic approaches to morality of the very type con-
demned by Jesus and Saint Paul. If one thinks of the Bible as 
a list of propositions that simply mirror the facts that make 
Harvard University Press, 1997).
45 On this point, see Mark Wilson, “Predicate Meets Property,” The Philosophi-
cal Review (1982), 91:4, 549–89.
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them true, then one is much more likely to think of moral 
reality as representable by such a finite set of propositions.
The moral rot of textual undermining is actually an instance 
of a broader spiritual psychosis. The problem is that repre-
sentations are accorded magical powers. But then believers 
accord magical powers to their own representations of real-
ity. Massive weirdness results, for example people who think 
that the primary spiritual fact about humans is whether or 
not they accept a history of the world that includes the resur-
rection. This makes no sense; it is as if the state of one’s soul 
depended upon whether one believes that the Gettysburg 
Address was delivered on a Thursday.
V. Truth in Fiction 
The object-oriented ontologist is correct, and we desperately 
need an understanding of what texts must be like such that 
they resist their own undermining and overmining. Since 
texts are linguistic, they are clearly representational. But they 
are more than that. They do not just tell us what reality is like; 
they give us guidance. And (as we will argue) sometimes in 
order to guide us to a truer conception of reality the texts 
must misrepresent that very reality. Likewise, since texts 
are socio-cultural entities, they are clearly interpretable by 
hermeneutic strategies devised by humans. But again, they 
are more than that, for there are surprises in individual texts 
either at variance with or simply not covered by hermeneutic 
strategies.
If one had a good theory of the actual truth of fictional 
texts, then one could easily thread the Scylla and Charyb-
dis of undermining and overmining. For since the work is 
fictional, its truth cannot be explained by the actual world 
being an element of the set of possible worlds determined by 
its representational purport. Since the work is true, it cannot 
be explained away as mere symptom of class struggle, castra-
tion anxiety, the metaphysics of presence (or the overcoming 
thereof), power, etc.
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Breaking from the representationalist paradigm requires 
taking care in exactly how the problem of truth is formulated. 
First, we should not define truth tout court, because the end 
result of this would probably be just that the vast majority of 
(if not all) texts end up being simply false. Instead we will 
define the extent to which a text is true. Moreover, we must 
define this with respect to some subject matter. For example, 
a science fiction novel can be very true psychologically while 
being nonsense with respect to the laws of physics, or (as 
was often the case in bad 1950s science fiction) the reverse. 
Second, we should not (as Cogburn and Silcox do in “Against 
Brain-in-a-Vatism”) define the truth of a text in overly repre-
sentational terms. It should be a consequence of our definition 
that someone reading a true text will end up having more 
of the relevant kinds of linguistically assertible true beliefs. 
Posing the definition in terms of true beliefs would both fail 
to capture key ways that texts can be true, but also draw us 
back into a pre-Heideggerian naivety where representational 
media are treated as originary. So with these caveats we put 
forward the following:
X is true (false) with respect to subject area Y to the extent that
imaginatively complicit readers of X will, 
all else being equal and as a result of reading X,
better (worse) partake in reality normative with respect to Y.
This is a mouthful. What might it mean to say that a novel 
is psychologically true to the extent that all else being equal 
one who reads it better partakes in reality normative with 
respect to psychology? To partake well in psychological 
normative reality is to be more likely to do the things involv-
ing psychological reality that one ought to do. So a novel is 
psychologically true to the extent that, all else being equal, 
reading it helps one develop virtue with respect to the things 
that psychology attempts to treat.46
46 Clinical psychology in general makes a hash of this, as it misconstrues 
the normative nature of things like “mental health.” When psychologists 
address this issue they tend to (as in the new DSM) equate mental health 
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And “having true beliefs” is, albeit important, just one 
such virtue. Thus, while we agree with Mary Sirridge that 
people imaginatively complicit in The Scarlet Letter are more 
likely to arrive at the ethical and psychological insight that 
“unacknowledged guilt leads to perdition, whereas expiated 
guilt leads to salvation,” we also think that the book helps a 
sympathetic reader’s general pre-linguistic attunement to 
ethical reality.47 Being non-judgmental goes far, far beyond 
what kind of sentences one is likely to utter and extends into 
every facet of one’s behaviour towards others. The properly 
complicit reader of The Scarlet Letter is better attuned to reality 
normative with respect to how we treat people.
Now to illustrate actual falsity of fictional texts, let us 
consider Ayn Rand’s Atlas Shrugged. The book is false with 
respect to economics, because it can only overcome a reader’s 
imaginative resistance if she accepts that all of a modern, 
industrialised society’s large scale infrastructure could be 
privately financed.
The false beliefs are not limited to possible worlds! Rand’s 
fictional character Nathaniel Taggart is based on the actual 
James J. Hill, who ran the Great Northern Railway. As a result 
of this, fans make much of the fact that (in common with Tag-
gart’s fictional company) the Great Northern was supposedly 
privately financed and did not receive land grants. But this is 
not correct, since the Great Northern was actually the second 
renaming of the Minnesota and Pacific Railway, which was a 
public railroad formed out of massive land grants and mil-
lions of (and this is nominal!) dollars’ subsidy. While Hill did 
privately finance the purchase of this in a fire-sale, the idea 
that anyone could actually build such a railroad without land 
grants and other public inducements is dangerous lunacy.48
with the ability to function well in one’s society. As if all societies nurtured 
health in equal amounts. 
47 See Sirridge, “Truth from Fiction?” and Nathaniel Hawthorne, The Scarlet 
Letter (Mineola: Dover Publications, 1994).
48 I should note that there are plenty of reflective libertarian fans of Ayn 
Rand who do not have this economic belief. I cannot imagine Roderick 
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Of course, having false economic beliefs is just one way 
that one can be out of synch with normative reality with 
respect to economics. And one can be out of synch with any 
other layer of reality as well: moral, mathematical, historical, 
metaphysical, psychological, etc. But we think our examples 
here are enough to illuminate the definition.
In the next section we suggest a theory of how texts manage 
to embody the properties isolated by our truth definition. But 
first we must clarify two points, the second of which illustrates 
our ontological need. First, one might think that our defini-
tion, as well as our blithe discussion of “normative reality,” 
completely precludes any concessions to relativism. Are we 
committed to a text just having one truth for everyone? No 
we are not. Our picture of true texts is that they are engines 
for helping people partake in normative reality, including 
developing relevant true beliefs. But this is consistent with 
normative reality being multi-faceted and with different 
people discerning different true beliefs from the same texts. 
Indeed, part of what makes a great work great is that it re-
mains a productive truth engine through reinterpretations 
motivated by historical changes and cultural differences. The 
analogy we would like to suggest here is to what direct refer-
ence theorists such as Alva Noë have to say about differences 
in perception.49 A dog’s sense of smell is quite different from 
that of a boy, but this does not mean that a boy and his dog are 
not both directly perceiving smell properties that actually exist 
in the world. Likewise, if I get radically different truths from 
a text than from the same reader of that text thirty years ago, 
that does not mean that we have not both discerned truths.
Long, who himself sometimes engages in libertarian critiques of large scale 
infrastructure, asserting it. This kind of libertarian would note that of course 
one cannot be a railroad tycoon without corruptly harnessing the resources 
of the state with respect to funding, eminent domain, and help in co-opting 
and crushing labour movements, but so much the worse for railroad tycoons. 
We are not endorsing this train of thought (and in fact both quite like pas-
senger rail), rather just noting this so that the above is not read as putting 
forward a comic-book version of contemporary libertarianism.
49 Alva Noë, Action in Perception (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006).
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Our second issue provides even more motivation. Suppose 
that Timothy Leary et. al. were right all along about LSD, and 
that it really does grant mystical insight into reality. Then 
suppose that someone has laced my copy of Justin Bieber’s 
ghost-written memoir (published when he was 16) First Step 2 
Forever50 with enough of the drug that when I read it I absorb 
it through my fingers, I get fantastically high. After I come 
down I am a better person.
It might look like our definition of truth in fiction would 
entail that Bieber’s drug laced memoir is ethically true. But 
this is not correct, because my ethical transformation did not 
come about as a result of reading the wretched book, which 
is required by the definition. But, to be fair, this just pushes 
the problem back. What is it about reading that allows books 
to have such an outsized effect on us? This then is what Sir-
ridge’s question now becomes, what is it about true (false) texts 
that makes it the case that reading qua reading better (worse) 
aligns us with normative reality? Without an answer to this 
question we are no closer to our goal than when we began.
VI. Interpretation as Thought Experiment
When skilled fiction writers such as Stephen King describe 
their craft, they almost invariably describe it in a strangely 
passive manner.51 The process stereotypically works like this. 
King wakes up in the middle of the night with some very vivid 
scene impressing on him, and then stays up until morning 
trying to figure out how that scene fits into a plausible evo-
lution. In doing this he will determine a setting and central 
problem. His phenomenology then is that there is a fact of 
the matter about how the setting will evolve in response to the 
problem. His primary job at this point is just to get the facts 
of the evolution correct. During writing he is often surprised 
by what his characters end up doing.
50 Justin Bieber, First Step 2 Forever: My Story (New York: HarperCollins, 2012).
51 Stephen King, On Writing: A Memoir of the Craft, Tenth Anniversary Edition 
(New York: Scribner, 2008).
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Importantly, it is not just that the initial set-up is a gift of the 
muse. Plot is also something writers experience as an external 
object with its own autonomy. The writer’s attentiveness to 
the muse regarding plot is attentiveness to how the set-up 
really would plausibly evolve, were the set-up incarnate in the 
actual world. A good book must first and foremost get both of 
these things (set-up and plot) correct. And this is our central 
claim concerning how texts paradigmatically put readers in 
accord with normative reality.
Let us return to Mary Sirridge, whose critical intervention 
had the unintended effect of largely killing off the debate 
surrounding the actual truth of fictional texts. Interestingly, 
Sirridge is clear at the end of the article that she does not 
think that the failure of linguistic turn mainstays means that 
fictions cannot teach us about the actual world:
works of fiction are by no means alone in not being able to serve as 
direct evidence about the actual world. Cooked-up counterexamples 
may defeat proposed criteria meant to apply to kinds of things in the 
actual world. Thought experiments are often used to clarify hypotheses 
and to do them in. Counterfactual analysis is often used to support the 
corresponding positive claim. No one supposes that the “facts” adduced 
in these cases are genuine—in fact, they are usually so chosen that we 
can assume that certain things are unproblematically true, as we could 
not in actual life … We seem to have no satisfactory explanation of how 
these methods work epistemologically.52
In defence of the cognitive status of thought experiments, 
Sirridge notes that they “form one of the mainstays of 
philosophical thinking.” Eva Dadlez follows Sirridge here,53 
persuasively arguing that if one takes thought experiments in 
ethics to have any positive epistemic weight, then one cannot 
gainsay the positive epistemic weight of fiction.
However, attending to writers such as King shows that the 
issue is considerably more general than just thought experi-
52 Sirridge, “Truth from Fiction?,” 470–71.
53 Dadlez, What’s Hecuba to Him.
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ments in ethics. For all thought experiments have the same 
structure as interpretations of fictional works. First there is 
a set-up, which will often involve physical impossibilities 
such as frictionless planes. Then the system evolves. Centrally, 
scientists are interested in the way in which the actual world 
would evolve, were the set-up incarnated, even in cases when 
the set-up is physically impossible in some respect.54
Consider, for example, the clear null-interpretation of 
Johannes Kepler’s Somnium. The set-up for the experiment is 
a young man transported to the moon by demons. The evo-
lution concerns what he would experience. In the evolution 
the young man floats slowly down to the moon’s surface and 
must breathe through a sponge. In addition, even though the 
moon is orbiting the earth, from the moon he sees the earth 
moving across the sky. So even though the set-up was impos-
sible (in the 1620s), the evolution of the impossible system 
did tell us three important things about the actual world: (1) 
that the moon has less gravity than earth, (2) that gravity is 
related to atmosphere, and (3) that people on the orbiting 
Earth would see the stationary sun as moving across the sky.
Here is an interesting thing. Though it is a classic thought 
experiment motivating the Copernican revolution, Carl Sagan 
and Isaac Asimov have called it the first science fiction novel. 
This is because, like Stephen King, most authors view novels 
as machines for generating thought experiments. The author 
54 In this context we should cite Lewis’s later claim that “fiction might serve 
as a means for the discovery of modal truth” (David Lewis, “Postscripts to 
‘Truth in Fiction’” in Philosophical Papers I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1983), 278, albeit keep in mind all of the caveats we offer in this section. Also 
one should consider the argument in Tobias Klauk, “Thought Experiments 
in Literature” in Counterfactual Thinking/Counterfactual Writing, ed. Dorothee 
Birke, Michael Butter, and Tilmann Köppe (Berlin: DeGruyter, 2011), 30-
44. Klauk argues that fiction should not be explicated in terms of thought 
experiments, because thought experiments in science and philosophy are 
characterised by (a) imagining a scenario, (b) considering whether and how 
the scenario answers the question, and (c) using the answer to the question. 
But Klauk is only able to make his argument because he does not consider 
questions like “what is reality like?” or “how should one be?” and does not 
count the transformation of oneself with respect to normative reality as a 
possible use of the answer.
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is the first interpreter, working through a set-up and, (if the 
novel is true), correctly describes the evolution. In writing 
the novel, she typically attempts to use language to create 
a machine that will convey this first interpretation to the 
reader. Of course: (1) as we will discuss below, the machine 
will get away from the author, yielding interpretations that 
she never foresaw, interpretations that may be better than the 
null-interpretation the author was aiming to build a machine 
to develop, (2) the set-up/evolution pair of an interpretation 
generated by a text-machine is typically recursive, contain-
ing stories inside of stories, where parts of earlier set-ups 
and evolutions become incorporated into contained set-ups 
and evolutions. All postmodern, and much modern, writing 
builds off of these two properties. The fact that in standard 
novels the author’s intent concerning what kind of thought 
experiment should be generated is not decisive can lead a 
good author to design texts where the intent of the author is 
actually to produce a text-machine radically under-determined 
(leaving it very unclear which thought experiment should 
be produced) or over-determined (producing inconsistent 
thought experiments) with respect to the interpretations. 
The fact that set-up/evolution is recursive in the way at which 
we have gestured is part of what allows authors to produce 
text-machines that yield so-called “meta-fictional” interpreta-
tions, where the text should be interpreted as commenting 
on itself in some way.55
Let us also note that contra Lewis, interpretations of true 
fictions do not describe mere possibilia, but rather actual pos-
sibilia, as the plot describes the way the actual world would 
plausibly evolve if such a set-up were incarnate.56 And related 
55 The connection between recursivity, self-reflection, and paradoxes is for-
mally complicated. It should be unproblematic that fiction is expressively 
rich enough to do the relevant work. For a great discussion tying these themes 
convincingly to recent continental philosophy, see Paul Livingston, The Poli-
tics of Logic: Badiou, Wittgenstein, and the Consequences of Formalism (London: 
Routledge, 2012). Priest’s Beyond the Limits of Thought is also extraordinarily 
helpful in thinking about meta-fiction.  
56 The metaphysical task involved in differentiating mere possibility from 
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to this, we should note that our use of “interpretation” is liberal 
here. We do not mean to just note what literature professors 
produce when writing articles. In our theory, there is no reason 
to go through yet another linguistic epicycle when produc-
ing an interpretation. Any imaginatively complicit reader 
of fiction is producing an interpretation while reading, an 
interpretation produced via sensitivity to the (true or false) 
window into counterfactual reality produced for her by the 
text-machine. This happens even if she is completely lost to 
herself while reading. Perhaps she can later articulate, expand, 
and alter the interpretation while discussing the novel with 
friends. But the text-machine generates interpretations (again, 
these are merely recursively nested set-up/evolution pairs) 
for anyone reading it, even if that person is constitutively 
unable to talk about the text.57
So here we have a general ontology of stories, which are 
machines producing recursively nested set-up/evolution pairs, 
the proper teleology of which is to get people in accord with 
some aspect of normative reality. The proper interpretations 
of many such stories, in science and literature, have set-ups 
that are impossible in some respect. But in discerning facts 
about how the actual world would plausibly evolve if that im-
possibility were incarnate we align ourselves with normative 
reality. In science this alignment is usually constituted by the 
ability to better design and predict the evolution of closed 
environments. In life, the abilities paradigmatically involve 
the extent to which we are able to craft worthwhile lives.
actual possibility is horrendous. See Laura Schroeter, “Two-Dimensional 
Semantics” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Winter 
2012 Edition), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/two-
dimensional-semantics/ (accessed January 13, 2014). We should also note that 
much more philosophy of science is needed to account for the objectivity 
of our judgments concerning whether a plot really does describe the way 
the world would evolve or not. We do not think that these reduce to mere 
intuitions, as with the way one might think of an ethical thought experiment.
57 These abilities do come apart in certain types of aphasia, where people 
cannot talk but can still read and via behaviour it is clear that they under-
stand what has been read. A surprising amount of philosophy and aesthetics 
cannot accommodate even the possible existence of such people. 
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Let us not make too much of these differences though. 
There is no metaphysical difference in kind between a phys-
ics textbook and a novel. Both allow readers to grasp, within 
margins of error, how the actual world would evolve after 
set-ups that are often impossible. This being said, there are 
obviously other differences between the two, most notably 
the norms involving form and content, or rather the connec-
tion between those formal properties of the text relevant to 
a given interpretation (and by “content” we mean to solely 
reference our understanding of interpretation) and those 
formal properties that are not so relevant. In physics, the 
connection is treated much more loosely in the sense that 
two different accounts of the same thought experiment 
might be expressed in radically different ways. In literature, 
(for reasons articulated by Nelson Goodman in a discussion 
of plagiarism and also earlier by Cleanth Brooks) this is not 
possible.58 We read literature with openness to the idea that 
what now seems contingently formal might in fact play a 
key role in articulating the content of the work according to 
some other interpretation. With poetry, form and content 
are even more inseparable. Mathematics is a weird hybrid 
of natural science and poetry. The basic descriptions of the 
mathematical structures themselves are treated like natural 
science descriptions, where form and content are loosely 
related. But with respect to proofs establishing properties 
of those structures, form is highly relevant to questions 
of individuation. Philosophy is, perhaps, even weirder in 
the norms employed with regard to separating form from 
content. In philosophy we typically take our own intuitions 
concerning abstract matters to be guided merely by content. 
But recent experimental philosophy has shown that this is 
not typically the case. Differences in wording can produce 
radically different intuitions about basic issues in ethics such 
as whether one can believe an act to be right without being 
motivated to do that act.59
58 Cleanth Brooks, The Well Wrought Urn (New York: Harcourt, Brace, & World, 
1947); Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1976).
59 See, for example, Derek Leben, “Cognitive Neuroscience and Moral 
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Much more needs to be said on this issue, and doing so 
will, we think, show not only what is unique about fiction qua 
fiction, but also provide the ground for arguing that fictional 
narrative is the originary concept, with other types only arrived 
at by operating on the norms in various respects involving 
the relations to formal properties of the text and the content 
summoned in interpretation. For example, consider how one 
might also argue that a norm constitutive of reading a text 
as fiction is that the circumstances of its production can be 
relevant to its proper interpretation.60 To the extent that this 
is plausible for fiction, one might be able to see its falsehood 
for other literary genres as a consequence of the reading 
norms involving the relation between form and content (or 
rather content relevant form and content irrelevant form). 
For one can only translate a physics thought experiment 
into a radically different form without loss of content if the 
circumstances in which the physics thought experiment were 
thought up are taken to be irrelevant.
Much clearer examples can be given with respect to scien-
tific modelling; it is usually very clear which properties of 
physical models are content irrelevant. Say that I build the 
planets in my model out of styrofoam when, for the purposes 
of providing the relevant window into counterfactual real-
ity, I would have lost nothing by using rubber balls. If there 
is anything to Nelson Goodman and Cleanth Brooks’s ca-
nonical arguments, they show that part of what is distinctive 
about aesthetic objects (and this holds when, as the object-
oriented philosopher takes to be fundamental, one looks at 
the natural world itself from an aesthetic point of view) is 
Decision-Making,” Neuroethics (2011), 4, 163–74. For an extended and pro-
vocative meditation on the relation between style and content, see Harman’s 
Weird Realism.
60 Our departure from the New Critics on “the intentional fallacy” might 
render our view more Garcian than Harmanian, though the emphasis on 
texts as machines that generate interpretations has the most in common 
with the capacity metaphysics view. Again, we do not think that this impli-
cates it in the problems for capacity metaphysics that Harman isolates, but 
of course we might be mistaken here. In this context we would love to see 
how a fourfold hermeneutics differs from our own.
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that such distinctions are always provisional. With respect 
to some interpretation, using rubber rather than styrofoam 
makes all the difference in the world. But this interpretation 
too will neglect some formal features as irrelevant. For the 
object-oriented ontologist who follows Harman’s reading of 
Heidegger, reality just is inexhaustible in this very way, the 
way that Goodman articulates with respect to paintings.
Let us restate this with an exclamation point. For an object-
oriented philosopher, the property of aesthetic objects isolated 
by Goodman and Brooks is in general a property of all objects! 
The Husserlian “scientific world-view” involves pretending 
that this is not the case in order to better predict things. And 
this is why for the object-oriented philosopher, as opposed 
to the naturalist underminer, one can say that fictions are 
engines that generate recursively structured set-up/evolu-
tions, and that physics is a species of fiction.
But objects in and of themselves are aesthetic. And even in 
physics this has to be allowed for. As Mark Steiner has shown 
with respect to mathematical parts of modelling, what seemed 
to be contingently formal at one time can end up years later 
being shown to have empirical import.61 For physics to do 
what it does, one must be able to relax the regulative ideal 
that nature herself separates the content relevant and con-
tent irrelevant form of objects. These are separated in acts of 
interpretation that objects engender whenever they interact 
with one another, acts which never exhaust the reality of the 
interpreted objects. 
VII. Objections and Explications
Here we want to consider three possible objections as a way 
to be clearer both about what we have said as well as how one 
might further develop the view. First, what we have described 
in terms of set-up and evolution might seem only to describe 
61 Mark Steiner, The Applicability of Mathematics as Philosophical Problem 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002).
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very conventional, mimetic literature. 62 In particular, while 
we have allowed impossible set-ups, our doctrine that true 
fictions yield correct interpretations that get the evolution 
correct (in the sense of describing what the actual world 
would do were the set-up incarnate) seems to entail that novels 
which yield interpretations with improbable and impossible 
evolutions are one and all false. But, do not many books suc-
ceed precisely because they flaunt these? At one end, books 
such as Laurence Sterne’s Tristram Shandy,63 a good narrative 
can evolve in implausible ways. At the other end lay much 
experimental fiction.
This is not actually correct though. First, our definition of the 
actual truth and falsity of fictional texts only concerns truth 
or falsity with respect to some subject matter. So a physically 
false interpretation might nonetheless be psychologically true, 
and even in virtue of the fact that the evolution of the text is 
physically impossible. Second, actual reality is improbable and 
true fiction must teach this. For a quotidian example, note the 
incredibly low prior probability of the exact performance of a 
set of one hundred coins that you just tossed. For less quotid-
ian examples, note that if Graham Priest is correct, then the 
actual world is in fact logically contradictory. In this respect, 
remember that the recursive nature of the set-up/evolution 
pair entails that part of the evolution can be set-up for new 
evolution. This not only allows meta-fiction, but makes sense 
of the full draw of writers such as Lovecraft. Lovecraft does 
62 We thank the reviewers of Speculations for this objection as well as some 
of the examples we use.  For a great discussion of how the unnatural does 
place constraints on theories of fiction, see Jan Alber, Stefan Iversen, Henrik 
Skov Nielsen, and Brian Richardson, “Unnatural Narratives, Unnatural Nar-
ratology: Beyond Mimetic Models,” Narrative (2010),18:2, 113-36. The article 
focuses on three sources of the unnatural: storyworlds, minds, and acts of 
narration. It would take us too far afield here to consider each of these in 
depth, but we think enough is said above to show how our theory of fictions 
(as machines that generate recursively stacked set-up/evolutions with the 
teleology of bringing the reader into alignment with normative reality) can 
explain the mechanisms at work in the texts discussed in the article.
63 Laurence Sterne, The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, Gentleman, Oxford 
World’s Classics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
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not only create a text which is an engine for interpretations 
that grant us sensitivity to what would actually happen were 
an impossible set-up incarnate. When you read Lovecraft 
in the dark of night you also wonder if anything like those 
set-ups are actual. Maybe reality itself contains horrifyingly 
indescribable things that are impossible with respect to any 
human conceptual scheme. In this sense, the best fantastical 
writing forces us to be deeper two-dimensionalists about the 
set-up itself, not just what would actually follow.
That is, one would only think that the holdovers from mi-
meticism in our theory tell against unnatural fiction to the 
extent that one is a naturalist about reality. But we think that 
unnatural fiction truly teaches that reality itself is not natural.
Surely there will be a remainder of fiction that does not fit 
well with our theory. To address this, let us define a technical 
term here, “Carrollism,”64 which construes philosophies of 
art as in the business of providing necessary and sufficient 
conditions, and then uses experimental art to argue against 
all such purported philosophies. This is a mug’s game though, 
just because artists are so good at self-consciously creating 
art that counter-exemplifies philosophical definitions. And 
there is no reason for philosophers to play along. Instead of 
providing necessary and sufficient conditions for various 
concepts, the philosopher of art should rather be providing 
relevant genetically necessary conditions for the practices 
in question. For example, instead of trying to ascertain the 
extent to which cruelty works in the definition of “humour,” 
we should see if the practice of humour would be possible in 
a world without cruelty. Our claim is analogous with respect 
to fiction. A world without textual machines that produce 
reader sensitivity to recursively nested set-up/evolution pairs 
would be a world without fiction.
64 See Noël Carroll, Philosophy of Art (London: Routledge 1999) for a book 
structured around this very conceit. It is still an excellent book though, 
because Carroll only plays the game with respect to trying to define “art,” 
and half of the book himself making sense of the relevant concepts (form, 
representation, etc.) independently of the definition of art.
Cogburn and Ohm – Actual Qualities of Imaginative Things
217
This does not mean that everything we call “fiction” au-
tomatically must fit our theory. However, to the extent that 
an aesthetic theory is complete, it must be the case that the 
genetically necessary conditions for the practice are such that 
anything that does not satisfy the conditions and is also an 
instance of the explanandum (e.g. experimental fiction that 
does not do what we have alleged) is parasitic on work that 
does. So, for example, while mimeticism is not necessary for 
artistic painting, non-mimetic paintings must be understood 
parasitically with respect to mimetic ones, and in fact could 
not exist as an autonomous practice. That is non-mimetic 
painting must best be thought either as really mimetic (as 
most abstract expressionists actually described their work) or 
in some sense making a comment upon a tradition founded 
in mimetic art.65
A second criticism is that our focus on thought experi-
ments leads to a narrowly scientistic view. If all that matters 
with respect to truth or falsity in a certain respect is that 
the actual world really would evolve in that respect were the 
set-up manifest, then is not this just to view truth or falsity 
in terms of the scientific virtue of predictive value? We do 
not think that this is the case. Intuition pumps in ethics, and 
philosophy general, do work as narratives in the way we have 
suggested. However, there is something correct about the 
worry. Interpretations can be morally true only to the extent 
that they are affectively engaging, and it should be clear that 
a theory of what makes a text affectively engaging will have 
to use resources far beyond those marshalled by us thus far 
with respect to a text’s correct interpretation. And, moreover, 
having the correct affective states in certain contexts is a 
paradigm way that we are in accord with normative reality. 
So one would need to say much more about how thought 
experiments achieve this. This leads to our third criticism.
65 One of Danto’s most powerful late period essays (Arthur Danto, “Art and 
Meaning” in Theories of Art Today, ed. Noël Carroll (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 2000)) makes a surprisingly powerful independent argu-
ment for this claim with respect to all art.
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Finally, we have said nothing at all about the tropes via which 
literature does much of its work (e.g. allegory, antanaclasis, 
irony, metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche) nor about narra-
tive voice in itself or as opposed to other voicings relevant 
to the text.
We agree that this would be a problem if anything we have 
said undermines good theories about how these tropes work. 
We do not think that this is the case. But this is not enough, 
one’s basic theory of actual truth of fictional texts and ontol-
ogy of fiction should in addition shed lights on these very 
tropes. In this respect, we confess a kind of Simondonian66 
hope here. Just as Gilbert Simondon modelled physical, vital, 
psychic, and collective objects in terms of various types of 
individuating processes, our intuition is that characteristic 
modes of treating content relevant and content irrelevant 
form is involved in all of these tropes. For example, for meta-
phor to work, the connection of a predicate to a subject must 
be understood to be both irrelevant (human beings are not 
firecrackers) and essential. One must prize apart form and 
content in distinct ways in the same interpretation so that 
the sentence is both false and true.
A less speculative example might be from narratology, where 
different takes on narrators reliably yield different interpreta-
tions in exactly the sense we mean. One who wrongly (albeit 
at the author’s later drunken insistence) identifies the narra-
tor and author of Jack Kerouac’s On the Road is likely to read 
the book as a how-to manual for beatnik kicks. But once one 
realises that the book was the sixth time he had rewritten the 
material and that it was exhaustively rewritten multiple times, 
one starts to see how much distance there is between narrator 
and author. And once one realises how fallible the narrator is 
in every respect then the novel is far more satirical and much 
sadder. These different interpretations are non-linguistically 
experienced by most fair minded readers of the text, the 
66 For an excellent overview, see Arne De Boever, Alex Murray, Jon Roffe, and 
Ashley Woodward, eds., Gilbert Simondon: Being and Technology (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2012).
Cogburn and Ohm – Actual Qualities of Imaginative Things
219
first when the book is read in high school, the second when 
returned to decades later. People who read it decades later 
and do not separate narrator from author are likely to see the 
book as simply obnoxious. While these different interpreta-
tions are experienced viscerally while reading the text, they 
can all be made explicit in terms of the thought experiment 
machinery of recursively nested set-up/evolutions. Of course 
the explications themselves will involve affectively weighted 
language (e.g. “then Dean Moriarity once again showed how 
pathologically selfish he is by. . .”). But only a philosophical 
naturalist would take anything we have said to preclude this.
The furthest end of our Simondonian hope would be to 
characterise different stances towards the narrator entirely in 
terms of how the reader differentiates content relevant form 
from content irrelevant form. But we must add a caveat; we 
do not think that one could do this entirely in terms of for-
mal properties of a text. This would fail for the same reasons 
Sirridge showed traditional approaches to the actual truth 
of fictional texts failed. Moreover, one cannot even begin 
to characterise the formal content of a text without already 
having begun to attribute content to it. This is similar to the 
way that formal properties of paintings are partly a result of 
what is depicted, for example in the unpainted lines of sight 
of the people or animals in the picture. This too is another 
way that form and content do not clearly separate with respect 
to aesthetic objects.67
VIII. Necessary Fictions
Kurt Vonnegut’s Slaughterhouse Five contains a discussion 
of The Gospel from Outer Space, written by fictitious author 
Kilgore Trout:
The flaw in the Christ stories, said the visitor from outer space, was 
that Christ, who didn’t look like much, was actually the Son of the Most 
67 McDowell’s Mind and World (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996) 
is to some extent an extended meditation on just this problematic, which 
(as noted earlier) was one of the engines moving forward German Idealism. 
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Powerful Being in the Universe. Readers understood that, so, when 
they came to the crucifixion, they naturally thought, and Rosewater 
read out loud again:
Oh, boy—they sure picked the wrong guy to lynch that time!
And that thought had a brother: “There are right people to lynch.” 
Who? People not well connected. So it goes.68
While this is certainly right as part of an explanation for why 
Christians have often been so horribly cruel to one another 
and to non-Christians, it is not clear to us that the space alien 
really gets the new Gospel correct.
The visitor from outer space made a gift to Earth of a new Gospel. In 
it, Jesus really was a nobody, and a pain in the neck to a lot of people 
with better connections than he had. He still got to say all the lovely 
and puzzling things he said in the other Gospels.
So the people amused themselves one day by nailing him to a cross 
and planting the cross in the ground. There couldn’t possibly be any 
repercussions, the lynchers thought.
The reader would have to think that, too, since the new Gospel ham-
mered home again and again what a nobody Jesus was.
And then, just before the nobody died, the heavens opened up, and 
there was thunder and lightning. The voice of God came crashing down. 
He told the people that he was adopting the bum as his son giving him 
the full powers and privileges of The Son of the Creator of the Universe 
throughout all eternity. God said this: From this moment on, He will 
punish horribly anybody who torments a bum who has no connections!69
By our account there is some truth to the space alien’s inter-
pretation, as one who shares it is all else being equal more 
likely to treat bums who have no connections better. But we 
think not as true as the correct interpretation of the gospel 
stories. For one whose kindness is based in fear of horrible 
punishment is not as in accord with normative reality as 
much as one whose kindness is not so grounded.
68 Kurt Vonnegut, Slaughterhouse Five (New York: Dial Press, 1999), 94.
69 Ibid., 94–95.
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In this context, consider Reinhold Niehbur’s favourite 
Bible passage, Ephesians 4:32: “And be ye kind one to another, 
tender-hearted, forgiving one another, even as God for Christ’s 
sake hath forgiven you.”70 To Niehbur, all of the Bible leads a 
reader to be in accord with the norm expressed in this one 
sentence. But, pace Vonnegut’s space alien gospel, how might 
this work in the actual Bible?
Following others, we interpret it this way. 71 There is initially 
an impossible set-up, a real creature somehow creating reality. 
This creature, despite all appearances to the contrary, assures 
us that her kingdom is coming, a kingdom just as impossible, 
where the suffering of innocents is somehow redeemed. Then 
there is an evolution. A central trope of the story is that this 
impossible being has no idea how to respond to the wicked-
ness of her creation, for example actually acting surprised 
when witnessing the aftermath of the first murder. By her 
understanding of humans, the best thing one could hope for 
would be for one’s offspring to thrive, and she promises this 
over and over again to various people. But most of her inter-
ventions leave things even more messed up than before, and 
after throwing a temper tantrum at the much suffering Job, 
she decides it is better to largely leave us to our own devices. 
But then she does just one more thing, sending a son who tells 
us things that we do not want to hear and acts in ways at vari-
ance with the political and religious powers of the time, and 
so we torture and kill him. Then, even though this impossible 
being possesses the power to destroy us, and even though it 
is clear that she regards the wellbeing of one’s offspring as 
among the greatest goods, she does not get revenge for what 
we have done to her offspring. In fact her son successfully 
petitions for our forgiveness from the very instrument of 
70 Justin R. Hawkins, “Reinhold Niehbur’s One Scripture Passage,” Fare 
Forward: A Christian Review of Ideas (2013), http://www.patheos.com/blogs/
fareforward/2013/03/reinhold-niebuhrs-one-scripture-passage/(accessed 
September 24, 2013).
71 Our reading of the Old Testament is from Jack Miles, God: A Biography 
(New York: Vintage, 1996).
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his torture. This is of a piece with the very messages that got 
him killed in the first place.
One might argue that a fiction correctly interpreted in 
this manner is not only true, but also necessary. Necessary 
in two respects. First, the transcendent nature of God and 
the kingdom of heaven might be such that it is disastrously 
misleading to think that we could talk about either except as 
impossible beings. To think that one can have any inkling 
of how this could be the best possible world, or for that mat-
ter even a minimally acceptable one, is to warp one’s soul. 
Voltaire’s Candide was right about this, and as a result the 
kingdom of heaven must be approached as an impossibility 
for which one nonetheless hopes.72 While the impossibility 
of the set-up might thus be necessitated by great mystery, we 
hope that we have said enough to dispel any deep mystery 
about how we achieve a description of it. Frictionless planes 
and point masses are likewise impossible entities, but none-
theless unavoidable.
This points to the second way in which one might take re-
ligious texts to be necessary fictions, not the sense in which 
God and the kingdom of heaven are necessarily fictional, but 
in the sense that they are also indispensable for the Bible to 
be true. Imagine if one were to do to the whole Bible what 
Thomas Jefferson attempted with the Gospels, assiduously 
removing all mention of the impossible. Call this the Jeffer-
son Bible. Would such a book be just as true as the text that 
involved impossible set-ups? In logic we might express this 
question by asking whether the Bible we have is a conserva-
tive extension of our imagined Jefferson Bible. We would like 
to argue that it is not.
In the standard Bible, God is presented as deserving the 
highest praise and also powerful enough to create and destroy 
worlds. Then humans do to her the worst thing one can do 
to someone. They kill her child. Yet she does not destroy the 
world, but rather forgives humanity.
72 Voltaire, Candide, trans. François-Marie Arouet (Mineola: Dover Publica-
tions, 1991).
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If this is a true story it is because reading it in the Bible 
brings one more into conformity with the normative reality 
expressed in Ephesians 4:32. It, combined with worship of the 
very God the Bible attempts to describe, will lead the person 
to be forgiving and more hopeful.
We are not saying that only Christians are forgiving and 
hopeful. Rather, we are merely noting that if the Jefferson Bible 
is not as good as the actual Bible at engendering forgiveness 
and hope, then the Jefferson Bible is not as morally true as 
the actual one. The Bible’s God is very much like a friction-
less plane in that her power and praiseworthiness are taken 
to be infinite limits of qualities (such as relative smoothness 
in the case of friction) that we do perceive. To say that such a 
being herself responds with forgiveness to the worst offense 
one can commit is to affirm in the strongest possible manner 
the praiseworthiness of forgiveness and love.
This kind of thing is, we suspect, a core facet of all good 
fiction. Could a non-fictional book be just as psychologically, 
anthropologically, and ethically true as Huckleberry Finn? If 
not, then the fiction is necessary in exactly the way we have 
suggested the Bible might be.
There is a final sense in which one might argue fictions to 
be necessary.73 If we return to the kind of pragmatist account 
of understanding that Okrent gets from Heidegger, then we 
see that the essential thought is that thinking is grounded in 
a certain sort of behavioural sensitivity to normative coun-
terfactual facets of reality, facets concerning what ought to 
be the case if something were actually to be.
Consider Heidegger’s hammer. Grasping the hammer requires 
not representing it in some Cartesian medium, but rather an 
understanding of its appropriate uses, which (according to 
Okrent) does not require language. However, this behavioural 
sensitivity will involve different things one could do with 
the hammer that one has not actually done. And with our 
account of true fictions, a true narrative is one that correctly 
limns the counterfactual facts about the actual world. This is 
73 We would like to thank Ridvan Askin for pushing us on this point.
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consistent with Harman’s guerrilla Heidegger, because the 
nail and neutrino also have their own interpretations of the 
Hammer, which is itself an inexhaustible reservoir of being.
But note that counterfactuals are already in a sense fictional 
since they concern states of affairs that are not actual. Many 
true stories about what the actually existing hammer would 
do involve states of affairs that will never actually come to 
be and new future objects that will never exist. It is true that 
one could use this hammer to build a birdhouse that one 
never does actually build.
Thus, if Okrent’s Heidegger is correct (again, interpreted as 
one instance of the broader theory of being Harman finds), 
then fictions are necessary in a more originary sense than 
what we have claimed with respect to Mark Twain. The good 
writer’s ability to discern what would really happen were 
some set-up incarnate is just a development of an ability that 
is fundamental to all cognition. Non-fictional, true proposi-
tions only get their content because the concepts involved 
can occur in true fictions. But then fictions themselves are 
genetically necessary in the very strongest sense. One could 
not have non-fiction without also having fiction.74
74 We would like to first and foremost thank Ridvan Askin for an extended 
e-mail correspondence.  Somewhere between one-fourth and one-third of 
the above was developed in reaction to Askin’s gentle Socratic prodding. We 
would also like to thank Askin and Paul Ennis for their similarly helpful 
detailed comments on the first full draft. In addition several people provided 
helpful input at various stages, in particular: Graham Bounds, Levi Bryant, 
Emily Beck Cogburn, Tristan Garcia, Graham Harman, Raphaël Millière, 
John Protevi, Duncan Richter, Jeff Roland, Mark Silcox, Jordan Skinner, Jazz 
Salo, Dawn Suiter, and Bradley Woods.
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What if Simondon and Harman        
Individuate Together?
Miguel Penas López
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
Université Toulouse II-Le Mirail
There are some questions that have persisted throughout the history of philosophy, and they 
remain with us. These questions constitute the business of 
philosophers, a business that does not fit very well in our 
present market-based economy because questions cannot 
be sold. We can only try to answer them, which leads to new 
questions. This is what philosophy does: to bear the tension 
of questions and the distance of answers. Putting it simply, 
one of these persistent questions is whether the intrinsic 
nature of reality is static or dynamic, whether we can isolate 
in it immutable traits or encounter nothing but perpetual 
change and transience. In scholarly expositions of pre-Socratic 
thought, Parmenides and Heraclitus are usually taken as 
representatives of these two positions: while Parmenides is 
seen as the champion of immutable being who denounces 
the illusion of non-being, Heraclitus has been known as the 
philosopher of change who cannot bathe in the same river 
twice. However, such exposition perhaps presents but a su-
perficial understanding of ancient thought. Hermeneuticians 
have taught us that both Heraclitus and Parmenides were 
trying to name the same thing—being—in an age in which 
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this verb was not limited to the copular function we expect it 
to perform today.1 Since then, the question about the nature 
of being and change has solidified into the metaphysical 
problem of substance, where substance means the endur-
ing features of an entity—or, more precisely, it means those 
entities or realities which do not need others as a support 
in order to exist—whereas properties are those features that 
change over time. Another commonplace in scholarly exposi-
tions is to attribute this doctrine to Aristotle, mainly due to 
the translation of the Aristotelian concept of “first ousia” as 
substance or essence. This translation can be seen as one of 
the most harmful ones in the history of philosophy, because 
it meant a loss of richness of the Aristotelian concept that 
has conditioned the whole metaphysical tradition.
In recent years, this dispute regarding objects, individuals 
and substances on the one hand, and processes, flux and be-
coming on the other has become one of the most interesting 
disputes in continental philosophy. Closely related to this is 
the question concerning the suitability of relational ontology. 
The presence of this dispute within the domain of specula-
tive realism counts as further evidence of the heterogeneous 
character of this movement: in the original group, Graham 
Harman represents the object-oriented pole whereas Ian 
Hamilton Grant defends an ontogenetic and dynamic ap-
proach in his Schellingian philosophy of nature.2 As we will 
see, Harman also maintains a long-term debate with other 
processualist and relational thinkers close to speculative 
realism such as Steven Shaviro. In the present article, I want 
to address this issue through an analysis of the encounter 
between Harman’s object-oriented philosophy and Gilbert 
Simondon’s philosophy of individuation with one main 
purpose in sight: trying to overcome the mistake that we have 
1 See Felipe Martínez Marzoa, Historia de la Filosofía, 2 vols (Madrid: Istmo, 
1994), especially 13-26 and 32-58.
2 See the transcript of the London Speculative Realism workshop where the 
term was coined to designate the common features of four different philo-
sophical proposals: Ray Brassier, Ian Hamilton Grant, Graham Harman, and 
Quentin Meillassoux, “Speculative Realism,” Collapse (2007), 3, 306-449.
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already seen at work in the scholarly expositions of Greek 
thought. This mistake, which is revamped in the current de-
bate, is the belief that processes and objects, individuation 
and the individual, cannot be thought together (as it can be 
noted, I do not make a difference between Harman’s concept 
of “object” and Simondon’s concept of “individual”). Since all 
objects have their particular process of individuation, why 
should an object-oriented philosophy have a problem with 
offering a philosophical account of it? Likewise, since all 
processes of individuation produce individuals with their 
particular haecceity, why should a process philosophy have 
an interest in denying it?
At the core of Harman’s philosophy is a defence of the unity 
and autonomy of objects with regard to their history, their 
components, and their relations. Hence, objects of all kinds 
and sizes, be they physical, social or fictional, become the 
principal actors of metaphysics, and Harman critiques two 
kinds of philosophical strategies in which this pre-eminence 
of objects is denied: undermining objects and overmining 
them. In the first case, “objects are a mere surface effect of 
some deeper force.”3 There are several ways of undermin-
ing objects: reductionism, monism, philosophies of the 
pre-individual, and process philosophy. In the second case, 
objects are dissolved in external relations. Here, we also find 
different ways of overmining objects. One of them is empiri-
cism, in which there is no object but a “bundle of qualities.”4 
Another is what Quentin Meillassoux calls “correlationism,” 
a concept that denotes all post-Kantian philosophies, whether 
modern or postmodern, where objects can only be thought 
in primordial correlation to some human sphere, be it the 
subject, Dasein, textual dependence, or social relations of 
power. Harman distinguishes a variant of correlationism: 
in “relationism,” the human sphere is no longer privileged, 
but the existence of some intrinsic substratum of objects 
outside their relations, with presence in, or effects on other 
3 Graham Harman, The Quadruple Object (Winchester: Zero, 2011), 6.
4 Ibid., 11.
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objects is denied. In short, Harman denounces that both the 
underminers and the overminers “skip the intermediate layer 
of autonomous objects that are both actually individual and 
also autonomous from all perception.”5
In several places, Harman rejects Simondon’s philosophy as 
undermining objects.6 Along with Henri Bergson and Gilles 
Deleuze, Simondon is grouped with those anti-object-oriented 
ontologies that try to overcome the centrality of being or 
substance in traditional metaphysics by way of positing a 
primordial flux or becoming; more specifically, Simondon 
is considered, as is Manuel DeLanda, a moderate monist who 
believes in a “heterogeneous yet continuous” pre-individual 
reality.7 In doing so, Harman forgets that Simondon, marking 
a difference with Bergson (one of his principal influences), 
privileges the discontinuous over the continuous.8 What is 
more, Harman claims that the “philosophies of the so-called 
‘pre-individual’ treat the world as a semi-articulate lump arbi-
trarily carved into pieces by the human intellect,” suggesting 
an anti-realist flavour in these philosophies, which is totally 
inadequate, at least in Simondon’s case.9 In asking if there is a 
place for Simondon’s philosophy in speculative realism, I try 
5 Harman, The Quadruple Object, 15.
6 See, for instance, Harman, The Quadruple Object; Graham Harman, “On the 
Undermining of Objects: Grant, Bruno, and Radical Philosophy” in The Specu-
lative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism, ed. Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek, 
and Graham Harman (Melbourne: Re.press, 2010), 21-40; Graham Harman, 
“Response to Shaviro” in The Speculative Turn, 291-303; and Graham Harman, 
Prince of Networks: Bruno Latour and Metaphysics (Melbourne: Re.press, 2009).
7 Harman, The Quadruple Object, 9.
8 This touches on a complex question that cannot be elaborated here. One 
of the principal reasons why Simondon is interested in quantum mechanics, 
to which he devotes a chapter in his major book, lies in that he saw in it a 
possibility of overcoming the opposition between the continuous and the 
discontinuous. It is in light of quantum physics that Simondon articulates the 
different modes of individuation (physical, biological, psychical-collective) 
as discontinuous but not detached. See Gilbert Simondon, L’individuation 
à la lumière des notions de forme et d’information (Grenoble: Éditions Jérôme 
Millon, 2005), 99-153.
9 Graham Harman, “The Road to Objects,” continent. (2011), 3:1, 172.
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to show that the ontogenetic concepts coined by Simondon 
to give account of the processes of individuation of physical, 
biological, psycho-social, and technical individuals, lead to a 
metaphysical realism, a realism of relations. While Harman 
does not include Simondon in his critique of Alfred North 
Whitehead’s and Bruno Latour’s relational ontology, I claim 
that Simondon’s own relational ontology can help us clarify 
this dispute about the nature of relations and (though this 
may sound strange) show that Harman’s position is not all 
that far from Simondon’s motto “relation has value of being.”10
So far, I have identified three issues concerning the status 
of the individual that are closely related in Simondon’s 
philosophy: the question of processes, that of relations, and 
that of realism. In what follows, I show that Harman’s rejec-
tion of Simondon’s ontology (or, more precisely, ontogenetic 
perspective) is too rash and not entirely fair. In the process, 
Simondon and Harman emerge as figures quite different 
from new contestants in an old metaphysical battle to become, 
to an extent, bizarre allies with respect to some of the ques-
tions they ask, and the answers they give. It would be wrong 
to say that Simondon denies the individuality of objects as 
his research on individuation precisely seeks an explanation 
of objects’ individuality or haecceity. Here we find that both 
Simondon’s philosophy and object-oriented philosophy face 
the same question: how can we explain the individuality of 
objects? The starting point of Simondon’s philosophy is to 
reject the idea that this explanation can be found either in the 
individuals already formed or in a pre-existent individuation 
principle; it can only be found in their process of individuation, 
and this explains why Simondon severely criticises the two 
main ways in which traditional metaphysics has approached 
individuals, namely hylomorphism and substantialism. Al-
though Harman’s radical defence of the subterranean life 
of objects, according to which they are withdrawn even with 
respect to their history, differs from Simondon’s statement, 
we may begin to wonder why object-oriented philosophy is 
not interested in the process of the genesis of objects.
10 Simondon, L’individuation, 62, this and all subsequent translations are mine.
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Before addressing the key points of Simondon’s philosophy, 
we must keep in sight that Simondon and Harman share 
a common goal: to overcome the anthropocentric view 
dominant in most of modern and postmodern philosophy. 
In modernity, philosophy was somehow reduced from the 
love of wisdom to the obsessive necessity of human self-
knowledge. Thus, its favourite topic was, and still mostly is, 
the “basic rift” between human and world (subjectivism), as 
well as the ways whereby the human constructs the world 
(idealism) or accesses it (epistemological realism). Even if 
the self is understood in a formal and universal way and not 
as the empirical self, this still counts as a form of idealism, 
just an objectivist or transcendental one. The strategies fol-
lowed by Simondon and Harman in pursuit of their goals are 
quite different, and we will have the opportunity to analyse 
their respective strength and weakness below. Simondon’s 
philosophy eludes the epistemological opposition between 
subject and object as being the starting point of philosophy 
by way of raising a more primary ontological question, i.e., 
the question about the genesis of both the subject and the 
object. This ontogenetical inquiry strips the subject and its 
relation with the world of all ontological privilege. On the 
other hand, Harman looks for the metaphysical framework 
of every object, which makes it possible to put all kinds of 
objects on equal footing. Instead of a basic rift between hu-
mans and objects, Harman’s philosophy points out a general 
rift between objects.
Harman has lucidly stated that this question links directly 
with aesthetics.11 The reduction of aesthetics to a reflection or 
theory of art is further evidence of the anthropocentric slant 
of modernity, because it means to understand aesthetics as 
the discipline of the sensible or perceptual relations held by 
human beings, with special attention to the conditions that 
make beauty appear in these relations. Harman opens the 
door to recover, in a panpsychist direction, the etymologi-
cal sense of aesthetics as a “general theory of sensations or 
perceptions”: 
11 See Graham Harman, “On Vicarious Causation,” Collapse (2007), 2, 187-221. 
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intentionality is regarded by almost everyone as a narrowly human 
feature. If this depiction were correct, sensual objects would be confined 
to a metaphysics of human perception, with no place in an ontology 
designed to address plastic and sand dunes no less than humans. This 
confinement of sensuality to the human kingdom must be refused. 
Intentionality is not a special human property at all, but an ontological 
feature of objects in general.12
As we can see, for Harman, the sensual problem is not confined 
to human beings, but is present in every relation between 
two real objects. This relation means the construction of a 
third real object which is an intentional object formed by the 
real object that is perceiving (thus absorbed in “sincerity”) 
and the sensual object that is perceived. Inasmuch as this is 
a problem common to every object, the primary question 
of aesthetics becomes that of panpsychism: is it true that all 
objects, even physical ones, have a mind that allows them to 
perceive and feel? Harman does not like to treat the issue in 
these terms because he does not want to ascribe the same 
mental properties present in human beings to every object 
and he has proposed the interesting concept of “polypsychism” 
instead.13 For now, we can leave this issue here; the related 
question about the possibility of access to real objects will 
be addressed right below.
12 Harman, “On Vicarious Causation,” 205. This quotation gestures towards 
what I think is the most interesting prospect in carrying on with the phe-
nomenological path; phenomenology should not be limited to a phenom-
enology of consciousness, but must take into account an a-subjective and 
non-conscious phenomenology of stones, tornadoes, plants, or any thing 
whatsoever.
13 On Harman and panpsychism, see Harman, The Quadruple Object, 118-23 
and Graham Harman, “Zero-Person and the Psyche” in Mind that Abides: 
Panpsychism in the New Millenium, ed. David Skrbina (Amsterdam: John Ben-
jamins, 2009), 253-82, which in my view is one of his best essays. Although 
I appreciate Harman’s proposition of a plurality of minds, I do not share 
his worries about the term “panpsychism,” because the mind (even in the 
case of the human one) has not to be necessarily understood prima facie in a 
rationalist, conscious, or reflective way, but can be understood in an affective 
or sensitive mode (eventually shared by all entities). 
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Simondon forces philosophy to seek the explanation of the 
haecceity of individuals not in an abstract principle—substance, 
matter, form—but in the materiality of their real, effective and 
unique process of individuation.14 But what kind of move-
ment can do this? Is it possible to gain an epistemological 
access to the various processes of individuation? If not, what 
is the nature of the task Simondon assigns to philosophy?15 
These questions allow us to further explore the links that can 
be established between Simondon, speculative realism, and 
aesthetics. In my view, the main division between the different 
proposals made under the heading “speculative realism” is 
not that between the processualists and the object-oriented 
camp, but between those who think that we can gain access 
to the real and those who do not. While all of them agree on 
rejecting the human-centred philosophy dominant in most 
of modern and postmodern thinking, and while all of them 
contest the privilege held by epistemology over ontology, 
they disagree on whether absolute reality is knowable or 
not. Meillassoux, for one, subtly avoids a return to dogmatic, 
pre-critical metaphysics without renouncing absolute state-
ments: for him, there is no necessary entity or principle; 
only contingency is necessary.16 Harman, on the other hand, 
contends that no access is possible to the always withdrawn 
real object. Any contact or relation with a real object is but 
a caricature of it; all that we can do is allude to the real. In 
this debate, Simondon is clearly aligned with Harman, since 
Simondon says that 
we cannot, in the usual sense of the term, know individuation; we can only 
individuate, individuate ourselves, and individuate within ourselves ... 
14 See Simondon, L’individuation, 158-59. Although Simondon explicitly 
rejects the doctrine of materialism, his philosophy could be linked to the 
current developments known as “new materialisms.”
15 Simodon is quite assertive in stating the task of philosophy, “philosophi-
cal thinking being that which is driven by an implicit or explicit search 
for ontogenesis in all orders of reality.” See Simondon, L’individuation, 229. 
16 See Quentin Meillassoux, Après la finitude: Essai sur la nécessité de la con-
tingence (Paris: Seuil, 2006).
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The individuation of the real that is exterior to the subject is grasped 
by the subject through the analogical individuation of knowledge 
within the subject; but it is through the individuation of knowledge, and 
not through knowledge alone, that the individuation of non-subject 
beings is grasped.17
So both Harman and Simondon try to develop a non-episte-
mological realism while differing on what the real that has to 
be grasped is. Even if the real is not knowable, we can specu-
late about its nature; that is the jovial message of speculative 
realism for me, and philosophy always needs joviality. At this 
point in time, I think that Simondon’s analogical theory of 
access to objects’ individuation is more developed than Har-
man’s theory of allure. Simondon holds that all individuals 
are “result and agent” of a process of individuation; we, as 
subjects, have our own individuation, but we cannot enter, 
live or know other individuals’ individuation.18 In his already 
famous example of the production of a brick, Simondon 
states that even the slave who makes the brick cannot know 
the individuation of the brick;19 to do that, “one would need 
to penetrate into the mould itself” while the clay progresses 
inside it.20 However, what we can do is grasp the individua-
tion of other beings by analogy with our own individuation. 
In Simondon, analogy does not mean a mere resemblance 
between structures or beings, but an identity of operations. 
He tries to develop a general theory of operations, called al-
lagmatic, which would be the complement to the knowledge 
17 Simondon, L’individuation, 36, original emphasis.
18 Ibid., 191.
19 Simondon makes this statement in the context of his harsh critique of 
hylomorphism as an intellectual reflection of the psycho-social reality of 
ancient Greece where the master does not enter the factory to see how the 
slave makes the brick or, needless to say, to even make the brick himself: 
“the technical operation that imposes a form onto a passive and indeterminate 
matter [i.e., understood in terms of hylomorphism] ... is essentially the op-
eration commanded by the free man and executed by the slave.” Simondon, 
L’individuation, 51, original emphasis.
20 Ibid., 46.
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of structures provided by the special sciences.21 The key point 
is that Simondon postulates the existence of a mutual reci-
procity between the operations and the structures that both 
result from these operations and sustain them, between the 
processes of genesis and the object, the individuation and 
the individual. Simondon looks for a comprehensive theory 
that allows him to think together the individual, its genesis 
and its becoming.
The differences between Harman’s theory of allure and 
Simondon’s analogical theory touch directly on questions 
of aesthetics in the sense advocated by Harman. They also 
show the divergences between these two philosophers on 
what the real that has to be grasped is. The concept of allure 
is the place where Harman poses the issue of access to real 
objects; allure means “the separation between a sensual ob-
ject and its quality.”22 The possibility of severing the sensual 
object from its qualities through allusion is considered the 
only way to access, though indirectly, the real object. Since 
every object, not only human beings, translate real objects 
into sensual ones, Harman grants this possibility to all kinds 
of objects, including inanimate ones. Simondon’s analogical 
theory in turn does not address the issue of access to objects, 
but to their individuation. This access cannot be direct, and 
here Simondon and Harman agree, as I mention earlier. What 
we can do, according to Simondon, is to become aware of the 
operations whereby our own individuation is developed and, 
due to the identity of operations proposed by the analogical 
theory, this makes it possible to grasp the individuation of 
other beings. However, we can suppose that this awareness 
is limited to human beings, so in principle Simondon does 
not unfold the possibility of panpsychism as Harman does.
As a first step towards a philosophical account of ontogen-
esis, Simondon introduces a speculative hypothesis about 
pre-individual reality, i.e., the state of being from which the 
21 See the interesting appendix entitled “Allagmatique” in Simondon, 
L’individuation, 559-66.
22 Harman, “On Vicarious Causation,” 215.
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individual comes into existence. Individuation means the 
formation of the individual from pre-individual reality, but 
its result is not only the individual but also its associated mi-
lieu; it is the totality formed by the individual and its milieu 
which makes new individuations possible (which are called 
“individualisations”). Thus, in order to explain the genesis 
of the individual and its subsequent individualisations, Si-
mondon establishes that being is something more than the 
individual.23 This is what Harman cannot accept, and the 
central point of contention is the concept of pre-individual 
reality. Before embracing or rejecting this concept, we must 
ask what, precisely, it denotes and what role it plays in the 
genesis of objects.
Drawing on physics, especially on thermodynamics, Simon-
don characterises pre-individual reality as the coexistence of 
heterogeneous orders of magnitude that do not communicate. 
This diversity—Simondon calls it disparation—has a potential. 
In this context, potential does not mean a hidden, not-yet-
present feature, but a real capacity for transformation. The 
modern concept of potential energy marks a difference with 
classical conceptions of potency; becoming is not conceived as 
a mere unfolding from beings-in-potency to beings-in-action, 
inasmuch as individuals are not preformed or contained in 
any way in pre-individual reality. In a first energetic approach 
to pre-individual reality, Simondon takes from thermodynam-
ics the notion of metastable equilibrium as a condition of 
possibility for individuation. While hylomorphism forgets 
these energetic conditions which make possible the acquisi-
tion of form by matter, it would also be wrong to take them as 
a sufficient condition for individuation. In addition to the 
material conditions (matter capable of receiving a form, e.g., 
the clay previously homogenised and purified by the slave) and 
the energetic ones (metastable equilibrium) of individuation, 
Simondon postulates the necessity of an evental condition: 
the appearance of a singularity. A process of individuation 
begins when communication between the different orders 
23 Simondon, L’individuation, 63.
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of magnitude is established through a singularity, which ac-
cording to Simondon is the “beginning of the individual” and 
“is preserved in it.”24 After the formation of the individual, 
we cannot explain its successive transformations by under-
standing it in isolation, which is why Simondon states that 
the individual has a complement of being, a pre-individual 
reality associated with it.
The problem with understanding Simondon’s philosophy 
is that, despite the centrality of the concept of pre-individual 
reality, he offers several approaches to it that are to some de-
gree inconsistent. Focusing on this issue will help us clarify 
why Harman rejects Simondon’s philosophy. For Harman, 
philosophies of the pre-individual, and, broadly speaking, 
all processualist philosophies must be rejected because they 
dissolve objects in “a semi-liquid, holistic quasi-lump.”25 Al-
though I have depicted Harman’s reading of Simondon as too 
rash, his criticism does rest on textual evidence. In trying to 
characterise pre-individual reality, Simondon claims that he 
is an heir to pre-Socratic thought: 
we might call nature this pre-individual reality that is carried by the 
individual, trying to find in the word nature the meaning that pre-
Socratic philosophers attributed to it: ... nature is reality of the possible, 
under the species of this apeiron from which, according to Anaximander, 
every individuated form emerges.26
But as Isabelle Stengers reminds us in an article that is rather 
critical of Simondon, there is more to him than this pre-
Socratic stance.27 Simondon can also be seen as “a thinker of 
the sciences in the most demanding sense” when he poses the 
problem of the heterogeneity of orders of magnitude which 
24 Simondon, L’individuation, 97.
25 Harman, “The Road to Objects,” 172.
26 Simondon, L’individuation, 305, original emphasis.
27 Isabelle Stengers, “Pour une mise à l’aventure de la transduction” in 
Simondon, ed. Pascal Chabot (Paris: Vrin, 2002), 137-59.
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constitute pre-individual reality.28 This heterogeneity cannot 
be thought as “a semi-liquid, holistic quasi-lump,” or through 
a substantialist or a predicative logic because it is a pure state 
of disparation. If Simondon recovers the concept of apeiron 
as “reality of the possible,” this is because the heterogeneity 
of pre-individual reality makes individuation (energetically) 
possible. Harman’s reading could be maintained if Simon-
don had stopped his research on individuation at this point. 
But Simondon adds that “individuation is thus presented as 
one of the possibilities of the becoming of being, that meets 
certain defined conditions.”29 What are these defined condi-
tions? Here Simondon gives an answer to one of the main 
questions posed by an object-oriented philosophy, i.e., what 
defines an object as an autonomous entity? Of course, Har-
man has the right to reject Simondon’s solution, but not to 
claim that Simondon eludes the question. A singularity—“the 
beginning of the individual”—is an interstitial reality which 
can solve in a unique way the problem posed by the hetero-
geneity of orders of magnitude. The individual performs a 
work of compatibilisation, and it exists to the extent that it 
gives signification to what until then was only disparity. This 
work is what characterises the haecceity of every object. It 
might even be called its identity. In any case, this identity 
is not conceived as some immutable traits of an underlying 
substance, but as an activity of mediation. Moving from the 
first energetic perspective to an informational one, Simon-
don conceives of it as a process of in-formation that he calls 
“transduction.” Hence, ontogenesis, information, transduction, 
and individuation are different terms for the same process: 
the genesis of the individual and its associated milieu, the 
activity or operation of information, the transduction of a 
singularity in a metastable field. As we will see below, Simondon 
28 Stengers, “Pour une mise à l’aventure de la transduction,” 153.
29 Simondon, L’individuation, 64, my emphasis. It must be clarified that 
“being” is used by Simondon as equivalent to pre-individual reality before 
individuation (first phase of being). After individuation, it is equivalent 
to the totality formed by the individual and its associated milieu (second 
phase of being).
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considers that both classical hylomorphism and the modern 
theory of information, as well as cybernetics, fail to grasp this 
process because they only take into account either its extreme 
terms (form-matter) or the message to be sent between them 
(signal), forgetting how these extremes can relate. Only then 
can the “defined conditions” of individuation announced by 
Simondon be understood.
I have tried to show that Simondon’s mere use of the 
adjective “pre-individual” should not lead us to reject his 
philosophy from an object-oriented point of view. Let me 
propose a criterion for the meaning of the concept: speak-
ing of pre-individual reality only makes sense in relation to 
the creation or development of a new individual, and there 
is nothing that forbids objects to be the pre-individual re-
ality of a new object. But why should we keep the concept 
of “pre-individual reality”? My point is that what matters 
in pre-individual reality is not the presence of individuals. 
This is so for two reasons: firstly, an ontology that is limited 
to the statement that “there are individuals” cannot account 
for the productive potential of reality, since the potential of 
pre-individual reality lies not in the presence of individuals, 
but in the existence of a heterogeneity, of a diversity. With-
out differences, there can be no change, as thermodynamics 
readily shows. Secondly, though it is possible to take a frozen 
photograph of reality, and to hold that there are individuals 
with some intrinsic and hidden properties, we cannot explain 
the transformations these individuals undergo without tak-
ing into account their associated milieu. To take my favourite 
example: a seed is an individual with its own properties, with 
its haecceity, as Simondon repeatedly emphasises, and it has 
some powers which condition what it can become. But, ap-
propriating Latour for our purposes, we must say that the 
seed needs allies in order to become a plant, namely water 
and light. The seed is a singularity in which a communication 
is established between the cosmic order of solar energy and 
the molecular order of the mineral salts contained in the soil 
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water.30 We can see that the photons of light and the mineral 
salts that are part of the pre-individual reality of the plant 
are themselves individuals. So pre-individual reality is not a 
reality mysteriously characterised as non-individual, but the 
very reality from which individuals emerge and that which 
makes their becoming possible. Even if we accept the plant as 
an autonomous object that persists over time and possesses 
a withdrawn reality that makes it be this plant, there are two 
questions haunting my reading of Harman’s object-oriented 
philosophy: how is the genesis of the plant explained? Once 
the plant is already individuated, how can we explain its 
successive transformations without appealing to a reality 
outside the plant? There seems to be a lack of interest in these 
questions. I appreciate Harman’s efforts to grant dignity to 
all kinds of objects after four centuries dominated by the res 
cogitans, the transcendental subject, conscience, Dasein, the 
exegesis of texts, and the critique of human institutions: in a 
word, by the delusion of a human-centred universe in which 
all objects revolve around the all so special human being. But 
there is a line beyond which this dignity can become a new 
delusion of manic omnipotence. Every object needs other 
realities in order to exist and to persist through time. It seems 
as if object-oriented philosophy must be complemented with 
a process-oriented philosophy, just as process philosophy 
must make space for enduring objects.
So far, I have argued for the pertinence of the concept of 
“pre-individual reality” for explaining the emergence and 
development of individuals. This explanation needs to be 
developed further. Despite the importance previously granted 
to differences in order to explain change, it would be as vain 
to say that “there are differences and that’s all” as it would be 
to say that “there are individuals.” We need an explanation of 
the mechanisms by which differences create individuals (i.e., 
of the creativity of becoming). If Simondon rejects the idea 
that hylomorphism can give us such an explanation, this is 
not only due to its abstract consideration of an active form 
30 See Simondon, L’individuation, 34-35n12.
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and a passive, formless matter, but also because it forgets the 
operation of mediation whereby the energy system that com-
prises both form and matter is established.31 The same holds 
for the modern theory of information, in which information 
is confused with the signal to be sent. This theory focuses on 
the optimum conditions of transmission: the signal must be 
regular and predictable in order to avoid confusion with the 
noise. Thus, it does not take into account the conditions that 
make the signal be significative for a receiver. To do that, the 
signal must be confronted with the structure of the receiver, 
and Simondon points out the two extremes in which there 
is no information: if the signal is totally coincident with the 
structure of the receiver, there is only an “outer iteration of 
an inner reality”;32 if there is a total disparity between the 
signal and the structure, the former cannot be effectively 
integrated in the functionality of the latter. Between these 
two extremes, there can be information, which is neither a 
form nor a signal sent or stored in a medium, but a structuring 
activity or operation. To sum up, “the signals must meet some 
previous forms in relation to which they are significatives in 
order to be received; the signification is relational.”33
Here we arrive at the core of Simondon’s philosophy: his 
defence of the necessity of relational ontology. By contrast, 
Harman completely rejects this necessity and he has radi-
calised this issue to the point of asserting that the fundamental 
metaphysical distinction must be sought in the difference 
between objects and their relations. But I think that Harman 
is aiming at the wrong target when he dismisses the philoso-
31 See Simondon, L’individuation, 45-48.
32 Ibid., 223.
33 Ibid., 223. Simondon makes these statements in the context of his reading 
of information theory and cybernetics. They nevertheless are also related to 
aesthetics in the narrow sense of the discipline as regards artistic creation 
and experimentation. Artworks are not a signal stored in a painting or a 
sculpture, nor are they a signal sent to the spectator. The aesthetic experience 
can only emerge in the specific relation between the structure of the artwork 
and that of the spectator. Thus, the question of beauty (or any other aesthetic 
feature) cannot be posed in objective terms, but only in relational ones. 
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phies of Whitehead and Latour as “relational ontology.” In 
my view, what Harman rejects is actually not relational ontol-
ogy, but holism. We can approach the subtleties of this issue 
via the debate Harman and Shaviro stage in The Speculative 
Turn. Following Whitehead, Shaviro, in “The Actual Volcano: 
Whitehead, Harman, and the Problem of Relations,” takes for 
granted the connection between relations and processes or 
becoming.34 The source of novelty is the way in which every 
actual entity makes its prehensions or selections. This pri-
vate sphere of actual entities constitutes their “singularity 
of aesthetic self-enjoyment.”35 But they also have a public 
sphere by which “every actual entity is present in every other 
actual entity.”36 In his response, Harman identifies this latter 
statement as the basic proposition of relational ontology and 
denies that it can provide us with an explanation of change. 37 
Harman’s argument is clear: if we dissolve every actual entity 
in the network of its interconnected relations, then there is 
no underlying reality of entities which can actually change. 
All we have is a perpetual perishing of cinematic networks, 
“an endless series of frozen statues, which give the illusion of 
continuous alteration as we flip through them as if through 
those novelty card decks that allow children to watch moving 
cartoons.”38 Thus, Harman can make his lapidary claim that 
“the only way to account for becoming is with a non-relational 
ontology,” and he does not give much credit to what has been 
called process-relational ontology.39
Simondon can help us show that Harman is misidentifying 
his enemy and that he may find his ally against holism in a 
relational thinker such as Simondon. The connection between 
relations and becoming is clear in Simondon: encounters 
34 Steven Shaviro, “The Actual Volcano: Whitehead, Harman, and the Problem 
of Relations” in The Speculative Turn, 279-90. 
35 Ibid., 284.
36 Whitehead qtd. in Ibid., 287.
37 Harman, “Response to Shaviro,” 291-303. 
38 Ibid., 300. 
39 Ibid., 293, original emphasis. 
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and relations between objects are the sources of individu-
ation processes by which new objects come into existence. 
As we have seen, what characterises these new objects is the 
relational activity whereby they establish communication 
between the heterogeneous—and discontinuous—orders of 
magnitude of their pre-individual reality. The possibility of 
change resides not in Harman’s mysterious non-relational 
and non-potential “reserves for change” but precisely in the 
creative activity by which individuals establish relations in 
an always novel way.40 Hence, Simondon does not dissolve 
objects in their effects or in their presence in other objects; 
he does not assert that the being of objects resides in the 
network of their external relations, but rather that objects 
are an activity of relation. In other words, Simondon does 
not state that objects are the relations they have, but that 
objects are relations:
Attempting to characterise the individual in itself or in relation to 
other realities amounts to making it the term of a relation, a relation 
with itself or with another reality; however, we must find a point of 
view from which we can grasp the individual as an activity of the rela-
tion, not as a term of this relation; properly speaking, the individual is 
not in relation with itself or with other realities; it is the being of the 
relation, and not a being in relation, because the relation is an intense 
operation, an active centre.41
French language gives Simondon the possibility of making 
a fundamental distinction between rapport and relation.42 
Rapport is an external relationship that does not result in 
the genesis of a new individual; a relation is a necessary 
condition for the emergence of an individual. It is in this 
sense that relations have an ontological value and this is 
what, I think, can properly be called a relational ontology. 
Such an ontology does not fall into the trap of the “house of 
40 Harman, “Response to Shaviro,” 299. 
41 Simondon, L’individuation, 62-63, original emphasis.
42 See Ibid., 68.
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mirrors” denounced by Harman in his discussion of other 
relational thinkers such as Whitehead.43 If we focus only on 
objects, and not on the relations between them that give rise 
to ontogenetic processes, we can explain neither the origin 
of objects nor their individuality. Simondon’s distinction 
between rapport and relation cannot properly be understood 
by identifying it with the traditional distinction between 
internal and external relations. Since Simondon conceives of 
the individual as having a complement of being (the associ-
ated milieu), the categories of interior and exterior do not 
adequately express its relational activity. An individual is a 
place of communication; therefore, a relation is a movement 
from the outside to the inside which constitutes and sustains 
the individual, an operation which produces a structure. Due 
to the reciprocity between structures and operations, there 
is also a movement from the inside to the outside: the previ-
ously formed structures condition and make possible new 
relations. What, then, defines the external relationships with 
regard to relations? We can say that they are contingent for 
the individual because it does not need them in order to ex-
ist; these relationships do not constitute the singular activity 
that the individual consists of.
Harman also sees that these points are crucial for assessing 
the suitability of relational ontology. Despite claiming that 
the basic metaphysical opposition is that between objects and 
relations, he may in fact be pointing to a relational ontology 
in the sense advocated here when he writes that “although 
all objects are made up of relations between component ob-
jects, it is not necessarily the case that all objects enter into 
larger components in turn.”44 What is more, Harman himself 
depicts an inflationary universe of genetic relations when 
he emphasises that “any relation immediately generates a new 
object.”45 The crucial question is: which ontological status 
should we attribute to these relations between component 
43 Harman qtd. in Shaviro, “The Actual Volcano,” 283.
44 Harman, “The Road to Objects,” 177.
45 Harman, The Quadruple Object, 117, original emphasis.
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objects? Harman makes a distinction similar to Simondon’s, 
which can help us understand what he means by “relation.” 
In an almost Simondonian paragraph, he holds that
by speaking of relations on the interior of a thing, I mean something 
quite different: the assembly of actors on the inside of any black box 
that enable it to exist. For lack of a better term, we might call these 
“domestic” relations to avoid confusion with the internal relations 
that deserve to be expelled from view. I hold that there is an absolute 
distinction between the domestic relations that a thing needs to some 
extent in order to exist, and the external alliances that it does not need.46
So what is the point of discord with Simondon? The answer 
comes on the heels of the passage quoted above: “But the ac-
tor itself cannot be identified with either. An object cannot 
be exhausted by a set of alliances. But neither is it exhausted 
by a summary of its pieces, since any genuine object will be 
an emergent reality over and above its components.”47 We 
should note that Harman now takes a direction opposite 
to that taken earlier in his rejection of relational ontology: 
before it was identified with holism; now it is identified 
with reductionism (since Harman regards relations as a 
mere summary of the pieces of an object). This is precisely 
the mistake that Simondon wants to avoid, because it would 
deny relations ontological value. While both Simondon and 
Harman explicitly reject reductionism as well as holism as 
inadequate ways of explaining the haecceity of the indi-
vidual, Simondon thinks of relations as something “over 
and above” the components of objects.48 These components 
can have external relationships while they remain without 
genuine communication; they can be combined, stacked, or 
composed; but they are not truly articulated until a relation 
is established between them by a new individual. This is the 
difference between reductionism and relational ontology, and 
46 Harman, Prince of Networks, 135.
47 Ibid.
48 See, for instance, Simondon, L’individuation, 224-27.
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the classical joke about reductionism serves to illustrate it: 
try to put the chemical components of a human being in a jar, 
and wait for the human being to appear. You will get a mass, 
maybe articulated to some extent at the chemical level, but 
never a human being. A genetic relation has to be established 
between the components: the human being, as every object, 
is “result and agent” of this relation, a creative activity which 
is the source of the novelty of becoming.
There is yet another point of divergence between Har-
man’s and Simondon’s conceptions of relation. When Har-
man points out that every relation generates a new object, 
he means something very different from what we find in 
Simondon’s relational theory. As we have seen above, what 
Harman contends is that a relation between two real objects 
creates a third intentional real object. But he does not explain 
how the genesis of non-intentional real objects is produced, 
and this is exactly the metaphysical issue that Simondon’s 
philosophy of individuation tries to develop.49
Before concluding, I want to address briefly the respective 
strength and weakness of the paths followed by Simondon and 
Harman in order to overcome anthropocentrism. Simondon’s 
research shows that in paying attention to the ontogenetic 
processes whereby individuals come into existence, we cannot 
establish a substantial difference between the various regimes 
of individuation, namely physical, biological and psychical-
collective. However, this does not imply reducing all these 
regimes to a monistic ontology without discontinuities. What 
we find in Simondon’s philosophy is, on the contrary, one of 
the most astonishing developments of a pluralist ontology, 
which is based on a detailed analysis and a thorough knowl-
edge of the special sciences devoted to each of these regimes. 
49 It must be clarified that Simondon tries to explain the genesis of objects 
in general, so he is not limited to non-intentional objects. My emphasis on 
these is only due to the fact that in my view Harman’s philosophy does not 
address their genesis. It could be argued that, inasmuch as Harman grants 
intentionality to all objects, this distinction is not so relevant. However, ac-
cording to Harman the always withdrawn reality of objects must be defined 
regardless of their relations or intentionality, and I contend that the genesis 
of this reality is what Harman does not explain.
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Yet we may regret that Simondon did not push further the 
struggle against the ontological gap usually supposed to exist 
between the animate and the inanimate world. Thus, unlike 
Whitehead’s concept of “sentience,” Simondon restricts his 
concept of “affectivity” to living beings. On the other hand, 
Harman’s interest in the basic metaphysical framework of 
the world can perhaps better help us develop a flat ontology 
in which no object enjoys a special ontological privilege, and 
where all relations between objects are on equal footing. In this 
sense, we must celebrate Harman’s statement that “aesthetics 
becomes first philosophy.”50 However, although Harman’s 
general metaphysics tries to depict an inflationary world of 
countless objects thus advocating a deeply pluralistic ontology, 
we may also regret the lack in such an object-oriented phi-
losophy of the detailed analysis of atoms, bricks, or protozoa 
that we find in Simondon’s work. If Harman and Simondon 
can be brought to individuate together, this should result in 
an ontogenetic theory of the plurality of objects, wherein 
the aesthetic concept of affectivity would be part of its basic 
ontological vocabulary.
It has not been my intention to restage the metaphysical 
battle between objects and processes, or between objects and 
relations in this paper. What I have tried to do is to show 
how a careful reading of Simondon’s philosophy can help 
us overcome such oppositions. In my view, Simondon and 
Harman can both be considered philosophers of emergence 
who celebrate the radical novelty present in the irreducible 
individuality of every object. While Harman is more inter-
ested in showing the emergent features of objects that forbid 
reducing them to any other reality, be it their components 
or their external relations, Simondon tries to shed light on 
the processes of individuation, on the ontogenetic relations 
that give existence to emergent units and individuals. Which 
is the source of the individuality of objects? Which work do 
objects perform in order to be what they are? According to 
Simondon, the individual is a place of problem-solving. It ex-
50 Harman, “On Vicarious Causation,” 221.
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ists because it manages to solve in a unique way the problem 
posed by the heterogeneity of those realities among which 
it establishes a communication. It perishes when it is no 
longer able to solve this problem. The relation or resolution 
that constitutes the being of the individual is not a mere 
composition or abstraction, but the creation of a new dimen-
sion not contained in any of its components. This is why an 
individual cannot be reduced to anything else. Simondon 
allows us to think reality as a process and a product at the 
same time, and he does so through a metaphysical realism 
in which relation means creation.51
 
51 This essay is an extended version of the paper I delivered at the Aesthet-
ics in the 21st Century conference in Basel in 2012. I would like to thank the 
University of Basel’s Department of English for the wonderful hosting of 
the event and for the opportunity to participate in it. I want to thank also 
those present in the audience for the warm reception of my paper, with extra 
special thanks due to Graham Harman and N. Katherine Hayles for their 
encouraging words concerning the ideas developed here. I am very grateful 
to the editors of this special issue for their extremely careful editing. They 
were very helpful in improving this extended version. Last but not least, I 
want to show my gratitude to my compañera, Ana Manzano, for having ac-
companied me, both physically and emotionally, to Basel.
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Greenberg, Duchamp, and the Next 
Avant-Garde
Graham Harman
American University in Cairo
In Clement Greenberg and Mar-cel Duchamp we have two of the pivotal figures in the twentieth 
century arts. Yet they seem to stand in complete opposition, 
so that the reputation of Duchamp rises as that of Greenberg 
falls, and vice versa. Greenberg is viewed as the champion of 
formalism, of artworks sealed off from their socio-political 
surroundings and even from the private intentions of the 
artist. Greenberg held that Duchamp was simply “not a good 
artist,” and that his devotees (including the highly regarded 
Joseph Beuys) were “also not especially good artists.”1 From 
the late 1940s through the early 1960s, Greenberg’s critical 
views marched step-by-step with the progressive advance of 
the artistic avant-garde, in the eclipse of Paris by New York, 
and the triumph of Jackson Pollock and the so-called “post-
painterly abstraction” of Kenneth Noland and Jules Olitski. 
Since that time, Greenberg and his preferred styles have fallen 
into disfavour, while in the words of one observer “the reputa-
tion and work of Marcel Duchamp … [have] surpassed those 
1 Clement Greenberg, Late Writings (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2003), 221.
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of Picasso in the eyes of art historians, artists, and Duchamp’s 
admirers alike.”2
Over the past decade, there has been a growing sense that 
Greenberg is becoming readable once again, while Duchamp’s 
legacy was perhaps on the verge of becoming overexploited. 
My hope is that by re-examining Greenberg’s complaints 
about Duchamp, by weighing the strengths and weaknesses 
of those complaints, we might gain a fresh sense of what 
avenues might still be open to art criticism and perhaps to 
the arts themselves. 
1. Greenberg’s Critique of Duchamp
From the dawn of his career in 1939 through May 1968, Clement 
Greenberg published a total of 333 essays, articles, and reviews. 
As far as I can determine, all of this written output contains 
just two references to Marcel Duchamp. In January 1943 there 
is a passing reference to some pieces by Duchamp in Peggy 
Guggenheim’s new gallery, which Greenberg felt were unsuc-
cessfully displayed.3 Almost a quarter century later, in April 
1967, Greenberg tells us that minimalism commits itself to 
the third dimension because this is where art intersects with 
non-art, and he credits Duchamp and the Dadaists with this 
discovery.4 Just two references in twenty-eight years; that is all.
But beginning with Greenberg’s May 1968 lecture in Sydney, 
published the following year, Duchamp becomes a more central 
opponent. Though the references become only slightly more 
numerous, they become more vehemently negative, as well 
as more central to Greenberg’s defence of his own aesthetic 
views. The tables had turned. Greenberg was now an intel-
lectual exile rather than a king, while Duchamp had been 
2 Gavin Parkinson, The Duchamp Book (London: Tate Publishing, 2008), 6. 
3 Clement Greenberg, The Collected Essays and Criticism: Perceptions and Judg-
ments, 1939-1944, vol. 1, ed. John O’Brian (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1986), 141.
4 Clement Greenberg, The Collected Essays and Criticism: Modernism with a 
Vengeance, 1957-1969, vol. 4, ed. John O’Brian (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1993), 253.
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retroactively anointed as the heroic forerunner of more recent 
artistic trends. Let us look briefly at each of these references, 
so as to prepare for a more general discussion.
In the Sydney lecture of May ‘68, Duchamp is criticised 
twice for attempting to transcend the untranscendable dif-
ference in quality between good art and bad art. The first 
instance condemns not just Duchamp, but a large portion 
of the art of 1968:
Things that purport to be art do not function, do not exist, as art until 
they are experienced through taste. Until then they exist only as empirical 
phenomena, as aesthetically arbitrary objects or facts. These, precisely, 
are what a lot of contemporary art gets taken for, and what any artists 
want their works to be taken for—in the hope, periodically renewed 
since Marcel Duchamp first acted on it fifty-odd years ago, that by dint 
of evading the reach of taste while yet remaining in the context of art, 
certain kinds of contrivances will achieve unique existence and value. 
So far this hope has proved illusory.5
Later in the Sydney lecture, Greenberg expands on this notion.6 
No one in the arts, he says, had ever questioned the difference 
between high-quality and low-quality art until the emergence 
of the “popular” avant-garde, by which he means Dada and 
Duchamp. The inherent difficulty of high artistic taste and 
production was replaced by the difficulty of accepting an os-
tensibly non-artistic phenomenon as an artwork. Greenberg 
offers a sarcastic list of real or imagined pseudo-artworks 
produced by the Duchampian pop avant-garde: 
The idea of the difficult is evoked by a row of boxes, by a mere rod, by 
a pile of litter, by projects for Cyclopean landscape architecture, by the 
plan for a trench dug in a straight line for hundreds of miles, by a half-
open door, by the cross-section of a mountain, by stating imaginary 
relations between real points in real places, by a blank wall, and so forth.7
5 Greenberg, The Collected Essays and Criticism: Modernism with a Vengeance, 293.
6 Ibid., 301-03.
7 Ibid., 302.
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Greenberg concludes: “In this context the Milky Way might 
be offered as a work of art too. The trouble with the Milky 
Way, however, is that, as art, it is banal.”8 In the 1968 Sydney 
lecture, then, Duchamp is presented as someone who evades 
questions of aesthetic quality and replaces them with the 
claim that any arbitrarily designated object can be an artwork. 
This interpretation of Duchamp is not surprising and not 
inaccurate.
In Greenberg’s 1971 essay “Counter-Avant-Garde,”9 the 
critique of Duchamp becomes harsher and more intricate. 
In Western art, Greenberg says, there had always been a small 
number of innovators who also led the way in terms of aes-
thetic quality. Beginning in the 1860s, there was increasing 
distance between advanced art and official taste. Advanced 
art began to challenge that taste to such a degree as to cause 
a certain amount of shock—important new art actually be-
came scandalous with Manet, the impressionists, Cézanne, the 
Fauves, and cubism. In each case the scandal wore off after 
some time, though the underlying aesthetic challenge of the 
avant-garde remained. But the challenge and the scandal came 
to be mistaken for one another. With the Italian futurists, 
“innovation and advancedness began to look more and more 
like … categorical means to artistic significance apart from 
aesthetic quality.”10 With Duchamp, this avant-gardeness was 
replaced by a full blown avant-gardeism. As Greenberg sees it, 
in a few short years after 1912, [Duchamp] laid down the precedents for 
everything that advanced-advanced art has done in the fifty-odd years 
since … [He] locked advanced-advanced art into what has amounted 
to hardly more than elaborations, variations on, and recapitulations 
of his original ideas.11 
8 Greenberg, The Collected Essays and Criticism: Modernism with a Vengeance, 303.
9 Clement Greenberg, “Counter-Avant-Garde,” Art International (1971), 
15, 16-19. Reprinted in Marcel Duchamp in Perspective, ed. Joseph Masheck 
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1975), 122-23. 
10 Greenberg, Late Writings, 6.
11 Ibid., 7.
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These are strong words, given the near-total absence of Duch-
amp from Greenberg’s writings until the latter was almost sixty 
years old. And what was the core of Duchamp’s vision, now 
credited by Greenberg with setting the agenda for advanced-
advanced art as of 1971? That agenda is that
the shocking, the scandalizing, the mystifying and confounding, became 
embraced as ends in themselves and no longer regretted as initial side 
effects of artistic newness that would wear off with familiarity. Now 
these side effects were to be built in. The first bewildered reaction to 
innovative art was to be the sole and appropriate one.12
More than this, the shock and scandal in question were 
no longer aesthetic as it was with great avant-garde art, but 
came solely from the extra-aesthetic realm: “Duchamp’s first 
readymades, his bicycle wheel, his bottle rack, and later on 
his urinal, were not at all new in configuration; they startled 
when first seen only because they were presented in a fine-art 
context, which is a purely cultural and social, not an aesthetic 
or artistic context.”13 The point became not to violate the aes-
thetic standards of the recent avant-garde in order to create 
progress in taste, but to violate social decorum.
There are a few other points to consider. Duchamp always 
took pride in an art that appealed to the mind rather than 
the eye, against what he dismissively called “retinal art.”14 But 
for Greenberg, this excess of thinking is precisely the death of 
art. In other words, avant-gardism of Duchamp’s type involves 
too much conscious choice. The artist performs a series of 
easy cognitive stunts that fail to outrun their conception; the 
artist is no longer surprised by what the artwork discovers: 
“Conscious volition, deliberateness, plays a principal part in 
avant-gardist art: that is, resorting to ingenuity instead of 
inspiration, contrivance instead of creation, ‘fancy’ instead 
of “imagination”; in effect, to the known rather than the 
12 Greenberg, Late Writings, 7.
13 Ibid., 12.
14 Parkinson, The Duchamp Book, 6.
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unknown.”15 The new becomes a consciously available set of 
external gestures rather than the object of unremitting struggle. 
As a result, “the exceptional enterprise of artistic innovation, 
by being converted into an affair of standardised categories, of 
a set of ‘looks,’ is put within reach of uninspired calculation.”16 
Yet aesthetics ought to be a matter of surprise rather than of 
shock, of difficult grappling with something slightly beyond 
our grasp rather than the transparent mastery of a clever 
subversive concept. As Greenberg later put it, mathematical 
demonstrations become boring when repeated, and so too do 
the “demonstrations” of Duchamp as to the arbitrariness of 
what counts as an art object. By contrast, “that’s not the way 
it is with more substantial art, good and bad: that kind of art 
you have to experience over and over again in order to keep 
on knowing it.”17
A related notion is that avant-gardism thinks it can overturn 
the entire history of art with a single transgressive gesture, 
whereas for Greenberg art advances by mastering the best art 
of the past and adapting it in some relevant way: 
Maybe the most constant topic of avant-gardist rhetoric is the claim 
made with each new phase of avant-garde, or seeming avant-garde, art 
that the past is now being finally closed out and a radical mutation in 
the nature of art is taking place after which art will no longer behave 
as it has heretofore.18
Attempts to shock and overturn art from the outside have 
replaced challenges to taste from within the established tradi-
tion. But for Greenberg, surprise must always occur inside a 
given context: “new and surprising ways of satisfying in art 
have always been connected closely with immediately pre-
vious ways … There have been no great vaults ‘forward,’ no 
innovations out of the blue, no ruptures of continuity in the 
15 Greenberg, Late Writings, 7.
16 Ibid., 8.
17 Ibid., 82.
18 Ibid., 9.
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high art of the past—nor have any such been witnessed in our 
day.”19 As he would claim five years later in his Bennington 
Seminars, “Duchamp had hardly grasped what real cubism 
was about”20—namely, the flattening-out of the picture plane 
as opposed to the deepening illusion of pictorial depth since 
the Italian Renaissance. For Greenberg this is evident from 
the rather traditional perspectival elements in Duchamp’s 
own quasi-cubist painting efforts, before he gave up paint-
ing and turned to the bicycle wheel and other readymades. 
Instead, Greenberg holds, Duchamp mistakenly believed 
that the force of cubism lay in its difficulty and shock value.
This leads us to the final and perhaps most important aspect 
of Greenberg’s anti-Duchampian views. Though it might seem 
surprising at first, Greenberg is adamant in treating both 
Duchamp and surrealism as forms of “academic art.” There 
are two kinds of academic artist, Greenberg holds. The first 
is able to recognise the new avant-garde trends of the present 
day but follows them in a watered-down, nonthreatening form. 
Greenberg offers the example of Paul-Albert Besnard, whose 
vulgarised if imaginative variant of impressionism in the 
1880s “outsold Sisley and Pissarro, to their grief, and became 
better known too, in the short term.”21 The second kind, far 
more common, “is one who is puzzled [by the new trends], 
and who therefore orients his art to expectations formed by 
an earlier phase of art.”22 Duchamp was a half-hearted early 
devotee of Cézanne and the Fauves, but was simply unable to 
grasp the new aesthetic standards generated by cubism, and 
misinterpreted cubism as nothing more than a shock and 
a scandal to previous standards rather than as a style with 
inherent aesthetic merit. For this reason, Greenberg holds, 
Duchamp can be taken seriously as an interesting cultural 
19 Greenberg, Late Writings, 15.
20 Ibid., 81.
21 Clement Greenberg, Homemade Esthetics: Observations on Art (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), 87.
22 Greenberg, Late Writings, 15.
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figure, but not as an artist per se.23 Dada, surrealism, pop art, 
and minimalism mark a gradual relaxing of aesthetic stan-
dards, with everything boiling down to how severely one can 
shock the previous expectations of what counts as art.
But we have not yet heard Greenberg’s most powerful 
definition of academic art, from another important Sydney 
lecture given in 1979: 
Academicization isn’t a matter of academies—there were academies 
long before academicization and before the nineteenth century. Aca-
demicism consists in the tendency to take the medium of an art too much 
for granted. It results in blurring: words become imprecise, color gets 
muffled, the physical sources of sound become too much dissembled.24 
Up through the 1920s and even 1930s, academic art tended 
to be blatantly academic, defended by official academies 
and conventional taste while disdained by a relatively small 
modernist elite. But Greenberg holds that with surrealism, 
the heir of Dada, we see a form of academic art that is cannily 
disguised as cutting-edge modernism.
As early as his pioneering essay “Avant-Garde and Kitsch” in 
1939, Greenberg wrote that “Picasso, Braque, Mondrian, Miró, 
Kandinsky, Brancusi, even Klee, Matisse, and Cézanne derive 
their chief inspiration from the medium they work in,”25 but 
added in a dismissive footnote that “the chief concern of a 
painter like Dali is to represent the processes and concepts of 
his consciousness, not the processes of his medium.”26 For all 
the shock value of Dalí’s flaming giraffes and skinny-legged 
towering elephants, his art is focused on shocking literary 
content, and in Greenberg’s view we have reached a stage 
in the history of visual art in which literary content is just a 
non-artistic distraction. In this respect, surrealism and Dada 
are simply two sides of the same academic coin. Surrealism 
23 Greenberg, Late Writings, 153-54.
24 Ibid., 28, my emphasis.
25 Greenberg, The Collected Essays and Criticism: Perceptions and Judgments, 9.
26 Ibid.
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takes its medium too much for granted by replacing drawing 
room portraits with wild fantasies of hallucinogenic entities. 
Meanwhile, Dada takes its medium too much for granted by 
giving up on the project of transforming it from within, and 
challenges it only with shocking gestures from the outside.
There are other details to Greenberg’s critique of Duch-
amp, other scathing and witty remarks, but already we have 
encountered the core principles of this critique, of which 
there are perhaps six:
1. Duchamp rejects quality as an aesthetic standard.
2. He treats the shock value of advanced art not as an 
unfortunate side effect that wears off over time, but as 
the central purpose of art.
3. He shocks established standards not by internal aesthetic 
means, but by transgressing everyday social decorum: 
displaying urinals, breasts, or the spread-out naked 
body of a murdered woman in a fine art context that 
will be predictably horrified by such gestures.
4. He privileges thinking in art, turning artworks into 
transparent concepts to an excessive degree.
5. He overestimates the radical break his work makes 
with the past.
6. Though he thinks himself to be the pinnacle of artist 
advancement, Duchamp is actually an academic artist 
who takes the medium of art too much for granted, 
despairs of being able to innovate from within, and is 
thus led into a sort of juvenile sabotage through shock-
ing affronts to the fine arts gallery context.
This six-point list is perhaps more interesting if we reverse 
it into Greenberg’s own positive aesthetic program:
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1. Art is always a matter of high and low aesthetic quality.
2. Shock value is merely a temporary symptom of advanced 
art, never its central purpose.
3. Important art is characterised by aesthetic challenge 
rather than extra-aesthetic shock.
4. Art is a matter of taste rather than of thinking, and 
taste must always struggle to refine and improve itself 
in contact with the art object.
5. Important art builds on the past rather than breaking 
radically with it.
6. Art should not be academic, meaning that it should not 
take its medium for granted. This final principle entails 
that art reflects a constant struggle to reinvent its form.
Stated differently, art avoids academicism when its content 
manages to reflect or embody the possibilities of its medium, 
rather than presenting content as an isolated figure whose 
ground or medium can be taken for granted. This is why 
Greenberg increasingly celebrated painting that announced 
the flatness of canvas, why cubism was for him the greatest 
school of art in the twentieth century, and why he experi-
enced such rapture over synthetic cubist collage as a way of 
negotiating the dangers of cubism’s possible two-dimensional 
deadlock.27 The content of cubism, for Greenberg, reflected 
and mastered the highest possibilities of its medium at that 
point in history. In other words, despite his concern with the 
flatness of the canvas, there is a sense in which Greenberg is 
primarily interested in depth: in making the invisible deep 
conditions of any medium somehow visible in the content 
of the art.
27 Greenberg, The Collected Essays and Criticism: Modernism with a Vengeance, 
61-66.
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2. Non-Relational Philosophy
This links Greenberg closely with two key figures in the 
twentieth century humanities. One is the Canadian media 
theorist Marshall McLuhan, famous for his statements that 
“the medium is the message” and that “the content or message 
of any particular medium has about as much importance as 
the stenciling on the casing of an atomic bomb.”28 In other 
words, we waste our time when we argue about the good or 
bad content of television shows, since the real work is done 
by the invisible changes in the structure of consciousness 
brought about by television regardless of what high- or low-
quality content it might possess. If we translate Greenberg 
into McLuhanian terms, then “the content of any painting 
has about as much importance as the stenciling on the casing 
of an atomic bomb.” All political activism in art, all literary 
anecdote and inspirational messaging, fades before the purely 
formal consideration of how the medium itself is made to 
shine forth in the content.
But perhaps an even more important link is with Martin 
Heidegger, the heavyweight champion of twentieth century 
philosophy, in my view still unmatched by any figure of equal 
stature since. Is not Heidegger’s entire philosophical breakthrough 
a premonition of what McLuhan and Greenberg formulated 
much later? The phenomenology of Edmund Husserl asked 
us to suspend judgment about any hidden reasons in nature 
for things to happen as they do, and to focus instead on the 
patient description of phenomena in consciousness, in all 
their subtlety. Heidegger’s great breakthrough came when he 
first noted that usually we do not encounter entities as present 
in consciousness. This is already an artificial special case that 
occurs most often in the breakdown of entities. As long as your 
heart and lungs are healthy and working effectively, as long 
as the highway is not buckled by earthquakes, as long as the 
hammer and screwdriver are working in your hands rather 
28 The longer quotation comes from the famous 1969 Playboy interview in 
Marshall McLuhan, Essential McLuhan, ed. Eric McLuhan and Frank Zingrone 
(London: Routledge, 1997), 222-60. 
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than shattering into tiny pieces, they tend not to be noticed. 
While phenomena in the mind are present or present-at-hand, 
entities themselves are ready-to-hand for Heidegger, remain-
ing invisible as they work towards various purposes.
Even this standard way of reading Heidegger turns out 
to be too superficial. He is not just giving us a difference 
between conscious perception and theory on the one hand 
and unconscious practical action on the other. Notice that 
even praxis reduces things to figures, since my use of a chair 
or hammer reduces it, oversimplifies it by interacting with 
only a small number of its vast range of qualities. The lesson 
from Heidegger is not that conscious awareness is the site of 
figure and unconscious praxis is the site of ground. Instead, 
the hidden ground is the thing itself, which is reduced, cari-
catured, or distorted by any relation we might have with it, 
whether theoretical or practical. And moreover, this is not 
just a special fact about human beings, but is typical even of 
inanimate relations. But for the moment there is no need to 
defend an unorthodox reading of Heidegger, since even the 
most orthodox reading already makes the point we need: what 
is visibly present in the world appears only against a hidden 
background from which it draws nourishment. In this sense, 
Heidegger’s critique of presence in the history of philoso-
phy can be viewed as another critique of “academic art”: art 
that consists in the tendency to take its medium too much 
for granted, in Greenberg’s powerful definition. In similar 
fashion, “academic philosophy” for Heidegger would be the 
kind that treats being as something that can be exhausted in 
some form of presence.
Yet there is a funny thing about this celebration of the deep 
background medium in Heidegger, McLuhan, and Greenberg. 
In all three cases, the depth turns out to be utterly sterile, 
incapable of generating anything new. Let us start with the 
clearest case, that of McLuhan. For McLuhan, the dominant 
medium in any situation is so deeply buried that there is no 
way to address it in direct cognitive terms. But not only can 
we not look at the medium directly—since any attempt to 
explain the effects of television or the internet will always 
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fall short of the awesome depths of these media—the me-
dium itself cannot even change without some impetus from 
the outside. As far as I am aware, McLuhan only allows for 
two ways that media can change. There is reversal through 
overheating, or retrieval through the work of artists. Reversal 
occurs when, for example, the speed and convenience of cars 
reverses into the slowness and inconvenience of traffic jams. 
Notice that this is not because cars themselves have changed, 
but only because their apparently superficial features (such 
as their shiny metallic bulk) became unmanageable due to 
the vast quantitative increase in the number of cars. What 
causes one medium to flip into another is not the deep aspect 
of a medium, but its more secondary and frivolous features.
As for retrieval, this happens for McLuhan when some 
current cliché or obsolete medium is given new life and 
made credible again. When vinyl LP records go from obso-
lete technology outstripped by compact discs to the newly 
revered medium of connoisseurs who despise the cold and 
sterile sound of CDs, we have a case of retrieval. But primarily, 
McLuhan thinks this is the work of artists. It is artists who 
transform banal visible figures by situating them in some 
sort of enlivening background medium that breathes new 
life into them. The crucial point for us here is as follows. For 
McLuhan, background media are more important than any 
of their content. Yet precisely because these media are so deep, 
so inaccessible to conscious contact, they are incapable of 
transformation. Such transformation can occur only at the 
most superficial layer of media—whether it be their peripheral 
features in the case of overheating and reversal, or the level 
of dead surface content in the case of the artist who retrieves 
some past medium as the content of a new one.
In Heidegger’s philosophy the same point also holds, what-
ever the appearances to the contrary. There are admittedly 
some passages in Heidegger, especially in the later writings, 
when he treats humans as if we could only passively await 
the sending of new epochs of being. But in fact, the implicit 
problem faced by Heidegger is that since his objects with-
draw so deeply from one another, they are unable to make 
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contact precisely because they are deep. If they make contact, 
it is only through their most superficial outer layer. If I am 
injured by a hammer or virus, it is not because they assault 
the very core of my personality, but only because they exploit 
minor features of my being: such as a sensitive thumb or a 
few accidental cuts in the skin. Heidegger’s depth is so deep 
that everything must happen on the surface, though he does 
not realise this as clearly as McLuhan does.
Even Greenberg admits that the content of painting is 
not unimportant. At times he calls it the site of inspiration: 
Picasso’s painting is not just about a relation between the im-
age and the flat picture surface of the canvas, but also about 
a guitar or horse or face of a woman. Yet this remains merely 
a placeholder in Greenberg’s writing; he concedes the point 
without developing further what the role of sheer content 
might be in art. His primary concern remains the way that 
the content of the medium reflects the very structure of the 
medium: famously, in his case, the flatness of the picture 
plane. And though Greenberg freely admitted that this was 
a transient historical constraint not binding for all eras, he 
wrote so little about non-contemporary art that we can only 
speculate as to the principles he would have used to distin-
guish good from bad Renaissance perspectival art, or good 
from bad twenty-first century installation art.
3. Art and Relations
It is well known that Greenberg was an opinionated man, 
capable of swift and harsh judgments; for this reason it can 
be tempting to dismiss him as cranky and arrogant, his views 
not worth taking seriously. But this would be a mistake. Green-
berg’s dismissal of artists we might happen to like is based on 
his adoption of certain underlying aesthetic principles, and it 
is better to reflect on and possibly challenge those principles 
than to condemn Greenberg for being their messenger.
There was no more vehement defender of modernism than 
Greenberg, who viewed the modern not as a break with the 
past, but as an attempt to maintain the quality of the past by 
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preventing its degeneration into a series of mechanically re-
peated academic gestures. His definition of the academic, we 
have seen, is “art that takes its medium too much for granted,” 
and we have linked this claim with certain insights in the 
media theory of McLuhan and the philosophy of Heidegger.29 
If academic art is the kind that takes its medium too much 
for granted, we can understand why Greenberg objected to 
Dalí and other surrealists as academic. There seems to be no 
innovation as to medium in the case of surrealist painting. 
Indeed, Greenberg thinks the surrealists deliberately retained 
the realist and perspectival conventions of academic paint-
ing in order to keep everyone’s focus on the startling content 
of their works. Though it may seem difficult to call Dalí an 
“academic artist” with a straight face, the charge is under-
standable if we accept Greenberg’s definition of the academic.
But with Duchamp, it seems almost impossible to use this 
designation. We have seen that Greenberg actually makes six 
separate critiques of Duchamp, with academicism being only 
one of them. The others were Duchamp’s apparent rejection of 
quality as a standard, his overestimation of the value of shock 
in art, his tendency to shock not through aesthetic means 
but through breaches of social expectation, his overreliance 
on transparent concepts rather than the uncertainty of aes-
thetic struggle and surprise, and finally his excessive claims 
of breaking radically with the past. But let us focus on the 
“academicism” charge. Dalí can easily (if controversially) be 
treated as an academic artist simply on the basis of Greenberg’s 
definition of the term: academic art as insufficiently aware 
of its medium. In Duchamp’s case a more oblique argument 
is needed, given that Duchamp is widely considered as the 
shining example of someone who challenges our expecta-
tions of what an artistic medium should be.
Greenberg’s point seems to be that Duchamp was so deeply 
academic in outlook (to judge from his insufficiently brilliant 
early efforts at fauvism and cubism) that he became frustrated 
by his limitations and misinterpreted cubism as primarily a 
29 Greenberg, Late Writings, 28.
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brazen shock to societal expectations. He then tried to outdo 
even the cubists in this respect by exhibiting the most banal 
objects as if they were artworks: a bicycle wheel, a bottle rack, 
a urinal. In other words, the sole choice for Duchamp is one 
between academic art and provocative gestures, and Duchamp 
wrongly thought he was following Picasso and all other mod-
ernists in pursuing a dazzling career of provocative gestures. 
This explains Greenberg’s other complaints about Duchamp 
as well. For once art is conceived merely as a shocking ges-
ture, then quality as a standard of measurement no longer 
matters. New and provocative concepts of what might count 
as an artwork replace patient aesthetic struggle within a set 
of plausible ground rules. And finally, by putting ever more 
ironic quotation marks around the artistic enterprise than 
anyone before him, Duchamp might easily think of himself 
as making the most radical break with the history of art.
Surrealism and Dada will forever be linked in the history of 
art, and the two movements do share some overlapping mem-
bership, the use of humorous or incongruous titles for their 
works, and the deployment of irreverent public personalities. 
But from a Greenbergian standpoint, they actually work in 
contrary directions, like two scientists performing experi-
ments with opposite controls. Dalí adopts the already banal 
conventions of three-dimensional illusionistic oil painting, all 
the better to let the strangeness of the content shine through. 
Duchamp works in reverse, choosing the most utterly banal 
content, all the better to shock our expectations about what 
might count as an artistic medium. If the two artists had not 
performed these respective controls, the result would have 
been massive confusion. Imagine that Dalí had painted his 
classics The Ghost of Vermeer of Delft Which Can Also Be Used as a 
Table or Gala and “The Angelus” of Millet Preceding the Imminent 
Arrival of the Conic Anamorphoses, not in what Greenberg calls 
academic illusionistic style, but broken up into planes in the 
manner of high analytic cubism.
Such a chaos of innovation would surprise the viewer from 
too many directions at once. It is hardly accidental that Pi-
casso and Braque chose such simple subject matter for their 
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cubist masterpieces—Violin and Candlestick, Fruitdish and Glass, 
Portrait of Daniel-Henry Kahnweiler—since these banal themes 
enable our undivided attention to innovations in technique. 
Likewise, Duchamp’s readymades would have tangled things 
too badly if he had chosen to display not simple and recog-
nisable everyday objects, but more complicated, esoteric, or 
ambiguous things. In any case, we can conclude from this 
that neither Dalí nor Duchamp can plausibly be treated as an 
academic artist. Dalí does not “take his medium for granted,” 
but deliberately suspends innovation of medium in order to 
open up innovation of subject matter. Meanwhile Duchamp, 
at least in his readymade pieces, neither takes his medium 
for granted nor suspends innovation of it, but innovates his 
media to such a degree that Greenberg can view them only 
as shocks to fine art decorum, as in his followers’ use of 
a row of boxes … a mere rod … a pile of litter … projects for Cyclopean 
landscape architecture … the plan for a trench dug in a straight line 
for hundreds of miles … a half-open door … the cross-section of a 
mountain … stating imaginary relations between real points in real 
places … a blank wall, and so forth.30
Such strategies can reach the point of academic banality 
as much as any other, and perhaps the arts in 2014 have 
long since reached that point. But there is no reason to as-
sume that no distinctions of quality are possible within the 
medium-stretching genres of recent art, that such art really 
flouts gradations in quality in any sweeping sense, or that it 
exists solely to provide shocks to social decorum. We should 
also consider Greenberg’s uneven track record as a predic-
tor of greatness. For while he deserves much credit for his 
early defence of Jackson Pollock, it is by no means clear that 
history will join him in preferring Gottlieb, Morris, Noland, 
and Olitski to surrealism, Duchamp, Warhol, and Beuys. In 
fact, the opposite now seems more likely.
A Greenberg foe might say that he simply uses the term 
30 Greenberg, The Collected Essays and Criticism: Modernism with a Vengeance, 302.
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“academic” for anything that he happens not to like. But this 
would not be quite fair; Greenberg’s critical vocabulary is 
more versatile than that. For instance, another famous target 
of Greenberg’s harshness is Wassily Kandinsky. A month after 
the Russian artist’s December 1944 death in liberated Paris, 
Greenberg offered a dismissal of Kandinsky’s career that was 
cold and brazen, but also rather fascinating. It would be dif-
ficult to describe a late-blooming innovator like Kandinsky 
as an “academic artist,” and Greenberg does not try to do so. 
Instead, he classifies Kandinsky as a “provincial” artist. His 
obituary review opens as follows:
There are two sorts of provincialism in art. The exponent of one is the 
artist, academic or otherwise, who works in an outmoded style or in a 
vein disregarded by the metropolitan center—Paris, Rome, or Athens. 
The other sort of provincialism is that of the artist—generally from an 
outlying country—who in all earnest and admiration devotes himself 
to the style being currently developed in the metropolitan center, yet 
fails in one way or another really to understand what it is about … 
The Russian, Wassily Kandinsky, [was a provincial of this latter sort].31
For Greenberg, the provincial Kandinsky was no naïve simple-
ton, but a quick-witted observer of advanced art:
Like many a newcomer to a situation, seeing it from the outside and 
thus more completely, Kandinsky was very quick to perceive one of 
the most basic implications of the revolution cubism had effected in 
Western painting. Pictorial art was at last able to free itself completely 
from the object—the eidetic image—and take for its sole positive matter 
the sensuous facts of its own medium, reducing itself to a question … 
of non-figurative shapes and colors. Painting would become like music, 
an art contained in its own form and thus capable of infinitely more 
variety than before.32
31 Clement Greenberg, The Collected Essays and Criticism: Arrogant Purpose, 1945-
1949, vol. 2, ed. John O’Brian (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 3-4.
32 Ibid., 4.
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But in this way, Kandinsky repeats Duchamp’s supposed er-
ror of thinking he can make a clean break with the history of 
art. Greenberg makes other objections that seem even more 
decisive for his verdict on Kandinsky, who in his view “for a 
relatively short time was a great painter,” namely in his earlier 
period.33 Greenberg’s biggest complaint is that Kandinsky 
was too focused on the abstraction of cubism while missing 
a more important aspect of that style. As he puts it in the 
same obituary review:
[Kandinsky] rejected what to my mind is a prior and perhaps even 
more essential achievement of avant-garde art than its deliverance of 
painting from representation: its recapture of the literal realization 
of the physical limitations and conditions of the medium and of the 
positive advantages to be gained from the exploitation of these very 
limitations.34
Although it might seem as if Kandinsky is fully aware of the 
flatness of the picture surface, “he came to conceive of the 
picture … as an aggregate of discrete shapes; the color, size, 
and spacing of these he related so insensitively to the space 
surrounding them … that this [space] remained inactive 
and meaningless; the sense of a continuous surface was lost, 
and the space became pocked with ‘holes.’”35 Aside from this 
purely technical shortcoming, Greenberg sees one clear sign 
of relapse by Kandinsky into academic art: for, “having be-
gun by accepting the absolute flatness of the picture surface, 
Kandinsky would go on to allude to illusionistic depth by 
a use of color, line, and perspective that were plastically ir-
relevant ... Academic reminiscences crept into [Kandinsky’s 
paintings] at almost every point other than that of what they 
‘represented.’”36
In another accusation of insensitivity to medium, Greenberg 
33 Greenberg, The Collected Essays and Criticism: Arrogant Purpose, 6.
34 Ibid., 5.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
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complains that “the consistency of [Kandinsky’s] paint surface 
and the geometrical exactness of his line seem more appro-
priate to stone or metal than to the porous fabric of canvas.”37 
Finally, his supposed failure to master what the avant-garde 
was really all about led Kandinsky to become an insecure 
and eclectic stylist. As Greenberg puts it, “the stylistic and 
thematic ingredients of Kandinsky’s later work are as diverse 
as the colors of Joseph’s coat: peasant, ancient, and Oriental 
art, much Klee, some Picasso, surrealist protoplasma, maps, 
blueprints, musical notation, etc., etc.”38 Greenberg concludes 
with a few concessions and a single crowning damnation: 
[Kandinsky] was and will remain a large and revolutionary phenom-
enon—he must be taken into account always; yet he stays apart from the 
mainstream and in the last analysis remains a provincial. The example 
of his work is dangerous to younger painters.39
But Greenberg’s description of the dangers of Kandinsky seems 
to hinge too much on a single debatable point. He cautions that 
Kandinsky’s exact line would be more appropriate for stone or 
metal than canvas, yet he immediately concedes that the same 
is true of Mondrian, whom Greenberg regards as a truly great 
artist despite that stony-metallic exact line. He also tries to 
warn us that “academic reminiscences” creep into Kandinsky, 
which should mean that Kandinsky has a lingering tendency 
to take his medium for granted. But even if this turned out 
to be sweepingly true for the whole of Kandinsky’s work, it 
would not follow that it must be true for any art that adopts the 
abstractions of cubism while downplaying its relation to the 
flatness of the medium. Revolutions are often fuelled when 
heirs adopt only one portion of their forerunners’ legacies 
while refusing the others. As Greenberg himself repeatedly 
admits, there is not just one way to make great art, and what 
succeeds in one era will fail in others—precisely because the 
37 Greenberg, The Collected Essays and Criticism: Arrogant Purpose, 5.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid., 6.
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same techniques are fresh at one moment and banal in the 
next. He even makes the surprising admission that Duchamp 
was right to be “wild” early on as a way of escaping the “cubist 
vise,” which suggests Greenberg’s firm awareness that even 
the greatest styles can become suffocating prisons.
Just like the Renaissance-era growth of perspectival illu-
sionist painting, the reverse movement towards painting that 
exploits the limitations of the flat canvas can reach a point 
of decadent banality. Were Duchamp, surrealism, and Kan-
dinsky truly relapses from cubism in the way that Greenberg 
claims? Or were they not instead more like probes seeking 
a new planet, quite apart from the question of whether they 
succeeded in finding it? Nonetheless, it is dangerous to call 
Greenberg “old-fashioned,” as many of his opponents do. His 
keen intelligence deserves more than that, as does his literary 
brilliance. For his critical work and his spiritual guidance of 
the shift in avant-garde art from Paris to New York, Green-
berg is no doubt one of the half-dozen or so most important 
intellectual figures the United States has produced. Moreover, 
everyone becomes old-fashioned someday, and those who 
dance on Greenberg’s tomb will eventually be danced upon 
in turn, viewed as outdated in their own right.
What will it look like when this happens? Let us assume 
for the sake of argument that surrealism produces no fur-
ther avant-garde revolution, since its basic principles have 
been thoroughly explored. The same holds for abstraction, 
a known quantity for just as long, even if its lifespan was 
longer. Duchamp’s wager of continually questioning what 
counts as art may have a few years of life left in it, and hence 
we are still prepared to be impressed by “a row of boxes … a 
mere rod … a pile of litter … projects for Cyclopean landscape 
architecture … the plan for a trench dug in a straight line for 
hundreds of miles … a half-open door … the cross-section 
of a mountain … stating imaginary relations between real 
points in real places … a blank wall, and so forth.”40 But this 
too will eventually become old and tired, if it is not already so, 
40 Greenberg, The Collected Essays and Criticism: Modernism with a Vengeance, 302.
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and something different will need to awaken to surprise us.
What will this new thing be? We have already considered 
the “academicism” of Duchamp and surrealism, and the 
“provincialism” of Kandinsky, and have stipulated a future 
in which all are spent forces along with Greenberg’s School 
of Flatness. What else is left? It could be many things, but we 
have only encountered one other possibility in the course 
of our discussions: the first kind of provincialism, different 
from Kandinsky’s second kind. To refresh our memories, 
Kandinsky’s sort of provincialism was said to be “that of the 
artist—generally from an outlying country—who in all earnest 
and admiration devotes himself to the style being currently 
developed in the metropolitan center, yet fails in one way or 
another really to understand what it is about.”41 The other kind 
of provincialism, which we have not yet discussed, is that of 
“the artist, academic or otherwise, who works in an outmoded 
style or in a vein disregarded by the metropolitan center.”42
At first it might sound as if this sort of artist cannot be a 
candidate for cutting-edge status, since the word “outmoded” 
suggests otherwise. But Greenberg already gives us an example 
of one such “outmoded” artist working in a vein disregarded 
by the metropolitan centre, and indeed one of the greatest 
artists: Paul Cézanne, whom he considers in a beautiful 1951 
essay entitled “Cézanne and the Unity of Modern Painting.”43 
The opening claim of that essay is that the apparent eclec-
ticism of avant-garde art in 1951 is merely an appearance. 
Great figures do not exhaustively accomplish what they aim 
to achieve, and always leave behind a tangle of loose threads 
for their successors to tie together. Greenberg views the late 
nineteenth century, and Cézanne in particular, as the origin 
of these threads. Even as great a movement as cubism was 
able to benefit speedily from the untied threads of Cézanne:
41 Greenberg, The Collected Essays and Criticism: Modernism with a Vengeance, 3-4.
42 Ibid.
43 Clement Greenberg, The Collected Essays and Criticism: Affirmations and 
Refusals, 1950-1956, vol. 3, ed. John O’Brian (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1993), 82-91.
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Picasso’s and Braque’s Cubism, and Léger’s, completed what Cézanne 
had begun, by their successes divesting his means of whatever had 
remained problematical about them and finding them their most 
appropriate ends. These means they took from Cézanne practically 
ready-made, and were able to adapt them to their purposes after only 
a relatively few trial exercises.44
But the truly interesting topic of Greenberg’s essay on Cé-
zanne is the opposite topic: not Cézanne as the far-seeing 
grandfather of later trends, but as the struggling admirer 
of the classical painters before him. It is the story of the 
artist who does not simply extrapolate from the threads of 
his immediate forerunners, but who attempts to bring back 
something important that recent revolutions had prematurely 
left behind. So it was with Cézanne and the Impressionists. 
As Greenberg unforgettably puts it:
[Cézanne] was making the first—and last—pondered effort to save 
the intrinsic principle of the Western tradition of painting: its con-
cern with an ample and literal rendition of the illusion of the third 
dimension. He had noted the Impressionists’ inadvertent silting up 
of pictorial depth. And it is because he tried so hard to re-excavate 
that depth without abandoning Impressionist color, and because his 
attempt, while vain, was so profoundly conceived, that it became the 
turning point it did … Like Manet and with almost as little appetite 
for the role of revolutionary, he changed the course of art out of the 
very effort to return it by new paths to its old ways.45
The danger faced by all modernisers is the danger of robotic 
extrapolation. They assume that the previous revolution 
performed innovation X, and therefore the next revolution 
must perform double-X or triple-X: since the Enlightenment 
advanced by denouncing superstition and defending reason, 
the next phase of history requires a campaign of utter persecu-
tion against all “irrational” people, and so forth. Extrapolation 
44 Greenberg, The Collected Essays and Criticism: Affirmations and Refusals, 90.
45 Ibid., 83-84.
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has its historical moments, and those lucky enough to live in 
such moments can complete their work rapidly at a young 
age thanks to struggling prior mentors, as did Picasso and 
Braque in their analytic cubist period. Others must struggle 
slowly like Cézanne (or Kant) to find the new principle of an 
age, painstakingly retrieving the old while not abandoning 
what is new, and perhaps dangling dozens of loose threads 
that others in the following generation can tie together as they 
please. If we follow Greenberg in treating art since 1960 as 
the reign of Neo-Dada, then what is most valuable in the past 
that this period sacrificed and left behind? What outmoded 
provincial might emerge as the Cézanne of the coming era? 
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Not Objects so Much As Images
A Response to Graham Harman’s “Greenberg, 
Duchamp, and the Next Avant-Garde”
Bettina Funcke
School of Visual Arts
Editors’ Note: This response was delivered at the Art, Information, and Philo-
sophical Objects event held at Columbia University on 8 March, 2013.
I want to start by making some comments on what you have writ-ten in your essay on Clement 
Greenberg and Marcel Duchamp, Graham. I was especially 
interested because I have also written about these two figures 
in my book Pop or Populus: Art between High and Low.1 I want 
to say first of all that your paper is dense and complex, but 
ultimately open-ended and speculative. And this is what 
makes it exciting.
As I see it, you are taking Greenberg’s criticism as a model 
that might once again be interesting or relevant, not because 
of his strict emphasis on formalism, but because he is known 
to us as the art critic who decreed what was right and what was 
wrong, and who therefore tried to predict what was to come 
next in art, or what should or should not be the next step. His 
judgments were moralistic, e.g. calling Wassily Kandinsky a 
dangerous influence for young artists, or describing Duchamp 
as a dead end. So, essentially you are looking to this viewpoint 
as a kind of inspiration, and then posing the question yourself 
1 Bettina Funcke, Pop or Populus: Art between High and Low (New York: Stern-
berg Press, 2009); see in particular chapters 1 and 2.
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of what might come next and how we might get to this next 
step in the evolution of art and its criticism.
You write, “Over the past decade, there has been a growing 
sense that Greenberg is becoming readable once again, while 
Duchamp’s legacy was perhaps on the verge of becoming 
overexploited.”2 And this is maybe because Greenberg was 
writing from what he saw as a point of exhaustion; in his 
view Duchamp was entirely played out and we needed to find 
a new direction. He was seeing land art, conceptual art, and 
minimal art as basically bankrupt derivatives of Duchamp. 
That may not be something that we agree with now, but it 
may be that, forty years later, we can finally sort of come to 
the same conclusions as Greenberg: OK, you were not right 
about the art of the 1970s, but now we have caught up with 
you, because now everything feels exhausted to us, too. And 
we recognise, of course, that this feeling of exhaustion, that 
things have been overexploited, is perennial.
I still would not necessarily agree that the period since 
the 1960s is a neo-Dada period, i.e., Duchampian, because I 
think that view, which was Greenberg’s, leaves out the influ-
ence of Andy Warhol, whom he could not really deal with, 
and who shifted the terrain again. But then again Warhol, 
like Duchamp, is another strain of art whose legacy may be 
over-exploited, as you put it.
So, I cannot give an answer to the question of what is com-
ing next, but I want to contribute to the discussion by coming 
from a slightly different angle, which is to fill in another side 
of Duchamp’s work which, I think, has really come to influence 
the art of the last few decades, more so than the readymade 
in fact. This is his play with information and documentation, 
with the very reception of his own work, through printed 
and editioned representations. It is an interference into 
art history. This is something that basically falls outside of 
Greenberg’s investigation, and is not really addressed by the 
6-point critique that you mention. Just to recap those points: 
2 Graham Harman, “Greenberg, Duchamp, and the Next Avant-Garde” in 
this volume. 
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Duchamp rejects quality or taste; is primarily interested in 
shock value; uses transgressive material; privileges the con-
cept; overestimates his own radicality; and is an academic 
artist who takes his medium for granted.
The thing is, these points of critique seem to make sense 
only as long as we focus on the readymades and other objects 
as objects per se, ignoring their context, their discourse, their 
perverse histories, and everything that Duchamp worked so 
hard to put into place, a practice which is now much more 
common because of his work. As an example, let’s take a 
look at the most famous (and as such the most exhausted) 
readymade: the Fountain.
Few people saw the original Fountain in 1917. Like almost all 
the readymades, the original had gone missing, its dimensions 
never even recorded. Never exhibited, and lost or destroyed 
almost immediately, the Fountain was actually created through 
Duchamp’s media manipulations rather than through the 
creation-myth of his hand selecting it in the showroom, the 
status-conferring (and, for Greenberg, would-be shocking) 
gesture to which the readymades are often reduced. A week 
after the Society of Independent Artists refused to exhibit the 
work, Duchamp transported the urinal to Alfred Stieglitz’s 
291 Gallery, where Stieglitz photographed it under theatri-
cal lighting in front of an expressionist painting. This is the 
only remaining visual trace of the original Fountain. This 
photograph has been reproduced in countless publications, 
and also served as the model for the edition of Fountain 
produced in 1964 by Arturo Schwarz, in collaboration with 
Duchamp. A critical commentary on the work, which, apart 
from the photographic reproduction, is all that allows for its 
inscription into what we might call the archive, appeared a 
month later without attribution in the second and final is-
sue of The Blind Man, a journal published not coincidentally 
by Duchamp. So the object disappears, but its semi-fictional 
documentation and narrative produced a guarantee, a shortcut 
to history through photography and writing.
With the original lost, the questions of what is a copy, what 
is an editioned object, and wherein the authorisation of ex-
original
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ecuting a work lies, are raised for the first time and remain 
complex and ambiguous. For example, the Fountain’s entry in 
the catalogue raisonné, The Complete Works of Marcel Duchamp, 
lists and depicts next to the original three additional urinals 
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that embody later versions of the work.3 Next to the original is 
one Sidney Janis selected in 1950 in Paris at the request of the 
artist; then there is one from 1963, selected by Ulf Linde for 
Duchamp’s retrospective at the Moderna Museet, Stockholm; 
and, last, there is the 1964 edition of eight replicas produced 
under the artist’s supervision from the photo by Stieglitz.
In Fountain’s elegant model, the artwork does not occupy a 
single position in space and time; rather, it is a palimpsest of 
gestures, presentations, and positions, as Seth Price suggests 
in his essay Dispersion. He writes:
Duchamp distributed the notion of the Fountain in such a way that it 
became one of art’s primal scenes; it transubstantiated from a provocative 
objet d’art into, as Broodthaers defined his Musée des Aigles: “a situation, 
a system defined by objects, by inscriptions, by various activities…”4 
In short: it turned art into discourse. Duchamp made sure to 
photograph the original, to publicise it, to archive it, and then 
to totally twist the trail. Had anyone previously done such 
work with copies and editions within the realm of high art?
Once art defines itself as an activity primarily manifested 
in the larger domain of distribution, it encounters new and 
illuminating problems, as in the case of Duchamp’s editions 
of his readymades created with Arturo Schwarz. Things de-
clared to be readymades were, mere decades later, no longer 
industrially produced, or had become untraceable. The objects 
in question thus had to be reconstructed by hand and at great 
expense from sketches or photographs. The 1964 edition of 
Fountain was reproduced by a Milanese ceramicist with the 
aid of Stieglitz’s photograph of the original. After Duchamp 
had authorised the designs for the copies, the “genuine copies 
of the readymades” were now—nearly forty years after they 
had been selected from among ordinary objects—seemingly 
3 Marcel Duchamp, The Complete Works of Marcel Duchamp, rev. and exp. 
pbk. ed., vol. 1, ed. Arturo Schwartz (New York: Delano Greenidge Editions, 
2000), 648–50.
4 Seth Price, Dispersion (Self-published, 2002), http://www.distributedhistory.
com/Dispersion2008.pdf (accessed March 18, 2013).
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conventional sculptures, handcrafted to imitate mass-produced 
articles. As Martha Buskirk has noted: 
For the readymades, Duchamp had developed new ways of establish-
ing authorship that would operate in tandem with their testing of the 
boundaries of the work of art. If Duchamp’s initial gesture of choosing 
the readymade referred to mass production, the later forms of reproduc-
tion through which the readymades cycled secured their status as art.5
From 1930 to 1940, Duchamp spent his creative energy 
mainly on the reconstruction of miniature replicas of earlier 
works. Most of the pieces from that period took the form of 
multiples: La boîte-en-valise (an edition of 300, completed in 
1941) included miniature replicas of the readymades, repro-
ductions of the works in glass or celluloid, collotype prints of 
the paintings, drawings, and commercial prints (some black-
and-white, others hand-coloured), as well as photographs of 
the readymades, of the optical apparatus, and of Duchamp’s 
studio, all manipulated in various ways. In order to reproduce 
some of them, he had to visit his collectors and take notes. 
The notes in Duchamp’s 1934 Green Box, in an edition of 
300, were thought to be the only extant notes about The Large 
Glass. Duchamp, however, had more. In 1966, thirty-two years 
after publishing The Green Box, he produced The White Box or 
A l’infinitif in an edition of 150, which contained additional 
notes. These were translated and typographically transferred 
into English by Richard Hamilton and Ecke Bonk, a so-called 
typotranslation published as a book in 1967, also under the 
authorisation of Duchamp.
I want to stop and point out that all these examples do not 
invalidate Greenberg’s critiques. Obviously Greenberg would 
have seen all of this as a confirmation of his doubts about the 
direction in which Duchamp was taking art. But this is how 
Duchamp allowed the work to enter a larger conversation and 
to circulate through cultural realms way beyond the exhibi-
5 Martha Buskirk, “Thoroughly Modern Marcel” in The Duchamp Effect: Essays, 
Interviews, Round Table, ed. Martha Buskirk and Mignon Nixon (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1996), 200.
Bettina Funcke – Not Objects so Much As Images
281
tion hall or gallery. Greenberg underestimated the power of 
this; he may have been right about the eventual waning of 
the readymade as a model, but there were a lot more powerful 
tools in Duchamp’s toolbox: the way he made manuals for 
his own work, the status of the copy and the editioned object, 
the tweaked reproduction of one’s work, the way art can turn 
into discourse, his thoughts on the fourth dimension and 
other quasi-mathematical and quasi-scientific aspects, and 
so on. In comparison, if you look at a painting by Jackson 
Pollock, you can admire the work, you can take something 
away in terms of attitude, experience, or freedom, but there 
are not so many concrete strategies to take away and use in 
your own work.
It is not in fact so much about objects now, but about im-
ages and their particular kinds of materiality; and now that 
we are in the realm of the digital, the image can migrate and 
transform much more rapidly and with all sorts of new forms. 
This is today’s over-exploited legacy of Duchamp, not the 
readymades as shocking new sculptural form. It is Duchamp’s 
work of documentation, information, altered photographs, 
forgeries, identities, narrativising, and transferrals.
I want to switch gears now. Graham, the last sentence of 
your essay is “What outmoded provincial might emerge as 
the Cézanne of the coming era?”6 You are referring to Cé-
zanne going back to pick up perspectival space and trying 
to synthesise it with contemporary strategies, and you are 
pointing to this as a possibly interesting new approach, or a 
direction for artists today, who retrieve passed-over elements 
and basically run them through a contemporary filter. With 
regard to this, there is a case study I would like to share.
I want to go back to the 1970s and look at certain pieces by 
Robert Whitman. Whitman is not exactly overlooked, but 
certainly not as well-known as he should be. He is mainly 
known for his performances from the 1960s and ‘70s, and his 
Cinema Pieces from as early as 1963, in which installations of 
everyday objects, like a shower, sink, or window, became screens 
6 Harman, “Greenberg, Duchamp, and the Next Avant-Garde,” in this volume.
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onto which he projected films showing these objects in use. 
He also worked over many years with Bell Labs engineer Billy 
Klüver and the Experiments in Art and Technology group, 
which brought him into contact, crucially, with the Xerox 
machine. A Xerox machine is interesting as a transitional 
technology. Unlike a camera, it is not based on a chemical 
development process; it does not really refer to the world of 
photography. It is electronic, it is electrostatic, and it sweeps 
across whatever you place on its flatbed, and puts it together 
in one image. So we are just one step away from the scanner, 
which is what is interesting here.
The contemporary artist collaboration Guyton/Walker, 
consisting of Wade Guyton and Kelley Walker, uses a scan-
ner as one of their main tools, and a whole component of 
their work comes out of something Whitman did in 1974 
when he had a fellowship at Xerox. The photocopier was not 
a common artist’s tool at the time; you had to have this kind 
of access. What Whitman started doing was Xeroxing sliced 
fruit, and fish, and other food.
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To return to the present, Guyton and Walker both saw the 
2003 Whitman exhibition at Dia Art Foundation, where Guyton 
was working. In the exhibition, there is a 1976 poster announc-
ing an earlier Whitman show at Dia that includes a sliced 
lime and a sliced orange placed on the flatbed of the Xerox 
and turned into a flat graphic element. These Xeroxed fruit 
slices then became the cover for Dia’s book, Robert Whitman: 
Playback.7 And this turned directly into a series of works in 
which Guyton/Walker started putting sliced fruit, particularly 
limes, through their scanner. What is different now is that 
the scanner brings the fruit not simply to the page, but into 
digital space, where you can do all kinds of things to a file. You 
turn the lime orange, you blow it up, and you pervert it. It is 
open to manipulations and applications in various formats, 
and to printing on different kinds of objects and surfaces.
7 Robert Whitman: Playback, ed. Lynne Cooke, Bettina Funcke, Karen Kelly 
(New York: Dia Art Foundation, 2003).
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You can see here the naked file as information first of all, a 
Photoshop document. The image was then printed by inkjet 
in various compositions onto different surfaces and objects: a 
paint can, canvas, sheetrock, the ubiquitous building material, 
itself part of an installation, and most recently, as depicted, 
laminated onto a table.
These artists are not the new Cézannes, by the way! But I am 
interested in taking up your idea, Graham, of past elements 
gaining a new relevance when they are brought to contem-
porary strategies that create a strange synthesis.
I want to close with the image of this table because it brings 
to mind another question. I wonder how, in thinking about 
the strangeness of how the scanner takes in the world of 
objects, and how these images are output through printing 
technologies in so many adaptable ways in order to cover the 
world of objects, we might possibly approach an understand-
ing of your notion of “the third table” through the work of art.
This is a concept you wrote about in a notebook for dOCU-
MENTA (13)’s 100 Notes – 100 Thoughts publication series, which 
I edited.8 I don’t want to presume to discuss this notion in 
too much detail but I will summarise briefly: the first table 
is the one that scientists would call the “real” table, which is 
a collection of materials, described in terms of the laws of 
physics. The second table is the table that humanists would 
find more real, and this is a table as we know it in everyday 
life, a familiar object inscribed in social use and customs and 
so on. You however say that neither of these tables is the real 
table, that there is a third table, which lies between the two, 
and which may belong to the culture of the arts. It is a table 
that is to some degree unknowable, it is a philosophical/
artistic table, and I will leave it at that.
In closing, I am hoping that in future discussions we can go 
a bit further into how an object-oriented philosophy might 
somehow change how we think about art, what art is, where 
its place is, and where it may be going.
8 Graham Harman, The Third Table, dOCUMENTA (13) 100 Notes – 100 
Thoughts Series (Ostfildern: Hatje Cantz, 2013).
Ben Vautier, If life is art why hang this up?, 1990.
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Strategic Invisibility
The Zero Pont of Modernism 
and the Avant-Garde
Thomas Gokey
“Anti-art is life, nature; true reality is the one and all.”
—George Maciunas, Fluxus Codex1
Introduction: Art and Life
Let us begin with a heist. On Sunday August 20th, 1911 Vin-cenzo Peruggia hid overnight 
in the Louvre. He was an Italian nationalist who mistakenly 
believed that the Mona Lisa had been stolen from his native 
Italy, and he aimed to steal it back. At least that was the story 
he would tell the press later on after he was captured and he 
became a national hero. In the meantime, what was the harm 
in making a little bit of money selling forgeries of the missing 
painting? On Monday morning, when the Louvre was closed 
to the public, he emerged from his hiding place wearing his 
official white smock, which is issued to the museum staff. In 
broad daylight he walked up to the Mona Lisa and removed 
it from the wall. It was as simple as that. In a stairwell of the 
Louvre he removed the wooden panel from the frame, tucked 
it under his smock, and left the building. Because it was com-
mon for the museum staff to remove artworks for various 
reasons it took a full day before anyone even noticed it was 
actually missing. At first he hid the painting behind a pile 
of firewood at his apartment. That is where it was when the 
1 Jon Hendricks, Fluxus Codex (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1988), 23.
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police came to interview him as they did all of the museum 
staff. Standing in the same room as the hot booty (L.H.O.O.Q.) 
they were none the wiser. Later he would hide it for two years 
in a customised secret compartment in the bottom of a trunk. 
Peruggia seemed to have gotten away with it, and he really 
might have if he had not tried to sell the infamous painting.
What is the Mona Lisa? On the one hand it is an image, a 
fictional three-dimensional depth representing an otherwise 
forgotten Italian woman of the merchant class from the 
fifteenth century. But of course it is much more than that. It 
is one of the most widely reproduced images in history. In 
countless art history surveys it is reproduced through various 
printing techniques, most commonly using Ben-Day dots, 
tiny points of pure CMKY colour which our brains combine 
into the shapes and forms of the familiar image. The Mona 
Lisa is reproduced on t-shirts, posters, postcards, rendered in 
pixels and just about every other medium conceivable, even 
paint balls.2 Indeed it has become an icon in its own right, 
the image of all other images, the very symbol of painting 
itself. Clearly it is a painting or an artwork if anything is. If we 
think of it slightly differently, however, we might describe the 
Mona Lisa as a thin skin of pigment suspended in linseed oil 
on a 13 millimetre thick piece of poplar measuring 77 cm by 
54 cm. The paint, like all of Da Vinci’s paints, was something 
of a scientific experiment in its own right. It was made of 
ground glass, precious stones, plants and wax, all of which 
were cooked to different temperatures. Over the years the 
pigment has undergone chemical changes as it continues 
to interact with the light and air. The colours have darkened 
slightly, and the paint itself is cracking. Due to humidity the 
poplar has also developed a healthy crack. In the eighteenth 
century a skilled craftsman fitted two walnut butterfly braces 
into the back of the panel to keep the crack from growing 
further. The poplar itself has warped and continues to change 
shape with changes in temperature and moisture.
2 To watch the Mythbusters Jamie Hyneman and Adam Savage create the Mona 
Lisa using 1,100 paintball guns see www.youtube.com/watch?v=fKK933KK6Gg 
(accessed September 30, 2013).
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But how do these two senses of the Mona Lisa, the Mona Lisa 
as an image and the Mona Lisa as a thing, relate to one another? 
And in which does the ontological status of the work of art 
lie, in the immaterial image or in the material support, or 
in the composite of both? Whether images are perfectly flat 
spectres, or whether images are real things among other real 
things, has been one of the questions that have continually 
driven the history of art forward almost since its inception.3 
In twentieth century art we can see this dynamic shift between 
the emphasis of pure spectral flatness in high modernism 
and the re-emergence of the image-as-object with minimal-
ism and post-minimalism. In many ways, the questions raised 
by speculative realism are more apropos for that era. We can 
imagine a counterfactual history in which a turn towards weird 
realism from within continental philosophy takes place in the 
late 1960s and a young Donald Judd latches on to a kind of 
object-oriented ontology to do battle with Michael Fried. For 
Fried, the modernist artwork needed to separate itself from 
its own material support, from the element within itself that 
was not art but merely life which Fried termed its “object-
hood.” In his famous criticism of minimalism, Fried writes 
that a modernist work of art is “in some essential respect 
not an object.”4 In a way it is a pity that speculative realism 
did not develop within the context of minimalism. We can 
imagine a healthy exchange between the arts and theory in 
which speculative realism helps the minimalists articulate 
the materiality of the image.5
3 The very origin of painting is focused on this question and identifies im-
ages with the shades of the dead. See the legend of the Corinthian maid and 
the origin of painting in Pliny the Elder, Natural History Books XXXIII-XXXV, 
trans. H. Rackman (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), 373. For the 
influence of this legend on classical painting, see Robert Rosenblum, “The 
Origin of Painting: A Problem in the Iconography of Romantic Classicism,” 
The Art Bulletin (1957), 39:4, 279-90.
4 Michael Fried, Art and Objecthood (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1998), 152.
5 Robert Jackson has written a brilliant interpretation of Fried through the 
lens of OOO in which he focuses on the role of the beholder for Fried and 
the distinction between theatricality and absorption. See Robert Jackson, 
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Instead, the situational dynamic in which speculative 
realism has emerged is a different one, and the problem 
that artists are using speculative realism to articulate now 
concerns a re-thinking of relational aesthetics. The art of the 
1990s was almost totally dominated by relational work that 
focused either on the way the viewer completes or creates 
the artwork by coming into relation to it, or artwork which 
sought to produce new social relationships and used these 
relationships as its medium.6 While there is much that is 
valuable and fascinating about relational aesthetics, indeed 
my own artwork is often relational, we are starting to see 
the pendulum swing back towards artistic practices that are 
curious about the remainder that escapes these relationships, 
usually thought in terms of the material or real in excess of 
all relation. The question many of today’s artists seem to be 
asking is about the status of the Mona Lisa when it was placed 
behind the pile of firewood. When no one knew it was there, 
when Peruggia was absentmindedly cooking his food, enjoy-
ing a walk, or sleeping, was the Mona Lisa still an image or 
a painting or an artwork in any sense? Or was it a colourful 
piece of wood, only slightly different from the firewood it was 
temporarily hidden behind and maybe potential kindling 
that could have been added to a fire?
Both of these questions, the relationship between the 
image and thing and the artwork’s relationship to human 
consciousness, share a common underlying question about 
the boundary between art and life. It would seem that aesthet-
ics, like politics and ethics, would provide the most difficult 
terrain for the various speculative realisms because such 
“The Anxiousness of Objects and Artworks: Michael Fried, Object Oriented 
Ontology and Aesthetic Absorption,” Speculations (2011), 2, 135-68, and his 
sequel presented in this issue. The present essay is in part a response. I do 
not disagree with anything in Jackson’s reading; instead this is an attempt 
to use OOO to offer a reading of the other path in the dispute between Fried 
and the minimalists.
6 Nicolas Bourriaud remains the definitive critic of relational aesthetics. See 
Nicolas Bourriaud, Relational Aesthetics, trans. Simon Pleasance and Fronza 
Woods (Dijon: Les presses du réel), 2002.
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areas necessarily involve human consciousness and values. If 
“there is no difference that does not make a difference,”7 then 
one of the differences that human beings make is the differ-
ence between art and life. I hope to show that the boundary 
between art and life is inviolable because it is produced and 
maintained by human consciousness itself. In this regard, I 
am defending a qualified relational aesthetics. But even if 
we accept that humans produce the distinction between art 
and life, to what degree can material things use this capac-
ity that humans have to their own ends? If humans produce 
values everywhere we go, to what degree can brute facts utilise 
humans to marshal values of their own? I see a potential in 
what I am calling strategic invisibility for artworks to operate 
in a semi-autonomous manner but only when they operate 
on the other side of what I will call a zero point, an internal 
impasse built into the very logic of the modernist and avant-
garde projects.
Modernism
The history of modernism can be thought of as a narrowing 
path which whittles itself away until it comes to an impasse. 
Modern painting arguably begins with the invention of the 
photograph. When Paul Delaroche saw a daguerreotype for 
the first time, he is rumoured to have announced: “From 
today, painting is dead.”8 Photography forced a kind of John 
Henry crisis for painting. How could painting justify its 
continued existence when representation could be achieved 
“better” through new technological methods? This forced 
painting to retreat into itself, to discover what it could do 
that no other media could, “to entrench it more firmly in 
7 This is Levi Bryant’s ontic principle. Levi Bryant, “The Ontic Principle: 
Outline of an Object-Oriented Ontology” in The Speculative Turn: Continental 
Realism and Materialism, ed. Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek, and Graham Harman 
(Melbourne: Re.press, 2011), 263.
8 Quoted in Geoffrey Batchen, “Ghost Stories: The Beginnings and Ends of 
Photography,” Art Monthly Australia (1994), 76, 4-8.
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its area of competence,”9 to find a safe house where neither 
photography nor any of the other media could break-in and 
steal its turf. The history of modernist painting is a history of 
several different routes through abstraction until they wind 
up in more or less the same place: complete flatness and pure 
colour. If the logic of modernism is to “purify” each medium, 
even if we have to use scare quotes around the word “pure” as 
Greenberg always did, then there is an approximate level of 
“purity” beyond which it is seemingly impossible to advance 
further. Modernism sharpens itself to a point.
The invention of the monochrome is a particularly illus-
trative crisis point. In 1921 Alexander Rodchenko produced 
three monochromes, one of each primary colour. Rodchenko 
claimed: “I reduced painting to its logical conclusion and 
exhibited three canvases: red, blue, and yellow. I affirmed: 
this is the end of painting.”10 In a way he was right, this was 
the internal impasse of modernism. Ad Reinhardt became 
the definitive painter of this endpoint, painting one black 
monochrome after another from 1953-1967. He called them 
his “ultimate paintings” and claimed he was “merely making 
the last painting which anyone can make.”11 In 1992, Clement 
Greenberg said that nothing happened in the past thirty years.12
Although a number of modern painters reached similar 
dead ends each in their own way, Kasimir Malevich’s Black 
Square stands apart because it was conceived not just as an 
aporia of painting but as a portal to a new and stranger world. 
9 Clement Greenberg, “Modernist Painting,” The Collected Essays and Criti-
cism: Modernism with a Vengeance, 1957-1969, vol. 4, ed. John O’Brian (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1993), 85.
10 Alexander Rodchenko, “Working with Majakowsky” in From Painting to 
Design: Russian Constructivist Art of the Twenties (Cologne: Galerie Cmurzyn-
ska, 1981), 191.
11 Ad Reinhardt, Art as Art: The Selected Writings of Ad Reinhardt, ed. Barbara 
Rose (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 13.
12 “In the summer of 1992, Greenberg spoke for a small group in New York. 
He claimed that perhaps never in history had art ‘moved so slowly.’ Nothing, 
he insisted, had happened in the past thirty years.” Arthur C. Danto, After 
the End of Art: Contemporary Art and the Pale of History (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1997), 105.
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Rather than the dead end of a pure flat surface it was more like 
Alice’s looking glass. When he first exhibited the Black Square 
at the 0.10 Last Futurist Exhibition in 1915, it caused a scandal. 
Indeed it was a scandalon in the technical sense of the word, a 
stumbling block that simultaneously bars the way forward while 
providing the foundation for a new quest, both the capstone 
for an old paradigm and a cornerstone for a new one. Critics 
read the Black Square as the death of painting and the death 
of God. For Malevich, it was teeming with new possibilities. It 
was as much a rebirth as it was a death, as much an Alpha as an 
Omega. In this regard, Malevich’s black monochrome, while 
a near visual twin, was the anti-Reinhardt. Malevich’s closest 
pupil, El Lissitzky, describes the Black Square the following way: 
When we have a series of numbers coming from infinity …6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 
1, 0… it comes right down to the 0, then, begins the ascending line 0, 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6... ... We are saying that if on the one side the stone of the 
Ad Reinhardt with several paintings.
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square has blocked the narrowing canal of painting, then on the other 
side it becomes the foundation-stone for the new spatial construction 
of reality.13
It is helpful here to contrast an artist like Piet Mondrian 
to someone like Reinhardt. Mondrian, for example, shows a 
continued development towards abstraction until he reaches 
a kind of dead end in his mature de stijl paintings. Like Rein-
hardt he seems to stall out at this point for a number of years 
until we get to Broadway Boogie Woogie. De stijl is a kind of zero 
point for Mondrian and on the other side representation is 
re-introduced in bizarre ways. The flat grid of the painting’s 
surface becomes the city, painting becomes jazz.
The exhibition As Painting curated by Stephen Melville, 
Philip Armstrong and Laura Lisbon at the Wexner Center 
in 2001 is such a fascinating exhibition precisely because it 
seeks to follow this logic of painting underground, through 
the zero point of modernism, and map the places that it tun-
nels. The thesis of As Painting is that painting thinks itself, it 
forms a kind of generative program where one object that 
13 El Lissitzky, “New Russian Art: A Lecture (1922)” in El Lissitzky: Life, Let-
ters, Texts, ed. Sophie Lissitzky-Küppers, trans. Helene Aldwinckle and Mary 
Whittal (Greenwich: New York Graphic Society, 1968), 333-34.
Drawing by El Lissitzky explaining Malevich’s Black Square as the zero point of modern 
painting, 1922
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counts as a painting in turn creates new conditions under 
which other objects can come to be seen as paintings and so 
forth. The exhibition itself is populated with 110 things, the 
vast majority of which would not ordinarily be recognised 
as paintings. It included artworks such as Robert Smithson’s 
Slantpiece, a mirror slanted against a wall in a pile of rock salt, 
Daniel Dezueze’s Cube built out of layered wooden lattices, 
conceptual drawings by Mel Bochner and installations by 
Imi Knoebel consisting of stacked plywood with lacquered 
surfaces that look like the storage room for building supplies. 
The conceit of the exhibition is that all of these are meant 
to be seen as paintings rather than, simply, as objects. We can 
Piet Mondrian, Broadway Boogie Woogie, 1943, oil on canvass
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only identify these objects as paintings historically, that is to 
say that these objects participate in the historical outwork-
ing of the logic of painting as a medium. What counts as a 
painting is historically contingent. High modernist painting 
created new historical conditions under which something 
like minimalism could become (one of) the step(s) beyond 
modernism. In As Painting we see modernism turn itself 
inside out, pulled through the buttonhole of the zero point, 
painting becomes sculpture, image becomes thing, surface 
becomes mass.
In his marvellous catalogue essay “Counting/As/Painting” 
Stephen Melville draws a straight line between an important 
footnote in Fried’s “Art and Objecthood” and Heidegger’s as-
structure.14 If as-structure is the idea that all consciousness 
is consciousness of something “as” something, what then is 
the as-structure of painting? Fried here is commenting on a 
passage from Greenberg that reads, “the observation of merely 
these two norms [flatness and the delimitation of flatness] 
is enough to create an object which can be experienced as a 
picture: thus a stretched or tacked-up canvas already exists as a 
picture—though not necessarily as a successful one.”15 Now Fried: 
Moreover, seeing something as a painting in the sense that one sees the 
tacked-up canvas as a painting, and being convinced that a particular 
work can stand comparison with the painting of the past whose qual-
ity is not in doubt, are altogether different experiences: it is, I want to 
say, as though unless something compels conviction as to its quality it 
is no more than trivially or nominally a painting ... This is not to say that 
painting has no essence; it is to claim that the essence—i.e. that which 
compels conviction—is largely determined by, and therefore changes 
continually in response to, the vital work of the recent past.16
14 Stephen Melville, “Counting/As/Painting” in As Painting: Division and 
Displacement, ed. Philip Armstrong, Laura Lisbon, and Stephen Melville 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), 1-26.
15 Clement Greenberg, “After Abstract Expressionism,” Art International 
(1962), 6:8, 30, original emphasis.
16 Fried, Art and Objecthood, 169 n.6, my emphasis.
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The history of painting has an agency of its own. What counts 
as a painting is not nominated as such by an artist or critic 
so much as it is by other pre-established paintings. Paintings 
are actants in their own right that use human consciousness 
parasitically to think according to their own logic. One paint-
ing can step up and “vouch for” another object’s status as a 
painting, thereby altering the very as-structure of what can 
count as a painting allowing new objects to be caught and 
identified as paintings and so forth. Note that Fried nearly 
endorses Duchamp’s position, that a tacked up canvas—a 
readymade canvas if you will—can only be seen as painting in 
a nominal sense. This is exactly what Duchamp discovered and 
called “pictorial nominalism” and which Thierry de Duve has 
fleshed out into a fully formed theory of art.17 What happens 
when painting passes through the zero point of modernism 
is that paintings can pick out and nominate other objects as 
painting in a semi-autonomous way. I say semi-autonomous 
because I take it for granted that paintings can only exist as 
paintings for human consciousness. If you removed all human 
consciousness and everything like human consciousness, the 
Mona Lisa would still exist, but only as an object or thing, or 
as non-art as indeed everything would be non-art, but not as 
a painting or an artwork.
Fried’s objection to minimalism was that it did not suspend 
its relationship to its own objecthood. For all artworks, not 
just the modernist ones Fried championed, the line between 
art and non-art runs through the artwork itself. This is per-
haps the clearest way to understand the difference between 
what Fried calls absorption (which Fried supported) and 
theatricality (which he opposed). Absorptive art suspends 
its relationship to its own material support, the part of it-
17 One of the notes for The Large Glass from 1914 reads: “A kind of pictorial 
Nominalism.” Marcel Duchamp, The Writings of Marcel Duchamp, ed. Michel 
Sanouillet and Elmer Peterson (Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 1989), 78. See 
Thierry de Duve, Pictorial Nominalism: On Marcel Duchamp’s Passage from 
Painting to the Readymade, trans. Dana Polan (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1991), and Thierry de Duve, Kant after Duchamp (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1996). If Melville is the best reader of Fried, then de Duve is by 
far the best reader of Duchamp.
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self that is non-art, whereas theatrical art like minimalism 
identifies with the aspect of itself that is non-art. Duchamp 
said the same thing from the other way around, noting that 
any artist who purchases a tube of paint at the art store is 
purchasing a readymade thing and that all paintings are just 
assisted readymades. It is to readymades that we now turn for 
they pose another zero point, this time at the very heart of 
the as-structure itself.
The Avant-garde
In 1913, in one of the many notes for The Large Glass, Duchamp 
wrote the following on the back of a card:
Speculations
Can one make works which are not works of “art?”18
I take this to be the fundamental formula which animates 
the logic of avant-garde. Just like the course of modernism, 
the course of the avant-garde will reach an internal impasse 
at roughly the same time in history. In this case it will dead 
end in the readymade, forcing Duchamp to adopt new tactics 
like quitting art for chess or trying to limit the number of 
readymades he “made,” all the way up to adopting a strategic 
invisibility.
Avant-garde art as I am using the term is not just innova-
tive art. We can see the history of art develop and innovate 
all throughout history, such as the innovations of Cimabue’s 
depiction of the human form or the discovery and applica-
tion of perspective. Rather, in order for a work of art to be 
avant-garde it must renegotiate the border between art and 
life. “Life” as it is used here is simply the conventional term 
artists have settled on to signify the set of all things that are 
not art. An avant-garde work of art takes place on the “life” side 
of the boundary between art and life, thereby redrawing that 
boundary. I take Courbet to be the first avant-garde artist and 
18 Duchamp, The Writings of Marcel Duchamp, 74. The bold text is in the original. 
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The Stone Breakers to be the first avant-garde painting. For a 
long time, violating the boundary between art and life simply 
meant violating social conventions about what counted as 
art, painting labourers rather than aristocrats, painting them 
in the course of their labour rather than posing for the audi-
ence, painting torn clothing rather than tidying up reality, etc.
One way of thinking about what Duchamp was trying to 
do with readymades is that he was trying to make a work of 
art that was not present-at-hand in Heidegger’s sense, that is 
to say Duchamp was trying to make a work of art that would 
not present itself to human consciousness as a work of art to 
be contemplated or appreciated by aesthetic judgement. The 
first readymades that he ever exhibited were not exhibited 
as art or as readymades, instead they were exhibited secretly 
even while being in plain view. We do not know where they 
are any more. Maybe they are floating around anonymously 
somewhere or more likely they are in pieces, some in land-
fills. Art historians are not even sure which objects they were. 
The consensus seems to be that one of the first readymades 
Gustave Courbet, The Stone Breakers, oil on canvas, 1849-50,
Speculations V
300
was probably his hat rack, placed in the front of the gallery 
Bourgeois near the door in 1917. People entering the gallery 
would place their hats on the hat rack without thinking 
about it, never considering it a work of art at all, completely 
oblivious to the idea that they had just encountered a work 
“by” Duchamp. They used it absentmindedly as a hat rack.
The avant-garde, in order to function as a redrawing of 
the frontier between art and life, requires this very frontier. 
This frontier might shift, indeed any work of avant-garde 
art will shift it, and the history of the avant-garde (which we 
should remember is a military term) is the history of a kind 
of colonial encroachment of art into the territory of life. 
The readymade announces a kind of globalism where this 
frontier disappears, art gains a totalitarian dominance and 
life has nowhere left to hide. Like self-replicating carbon-
based nano-bots, art threatened to swallow up all of life.19 
One tactic that Duchamp adopted in an attempt to maintain 
this boundary was to simply create an artificial limit to the 
number of readymades he would “make” in a given year. “I 
realized very soon the danger of repeating indiscriminately 
this form of expression and decided to limit the production 
of ‘readymades’ to a small number yearly. I was aware at that 
time, that for the spectator even more than for the artist, art is 
a habit forming drug and I wanted to protect my ‘readymades’ 
against such contamination.”20 Duchamp tried to quarantine 
his readymade against the pandemic spread of art. Should we 
read the readymade as an object that marks the boundary be-
tween art and life, a kind of herma marking a territory beyond 
which art should not tread, or as an object that is neither art 
nor life but a zone of indistinction between the two? I would 
suggest not, for two reasons. First, the anxiousness of the 
work of art comes from being internally split by life and art. 
The boundary line runs through the work of art itself. This 
19 See Ransom Riggs, “How to Destroy Civilization with Nanotechnology,” 
mental_floss http://mentalfloss.com/article/21077/be-amazing-movie (ac-
cessed August 31, 2013).
20 Duchamp, The Writings of Marcel Duchamp, 142.
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is Duchamp’s example of the tube of paint as a readymade.21 
A painting by Van Gogh is an assisted readymade. Van Gogh 
purchased readymade tubes of paint and simply rearranged 
these colours. Even when artists mixed their own paint we 
just push the point at which they are assisting readymades 
back one step further. Second, when we come to regard a 
readymade as a work of art, human consciousness again 
splits the readymade in two and establishes the boundary line 
between art and life within the readymade itself, converting 
it into a work of art. The problem is that as soon as you see 
the readymade as a readymade it ceases to be a readymade in 
some true sense. If every object of life can come to be seen 
as readymade and any readymade seen as such becomes art, 
what becomes of the avant-garde?
Duchamp tried to quarantine life against the pandemic 
spread of art. But he could have no such luck against the culture 
industry which quickly sweeps in behind the advances of the 
avant-garde co-opting and assimilating it as art history. The 
culture industry has left us no place to hide. No place that is, 
unless we adopt an absolute strategic invisibility. Suzi Gablik 
begins her 1984 book Has Modernism Failed? the following way:
The art dealer and critic John Bernard Myers once asked Marcel Du-
champ how many people he thought really liked avant-garde art, and 
Duchamp replied, “Oh, maybe ten in New York and one or two in New 
Jersey.” That was back in 1945.22
She then goes on to detail the massive expansion of the 
multi-billion dollar market for avant-garde art that was able 
to instantly commodify and completely neutralise any ex-
ternal avant-garde advances or resistance. The situation is no 
doubt even worse today where art fairs dominate the cultural 
field. In the holy war between modernism and kitsch, kitsch 
emerged victorious. In the battle between the culture industry 
21 See “The Readymade and the Tube of Paint” in de Duve, Kant After Duch-
amp, 147-98.
22 Suzi Gablik, Has Modernism Failed? (New York: Thames and Hudson, 1984), 12.
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and the avant-garde, the culture industry won in a rout. The 
state of cultural production today can only be expressed by 
a Leonard Cohen lamentation: “everybody knows the war 
is over / everybody knows the good guys lost.”23 But is there 
any way to continue to fight the good fight? Is there any way 
to remain faithful to the revolutionary ideals of the avant-
garde? The only way to resist instantaneous assimilation to 
the culture industry is to become strategically invisible to 
it. This is how I read Duchamp’s claim that he had given up 
art for chess, as a strategic manoeuvre to shake a tail (or as 
Picabia might put it, the task of the avant-garde artist is to 
avoid having one’s artwork caught by the tail). The landscape 
had already changed by 1965 when Duchamp claimed that, 
despite the fact that there were vastly more people who really 
liked avant-garde art, there was no longer any avant-garde left. 
Duchamp asserted at the time, “There is no avant-garde art today. And 
if there were, it would be so totally underground art that no one would 
see.” As a quintessential “exercise in strategic invisibility,” Duchamp 
then used a torch in the [University of Minnesota] grad sculpture 
studio to sign his name in soot on a piece of metal, and inscribed his 
signature in pieces of wet clay that were subsequently fired.24
Fried had said that a tacked up canvas might be seen as a 
painting, but not necessarily as a successful one. It fails at 
painting by being merely a readymade canvas. One way to 
understand what is meant by strategic invisibility is to ask 
what it would mean to be a successful readymade. A successful 
readymade can never be seen as such; or put otherwise, a true 
avant-garde work of art could never appear as an avant-garde 
work of art. Like a meteor that burns itself up as it enters 
Earth’s atmosphere never actually reaches Earth, a readymade 
23 Leonard Cohen and Sharon Robinson, “Everybody Knows,” I’m Your Man 
(Columbia Records), 1988.
24 Micaela Amateau Amato, “Duchamp as Stealth Artist,” Art in America 
(2000), 88:7, 19.
Thomas Gokey – Strategic Invisibility
303
burns itself up as it crosses the boundary between life and 
art. Sheldon Nodelman describes strategic invisibility as the 
ability to evade being recognised as a work of art:
But in a larger sense, Duchamp’s entire artistic activity since the “defini-
tive incompletion” of the Large Glass in 1923 was an exercise in strategic 
invisibility, giving rise to objects and events which—because they were 
apparently too impermanent or unimportant or insubstantial, or because 
they eluded established genre conventions, or because they confused 
or diluted authorial identity—evaded recognition as “works of art.”25
Piggybacking on Melville, we might ask: what counts as a 
work by Duchamp? Nodelman notes the fun fact that while 
the 1969 edition of The Complete Works of Marcel Duchamp 
contained 421 known works, the most recent edition contains 
663 known works. A whole army of art historians are going 
back and adding all of these apparently insubstantial items. 
In this way we can say that anything that is recognised as 
one of Duchamp’s readymades in some real sense fails to be 
one of Duchamp’s readymades. Likewise we can say that any 
successful readymades are ones that avoid detection as art 
and remain merely objects of life. What makes them differ-
ent from mere objects of life is that they participate in the 
outworking of the logic of art history, albeit a history that is 
inaccessible to human consciousness.
It becomes possible to imagine that the boundary between 
art and life no longer holds or might be obliterated altogether. 
This seems to be the position that Allan Kaprow held. At times 
he described his happenings in terms of strategic invisibility. 
“Once, the task of the artist was to make good art; now it is to 
avoid making art of any kind.”26 Or again, “Leaving art is the 
art ... I define it as that act or thought whose identity as art 
25 Sheldon Nodelman, “The Once and Future Duchamp,” Art in America 
(2000), 88:1, 37.
26 Allan Kaprow, Essays on the Blurring of Art and Life, ed. Jeff Kelley (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2003), 81.
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must forever remain unknown. That is, to answer the initial 
question What is Art?, art could (but might not) be simply 
doing art, whatever that is, as long as it can’t be identified.”27 
But it soon becomes clear that his real goal is not to make “art” 
on the side of “life” that nobody ever notices, but instead to 
make us really and truly notice our lives while we live them.
At the end of Thornton Wilder’s Our Town, when Emily has 
died and only now that her life is gone can she truly notice 
how magical it had always been, she cries “Oh, earth, you’re 
too wonderful for anybody to realize you.” She turns to the 
Stage Manager and asks “Do any human beings ever real-
ize life while they live it?—every, every minute?” The Stage 
Manager replies, “No. The saints and poets, maybe they do 
some.”28 Allan Kaprow was such a saint, someone who tried 
to cultivate a habit of hypervigilance, of truly seeing what 
he was looking at, of really noticing life every, every minute. 
Kaprow’s hypervigilance seeks to turn everything in the world, 
at every given moment, into a broken tool. It is as if he turned 
to Heidegger’s carpenter and said “look, look at what you are 
doing. Feel—no really truly feel—the weight of the hammer 
as you swing. Listen to the sound of the wood rattle as the 
hammer strikes the nail. Take joy in its momentum. Feel 
the vibrations in your elbow as it lands. Notice the way the 
light changes as you swing. Take pleasure in the hammering 
while it happens for even this simple happening can disclose 
the whole world.” If Fried says that we are literalists most 
of our lives, Kaprow would say we are not nearly literalist 
enough. Creating his own Latour litany, Kaprow declares,29 
Objects of every sort are materials for the new art: paint, chairs, food, 
electric and neon lights, smoke, water, old socks, a dog, movies, a thou-
27 Kaprow, Essays, xxix, original emphasis.
28 Thornton Wilder, “Our Town,” Three Plays by Thornton Wilder (New York: 
Bantam Books, 1957), 62.
29 Latour litany is a term coined by Ian Bogost to describe a long list of as-
sorted objects that Bruno Latour frequently uses in his books to shock us 
into noticing the awful abundance and variety of reality.
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sand other things that will be discovered by the present generation 
of artists. Not only will these bold creators show us, as if for the first 
time, the world we have always had about us but ignored, but they will 
disclose entirely unheard-of happenings and events, found in garbage 
cans, police files, hotel lobbies; seen in store windows and on the streets; 
and sensed in dreams and horrible accidents. An odor of crushed 
strawberries, a letter from a friend, or a billboard selling Drano; three 
taps on the front door, a scratch, a sigh, or a voice lecturing endlessly, 
a blinding staccato flash, a bowler hat—all will become materials for 
this new concrete art.30
John Cage also does the same thing. At first it might seem that 
his furniture music (a beloved term he borrowed from Erik 
Satie) is music that is meant to be strategically invisible, but 
it soon becomes clear that his real goal is to make us notice 
all of the other furniture in the world. For Cage the proper 
response after encountering his compositions is to immedi-
ately abandon them to become constantly aware of the world 
around you, to become hypervigilantly aware of it. What we 
see here is that Kaprow and Cage’s inheritance of Duchamp’s 
legacy does not seek to make strategically invisible artworks 
on the “life” side of the art/life divide, but to make the life 
side of this division glaringly visible to us. It would seem that 
both Kaprow and Cage really truly believed that they could 
blur the boundary entirely and abandon it completely. Yet 
upon further investigation by the next generation of Fluxus 
artists, it becomes evident that the boundary is maintained 
by human consciousness itself. Artists like Ben Vautier spent 
years honestly pursuing the goal of obliterating the distinc-
tion between art and life but ended up concluding that the 
boundary is inviolable.
We are trying to do non-art but non-art cannot exist because it is art. 
And we are trying to do life-art but life-art cannot exist because it is 
either art or life. If it is life it’s life and nobody knows about it. It’s my 
mother-in-law opening the tap and she doesn’t care. And if she finds 
30 Kaprow, Essays, xx.
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out it’s Drip Music by George Brecht then she starts thinking that it’s 
art. So you can’t get one into the other. It’s one and another and that’s 
important.31
The limit point that the avant-garde runs into is built into 
the as-structure itself. The point is that after the avant-garde 
was forced underground, it is no longer possible for human 
consciousness to see that dividing line between art and life, 
even as the line’s very existence is produced by human con-
sciousness. At this very moment, in the very space you are 
reading this text, you could be entertaining readymades the 
way one might, without knowing it, be entertaining angels. 
A pair of trousers hanging over a chair, the window in the 
library, the very floorboards, a passenger sitting next to you 
on the subway who is stiff from sitting still so long and begins 
to fidget, any of these could be, without anyone realising it, 
the greatest work of avant-garde art the world has ever known. 
Except that the world can never know it for if the world knew 
it, it would destroy it. When the police interviewed Vincenzo 
Peruggia in his apartment while the Mona Lisa was buried 
under a pile of firewood, one of those pieces of firewood might 
have been the true work of avant-garde art. George Maciunas’s 
favourite piece was said to be George Brecht’s Exit because it 
was something that everyone did every day without realising 
it and as such became a strategically invisible work of art.
The Avant-Garde and Justice
At first glance, axiology would seem the toughest terrain 
for the various speculative realisms to deal with. There are 
parallels between the strategically invisible aesthetics of the 
avant-garde and the strategically invisible ethics of someone 
like Emmanuel Levinas. For Levinas, justice cannot show 
31 Ben Vautier, quoted in The Misfits: Thirty Years of Fluxus, directed by Lars 
Movin (Copenhagen: The National Film Board of Denmark, 1993), video. 
The relevant clip from this interview can be viewed at www.youtube.com/
watch?v=wifEeopqg3o&feature=share&list=UUKJRuwRVn0agrL6OL_5ioWw 
(accessed August 31, 2013).
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itself as such without becoming self-righteousness for the 
same exact structural reason that Vautier outlined between 
art and life. True justice for Levinas is not the justice of the 
ego. The justice of the ego is merely self-righteousness. The 
problem is that to even recognise something as justice is 
to instantaneously convert it into a self-justification. One 
can never know if one is doing justice and one can never 
even write a history of justice without turning it into a his-
tory of injustice for the same reason that Jacques Derrida 
demonstrated that one can never write a history of madness 
without turning it into a history of reason.32 Levinas writes, 
“The just person who knows himself to be just is no longer 
just. The first condition of the first as of the last of the just is 
that their justice remains clandestine to them.”33 As soon as 
I say “I am just” or even “this deed is just” it ceases to be just 
and instead becomes mere self-righteousness. This is not to 
say that justice does not happen or operate in the universe, 
only that we cannot perceive it as such.
The avant-garde has always been linked to a utopian justice. 
Like the avant-garde, justice operates in a strategically invis-
ible way, for the two are really synonymous. Justice exists 
and operates, but it does so clandestinely and can only do 
so clandestinely. You can see the same dynamic play out in 
the history of Christian theology. What does it mean to be 
justified by the radical outside? Here the primary concern 
was a way of trying to avoid Pelagianism, one that I believe 
ultimately is impossible to avoid. We can only be more or less 
Pelagians, just like, as Derrida said, we can only ever be more 
or less generous narcissists.34 Every theory of justice, every 
32 See Jacques Derrida, “Cogito and the History of Madness” in Writing and 
Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 31-63.
33 Emmanuel Levinas, “Transcendence and Height” in Basic Philosophical 
Writings, ed. Adriaan Theodoor Peperzak, Simon Critchley, and Robert Ber-
nasconi (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 17.
34 “There is not narcissism and non-narcissism. There are narcissisms that 
are more or less comprehensive, generous, open, extended. What is called 
non-narcissism is in general but the economy of a much more welcoming 
and hospitable narcissism.” Points…: Interviews, 1974-1994, ed. Elizabeth Weber, 
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doctrine of justification, ultimately collapses into a version 
of Pelagianism for the same reason that every war is always 
a just war in the eyes of the aggressors. We can actually watch 
the moment in Luther’s commentary on the book of Romans 
where he slips up and his radical vision of justification from 
the wholly other through a general economy of grace falls 
back into a restricted economy of works.
God does not want us to redeem us through our own, but through ex-
ternal, righteousness and wisdom; not through one that comes from 
us and grows in us, but through one that comes to us from the outside; 
not through one that originates here on earth, but through one that 
comes from heaven. Therefore, we must be taught a righteousness that 
comes completely from the outside and is foreign. And therefore our 
own righteousness that is born in us must first be plucked up … Even 
though a person with all his natural and spiritual gifts may be wise 
before men and righteous and good, God will not on that account look 
upon him as such, especially if he regards himself so ... Therefore we 
must in all these things keep ourselves so humble as if we still had 
nothing of our own. We must wait for the naked mercy of God, who 
will reckon us righteous and wise. This God will do if we have been humble 
and have not anticipated God by justifying ourselves and by thinking that 
we are something.35
This radical exterior justice gets converted into an if/then 
statement in exactly the same way that a strategically invis-
ible work of avant-garde that takes place on the side of “life” 
gets converted into art. But it also provides us with a way of 
trans. Peggy Kamuf (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 199. Com-
pare this to Vautier: “Fluxus in America try to keep onto the impersonality 
research. Impersonality means the non-ego research of John Cage which did 
not succeed but was very interesting as a tentative because I don’t believe 
you can do anything non-ego. Man [sic] is a hundred percent ego and even 
when he becomes a non-egoist it is pure ego non-ego. You cannot get non-
ego but you can get a new statement on ego which is non-ego. Complicated 
huh?” Vautier, quoted in The Misfits.
35 Martin Luther, Lectures on Romans, Glosses and Schoilia: Luther’s Works, vol. 
25, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1986), 136, 
my emphasis.
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seeing how speculative realism could approach issues of 
axiology. If every difference makes a difference, then one 
of the differences that human consciousness introduces is 
value. Yet the location where these values take place can still 
be outside human consciousness. Art and ethics are both 
dependent on the existence of human consciousness (or 
something like human consciousness) in the sense that if 
you removed all human consciousness, there would no lon-
ger be any difference between things that are art and things 
that are not art, nor would there be any ethics. Billiard balls 
might continue to collide into things without humans, but 
never as an assault. Fire might continue to burn cotton but 
never as arson. Yet although human consciousness produces 
ethics in a Levinasian sense, the real work of ethics happens 
outside of human awareness.
Today it is taken as a matter of dogma that the avant-garde is 
no longer possible, that it was a historical period that came to 
an end. The exact date at which it ended is hard to pin down, 
but sometime between May ‘68 and November ‘89, the door 
to the future closed seemingly forever. History, we were told, 
had ended.36 Global capitalism and liberal democracy are now 
36 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free 
Press, 1992).
Sign at the inaugural lecture of the University of Strategic Optimism
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the only possibility. There is no alternative. The avant-garde 
and its ideals had a good run, but to pine for them now is 
pointless. The best thing to do is to make your peace with the 
current order of things. Look, you can still paint and sculpt 
and hang art on the wall, they can never take that from you. 
But the avant of the avant-garde is now closed. The reading I 
am offering rejects this account. In contrast, it holds that the 
history of justice is a secret one, and that, clandestinely, it still 
marches on. Likewise, the avant-garde as it passes through the 
zero point of the readymade is liberated from the human to 
follow its own devices on the side of life. Without realising 
it, we may be participating in justice or in the avant-garde, 
which amount to the same thing. History is not over, events 
are still possible, they just continue invisibly.
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The Anxiousness of Objects 
and Artworks 2
(Iso)Morphism, Anti-Literalism 
and Presentness1
Robert Jackson
University of Lancaster
Look at a stone and imagine it having sensations. – One says to oneself: 
How could one so much as get the idea of ascribing a sensation to a thing? 
One might as well ascribe it to a number! – And now look at a wriggling fly 
and at once these difficulties vanish and pain seems to get a foothold here, 
where before everything was, so to speak, too smooth for it.
—Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations2
As its title indicates, this contribution is a continuation of my article published in this 
very journal in 2011, where I first attempted to align the 
principles of Graham Harman’s object-oriented ontology 
(OOO) with Michael Fried’s art criticism.3 Since then, three 
important and surprising events have occurred which the 
present essay takes as its task to integrate and elaborate on.
Firstly, Harman himself has published, presented, and 
publicly blogged on similar connections between Clement 
1 I extend my thanks to Ridvan Askin and Andreas Hägler whose invaluable 
insights refined any muddled judgements and their patient editing work 
immeasurably enhanced my earlier drafts.
2 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, 
3rd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 83e. 
3 See Robert Jackson, “The Anxiousness of Objects and Artworks: Michael 
Fried, Object Oriented Ontology and Aesthetic Absorption,” Speculations 
(2011), 2, 135-68.
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Greenberg’s modernist principles of the avant-garde and his 
own philosophy of objects.4 In consideration of the fact that 
Fried was arguably Greenberg’s most famous protégé alongside 
Rosalind Krauss, this adds an impetus for critical development. 
As is the norm with any deliberation on Fried’s criticism, 
the essay will also gather central insights from the work of 
his philosophical compadre and close friend Stanley Cavell.
Secondly, the expansion of speculative realism not only 
continues to proliferate in-between distinct disciplines outside 
of philosophy—including the arts—but the movement itself 
has exposed a critical fault-line which can be separated into 
two distinct, contradictory philosophical orientations. The 
essay will borrow Quentin Meillassoux’s distinction between 
demonstration and description,5 and in so doing, illuminate 
4 For a very brief exposition of Harman’s broad influence by Greenbergian 
literary criticism, see the recently published Graham Harman, Weird Realism: 
Lovecraft and Philosophy (Winchester: Zero Books, 2012), 19-21. As for public 
talks, I can only cite the most explicit lectures and presentations in this area 
from 2012 and the beginning of 2013. Graham Harman, “Greenberg, Heidegger, 
McLuhan, and the Arts,” presentation given at Pacific Northwest College of 
Art, Museum of Contemporary Craft, January 22, 2013. The audio for this 
lecture can be found at http://untitled.pnca.edu/multimedia/show/6380/ 
(accessed February 19, 2013). Graham Harman, “Non-Relational Aesthet-
ics: An Object-Oriented Look at Contemporary Art,” presentation given at 
The School of Art and the Center for the Arts in Society, Carnegie Mellon 
University, October 23, 2012. Graham Harman, “The Next Avant-Garde,” key-
note delivered at the Aesthetics in the 21st Century conference, University 
of Basel, September 13-15, 2012. For references to Graham Harman’s weblog 
posting, see Graham Harman, “where Greenberg and McLuhan meet,” Object-
Oriented Philosophy, http://doctorzamalek2.wordpress.com/2011/10/27/
where-greenberg-and-mcluhan-meet/ (accessed February 1, 2013); Graham 
Harman, “Greenberg and McLuhan,” Object-Oriented Philosophy, http://
doctorzamalek2.wordpress.com/2011/07/05/greenberg-and-mcluhan/ (ac-
cessed February 1, 2013); Graham Harman, “Robert Jack[s]on on my Green-
berg posts,” Object-Oriented Philosophy, http://doctorzamalek2.wordpress.
com/2011/06/21/robert-jackon-on-my-greenberg-posts/ (accessed February 
1, 2013); and Graham Harman, “Greenberg as a writer,” Object-Oriented 
Philosophy, http://doctorzamalek2.wordpress.com/2011/05/20/greenberg-
as-a-writer/ (accessed February 1, 2013).
5 See Ray Brassier, Graham Harman, Iain Hamilton Grant and Quentin 
Meillassoux, “Speculative Realism,” Collapse (2007), 3, 391-392. For the rest 
of the article, I will distinguish my own appropriation of these terms as 
Robert Jackson – The Anxiousness of Objects and Artworks 2
313
how the critical demands of this philosophical distinction in 
speculative realism can be associated with the critical demands 
of Fried’s distinction between “Literalism and Presentness,”6 
or as it is better known, “Theatricality and Anti-theatricality.”7 
My use of Meillassoux’s fault-line in this essay is exactly that: 
a critical use, and not a purely descriptive, or empirical one. 
I will not attempt to deliberately align these terms, as Meil-
lassoux does, with a single viewpoint or a school of thought, 
but with a general orientation of conflict: such a conflict, I 
claim, can also be traced in the terrain of aesthetics, by means 
of juxtaposing conflicting theoretical viewpoints.
Thirdly, in September 2011, Fried published his latest col-
lection of essays on contemporary art criticism called Four 
Honest Outlaws.8 In these four essays, Fried discusses works 
by contemporary video artist Anri Sala, sculptor Charles Ray, 
painter Joseph Marioni, and Douglas Gordon, whose work 
crosses different types of media. I have included this work 
primarily because I consider it to be an important progres-
sion in Fried’s later career; a snapshot of a modernist thinker 
who is not only opening up his modernist conviction to other 
media (in this case video projection), but is also indirectly 
revealing new claims on anthropomorphic absorption and 
presentness taking place within non-human reality. These 
new claims unfold under the catchphrase of empathic projec-
tion, which I argue is not just central to Fried’s late criticism 
(at least in Four Honest Outlaws), but in combination with 
Demonstration and Description, capitalised and in boldface.
6 Michael Fried, “Art and Objecthood,” Artforum (1967), 5, 12-23. Reprinted in 
Minimal Art: A Critical Anthology, ed. Gregory Battcock (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1995), 116-47; Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology, ed. George 
Dickie and Richard J. Sclafani (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1977), 438-60 
and Looking Critically: 21 Years of Artforum, ed. by Amy Baker Sandback (Ann 
Arbor: UMI Research Press, 1984), 61-68. Subsequent citations are taken 
from Art in Theory 1900-1990: An Anthology of Changing Ideas, ed. Paul Wood 
and Charles Harrison (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2002), 822-34.
7 Michael Fried, Absorption and Theatricality: Painting and Beholder in the Age 
of Diderot (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980).
8 Michael Fried, Four Honest Outlaws: Sala, Ray, Marioni, Gordon (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2011).
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Harman’s philosophy of objects has the potential to unveil a 
general aesthetic relationship between objects. This relation-
ship I call isomorphism. 
Part 1
Harman and Greenberg: Radicalising Anthropomorphism
If one is convinced by Harman’s maxim that philosophy must 
primarily align itself with a primordial aesthetics (rather than 
analytic logic, rational science or militant politics),9 then 
one could assert the following challenge as a loose provoca-
tion: an OOO non-relational aesthetics must be associated 
with a Greenbergian high modernist criticism, rather than 
any philosophical deliberation in recent art theory.10 Such 
a challenge will require taking the metaphorical theories 
of modernist criticism into a realist direction, rather than 
rejecting them outright or keeping them within the confines 
of correlationism.
In order to do so, my aim is to develop the deep relevancy 
between OOO and the modernist criticism of Greenberg 
and Fried in an effort to understand how the connection 
between them radicalises certain critical boundaries between 
anthropomorphic art and its objecthood. Art’s autonomy is 
meaningless if a beholder is unable to at least acknowledge 
some haggard form of distinguishing one from the other, and 
to get straight to the heart of the intervention, the critical role 
of the beholder may not just be a matter of human discourse.
So why high modernism? At first pass, the high modernist 
sensibility evokes the opposite goals of Harman’s philosophy, 
for it privileges human opticality (in the modernist sense) 
and a deep, self-knowing sense of privilege, where the impact 
of a critic’s decision relegates non-art to “mere” objecthood. 
9 Graham Harman, “On Vicarious Causation,” Collapse (2007), 2, 221.
10 For prominent examples of such theory, see Jacques Rancière, The 
Emancipated Spectator (London: Verso, 2011) and Alain Badiou, Handbook of 
Inaesthetics (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).
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However, consider two prominent criticisms usually levelled 
at both positions: the charge of conservatism for trying to cut 
off objects in general and artworks in particular from their 
social and political relational context, and an ever-present 
dismissal based on the joint endorsement of categories such 
as limit, naiveté, taste, quality and essence to describe the art 
object’s determinate character. To adopt an old saying, the 
enemy of an enemy is a friend (paradoxically, Greenberg was, 
in his harsher articles, nothing if not his own worst enemy 
at times).
The key term which modernist critics used to distinguish 
art from the mundane is anthropomorphism; namely the at-
tribution of human characteristics to an impersonal world, 
thing, animal, machine, or a god. As J. M. Bernstein points 
out, Greenberg’s formalism originated in, and was a reaction 
to, what he saw as the demythologisation of anthropomor-
phism inherent to a particular historical response within 
modernity according to which only reductive strategies of 
reason and logic should be associated with genuine progress 
and understanding.11 Scepticism demonstrates the forward 
march of progress, whilst irrational superstition is purged 
and abandoned. As Bernstein writes:
Beginning with Descartes’s methodical doubting of appearances, moder-
nity has construed its rationality as a critical overcoming of the endless 
displays and temptations of anthropomorphic understanding—the 
projecting of human meaning onto an inhuman or indifferent material 
world. If, the argument runs, things only have meaning through what 
we project onto them, then in themselves things are meaningless and 
thus ought to be understood in the visionless medium of pure mathematics. 
The same movement of demythologisation that fashioned the death 
of God is carried forward by a rationalism that limits meaning and 
value to the satisfaction of human desires and interests as processed 
through a practical reasoning that is instrumental, means-ends rational, 
through and through. All else is mythology and illusion.12
11 J. M. Bernstein, Against Voluptuous Bodies: Late Modernism and the Meaning 
of Painting (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 124-26.
12 Ibid., 123, my emphases.
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Despite sharing similar historical and cultural tendencies, 
Greenberg’s celebration of abstraction (ultimately guided 
by Kant) defended the human limits of anthropomorphism 
against visionless pure reasoning and rational justification.13 
Painting cannot be demythologised from a non-anthropolog-
ical view from nowhere, otherwise it ceases to operate as an 
independent artwork of depth and quality which connects 
with reality through its own allusive form. Instead, what is 
primary in aesthetic experience are the Kantian relations 
of finite intuition and description of an independent entity: a 
failed demonstration which the beholder or artist can never 
deduce. In Greenberg’s words, modernist practice must justify 
itself from the inside of a limiting condition, which “does not 
offer theoretical demonstrations.”14 If Enlightenment’s criti-
cism came from processing the outside through the cold light 
of reason and knowledge, modernist art attempts to process 
the outside through the sensual light of intuition and allusion. In 
Greenberg’s words, it “criticizes from the inside, through the 
procedures themselves of that which is being criticized.”15
This refusal of demonstration is what keeps modernist 
artworks shorn of political and cultural baggage, never de-
pendent on external reason or context, but on a passive and 
“heightened cognitiveness without cognition.”16 For Green-
berg, aesthetic justification was an end to itself, “not to be 
13 Bernstein, Against Voluptuous Bodies, 124.
14 Clement Greenberg, “Modernist Painting,” first published in Arts Yearbook 
(1961), 4, and reprinted with revisions in Art & Literature (1965), 4, 193-201 
and in Art in Theory 1900-1990: An Anthology of Changing Ideas, ed. Charles 
Harrison and Paul Wood (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1992), 754-60. All 
citations are taken from Clement Greenberg, “Modernist Painting,” in Mod-
ern Art and Modernism: A Critical Anthology, ed. Francis Frascina and Charles 
Harrison (London: Harper and Row, 1982), 9, cf. 5-10.
15 Ibid., 5.
16 Clement Greenberg, “The Language of Esthetic Discourse,” in Homemade 
Esthetics: Observations on Art and Taste (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999), 65. The second part of Homemade Esthetics transcribes Greenberg’s 
Bennington Seminars delivered over nine nights during April 6-22, 1971. On 
the third night and in response to a question asked at the Q&A concerning 
the similarity between Greenberg’s concept and the apparatus of seeing, 
Greenberg explains his idea of “cognitiveness without cognition” thus:
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obtained from any other kind of activity,” to the extent that 
the proper practice of artistic competence would reveal the 
unique nature of its medium, in its own right.17 An aesthetic 
medium establishes a timeless essence in which “each art 
[must] determine, through the operations peculiar to itself, 
the effects peculiar and exclusive to itself.”18 Refusing reli-
ance on anything outside the medium, abstraction removes 
the representational image, which could always be subject to 
demystifying critique, and decides on the optical space of a 
painting to transcend its image. Greenberg’s commentary 
consists in following the practice of artists who test a medium’s 
conventions, and whose continual testing of conventions 
determines which ones are either essential or dispensable 
in different movements. According to Greenberg, such test-
ing reveals that flatness (and the delimitation of flatness) in 
abstract expressionism and modernist painting in general 
has the status of essential quality and truth.
As Bernstein states, painting for Greenberg was a human 
practice: “the world as seen, the seen world, is not the world 
as a thing in itself, but precisely the world as the internal cor-
relate of the seeing eye.”19 To summarise this in Greenberg’s 
words (and Bernstein correctly cites this passage):
I think one of the ways in which you can stab at saying what art does 
to you is that it puts you in a state of heightened cognitiveness. Not 
cognition, but cognitiveness. It’s somehow as though you’ve risen 
above impediments to knowledge or awareness, but not on the basis of 
anything specific, that you are specifically aware of. Now, I come back 
to good old Kant who said that the pleasure of art consists in the free 
play of reason together with intuition or imagination. These faculties 
are stimulated at the same time: there’s nothing there for you to know, 
there’s just something there to intuit, and there’s nothing there for the 
understanding to really absorb as information.
Clement Greenberg, “Night Three: April 8th, 1971” in Homemade Esthetics, 
113, my emphasis.
17 Greenberg, “Modernist Painting,” 5.
18 Ibid.
19 Bernstein, Against Voluptuous Bodies, 124-25.
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the making of pictures, in the flat, means the deliberate choice and 
creation of limits. This deliberateness is what Modernism harps on: 
that is, it spells out the fact that the limiting conditions of art [that is, 
the flatness of the picture-support] have to be made altogether human 
limits.20
For Greenberg, the joint fusion of human convention and a 
medium’s limiting condition of form is not simply a matter 
of tweaking physical constituents to suit particular purposes. 
Quoting one of Greenberg’s famous commenters, Thierry 
De Duve, “it comprises know-how, cultural habits, working 
procedures and disciplines.”21 The consensus in convention 
in a specific medium is fragile and momentary, and it is the 
form of the work itself (such as the flatness in painting) which 
makes the subject matter of decision and judgement not only 
visible, but also offers access to its content and quality.22 The 
form is hidden, and it is the hiddenness of the form’s con-
straint, which “puts pressure” on the aesthetic judgement of 
the artist and the beholder—such constraints remodel content 
and the decisions of the artist, thus transgressing aesthetic 
quality. Judgement in Greenberg’s eyes cannot be reduced to 
a formulaic, knowledgeable realm of visionless reason, nor is 
it purely inferred from any autonomous realm of conscious 
reasoning—rather “judgement” in this sense is provoked by 
the medium itself. In Greenberg’s words, “the artist receives 
judgements-decisions-inspiration, if you like—from this 
medium as he works in it.”23 The historical remodelling of 
the work’s form cannot be found as “art” in a generic knowl-
edgeable sense, but in the specificity of the medium: painting, 
video, sculpture, music, poetry, etc.
20 Greenberg, “Modernist Painting,” 9.
21 Thierry de Duve, “The Monochrome and the Canvas” in Kant after Duchamp 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999), 210.
22 Ibid., 210.
23 Clement Greenberg, “Judgement and the Esthetic Object” in Homemade 
Esthetics, 42-23.
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Although this commentary is far from deliberative, there 
are key points we can bring forward into the discussion which 
are already evident in Fried’s early criticism. Even though 
Greenberg’s criticism was at base Kantian, and thus imme-
diately dwells within the realm of correlationism (that only 
the highest quality of art encloses the material world within 
the limits of human activity), it ultimately seeks to counter 
a demonstrative and non-anthropomorphic epistemology 
by upholding the intuitive realm of the aesthetic bound by 
the limitations of the respective medium operating in the 
background. We cannot exactly specify what conditions 
Greenberg had in mind when he aligned human limits with 
a medium’s own, but whatever they are, it is at least clear that 
the form of such a medium remains intrinsically correlated 
with artists and viewers. Thus, the artist’s and viewer’s “mor-
phisations”—to put it rather awkwardly—are always already 
conditioned judgements of the withdrawn formal capacities 
of a medium. Aesthetic judgement cannot be known and 
processed into extrinsic mechanical form, but only passively 
intuited intrinsically, from the inside. As the later Greenberg 
writes elsewhere:
Your aesthetic judgement, being an intuition and nothing else, is re-
ceived, not taken. You no more choose to like or not like a given item 
of art than you choose to see the sun as bright or the night as dark.24
Demonstration and Description
Having shown what Greenberg’s criticism attempted to defend, 
we can associate the stakes of his criticism with a more famil-
iar philosophical sort of distinction. Once the philosophical 
position of correlationism is rejected in speculative realism, 
an incompatible discord in continental philosophy is let 
loose, and this discord operates between two broad orienta-
tions. Freely drawing on Meillassoux’s distinction, we can 
24 Clement Greenberg, “Intuition and the Esthetic Experience” in Home-
made Esthetics, 7.
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assign the terms Demonstration and Description to these 
orientations.25 Note here that in using these terms, I do so 
in an extremely general sense, without ascribing a particular 
role, function, or argument of any author as an overriding 
factor to them.
First there is Demonstration: a passive, inert material reality 
can be epistemologically demonstrated through the formal, 
inferential properties of thought and an extrinsic principle of 
the fact, so that thought becomes radically divorced from a 
non-anthropomorphic being. This position is shared both 
by Meillassoux and Ray Brassier in their joint commitment 
to explaining the truth of reality rationally. The very reality 
of thought itself is to be uncovered, and in doing so, seeks to 
uncover the “in-itself” through a visionless absolute under-
standing, as a significant (yet the culmination of a contingent) 
rational achievement.
But there is also Description: reality is composed of funda-
mental entities, objects, things, forces and powers which exist 
in their own right; the relations of which, in their specific 
limitations or groundings, are no different in kind from the 
epistemological limits of cognition. This is an intrinsic principle 
of the thing. The limitations of the correlation between thinking 
and being are radicalised and hypostatised such that they are 
turned into the characteristics of relationality in general. The 
descriptivists subdivide into substance ontologists (Harman, 
Levi Bryant), the radical empiricists of networked actants 
(Bruno Latour), and the panpsychist, vitalist dynamists of 
active matter (Iain Hamilton Grant, Steven Shaviro, Jane 
Bennett). Description, in this sense, does not solely include 
phenomenological descriptive claims, but appeals to a broader 
importance of ontological “being”; that is, the modality of 
entities, which “describe,” “withdraw,” “intensify” or “affect” 
with as much exuberant metaphysical importance as cognition.
25 I have written about the detailed differences between these two orienta-
tions in the short essay “Demonstration and Description” in And Another 
Thing, ed. Katherine Behar and Emmy Mikelson (New York: Punctum Books, 
forthcoming).
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What is important here is the utterly incompatible nature 
of both orientations, precisely insofar as correlationism was 
a pre-synthesis of both. No middle way is possible, because 
correlationism was that middle way. Like a Hegelian dialec-
tic stuck in reverse gear, speculative realism fractures the 
correlate into these two halves and only these two. Fuse both 
Demonstration and Description together and you arrive 
back at correlationism; that the world cannot be known in 
itself, and only be internally related by human thought. The 
key split between the two lies in how reality is accounted for 
within the ontological importance or unimportance of knowledge 
and mastery in human thought.
In Demonstration, the discontinuity of thought from 
material reality must be explained in emergent materialist 
terms through rational knowledge, whilst in Description any 
discontinuity or continuity between thought and the reality 
of objects, occasions, assemblages or processes is understood 
to be different in degree and not ontologically special in kind. 
Elsewhere, Steven Shaviro has argued that this central axis 
marks two extreme speculative positions at base, eliminativism 
and panpsychism.26 This latter position, which entails Descrip-
tion as I have just defined it, has recently been attacked by 
Meillassoux as a lamentable strain of “subjectalism.”27 This 
neologism was coined by Meillassoux to capture the history 
(since Berkeley) of thinking absolute thought as an ontologi-
cal category, a lineage that encompasses not only Diderot’s 
“Hylozoism,”28 Schelling’s “Freedom,” Nietzsche’s “Will to 
26 Steven Shaviro, “Eliminativism and/or Panpsychism,” talk given at the 
OOOIII conference in New York and the SLSA conference in Kitchener, 
Ontario. Available online: http://www.shaviro.com/Blog/?p=1012 (accessed 
on June 30, 2013).
27 Quentin Meillassoux, “Iteration, Reiteration, Repetition: A Speculative 
Analysis of the Meaningless Sign,” lecture given at the Freie Universität 
Berlin, 20 April 2012. It is available online: http://oursecretblog.com/txt/
QMpaperApr12.pdf, trans. Robin Mackay (accessed June 30, 2013).
28 The inclusion of Diderot here by Meillassoux is quite telling for my ar-
gument, especially if one considers Fried’s infamous research on Diderot 
and premodernist art (although on Fried’s part, there would not be any link 
between Diderot’s panpsychism and his art criticism). See Fried, Absorption 
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Power,” and Deleuze’s “Larval Vitalism,” but also Hegelian 
idealism, despite the obvious conflicts between these positions 
(this is why for example Grant’s position cannot be located 
outside this divide and Meillassoux is right to include him 
in the opposing faction: human knowledge and phenomena 
for Grant are the products of nature, not a special rational 
achievement).
It follows then that speculative realism simply is this incom-
patible splintering, this fracture, and its existence emerges 
from this schism. Demonstration argues that thought itself 
can fruitfully prove or deduce knowledge of itself and thus 
reality, whilst Description argues that thought never fully 
deduces any in-itself and has little ontological significance 
or achievement in doing so, since its ontological significance 
is not superior to any other kind of possible relation between 
entities. Once correlationism is rejected, there is no middle 
way to stake a claim apart from these two broad orientations 
of “what is”: either reality must be epistemologically demonstrated 
or reality must be described in terms of real ontological variance. 
Once one side is chosen, the other recedes from view.29
Demonstration justifies itself in two ways: in the first way, it 
aligns itself with the rational rejection of anthropomorphism, 
endorsing a visionless absolute knowledge (as attributed to 
Brassier and especially Meillassoux); in a second (but related) 
and Theatricality. For my claim that Fried’s notion of “Absorption” is related 
to Harman’s notions of “allure” and “withdrawal,” see Jackson, “The Anx-
iousness of Objects and Artworks,” 156-62.
29 As a side note, it increasingly appears that because speculative realism 
manifests itself as this contradictory fracturing of the correlate into these 
two specific modalities, there are only three possible moves forward. The 
first move is already taking place, with Demonstration and Description 
both making their progressive strides in each orientation, whilst also be-
ing stretched and pulled apart more vigorously within certain trench war 
debates. The second move simply re-embraces correlationism and all of its 
anti-realist flaws. The third move, finally, requires the difficult, yet more 
elusive, necessary and creative step in reconciling both orientations without 
inadvertently arriving back at correlationism and repeating the gesture that 
the world can only ever be internally related. In other words, how does one 
reconcile the “thinking reality/existing beyond thought” discord without 
immediately embracing the easy option of anthropocentric anti-realism?
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way, it aligns itself with the sceptical or absolute rejection of 
anthropomorphism—which is to say, that for Demonstration 
it makes little to no sense to speak of an unthinkable ontol-
ogy outside of ourselves (similar to Meillassoux’s notion of 
strong correlationism). The former way takes the progressive 
step of attaining knowledge through the rational capabilities 
of thought knowing, progressively mastering and uncovering its 
own materialist, contingent functioning, its own reality. The 
sceptical onslaught of the latter way demonstrates the reality 
of finitude as such, rather than merely bathing in its givenness.
The impact that Demonstration has on aesthetics is the crux 
here. Demonstration has little concern with allusive strategies 
of sensual apprehension for its own purposes. Intuition is not 
an end goal. It is worth noting that Meillassoux in particular 
has a philosophical investment in Duchamp, although this 
influence remains, as of writing, unpublished.30 Regardless 
of any possible speculation concerning Duchamp’s role in 
Meillassoux’s system, his role in Demonstration will become 
clear under the topic of generic objects and appearance in 
part two of this essay. Brassier’s early writings on noise and 
sonic practice are perhaps a more deliberate provocation 
to eliminate any sensual judgement from aesthetic taste, to 
the point of endorsing a “destitution of the aesthetic”;31 one 
which “exacerbates the rift between knowing and feeling by 
splitting experience, forcing conception against sensation.”32 
Demonstration, in whatever form it takes, cannot abide the 
apprehension of Kantian disinterest, nor be satisfied with its 
rejection of empirical “gratification.”33
30 See Harman’s interview with Meillassoux in Graham Harman, Quentin 
Meillassoux: Philosophy in the Making (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2011), 173-74.
31 Ray Brassier, “Genre is Obsolete,” in Noise & Capitalism, ed. Mattin and 
Anthony Iles (San Sebastian: Arteleku Audiolab, 2009), 60-71.
32 Ray Brassier, “Against an Aesthetics of Noise,” Transitzone, nY, 2009, <www.
ny-web.be/transitzone/against-aesthetics-noise.html> (accessed November 
30, 2012).
33 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: 
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With Harman’s position so utterly invested in his variant 
of Description, it should be clear why his own version of 
speculative realism so readily embraces Greenbergian criti-
cism. The modernist discovering or illumination of sensual 
representation operates through an anthropomorphic discovery 
of involuntary aesthetic description (however, we must also 
realise that other philosophers of Description may clearly 
reject Greenberg’s aesthetic criticism, particularly Grant and 
definitely Shaviro).34 Meillassoux’s charge that “subjectalism” 
conveys a “non-materialist form of absolutism”35 is accurate 
here in terms of rejecting the reductive and correlated un-
derstandings of “materialism,” yet is perhaps inaccurate in 
characterising the status of thought as absolutising (Harman, 
for instance does not assign any primordial level of cognitive 
phenomena, such as memory, to objects).
Whatever relation fits, we can suggest that the relationship 
between Harman and Greenberg is part of a wider frame-
work within which works of art are essential, discrete things, 
that actually matter and that cannot be replaced with social 
determinacy, analytic reduction or scientific deduction. 
The artwork is a transformation of an object—it outlines a 
dark shape, a silhouette, as Bernstein might say—which has 
the potential to allusively bridge finite understanding and 
material world.36
In this regard, if Fried and Greenberg are left as they are, 
they can only stretch towards a “weak correlated” variant 
of Description. Their criticism can never speak about the 
Hackett Publishing, 1987), 47. Here, I am referring to Steven Shaviro’s ex-
traordinary reading of Kant’s aesthetics. Shaviro reads Kant’s description of 
beauty in experience in light of a Whiteheadian metaphysical affective event. 
See Steven Shaviro, Without Criteria: Kant, Whitehead, Deleuze, and Aesthetics 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009), 4-5.
34 Steven Shaviro, “The Actual Volcano: Whitehead, Harman, and the Prob-
lem of Relations” in The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism, 
ed. Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek, and Graham Harman (Melbourne: Re.press, 
2011), 288-89, cf. 279-90.
35 Meillassoux, “Iteration, Reiteration, Repetition,” 3.
36 Bernstein, Against Voluptuous Bodies, 126.
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material world in itself. The next step is to radicalise this 
modernist sensibility so that it becomes a speculative one, and 
to suggest how aesthetics not only bridges the finite limits 
of human intuitions, but bridges the finite limits of all objects. 
What if Greenberg’s limiting condition was not a feature of 
art as a human discipline, but a basic feature of an ontology 
that features aesthetics as the general and fundamental mode 
of causal relation?
This is the work Harman has already begun. Besides Har-
man’s theory of allure in Guerrilla Metaphysics and “Vicarious 
Causation,” there are other developments and implications 
to consider. Thus, Harman values in Greenberg what he also 
values in thinkers of technology like Marshall McLuhan, 
namely that such critics not only identify a central interac-
tion between the present-at-hand sensual figure, content, or 
foreground and the withdrawn, real background of medium 
and form, they also grasp how creative movements of ripe 
discovery and fresh surprise can be retrieved and historically 
stimulated within the throws of decadence and monotony.37 
In the second instance, such a discovery of creative progress 
is indicative of Harman’s recent critical trajectory; that new 
movements, new methods and new principles emerge as a 
result of retrieving outmoded ideas in aesthetics and philoso-
phy, left behind by previous modernisers in recent history.38 
I shall now turn to Fried and Cavell who add another layer 
to this logic.
37 This relationship is expanded on briefly in the keynote lecture “Every-
thing is Not Connected” delivered at the Transmediale festival in February 
2012 and published in Graham Harman, Bells and Whistles: More Speculative 
Realism (Winchester: Zero Books, 2013), 100-127. For an extensive treatment, 
see Harman’s contribution to this volume.
38 The outstanding essay which extrapolates this sense of aesthetic progress 
is Greenberg’s “Cézanne and the Unity of Modern Painting,” written in 1951 
and published in Clement Greenberg, The Collected Essays and Criticism: Af-
firmations and Refusals, 1950-1956, vol. 3, ed. John O’Brian (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1993), 82-91.
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A Paradigm Shift of the Senses: Fried’s Anthropomorphism
Whilst Fried supported Greenberg’s views on the finite 
limits of human anthropomorphism in modernist conven-
tion, he rejected the view that painting had an unchanging 
and timeless essence. For him, such a position led down a 
“cul-de-sac artistically and theoretically” (for instance, how 
could anything new emerge in foregrounded convention if 
its formal, backgrounded essence remains fundamentally 
unchanged?).39 Fried believed that the authentic way to think 
of essence was historical: artists discovered conventions, which 
in the present moment and in response to the vital work of 
the past turned out to be essential to the medium in question. 
Such an acknowledgement could only be both beholden to 
the recent past and subject to change. Fried’s modernism did 
not seek to “overthrow or supersede [or] break with the pre-
modernist past, but rather ... attempt[ed] to equal its highest 
achievements, under new and difficult conditions that from 
the first were recognised by a few writers and artists stacking 
the deck against the likelihood of success.”40
Thus Fried’s own strategy for defeating scepticism lies in 
aligning human limits with historical pressures and bursts 
of conviction. Indeed, in a footnote to his famous essay on 
the artist Frank Stella, “Shape as Form,” Fried cites Thomas 
Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, inferring that 
Kuhn’s infamous “paradigm shifts” may offer an insight into 
the mechanism of revolutions in art.41 As Caroline A. Jones 
and Vasso Kindi argue (the former more polemically), Fried’s 
articulation of Greenberg’s modernist criticism “was indebted 
to the matrix of ideas circulating around Kuhn ... many of 
39 Fried, Four Honest Outlaws, 8.
40 Michael Fried, “How Modernism Works: A Response to T.J. Clark” in 
Pollock and After: The Critical Debate, ed. Francis Frascina (New York: Harper 
and Row, 1985), 70.
41 Michael Fried, “Shape as Form: Frank Stella’s Irregular Polygons” in Art and 
Objecthood (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004), 99, n.11, cf. 77-99.
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them mediated by the cogent philosophy of Stanley Cavell.”42 
A detailed exposition which evenly accounts for these differ-
ent approaches (along with their critics) is beyond the word 
limit of this essay, and is better suited to be pursued elsewhere. 
Instead, I will turn to a brief discussion of how Fried’s posi-
tion relates to Harman’s own approach.
Kindi’s essay deftly unpacks the controversial anti-Hegelian 
nature of Kuhn’s scientific revolutions, insofar as they are 
“nothing typically rational,” nor “objectively ascertainable.”43 
Kindi also examines the conflicting methods of these ap-
proaches, as commentators often misconstrue that both Fried 
and Cavell favour the discovery of “genuine” essence in the 
establishment of new conventions compared to a medium’s 
history (that the essence of painting is recovered and restored 
from its past), whilst Kuhn removes any presentation of es-
sential progress in science, because the breaking of scientific 
tradition is a clean, destructive break from its past. However, 
Kindi argues that the two disciplines are not so different.44 
Like Kuhn, Cavell does not push an essentialist tradition, but 
a project of brutal re-conceptualisation, and a resistant but 
anxious learning of a language initiated by the joint internal 
criticisms of both art and science.45
42 Caroline A. Jones, “The Modernist Paradigm: The Artworld and Thomas 
Kuhn,” Critical Inquiry (2000), 26:3, 523. Jones articulates the polemical cri-
tique that Kuhn’s evolutionary metaphor lends itself to an essentialist and 
teleological conceptualisation of progress in modernist art and especially 
Fried’s criticism, insofar as Fried’s modernist project becomes the only 
paradigm which deserves to be dominant. Unsurprisingly, Fried was not 
amused and wrote a rejoinder to Jones’s essay; see Michael Fried, “Response 
to Caroline Jones,” Critical Inquiry (2000), 27:4, 703-05.
43 Vasso Kindi, “Novelty and Revolution in Art and Science: The Connection 
between Kuhn and Cavell,” Perspectives on Science (2010), 18:3, 298.
44 Kindi also reveals the mutual indebtedness of Kuhn and Cavell in their 
respective understandings of their different disciplines after regularly 
meeting at Berkeley from 1956 onwards; see Kindi, “Novelty and Revolution,” 
284-85. See also Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1970), xiii; and James Conant “An Interview 
with Stanley Cavell” in The Senses of Stanley Cavell, ed. Richard Fleming and 
Michael Payne (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1989), 35-72.
45 Kindi puts it thus:
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In my view, Kindi all too carefully avoids the problems of 
essence that the philosophical tenor of modernist aesthetics 
and scientific paradigm shifts pose. Harman’s object-oriented 
ontology indicates a potentially profound change of under-
standing of this literature. In this vein, the reasons why Fried, 
Cavell and Kuhn’s conceptions of revolution are similar are 
not to be found in their favouring a re-conceptualisation of 
the concept of essence.46 Instead, each thinker repeatedly 
misunderstands that essence is real but can never be ultimately 
known or forever mastered, and as such the modernist aesthetic 
generated from this historical allusion can never be teleological. 
Successive interpretations may seemingly be progressively 
They consider particular revolutionary developments (for instance, 
Modernism in art or the Chemical Revolution in science) in order to 
understand and elucidate what radical novelty involves. Both art and 
science are marked by the high value they attach to the mastery of a 
tradition which, according to Kuhn and Cavell, far from committing 
these disciplines to a confining conservative practice, constitutes the 
condition for bringing about revolutionary changes. Scientists, confronted 
with anomalies (i.e., deviations from what tradition inclines them to 
expect), seek to restore order while artists, striving for originality and 
excellence, measure up to the standards of past achievements. In their 
effort to recover what has been lost, practitioners of both fields break 
new ground and, consequently, redefine their respective disciplines. 
This is not an attempt to uncover an already given, atemporal, essence 
but a dynamic process of re-organization and re-conceptualization. 
Cavell’s talk of essence must be seen in this light. In his view, essence is 
redefined with each attempt to preserve it. The result is not a continu-
ous, piecemeal advancement, but a re-vision involving breaks and the 
redrawing of boundaries. Here, Cavell’s analysis again meets Kuhn’s, 
who understood revolutions in science as re-conceptualizations.
Kindi, “Novelty and Revolution,” 306.
46 It is telling here that Kindi reverts back to the idea that the newness of a 
revolution in art or science is something that anthropomorphism initiates, 
rather than a genuine, fresh encounter with an allusive hidden layer of the 
real world. Or in other words, revolutions are internally related to human 
history only. Kindi thereby repeats Greenberg’s axiom that the limiting con-
ditions of art and science must altogether be human limits. To quote Kindi 
once more: “What it means, I think, is that we take huge responsibility in 
what we do and what we bring about. The new is not something we stumble 
upon which we need to seize so that a revolution occurs ... it is something we 
initiate, we bring about by looking, in a way, backwards, to our history and 
our past achievements.” Kindi, “Novelty and Revolution,” 305, my emphases.
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more truthful in closing in on the object in question, but this 
is only an allusive shift, not a direct one. Regarding Kuhn, 
Harman has already indicated how this might be mapped:
A paradigm is not an arbitrary principle constructed by a social com-
munity in a contingent time and place and imposed by the power of 
the mob, but rather the rule of a unified scientific object beyond all 
nail-filing arguments and contradictory evidence and public catalogu-
ing of its traits ... “Normal science,” like normal perception, tidies up 
our lists of known properties and fixes previous inconsistencies in 
our map of things, but does nothing to shift the underlying field of 
objects that are accepted as real. Allure, with its severing of objects and 
qualities, is the paradigm shift of the senses.47
Under this view, the dual paradigmatic roles of modern art 
and the sciences are one of temporally exposing or retrieving 
a new revelation from the essences of withdrawn real objects 
within the caricature of a work’s content. The role of the artist 
is to trace the contours of this withdrawn essence through the 
content; to inscribe a practice within it and through it, whilst 
being never entirely sure of the consequence that emerges 
from the output. Whilst Fried’s ultimate contribution to high 
modernist criticism is to follow artists who inscribe what 
Harman calls a “paradigm shift of the senses” (a model which 
still informs Fried’s twentieth century criticism, as well as 
his more famous historical research), we can see in object-
oriented ontology an initial outlay towards a rejuvenation 
of theorising essence within an arts context, which rejects 
the sole dependency on an internal anthropomorphic cor-
relate. Although neither Fried, nor Cavell, nor Kuhn would 
ever endorse this reading, Harman’s intervention loosely 
signals why aesthetics is bound to causal relation and helps 
recalibrate the repeated (failed) efforts of modernist art theory 
and the philosophy of science to jointly allude to an object’s 
withdrawn essence.
47 Graham Harman, Guerrilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the Carpentry 
of Things (Chicago: Open Court, 2005), 152, original emphases.
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Part 2
Things and Objects: Contemporary Literalism
Meanwhile, consider the contemporary art-world’s indi-
rect dealings with the speculative turn so far. The take-up 
of speculative realism in the art world has, arguably, been 
predominantly aligned with OOO and more broadly the 
growing opposition to anthropocentric thought. Whether 
artists have been directly influenced by the proponents of 
OOO, actor-network theory, and the new materialisms or not, 
it certainly seems that a change has occurred concerning the 
understanding and exposure of the nature of materiality after 
years of framing it through human orientation. The artist’s 
materials are no longer passive or inert, but are reworked 
and re-contextualised to “let loose” their inherent, dynamic 
creativity.
This renewed democracy of things, the sociality of objects, 
can be traced in a number of shows which attempt to under-
stand how the agency of units and “things” shapes viewer 
interactions, from the famous THING: New Sculptures from 
Los Angeles show at the Hammer Museum in 2005, to Steven 
Claydon’s exhibition Strange Things Permit Themselves the 
Luxury of Occurring at the Camden Arts Centre in 2008, to 
the show Material Intelligence at Cambridge’s Kettle’s Yard in 
2009. This new sensibility towards the aesthetic imperative 
and agency of things is also what brought Katherine Behar 
and Emmy Mikelson to curate the 2011 show And Another 
Thing at the CUNY.48 The curators sought “to dislodge the 
human from the center of discussion, to enrich the concept 
48 Hammer Museum, THING: New Sculptures From Los Angeles, Exhibition, 
Los Angeles, February 6, 2005 - June 5, 2005. Camden Arts Centre, Strange 
Events Permit Themselves the Luxury of Occurring, Exhibition, London, Decem-
ber 7, 2007 - February 10, 2008. Kettle’s Yard, Material Intelligence, Exhibition, 
Cambridge, May 16, 2009 - July 12, 2009. The website for the exhibition show 
at Kettle’s Yard featuring Claire Barclay’s Stillstill (2009) is here: http://www.
kettlesyard.co.uk/exhibitions/mi_catalogue/index.html (accessed October 
20, 2013). CUNY Graduate Centre, And Another Thing, Exhibition, New York, 
September 14, 2011 - October 29, 2011.
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of being, and to open the very world itself to all things that 
comprise it” using the minimalist work Base 5 Aluminum 
Stack (2005) by Carl Andre as a starting point: a work which 
simply “is what it is.”49
Moreover, the art theoretical literature surrounding this shift 
is expanding. Rikke Hansen’s 2008 essay “Things vs. Objects” 
in Art Monthly was specifically written to address art’s return 
to things. According to Hansen, works such as Superflex’s 
Copy Right (2007) and Hans Schabus’s Next Time I’m Here, I’ll 
Be There (2008) have a “bearing on the way we perceive and 
critique the social.” Such works need the beholder to work, 
but are “never determined by the subject alone,” and instead 
“engage directly with the form of sociality that is produced 
by things; artworks that, momentarily, make objects stand 
out against the backdrop of everyday life.”50 More recently, 
in his review of dOCUMENTA 13 in ArtForum, Daniel Birn-
baum argued that there was a productive conflict between 
the trauma-led artworks focusing on human conflict and 
reconciliation, and artworks which explicitly focused on 
the thingliness of actants and objects (or as dOCUMENTA’s 
catalogue attests: “[t]his vision is shared with, and recognizes, 
the shapes and practices of knowing of all the animate and 
inanimate makers of the world, including people”).51
Elsewhere, artists and writers Pil and Galia Kollectiv have 
described this mode of artistic practice as an “anti-aesthetic 
which asks us to consider the changing nature of our rela-
tionship to objects,” whilst at the same time criticising it for 
disabling political action:
49 Katherine Behar and Emmy Mikelson, “Curatorial Statement,” And Another 
Thing, http://andanotherthingexhibition.wordpress.com/curatorial-statement/ 
(accessed June 20, 2013).
50 Rikke Hansen, “Things vs. Objects: Rikke Hansen on the Public Life of 
Things,” Art Monthly (2008), 318, http://www.artmonthly.co.uk/magazine/
site/article/things-v-objects-by-rikke-hansen-jul-aug-2008 (accessed Feb-
ruary 10, 2013).
51 Daniel Birnbaum, “Documenta 13,” ArtForum (October 2012), http://blog.
urbanomic.com/sphaleotas/archives/id_34514/id_34514.htm (accessed Feb-
ruary 10, 2013). Carolyn Christov-Bakargiev, “Artistic Director’s Statement,” 
in Introduction to dOCUMENTA (13) - Press Release, <http://d13.documenta.
de/uploads/tx_presssection/3_Introduction.pdf> (accessed June 20, 2013). 
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The vague sociality inscribed in the recognition of the thingly character 
of objects withdrawn from our consciousness seems insufficient in 
this context as the basis of the transformative power promised by art 
throughout modernity. At best it suggests a kind of Romantic failure—of 
consciousness, and of matter that threatens to collapse, but probably 
never will given the polished, well-heeled environments into which 
it is gathered.52
On a side note, Pil and Galia Kollectiv misunderstand the 
philosophical literature somewhat. They mistake the politi-
cal implications of equality (what should be) with the onto-
logical implications of equality (what exists) and neglect the 
nuanced differences between an actor-network distribution 
of the social and the discrete, object-oriented metaphysi-
cal withdrawal from the social. That said, their meandering 
critique is not the only problem here; whilst the curation of 
things and our relationship to them speeds on, both forms 
of aesthetic commentary miss the larger ontological picture.
I propose that a more fundamental link with OOO should 
perhaps avoid assumptions which take objects in art dis-
course too literally, as if any encountered, re-contextualised, 
or re-focused object or unit of matter is worth exhibiting in 
a gallery because it can perform its own thingly stage the-
atrics for the beholder as such. Whilst it may provide a posi-
tive, entirely honourable and worthy antidote to the banal 
merry-go-round of relationality and the creative malaise of 
participation-oriented art in the mainstream art-world, the 
paradigm’s dominance is hardly contested.
The reason why New Sculpture’s “thingliness” has sincerity, 
yet lacks aesthetic teeth, attests to the proposed Greenbergian 
challenges which OOO may pose for artistic practice as a 
52 Pil and Galia Kollectiv, “Can Objects Perform? Agency and Thingliness 
in Contemporary Sculpture and Installation,” paper delivered at the Sculp-
ture and Performance conference at the Henry Moore Institute, March 24, 
2010, http://www.kollectiv.co.uk/Object%20Orientations.html (accessed 
February 10, 2013). You can also listen to an audio recording of the paper 
here: http://www.henry-moore.org/hmi/events/multimedia-recordings/
sculpture-performance-conference-archiveaudio/pil-and-galia-kollectiv 
(accessed October 20, 2013).
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historical challenge; for if artists continue to enter shows and 
create works which disregard human meaning in favour of 
speculation, gathering disparate interests in the non-human 
world, there must be an adherence to the philosophical and 
critical stakes of that speculation. Such an adherence will, in 
the end, be more closely aligned with and more specific to 
the stakes of speculative realism proper and result in artistic 
practices which prevent literal illustrations of the philosophi-
cal ideas or unnecessary concoctions operating from differ-
ent philosophical positions and consequences. Art is far too 
important to illustrate conceptual achievements.
It is not enough to demand that an anti-anthropocentric 
artwork “is what it is” simply because it illustrates a theoreti-
cal point about things in relation to a beholder. It is because 
speculative realism offers two rather different and incompat-
ible versions of the noumenal “is” in relation to the beholder 
that this rift exposes specific issues and competing tensions 
between a viewer and the artwork, or to be more specific, be-
tween the thought of the viewer and the being of the artwork. The 
construction of the work must either demonstrate “what is” 
for the beholder’s appearance, or it offers an internal allusive 
finite description within the thing itself, both in human and 
non-human modalities. New Sculpture carries some unfor-
tunate but latent minimalist baggage in its history, and as 
we will see, this means it cannot fully come to terms with its 
confident interest in a thing’s independence.
To create a work which simply presents a “thing” in a space, 
no matter how weird, cannot take advantage of the allusive, 
anti-literal properties inherent to its speculative Descrip-
tion. An OOO aesthetics has to fully reconcile itself with this 
limited descriptive gesture because any object, including the 
artwork itself, always withdraws from the beholder. Not only 
this, but it also has to reconcile itself with the separate, but 
more pressing, aesthetic issue that the relationship between 
the beholder and work can never be centralised in accordance 
with the primacy of human beholders. In short, whilst the 
return to literal things is welcome in art practice, this setting 
cannot ignore the sustained historical and critical problems 
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of the inclusion or exclusion of the beholder. How can an 
aesthetic which embraces the performative independence 
of materials and objects deal with its beholders?
Literalism and the Theatrical
Art criticism can take solace in this discord. Fried’s famous 
text “Art and Objecthood,” published in ArtForum in June 
1967, highlighted the stakes involved in what was a crucial 
moment of activity in contemporary art (in Fried’s case, the 
stakes of American modernist sculpture), one that may reveal 
or indeed retroactively manifest itself in delicate aesthetic 
differences within continental philosophy today. The inherent 
conflicting consequences of the different positions attributed 
to speculative realism may be explored in the context of the 
multitude of conflicting interpretations as they arose from 
“Art and Objecthood.” For instance: mundane objects vs. art-
works, generic vs. specific, non-gesture vs. gesture, immanent 
vs. transcendent, contingency vs. purpose, hollowness vs. depth. 
The most central critical dichotomy for the purposes of this 
essay, however, is anti-anthropomorphism vs. anthropomorphism.
Reading “Art and Objecthood” again today, one is still struck 
by Fried’s polemical sting and blunt criticism of Donald Judd 
and Robert Morris’s minimalist work. Reiterating Fried’s 
basic charge, minimalism (or literalism, a term which Fried 
still prefers) operated as a kind of theatre, which brought 
out the wrong sort of anthropomorphic relationship compared 
to the more authentic high modern one. Distinct emphasis 
was placed on the relationship between the beholder and the 
work, meaning that any relationship within the work itself 
as a separate entity or separate mechanism had been made 
irrelevant. What mattered was the beholder’s experience 
within a relational situation and each experience became 
commensurable with every other, insofar as each duration 
of experience “was” the work so to speak. The situation of the 
viewer literally replaces or stands in for the work itself, which 
in Fried’s view brought out an inferior relationship. Fried’s 
key point is that the beholder’s subjective response cannot 
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stand in for the object itself—the pure experience of the work 
is not the work. Whilst the relevance of one’s conviction is 
subject to change, the self-determining autonomous nature 
of the work itself cannot be.
In contrast, relations in modernist works such as Morris 
Louis’s Alpha-Pi (1960) or Frank Stella’s early paintings do 
take place within the works’ objecthood. Their formal purpose, 
for Fried, is precisely to defeat and suspend meaninglessness 
and scepticism. The job of the artist is to construct an object—
entirely specific, unified, portable and self-sufficient—that 
offers more than the ordinary, which means finding in the 
historically contingent medium something more than simple 
contingency, discovering the sensual paradigm shift within 
the work itself. The minimalist/literalist projection took ob-
jecthood too far and made it literal, empty, and false, which 
put it “at war [with the] modernist sensibility as such.”53 This 
was a war which Fried lost of course—quite spectacularly 
as he admits—to the point where his polemical arguments 
against minimalism inadvertently influenced mainstream 
art’s subsequent rejection of the art object.54 This is what 
Lucy Lippard influentially summarised as conceptual art and 
system art’s dematerialisation of the art object.55
For the purposes of this essay, Fried’s importance lies in 
reminding us of the ontological difference between mod-
ernist aesthetic values and the new, contemporary view on 
objecthood. Is it not the case that the dividing line between 
Demonstration (in the sceptical sense) and Description 
53 Fried, “Art and Objecthood,” 830.
54 Fried, Four Honest Outlaws, 10-11. Fried is quite explicit here:
The important point ... is that my arguments did not prevail in the 
world of contemporary art; on the contrary, the overwhelming impetus 
of new art during the 1970s and indeed the 1980s ... was nothing but 
theatrical in my pejorative sense of the term, to the extent that it has 
sometimes seemed to me that I might inadvertently have contributed 
to that development.
55 See Lucy Lippard, Six Years: The Dematerialization of the Art Object from 
1966-1972 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), republished with a new 
introduction by the University of California Press in 1996.
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(in the high modernist sense) maps onto the dividing line 
between objecthood and art respectively?
By aligning objecthood with Demonstration, I could be 
called up for misunderstanding the usual reading here. For 
instance, according to Pil and Galia Kollectiv, Jan Verwoert’s 
2007 talk “Make the Prop Talk” spoke of a return to Fried’s 
theatricality through the performance of New Sculpture and 
how the use of generic sculptures was a vehicle for staging 
performative social practices.56 What is more, surely Fried’s 
hatred of minimalism and the focus on individual units 
makes this arch-modernist critic susceptible to a harsher 
critique than ever before.
Verwoert’s view is not unreasonable, for there is a deep link 
between Fried’s theatricality and New Sculpture. But that does 
not inevitably mean Fried’s endorsement of modernist criti-
cism should be rejected in this light. If one remembers, Fried’s 
life-long hatred of theatrical artworks was not because they 
were simply objects, although there is an element of truth to 
this (in Fried’s eyes, as in Greenberg’s, “a good work of art” is 
meaningless—the quality and significance of contemporary 
works of art lies in their historicised medium specificity). In-
stead, Fried charges minimalism with a two-step movement: 
it distances itself from commitment to internal relations 
whilst concomitantly the beholder’s situation becomes the 
exclusive focus of viewing the work, even demonstrating that 
the beholder’s situation actually becomes the work and vice-versa.
So the question we seek is this: what was it about the mini-
malist sensibility of a Judd “Block,” a Smith “Die” or a Morris 
“L Shape” that induced such a sceptical view in Fried’s criti-
cism? And, more to the point, why am I arguing that these 
sensibilities indicatively support variants of Demonstration 
as opposed to variants of Description? Even more to the point, 
how does this relate to the art world’s increasing embrace of 
material objects today?
56 Jan Verwoert, “Make the Prop Talk—On Putting Performance Back into 
Sculpture” in The Showroom Annual 2006/7, ed. The Showroom (London: The 
Showroom, 2008), 30-31.
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Fried was sensitive to two particular qualities of the mini-
malist enterprise: its literal, generic quality together with 
its hollowness. Both qualities mean more or less the same 
thing—the general requirement of the literal object is for 
it to be “just what it is,” utterly holistic and commanded by 
its totality. The emptiness of, say, Tony Smith’s Die (1962) or 
Judd’s Untitled (1966), with their hollowed-out interior, re-
vealed their explicit, epistemological intention, namely that 
of being pure surface standing in for nothing. Smith was not 
concerned with the discrete thing in itself but the literal empti-
ness of the thing, the fact that there was no-thing and nothing 
behind it. Fried puts it this way: literalism “is inexhaustible…
not because of any fullness—that is the inexhaustibility of 
art—but because there is nothing there to exhaust, it is end-
less the way a road might be: if it were circular, for example.”57 
The literalist work offers a diminished, impoverished source 
of aesthetic appreciation in that it literally is nothing and the 
thing demonstrates this. The modernist aesthetic not only 
privileges a work which is something, but also stresses that 
its aesthetic fullness operates in the relationship between 
the beholder’s and artist’s judgement of quality as a playing 
out within the limiting condition of the work.
More recently in a 2007 lecture, Stephen Melville elucidated 
on the nuances of Fried’s argument and revealed certain 
ontological assumptions inherent to it.58 Fried’s definition 
of “theatre” does not simply signify the presence of the 
gesture-less work and its architectural relational lighting 
within the exhibition, but is symptomatic of Judd’s and Mor-
ris’s profound epistemological declaration. Minimalism is a 
sceptical performance declaring that “nothing” is operating 
behind the facade of the inert work and that it can only ever 
57 Fried, “Art and Objecthood,” 831.
58 Stephen Melville, “Art and Objecthood”: A Lecture (Barcelona: Museu d’Art 
Contemporani de Barcelona, 2007). The booklet is available online here: 
http://www.macba.cat/uploads/20080915/QP_15_Melville.pdf (accessed 
August 20, 2013). I owe a great debt and sincere gratitude to Thomas Gokey, 
who introduced me to Melville’s text.
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be “what it is.”59 This is why the work itself becomes unnec-
essary for the beholder’s aesthetic judgment. The visionless 
realisation that “nothing is there” in reality only requires a 
literalist demonstration of an exhibited object to support it, 
the deliberate satisfaction of the beholder’s experience that 
there can be no barrier between appearance of the thing 
and the thing itself, whereas Fried believed that illusion was 
essential to the modernist conviction.60
A brief but rich quote from Melville on the links between 
Fried’s definition of theatre and Cavell’s essay “The Avoidance 
of Love: A Reading of King Lear” should be sufficient here:
Theatricality means ... something like what is left of theatre once the 
drama “itself” has ceased to count or vanished altogether. ... It begins 
with the old story of someone in the audience who rushes onto the 
stage to stop the terrible thing going on there. The butt of this joke is 
evidently someone deeply naive, who does not know what theater is, 
and the point of our telling it is presumably the satisfaction we take 
in knowing better than him. “But what mistake,” Cavell writes, has the 
yokel in the theater made, and what is our way? He thinks someone 
59 Here I am following Melville’s lead in conjunction with Cavell’s writings 
on “generic objects”: 
The object set before us and claiming to be there as a “specific object” 
Fried sees as all too clearly a variation on what Cavell describes as a 
“generic object” and understands as a crucial relay within the standard 
epistemological or skeptical performance.
Melville, “Art and Objecthood,” 12.
60 This is why Jeff Wall in his 2003 essay “Frames of Reference” stresses the 
importance of Fried’s concern with illusion in pictorial arts, both in paint-
ing and (much later) photography. Here is Wall on Fried’s understanding 
of literalism/objecthood:
I read “Art and Objecthood” to say that if an artwork simply cast its 
lot with physicality and immediacy, it lost its essential possibility as 
serious art and was reduced to a repetitious staging of the encounter 
between an object or group of objects in the world and a person looking 
at that object. It soon became obvious that it was arbitrary what the object 
was ... Fried showed that illusion is essential.
Jeff Wall, “Frames of Reference” in Selected Essays and Interviews (New York: 
The Museum of Modern Art, 2007), 178, my emphasis.
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is strangling someone. —But that is true. Othello is strangling Des-
demona. —Come on, come on; you know, he thinks that very man is 
putting out the light of that very woman now. —Yes, and that is exactly 
what is happening. —You’re not amusing. The point is that he thinks 
something is really happening, whereas nothing is really happening. 
It’s play acting. The woman will rise again to die another night. ... The 
trouble is that I really do not understand what I am being asked, and 
of course I am suggesting that you do not know either.61
 
Theatricality is not simply defined by the inclusion of the 
beholder as the literal criticism of a slickly polished, well-lit 
situation (a stupid point which I also fell for in my earlier 
essay)—rather theatricality is predominantly defined by its 
sceptical attitude emphasising that nothing is really going 
on when the play-acting is eliminated: when the work is no 
longer naive, no longer gullible, no longer full of transcendent 
depth, concealing a reality behind it. Instead, it is flattened 
into a literal immanent facade of itself. Therein, minimal-
ism only produces the ability to demonstrate, or to reduce 
everything to the appearance of the beholder.
So too is Cavell helpful in articulating that, for Fried, the 
objects of minimalism were not specific (that is, to be described 
in detail), but the result of being “generic objects”: they focus 
entirely on the beholder’s relationship to them. A literalist 
object simply “is,” but only insofar as it demonstrates that 
it also has a part which cannot be experienced. The lack of 
parts in a generic object requires the beholder to inspect them 
in a situation, rather than behold this appearance from the 
start. It is inherently meaningless, deliberately constructed 
to exude no depth, and is thoroughly expunged of any an-
thropomorphic traits. In this sense, any argument on the 
aesthetic effect generated by the literalist work cannot be 
grounded in its distinguishable traits or qualities (even the 
61 Melville, “Art and Objecthood,” 9, italics original emphasis, italics and bold 
my emphases; missing quotation marks in the original. Melville’s citations 
are from Stanley Cavell, “The Avoidance of Love: A Reading of King Lear” 
in Must We Mean What We Say? A Book of Essays, updated ed. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 328.
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trait of quality is expunged) as all aesthetic effects generated 
by any beholder’s perspective become commensurable with 
that of any other. Cavell’s “generic objects” are not presented 
for their features, but specifically presented without features, 
which forces the beholder to look for them, without finding them. 
The moment the beholder moves, “the ‘parts’ disappear, or 
else we see what had been hidden from view”—which in turn 
bequeaths new hidden parts to be revealed by the beholder 
and a new view from within the situation.62
As an added side effect, each generic object becomes sub-
stitutable in equal measure: 
The “generic object” is defined in its employment by its lack of features, 
and so is not arguable in the way we can argue over our recognition 
of fully-featured objects ... specific objects, in Cavell’s sense, are dis-
tinguishable through their close contact with other specific objects, 
generic objects merely substitute for one another without establishing 
any other contrasts.63
In a brief note, Melville makes the correct statement (in my 
opinion) that Duchamp’s Fountain (1917) is unique in dis-
counting its qualities and features in favour of a disconcerting 
generic frame within which all content can be considered 
substitutable. In this light, he suggests, Fried’s complaint about 
objecthood was not about objects at all, but the “no-thing that 
we do not see, thus not a synonym for ‘object’ but something 
more like its opposite.”64
Bernstein’s treatment of Fried’s critique (and of Judd spe-
cifically) is even more explicit on the matter. The anthropo-
morphic power of signification within traditional painting 
was (for Judd) exhausted and the future of its signification 
“required elimination.”65 Bernstein argues that Judd’s “art and 
62 Stanley Cavell, The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and 
Tragedy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 302.
63 Melville, “Art and Objecthood,” 12.
64 Ibid., 13.
65 Bernstein, Against Voluptuous Bodies, 128.
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criticism ultimately belong to the tradition of Enlightenment 
rationalism” and that the
material item … no longer depends for its holding in the visual field 
through anthropomorphic assumptions, but literally appears as an 
object, a mere thing, in the same way that natural objects appear for 
the natural scientist as constituted through quantities that escape the 
vagaries of human perceivings and doings. Judd wishes to achieve for 
artworks an analogue of the perspectiveless appearing that is the telos of 
absolute knowing: a view from nowhere.66
Note here the crucial resemblances between Judd’s intentions 
and Demonstration. As Bernstein rightfully grasps from the 
consequences of Fried’s argument, Judd wanted to eliminate 
the descriptive aesthetic, morphised assumptions we make 
about artworks and instead craft a literal encounter with the 
object as it appears, without allusion, without depth, without 
essence. The literalist object would be fully known, within the 
beholder’s “perspectiveless appearing”: another way of saying 
that the object’s appearance (all it is) can be known with or 
without the beholder’s perspective, privileging the ultimate 
reality of human perspective all by itself.
The correlationist rub reappears. It is the contingency of 
the beholder which requires this “nothing” to be known and 
demonstrated, as if they alone were capable of realising the 
literal truth of the nothingness upon which the aesthetic 
experience rests. Thus Demonstration, as I have described 
it in the aesthetic sense, becomes an impoverished anthropo-
morphism. There is no absolute knowing; only a view from nowhere, 
which still is a human view from nowhere. This view transforms 
something with substantial anthropomorphic depth into a 
no-thing, deliberately constructed not to be anthropomor-
phised, precisely as it eliminates any visual projection of 
human characteristics.
The question that follows is whether minimalism achieves 
its Demonstration. But as Bernstein writes, “art cannot ut-
terly remove the viewer from the viewed, but it can aspire to 
66 Bernstein, Against Voluptuous Bodies, 128, my emphasis.
Speculations V
342
neutralise viewing by decentering the viewer and disorienting 
and dehumanizing the visual field.”67 This neutralisation is 
the chief method of literalism’s broad attempt to create an 
aesthetic anti-anthropomorphism. It seeks to demonstrate the 
neutralisation of the beholder’s appearance so as to render 
explicit, or present to them, how the work is constituted by 
nothing, for nothing, because the situation of both work and 
beholder (which is only the beholder’s appearance) is pure 
surface. It is this sense of demonstrable “absence” that Fried 
has been actively fighting against throughout his career in 
favour of anthropomorphic presentness.68
The principle problem of New Sculpture is this anti-anthro-
pomorphic attitude of exhibiting works as situational, literal, 
essenceless surfaces, rather than exhibiting works which al-
lude to the hidden essence of things through the beholder’s 
naiveté. This is why Fried is vital for contemporary aesthetics, 
because his critique in “Art and Objecthood” works in exactly 
this way. It becomes problematic for New Sculpture to both endorse 
the independence of things, whilst at the same time constructing 
works which have historically neutralised the beholder’s situation. 
We are, in effect, talking about two different types of aesthetic 
relation: one pure surface, the other pure morphism.
67 Bernstein, Against Voluptuous Bodies, 128, my emphasis.
68 To reiterate, OOO is quite a novel realism, insofar as its realism is not 
conditioned by a common sense, perspectiveless reality of things “simply 
as they are.” Rather, OOO is an ontology of real essential objects, which have 
their own modes of perception and relationships towards other objects, or 
what Ian Bogost calls “metaphorism.” See Ian Bogost, Alien Phenomenology, 
or What It’s Like to Be a Thing (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2012), 61-83.
The being of real objects is defined not by being simply real in a view 
from nowhere, but being real in having a view from somewhere, i.e. 
from something real. With ontology being the study of what there is, 
OOO simply extends this insight into all irreducible units—which is 
to say all units are capable of a perspective of some description, and 
reality is the total sum of these entities coupled with their perspec-
tives. This is what makes OOO a particular kind of post-correlationist 
philosophy, insofar as it extends the correlate—minus the privileging 
of demonstrative reason—to all entities and all relations of being (or 
at the very least, it decentralises the correlate but keeps its finitude).
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Fried argues that Minimalism can never entirely shrug off 
internal anthropomorphism, and so it has to disguise it, even 
dissimulate its inherent anthropomorphism into an empty 
shell of art; or as he states: “what is wrong with literalist work 
is not that it is anthropomorphic but that the meaning and, 
equally, the hiddenness of its anthropomorphism are incurably 
theatrical.”69 The result of this endeavour manifests itself in 
a work which has the opposite effect of anything resembling 
an OOO object. The structuring of the work, together with 
the situation it generates, utterly exhausts itself in its effect 
on the beholder, or as Bernstein puts it so wonderfully again, 
minimalist works create what might be termed “the art effect” without 
anything substantial corresponding to that effectivity ... If the sense of 
such works is the situation they compose, then they are not separate or 
independent from the viewer, and they are relational: poles or elements 
of a relational situation. Being only elements of a situation, deriving 
their identity from the situation they create, minimalist works lack 
any “in-side,” any internal complexity or depth that would token their 
separateness or autonomy ... They simulate the manner of an aesthetic 
encounter without there being anything of significance to encounter.70
Whilst pages and pages of academic sweat have been spilled 
since the fallout of Fried’s 1967 essay, the aesthetic stakes 
which he diagnosed still hover precariously in the arts and 
will continue to do so. This is not to say that Fried’s diagnosis 
was fool-proof, only that he highlighted the fault-lines of the 
most important schism in the recent history of art. This is the 
ongoing problem with art practice attempting to justify itself 
as anti-correlationist, via foregrounding the independence 
of autonomous things: by abandoning anthropomorphism, it 
removes any “in-side” of that complex autonomy from the very 
start. Devoid of any characteristics which may be morphised 
by the beholder, the autonomous thing becomes arbitrary in 
the wake of eliminating givenness as such.
69 Fried, “Art and Objecthood,” 827.
70 Bernstein, Against Voluptuous Bodies, 133.
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Likewise, the immediate challenges that OOO brings in the 
name of aesthetics (not just to current philosophy or the arts 
but also to already existing models of anti-anthropocentric 
theory), consist in the injunction to return to an anti-literal 
mode of conviction, with the necessary addition that humans 
are no less capable of an anti-literal perspective than desks, 
motherboards and ice-laden comets. In other words, what 
real characteristics (or qualities) of objects allow other ob-
jects to be morphised by them? The task then is to show this 
continuity, and to show how such an alternative, anti-literal 
aesthetics of autonomous objects can be carved out of Fried’s 
historical and critical trajectory since “Art and Objecthood.”
Metaphysical Objects of Presentness
Against the viewer’s duration of experience and the liter-
alism of objecthood’s strange, exhaustive stage presence, 
Fried defines the authentic experience of anti-literal art as 
“presentness”—yet another term and worldview he shares 
with Cavell—and, much later, as “absorption.” Both terms 
express a Kantian delight in the finite miscommunication 
and disinterest of aesthetic experience within the fullness of 
anthropomorphic appreciation. Presentness is described as 
“metaphorical [but] (not literal) instantaneousness,”71 where 
“at every moment the work itself is wholly manifest.”72 In the 
first instance the use of the term is an explicit rebuttal of the 
literalist manifestation of presence, designed to expose the 
“bad” anthropomorphism of minimalism. The literalist object 
of presence simply is, insofar as it deliberately has no essence, 
whereas the absorptive object of presentness attempts the 
much harder task of bringing the hidden reality of the world 
before the involuntary givenness of the anthropomorphic 
beholder. In this vein, Cavell says of painting and photography:
71 Fried, Four Honest Outlaws, 10.
72 Fried, “Art and Objecthood,” 832.
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To maintain conviction in our connection with reality, to maintain our 
presentness, painting accepts the recession of the world. Photography 
maintains the presentness of the world by accepting our absence from 
it. The reality in a photograph is present to me while I am not present 
to it; and a world I know, and see, but to which I am nevertheless not 
present ... is a world past.73
Thus, for example, the presentness in painting for Cavell 
“would be painting’s latest effort to maintain its conviction 
in its own power to establish connection with reality—by 
permitting us presentness to ourselves, apart from which 
there is no hope for a world.”74
The differences between the works of presence and present-
ness can be traced in the differences between Demonstration 
and Description in relation to how the beholder is meant 
to critically relate to a work. The work of presentness exists 
as a whole, a unity of instants which need not require the 
beholder’s presence to complete it. Unlike the “bad” anthro-
pomorphic literalist artwork of presence, the autonomy of the 
work does not require the beholder to exist for what it is. For 
every moment that the work exists, it does so instantaneously, 
maintaining as much conviction in the beholder as it did 
in the previous moment. Anthropomorphic description is 
all we have to relate to such an aesthetics of presentness in 
a world whose objects continue to exist without us and re-
cede interminably. Any aesthetic quality must be generated 
from the mechanism of the work itself, only the beholder 
must be present for this quality and may have the ability to 
be enthralled by it. In doing so, the beholder projects their 
inherent, finite perceptive limitations onto the work of art. 
In contrast, a work that exudes presence is only committed 
to a surface of presence taking place in the beholder, with 
nothing behind it.
By what criteria must the work appeal to different treat-
ments of the beholder? For Fried, the anti-theatrical artwork 
73 Stanley Cavell, The World Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology of Film (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), 23.
74 Cavell, The World Viewed, 23.
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is defined by its refusal to acknowledge the beholder’s pres-
ence, whilst paradoxically remaining worthy of being pres-
ent. The aesthetics of presentness is afforded asymmetrically, 
when the beholder is present for the artwork, yet the deep essence 
of the artwork is never present for the beholder as such. Now, it 
can be said that this is exactly what Judd sought to do, with 
the use of simple natural shapes that attempt to “naturalise” 
the beholder’s vision, yet this is the crux of the reading given 
here: the focus on neutralising the beholder’s epistemological 
vision in the ontological world, against the focus on the beholder 
accepting the recession of the ontological world.
Fried’s life-long project as a critic has been to trace those 
historical moments when variants of theatricality and anti-
theatricality surface in and out of a medium’s convention. 
In the same manner that Fried and Cavell’s high modernist, 
historical conviction was unabashedly correlationist, so too 
is presentness: the world of presentness is only internal, and 
without us it is nothing but absent. But my central aim here 
is to radicalise presentness and follow a similar anti-presence 
metaphysics as outlined by OOO and Description more 
broadly: a metaphysics of non-human aesthetic description. 
What is needed is an abandonment of anthropocentrism 
and an endorsement of anthropomorphism, latent in Fried’s 
endorsement of human limitations, which brings with it an 
understanding of various isomorphisms within the realm 
of objects. What we do not need in art is an impoverished 
anthropomorphism masquerading as an anthropocentric 
generic object: art objects need to get specific. As Jane Bennett 
puts it in Vibrant Matter:
A touch of anthropomorphism, then, can catalyze a sensibility that 
finds a world filled not with ontologically distinct categories of beings 
(subjects and objects) but with variously composed materialities that 
form confederations. In revealing similarities across categorical divides 
and lighting up structural parallels between material forms in “nature” 
and those in “culture,” anthropomorphism can reveal isomorphisms.75 
75 Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2010), 99.
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But unlike with Bennett’s rejection of substantial form in 
favour of relational, vital matter, there does exist a similar-
ity between Harman’s allure and Fried’s paradigmatic shift 
of the anthropomorphic senses. We may only have a finite 
morphised access to the world, but that does not preclude 
real morphised relationships happening beyond and within 
that access.
An authentic artwork, present to the beholder, is never “noth-
ing” for Fried, but instead is unveiled in a perpetual creation 
of itself as something intense, essential and inexhaustible, 
and not as a thing of literal presence in duration. Similarly, 
if the literalist work has an obsession with the duration of 
the subject’s experience of the relational situation (and not 
the work), the anthropomorphic experience of presentness 
within the high modernist work “has no duration.”76 The 
work of presentness cannot be completely contingent on 
the beholder in order to work, but Fried’s more controversial 
suggestion refuses minimalism’s conviction that the artwork 
is contingent on time to function.77
Consider then, the striking similarity in the following quote 
from Harman’s 2011 essay “The Road to Objects”:
According to the object-oriented model only the present exists: only 
objects with their qualities, locked into whatever their duels of the mo-
ment might be. In that sense, time seems to be illusory ... time does not 
exist simply because only the present ever exists.78
76 Fried, “Art and Objecthood,” 832.
77 The literature on minimalism’s inherent relationship to time is vast. Suf-
fice it to say that a minimalist work as such is contingent on time, for its 
manifestation is dependent on repetition and infinite configuration. For 
instance Morris’s Untitled (Three L-beams) (1965) requires the pieces to be 
placed in varying positions, so that beholders are unable to view the work in 
identical fashion. Once again it is the neutralisation of a fixed point of view 
which marks the passing of time in continuation with the presence of the 
work. For a more relevant, extended historical analysis of this effect, together 
with a deeply critical exposition of Fried see Pamela Lee, Chronophobia: On 
Time in the Art of the 1960s (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006).
78 Graham Harman, “The Road to Objects,” continent. (2011), 3:1, 179, my 
emphasis.
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Harman’s anti-durational claim, no matter how controversial, 
fits his object-oriented ontology precisely because this ontol-
ogy only contains objects in the present, not objects grounded 
by the primacy of time, space and relationality.79 Essential 
objects come first, and the conflicts between them account for 
the illusion of time. Time and space are produced by objects, or 
to be more specific, they occur as withdrawn relationships 
in-between the presences of each object’s wake. Harman’s 
intervention has been exactly this point: that all relations are 
contingent on objects, and never the other way round.
Fried’s justification for an aesthetic presentness is an odd 
one, and is never elucidated into a full blown metaphysical 
claim with much depth (he is an art critic, poet and historian, 
not a philosopher). Nevertheless, these brazen descriptions 
are meant to offer somewhat tenuous attempts at bridging 
Harman’s Leibnizian intervention and Fried’s conception 
of presentness. It is my conviction that Harman’s object-
oriented philosophy provides the metaphysics adequate to 
Fried’s criticism and, conversely, that Harman’s philosophy 
warrants a radicalised Friedian approach to art. With this in 
mind, I now turn to a final discussion of Fried’s theoretical 
elaborations, to push forward how isomorphism may operate 
in contemporary art.
79 There is a notable analogy in science, in the para-academic work of theo-
retical physicist Julian Barbour. Barbour has, independently from academia, 
worked on a counter-factual history of theoretical physics, where the adoption 
of Einstein’s theory of general relativity is replaced by the earlier theory of 
relativity as developed by Ernst Mach. Barbour advocates the controversial 
and tendentious view of a timeless physics, where time does not exist, thus 
circumventing irresolvable issues attached to Einstein’s theory (for example 
attempts to prove causative agents such as dark energy). For Barbour, reality 
is not partly contingent on the external existence of a space-time dimen-
sion. Instead, its changes can be explained entirely from the actual content 
of matter, the configuration of which is subject to change within the opera-
tions of timeless matter itself. For further reading, see Julian Barbour, The 
End of Time: The Next Revolution in our Understanding of the Universe (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999).
Robert Jackson – The Anxiousness of Objects and Artworks 2
349
Part 3
Iso-Morphism: Empathic Projection within Non-Humans
As I argued in my earlier essay, presentness within an artwork 
operates when the work deliberately withdraws from an 
explicit method of relational execution and never attempts 
to seek out the beholder’s presence, whilst at the same time 
being paradoxically constructed by the beholder’s anthropo-
morphic finitude. For Fried this manifests itself in behold-
ers being entirely absorbed in their actions, feelings and 
thoughts, completely unaware of their situation vis-à-vis the 
artwork. Presentness thus institutes a “supreme fiction” in 
the beholder absorbed in and persuaded by the work’s depth 
such that they are convinced they were not “really there, or ... 
had not been taken into account.”80 The work has to convey 
the illusion of a pictorial depth, a supreme fiction, which 
surpasses and trumps its material basis. This is not to say that 
an inanimate, stretched canvas covered in dry chemicals is 
not real. Rather, for Fried, the aesthetic encounter is defined 
by critically showing how the beholder’s representation of the 
work trumps its material basis, its thingliness. As soon as either 
the material basis of the work itself or the beholder’s presence 
is deliberately made explicit (that is, the work is no longer 
needed and becomes contingent purely on the beholder to 
exist), theatricality ensues and absorption is cut short.81 As 
soon as any hint of the figure’s obliviousness is found to be 
staged or acted, the ontological primacy of absorption makes 
room for a literal impression on the beholder, ruining the 
aesthetic effect, exhausting the experience and retaining 
only appearance.
80 Fried, Absorption and Theatricality, 96.
81 Fried describes the following Diderotian shifts in the construction of the 
tableau, which indicate how subtle changes can transform an absorptive 
painting into a theatrical one: “action is replaced by posing, expression is 
replaced by grimace, grace and naiveté by mannerism, and the entire paint-
ing is inflected by falsity.” Fried, Four Honest Outlaws, 169.
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Empathic Projection: A History
Before I move on to Fried’s writings on the work of contem-
porary artists Douglas Gordon and Anri Sala, I feel that a 
punishingly brief summary of Fried’s published work on 
art history is necessary in order to give the reader a taste for 
how Fried understands how anti-theatrical presentness has 
been and continues to be historically opposed to theatrical-
ity. This summary will not follow the chronological order of 
Fried’s publications on the issue, but rather, for the reader’s 
ease, the chronological order of the artworks and periods 
discussed. In doing so, I hope to elucidate Cavell and Fried’s 
notion of empathic projection, which will become essential 
for my speculative intervention into Fried’s work, for the 
operation of empathy lends itself to a nuanced discussion 
of aesthetics within the framework of OOO (that said, I do 
not endorse that it is the only method).
In The Moment of Caravaggio, Fried locates the initial inven-
tion of the absorptive “mechanism” in the early Caravaggio’s 
Penitent Magdalen from 1596-97. The work depicts a young 
woman who is entirely devoid of outward expression and 
completely absorbed in her thoughts, actions, and feelings. 
As opposed to the “spectacular” representations of Magda-
lene which depicted her in a state of “histrionic remorse,”82 
Caravaggio managed to retrieve this context and to force 
this imagery into the present moment of the immediate 
everyday: by inviting the beholder to “see the woman in his 
painting as wholly absorbed in painful thoughts and feel-
ings—thoughts and feelings that, the painting suggests, lie 
too deep for expression in any more demonstrative form.”83 
This discovery is significant for Fried, insofar as it unleashes 
within the beholder an “intense inwardness,” and the “dis-
covery of the basic truth that human beings tend strongly to 
82 Fried, Four Honest Outlaws, 207. Here Fried is thinking of Magdalen’s 
theatrical portrayal in Titian’s Penitent Magdalen of 1533.
83 Michael Fried, The Moment of Caravaggio (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2010), 76.
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project—that by and large they cannot not project—a convic-
tion of inwardness.”84 Subsequently Caravaggio exploits this 
discovery, this “moment,” throughout his short (and eventful) 
artistic career, by repeatedly evoking the beholder’s inward-
ness as projected onto the work.
Fried’s most well-known historical trilogy Absorption and 
Theatricality (1980), Courbet’s Realism (1990) and Manet’s 
Modernism (1996) recounts, starting with the mid-eighteenth 
century, similar but more explicit pictorial issues which were 
already at stake in Denis Diderot’s pre-modern celebration 
of absorption and raised prominently in Chardin’s Young 
Student Drawing (1733-8) and The House of Cards (1737). The 
internal dynamic of these works, and the Diderotian project 
as a whole, reached its climax in Edouard Manet’s revolu-
tionary Dejeuner sur l’herbe (1862-63). The success of the 
woman’s gaze and her “facingness” subjects the beholder in 
a strikingly non-absorptive manner, to such an extent that 
some acknowledgement of the beholder became central to 
the ambitious French tradition of modern art, and especially 
Manet.85 Naturally, this opposition became an issue once again 
in “Art and Objecthood,” where the historical pressures of 
literalism/theatricality posed similar issues for modern art 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s, as discussed earlier.
But at the turn of the twenty-first century, Fried forcibly 
moved back into the territories of contemporary art criticism: 
first with the 2008 publication Why Photography Matters as Art 
as Never Before, where to the art world’s surprise (and Fried’s 
own) he argued that the artistic and ontological projects of 
anthropomorphism, as associated with high modernism, were 
being taken up once more in contemporary photography, 
albeit for vastly different reasons. Jeff Wall’s Adrian Walker, 
Artist, Drawing from a Specimen in a Laboratory in the Dept. of 
Anatomy at the University of British Columbia (1992) is one of 
the more famous examples; a piece which seemingly cap-
84 Fried, The Moment of Caravaggio, 76-77, my emphasis.
85 Michael Fried, Manet’s Modernism: Or, The Face of Painting in the 1860s 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996), 405.
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tures the absorption of the draftsman completely unrelated 
to the world around him. Despite this refreshing turn, Fried 
admits that some theatricality is manifest in the presentness 
of Wall’s pieces (i.e. the subjects are posing for Wall and the 
beholder) and brands this view “to-be-seenness,” a sort of 
“good” or “better” theatricality.86
More intriguingly still, Fried’s most recent and largely 
ignored publication Four Honest Outlaws points towards the 
beginnings of a non-human anti-literal presentness within 
the work of artists working today. It presents what is in Fried’s 
eyes a resurgence of the modernist conviction, even in pri-
marily temporal media that would have been previously 
considered utterly theatrical (such as video projection). In 
what I consider to be a long overdue admission, Fried briefly 
suggests that the vitality of the modernist movement is not 
tied to historical, conventional media.87 In “Art and Object-
hood,” Fried’s largely formalist view, much like Greenberg’s, 
was that theatre operated between the arts, which is to suggest 
that anything between the historical media of the arts (such as 
sculpture or painting) could only be confined to objecthood.88 
But in Four Honest Outlaws, and on evidence of the four artists 
under interrogation, Fried is no longer persuaded by the sug-
gestion that the historical nature of the medium functions so 
exclusively in either Sala’s video work or the interdisciplinary 
work of Gordon (Marioni’s paintings and Ray’s sculptures 
are not discussed in this context). Fried is certain that these 
artists are investigating the absorptive mechanism in new 
vital methods that escape the traditional media of modern-
ism. This is a notable and important development in Fried’s 
later criticism which should not be ignored.
86 Michael Fried, Why Photography Matters as Art as Never Before (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2008), 58-59.
87 Fried, Four Honest Outlaws, 204.
88 This is the respective famous passage: 
The concepts of quality and value—and to the extent that these are central 
to art, the concept of art itself —are meaningful, or wholly meaningful, 
only within the individual arts. What lies between the arts is theatre.
Fried, “Art and Objecthood,” 831.
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But what is far more important is a certain speculative 
reading which emanates from Fried’s account of Gordon’s 
video installation Play Dead: Real Time (2003). Gordon’s work 
depicts the repeated action of Minnie, an elephant, who is 
commanded to “play dead,” that is, she sits down, plays dead, 
stands up and walks in a circle. Fried’s own viewing took place 
at the New York Gagosian, Chelsea, in March 2003, where 
the arrangement of the projections consisted of two semi-
transparent large screens positioned in an angle of ninety 
degrees to each other, with a television monitor on the floor.
In the first instance, Fried reflects on the appearance that 
Gordon’s elephant “may be described as absorbed in what 
she is doing.”89 In Fried’s eyes, Minnie’s response to the call 
of her trainer, absent from the video piece, exudes a self-
determination of the subject, entirely focused on the rules 
that are given:
the fact that Play Dead depicts an animal (and such an animal) puts 
a new and different complexion on the whole topic of the subject’s 
awareness of being beheld, and a fortiori of being photographed or 
filmed. That is, we cannot doubt—the projections leave no room for 
doubt—that Minnie was aware of her trainer and the others sharing 
the gallery space with her. But in what precisely, with respect to the 
issues that interest us, did that awareness consist? For example, is it 
remotely conceivable that she understood that she was being filmed 
for subsequent exhibition? Obviously not. Nor do her actions ... convey 
the least sense of self-consciousness, mannerism, or theatricality.90
Part of the delight about Fried’s reading of Play Dead is the 
difficulty of the questions he himself poses whilst trying 
to honestly account for the empathic nature of Gordon’s 
piece. He is, as he admits, “on ontologically shaky ground 
here” in attempting to speak of what Minnie is absorbed by 
in the piece.91 Yet that “shaky ground,” I claim, is only Fried 
89 Fried, Four Honest Outlaws, 171.
90 Ibid., 173.
91 Ibid.
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wrestling with the fact that the anthropomorphic tropes of 
anti-literal absorption can be witnessed and extended beyond 
the modernist limits of human sensibility. All of the aesthetic 
effects of quality that Fried endorses and promotes are clearly 
and utterly evident in Gordon’s Play Dead, within something 
undoubtedly non-human, direct and real, and yet never a 
lesser subject of empathic acknowledgement.
Who thought that a critic like Fried, the arch-reactionary 
critic who supposedly despises the anti-modern fallout of 
post-formalism, could find a video projection of an elephant 
playing dead so utterly captivating? Yet he is right. Gordon’s 
work is so inexorably strange, haunting, intensely anthro-
pomorphising, that it fosters empathy as much as any work 
playing up to human subjectivity. The beholder is ultimately 
absorbed in “an intense but also in the present instance largely 
gratuitous or unearned emotional response to Minnie.”92 
Notice for example the intense expressiveness of Minnie’s 
eyes, the willingness she depicts in order to obey the rules 
of the absent trainer, the “freakishness but also the nobility 
of her massive head,” her fixed, expressionless, waiting stare, 
and her effort-laden determination to simply stand up.93 The 
success of Play Dead lies within the beholder’s finite projec-
tion of Minnie’s own absorption, which, quoting Fried again, 
“elicit[s] such feelings, and … promote[s] a consciousness in 
the viewer of his or her tendency to project empathically.”94 
This is to suggest that beholders project onto and into the work 
their real empathy towards the non-human subject. They do 
not just “see” Minnie, or possess a discernible “identification” 
of Minnie, but empathically project a sensual morphism 
“with” Minnie, even though Minnie is not “literally” there, 
and especially not as a literal thing in a situation. Human 
beholder map their traits onto Minnie’s own present situ-
ation, without this mapping occurring explicitly. Fried also 
notices this mechanism at work in Gordon’s 10 ms –1 (1994) 
92 Fried, Four Honest Outlaws, 175.
93 Ibid., 176.
94 Ibid.
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and especially Anri Sala’s Time After Time (2003), a video de-
picting an emaciated horse, completely abandoned by the 
side of a road in Tirana;95 a piece which “all but defies the 
viewer not to empathize.”96
The crucial question that Fried must tackle is what separates 
Gordon and Sala’s video pieces from other similarly-minded 
theatrical video works, which usually require the subject’s 
personal experience to be entirely part of the literal situation 
(one has in mind Bruce Nauman or the ghastly theatrical video 
work of Bill Viola here). Here Fried is still adamant that the 
work makes no appeal to different subject positions, or to an 
“experience standing in for the work,” as theatricality would 
aver.97 Instead the effect of empathic projection is built into 
the work from the start as a specific effect, which is to say that 
“the emphasis falls on the structurally imposed recognition 
of the ‘mechanism,’ not the nuances of a particular subject’s 
personal experience of it.”98
One might be tempted to assert that only humans could 
be indicative of this phenomenon due to the finite universal 
framework of sensation which they share qua living things. 
But on further inspection, I am not convinced. For instance, 
consider the equally absorptive, equally anti-theatrical com-
putational artwork Avec Determination (2000-2001) by the 
algorithmic artist Antoine Schmitt. In this procedural piece, 
the artist constructs an automated struggle, a procedural tor-
ture of sorts: the struggle of an algorithmic creature caged in 
a coded box, beholden to a gravitational pull—an ever present 
limit, never released. There is of course a shift of medium from 
time-based video to a computer algorithm, a puzzle solver, a 
95 10 ms ⁻1, an early piece by Gordon, is a video loop depicting a fragment of a 
medical film, where a World War I soldier is utterly shaken by psychological 
damage and who, like Minnie in Play Dead, also struggles to stand up and 
walk with determination. Whilst Fried admits that Gordon’s mechanism in 
10 ms ⁻1 borders on the level of being sadistic, it is nonetheless capable of 
aesthetic conviction and absorption regardless of the beholder’s reaction to it.
96 Fried, Four Honest Outlaws, 211.
97 Ibid., 177.
98 Ibid., 210.
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step-by-step procedure, a recipe. Each creature that Schmitt 
codes has different goals—to stand, to walk, to jump, to step, 
to resist, to push—and they are impeded in real time, by other 
algorithmically constructed forces continually acting on it 
in the present. The goals are determined, but the autonomous 
reality of the creatures’ actions are never perfect nor the same. 
Built with intention and intensity, the other algorithmic rules 
which surround it force errors of judgement (much like the 
rules given to Minnie). This is then a much more explicit 
form of the autonomous mechanism Fried favours.
As Schmitt states, we are but helpless spectators, entirely 
beholden to the algorithm’s movement—the slightest shift of 
the mouse perturbs its journey for the worse we might add, 
smashing it into the sides without damage. It is invincible and 
yet tortured. “For each of these creatures,” Schmitt states, “I try 
to approach a certain essence of being ... The function of the 
image is to enable us to apprehend their mode of being. The 
interaction itself is only a minimal link between their reality 
and ours.”99 Like Gordon’s Play Dead (and for entirely differ-
ent reasons), Avec Determination commands our projection, 
and is just as intense. Like Minnie, the role of the beholder 
is sealed off from its struggle, yet we behold it anyway—and 
we do so by witnessing the work’s strange perpetual creation 
of itself. The reality of the mechanically inanimate cannot be 
disregarded in modernist conviction, or as Schmitt candidly 
muses, “they are silent creatures, struggling against their 
environment, which we are a part of.”100
This is all the more startling insofar as Cavell’s descrip-
tive theory of empathic projection in his famous The Claim 
of Reason was originally written to stave off external world 
scepticism and mind scepticism: the point that we cannot 
reducibly prove self-consciousness in other human creatures, 
or doubt it, in any case. Cavell described empathic projec-
tion as a “dummy concept for something that must be the 
99 Antoine Schmitt, “avec determination (with determination),” Antoine 
Schmitt Website http://www.gratin.org/as/avecdetermination/ (accessed 
February 1, 2013).
100 Ibid.
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basis of my claims to read the other.”101 In other words, it is 
perfectly plausible that the sceptic can doubt the existence 
of other minds, or other subjects, but empathic projection 
nonetheless suggests that we acknowledge the existence of 
something specific outside of ourselves, even though it is pro-
jected and unknowable. In Cavell’s words, another human 
could just possibly be “an automaton, a zombie, an android, 
an angel, an alien of some unheard of kidney,” yet whatever 
it is, we find ourselves empathically projecting, or finding a 
common trait in that external thing, even if our knowledge 
about it eventually turns out to be incorrect.102
It cannot be a coincidence that the withdrawn nature of the 
phenomenological object plays an identical role in Harman’s 
philosophy, not simply in the way that acknowledgement 
“goes beyond” knowledge, but also in the added suggestion 
that humans do not play the starring role in empathically 
projecting their inwardness towards other things.103 The 
only thing that stops us from perpetually empathising with 
specific human and non-human objects is the banality of 
the everyday as expressed in the objecthood of mundane art. 
What is needed then is an aesthetics of the isomorphic. This is an 
aesthetics of asymmetrical causation, where the inwardness 
of objects or units corresponds to their local neighbourhood, 
blind only to themselves. Following Harman’s intervention, 
what is crucial in isomorphism is the ability for the aesthetic 
effect to occur in a non-anthropocentric manner, without the 
acknowledgment of a human beholder; i.e. the primordial 
logics of projection, absorption and presentness occur be-
tween neighbour cat and catnip, sodium and chloride, lemon 
juice and salmon flesh, wheat and flame, as well as the work 
of art and beholder. Any such beholding thing cannot “step 
outside” empathic projection, much like the correlationist, 
who cannot escape their own correlation. This is a direct 
consequence of Description.
101 Cavell, The Claim of Reason, 440.
102 Ibid., 423-24.
103 Ibid., 428.
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The necessary question that must be asked in light of Play 
Dead and Time After Time is how other objects themselves also 
empathically project. Is this “mechanism” to which Fried 
ascribes such an importance capable of a projection all by 
itself and if so, can artists take advantage of it? The important 
point to emphasise here is that whilst human beholders are 
locked into their own traits of projection, such other isomor-
phic projections need not correspond to narrowly human 
attributes. The function of “projection” in isomorphism takes 
on a simple form of self-determination. To take the liberty of 
paraphrasing Fried, by virtue of its determinate essence, an 
object cannot avoid projecting its own aesthetic inwardness 
onto other objects, yet it also cannot avoid accepting the 
“presentness” of recession, which traps its contents.
There is something here in Fried’s later work, a wider 
metaphysical significance of his theory of absorption and 
presentness that needs to be fast-forwarded into fuelling the 
current technologies of the ambiguous. Perhaps a twenty-first 
century aesthetics will not be about a return to objects in the 
literal sense, but about a realist explosion of isomorphisms: 
any mindless, inanimate, cephalic or a-cephalic beholder in 
its withdrawn inwardness has the potential to be, in a realist 
manner, absorbed through its own projected presentness of 
withdrawal.
Post Script
The Wittgenstein epigraph is taken up by Fried in Four Hon-
est Outlaws to illustrate the consequences of another work by 
Douglas Gordon. B-Movie (1995) is a small fragmented video, 
similar to Gordon’s 10 ms ⁻1, where an upturned fly struggles 
to flip to its natural state. The beholder empathically realises 
the fly’s pain through their own inwardness. Following Har-
man, could we not realise that the fly may project its own 
inwardness onto us, during our darkest struggles?
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The Alien Aesthetic of Speculative 
Realism, or, How Interpretation Lost 
the Battle to Materiality and How 
Comfortable this Is to Humans
Roberto Simanowski
City University of Hong Kong
Anyone interested in the central issues of media studies will also have an interest in specu-
lative realism or object-oriented ontology, particularly when 
it comes to the question of the extent to which the respective 
subject of research has a life of its own. Media studies and 
speculative realism both discuss whether agency is with the 
people using an object or technology or with the objects and 
technologies themselves. While speculative realism may ask 
“Do people kill people or does the gun kill people?” media 
studies debates whether technologies represent social practices 
or are imposing their own constraints and rules on humans. 
Presuming the latter—i.e., that agency lies with the gun and 
the acting media—represents a perspective based on the in-
dependent existence of technologies and objects. Voting for 
the former corresponds to an anthropological point of view 
or to an anthropocentric one, as speculative realism terms it.
The pejorative connotation of this characterisation is in-
tended; speculative realism objects to any privilege humans 
may claim over entities. It does so even if the privilege is 
actually a disadvantage, if, for example, one assumes—in the 
philosophical tradition since Immanuel Kant’s Copernican 
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Revolution—that objects only exist in relation to human 
perception, that they are nothing more than the products of 
human cognition. The assumption that the known does not 
exist without the knower, such “correlationism,” as Quentin 
Meillassoux calls it, is a “negative privilege” since it rejects 
all possible knowledge of an absolute: “it is the claim that 
we are closed up in our representations—whether conscious, 
linguistic, or historical—with no sure access to an eternal 
reality independent of our specific point of view.”1 The 
answer of speculative realism to such anthropocentrism is 
anthrodecentrism, claiming not only that objects exist in-
dependently of human perception but also that they relate 
to one another on their own. If speculative realism—evoked 
here predominantly in its object-oriented guise—overcomes 
correlationism in the name of objects, it also overcomes 
the epistemological nihilism that modern and postmodern 
philosophy have passed on to us.
Part of the proclaimed anthrodecentrism is an aesthetics 
that replaces human agency by the self-expression of objects. 
Ian Bogost, in particular, advocates such “Alien Aesthetics,” as 
he terms it, which does not centre around the human percep-
tion of objects but around objects’ perceptions of humans, 
aiming at “the secret lives of things.”2 This paper explores 
such claims with respect to two examples Bogost presents 
and discusses, asking to what extent the alien aesthetics of 
speculative realism has been anticipated and supported by 
certain aesthetic theories and artistic practices since the 
end of the twentieth century, and exploring how useful this 
philosophical movement is for describing the mode of being 
of certain artworks. While the driving question of my consid-
eration is the ethics of aesthetics, the central subject of this 
paper is the relationship between art and interpretation. My 
thesis is that these aesthetic and artistic developments aim 
1 Quentin Meillassoux, “Presentation by Quentin Meillassoux,” Collapse 
(2007), 3, 427.
2 Ian Bogost, “The New Aesthetic Needs to Get Weirder,” The Atlantic, http://
www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/04/the-new-aesthetic-needs-
to-get- weirder/255838 (accessed June 6, 2013).
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at overcoming both correlationism and the psychological 
burden of destabilised meaning in their own ways, either by 
evading interpretation or by turning to statistics.
1. The Aestheticisation of Society, or, The Postmodern 
Condition Is Aesthetic Insofar as it Is Epistemologically 
Nihilistic
A general statement, though not the only possible one, about 
the function of art conceptualises art as the negation of what 
the world is and of who we are, as place of the other, as the 
experience of alienation and deconstruction. Art does so not 
only by presenting other ideas and concepts of being, but also 
and first of all by denying a stable signifier. “All artworks—
and art altogether—are enigmas,” Adorno notes, “it is their 
incomprehensibility that needs to be comprehended.”3 The 
essential role of art is to undermine any automatism and 
certainty in the process of signification. Hence, in his 1999 
book The Sovereignty of Art: Aesthetic Negativity in Adorno and 
Derrida, German philosopher Christoph Menke aptly titles 
one of his chapters “The Aesthetic Experience of Crisis.”4
There are various attempts to escape such experience. Susan 
Sontag’s seminal essay “Against Interpretation” identifies 
one of them in a certain hermeneutic approach: “In a cul-
ture whose already classical dilemma is the hypertrophy of 
the intellect at the expense of energy and sensual capability, 
interpretation is the revenge of the intellect upon art. Even 
more. It is the revenge of the intellect upon the world. To 
interpret is to impoverish, to deplete the world—in order to 
set up a shadow world of ‘meanings’.”5 People who have not 
used the term interpretation for a long time probably like 
this quote. However, they should also remember that the essay 
3 Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, ed. Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann, 
trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor (New York: Continuum, 2004), 160, 157.
4 Christoph Menke, The Sovereignty of Art: Aesthetic Negativity in Adorno and 
Derrida (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999), 215-40.
5 Susan Sontag, “Against Interpretation” in Against Interpretation and Other 
Essays (New York: Noonday Press, 1966), 7.
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was published three years before Guy Debord’s book Society 
of the Spectacle and that in 1996, in the afterword “Thirty 
Years Later” to the anniversary issue of the essay collection 
Against Interpretation, Sontag adopts a different tone. Given the 
ongoing “transvaluation of values,” the shift from symbolic 
concerns to intensities of direct sensual stimulation, and 
the arrival of “the age of nihilism,” Sontag distances herself 
from her original attack on interpretation.6 At the end of the 
century, giving up the search for meaning has turned out to 
be a much more efficient and popular strategy for escaping 
the experience of crisis than the fixation of meaning.
At the same time, interpretation is no longer aiming at 
stabilising meaning. In his 1994 book Beyond Interpretation: 
The Meaning of Hermeneutics for Philosophy (engl. 1997), Italian 
philosopher Gianni Vattimo speaks of a “nihilistic vocation 
of hermeneutics”—this is the title of the first chapter—
which is to dissolve “the principle of reality into the Babel 
of interpretations” and to “reveal the world as a conflict of 
interpretations” without the prospect of reconciliation.7 In 
this perspective, interpretation has the opposite effect of 
what Sontag assumed in 1964. In addition, the “age of nihil-
ism” that Sontag deplores in 1996 is now attested positive 
ethical consequences: “the guiding thread of nihilism” is 
“the reduction of violence, the weakening of strong and ag-
gressive identities, the acceptance of the other, to the point of 
charity.”8 Vattimo is not the only one who, back in the 1980s 
and 1990s, asserted the moral, antifundamentalist effects of 
putting any claim of truth or “correct” interpretation into 
6 Susan Sontag, “Thirty Years Later” in Against Interpretation and Other Essays 
(New York: Picador, 2001), 311.
7 Gianni Vattimo, Beyond Interpretation: The Meaning of Hermeneutics for Phi-
losophy, trans. David Webb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 39-40.
8 Vattimo, Beyond Interpretation, 73. Vattimo further elaborates: “Thinking 
that no longer understands itself as the recognition and acceptance of an 
objective authoritarian foundation will develop a new sense of responsibil-
ity as ready and able, literally, to respond to others whom, insofar as it is not 
founded on the eternal structure of Being, it knows to be its ‘provenance’.” 
Vattimo, Beyond Interpretation, 40.
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the perspective of the context from which it arises. Against 
the interpretation of postmodern perspectives as ethically 
cynical, Vattimo and others considered such renunciation 
from the illusion of an absolute truth as a call for accepting 
difference and thus as an adequate foundation of multicul-
tural society in a global world.9
Highlighting the link between Vattimo’s epistemological 
nihilism and Menke’s aesthetic experience, I should also 
point to the German philosopher Wolfgang Welsch, who in 
the early 1990s extensively discussed aesthetics as the new key 
currency—or “Leitwährung”—and the “homo aestheticus” as 
the new prevalent figure in contemporary society.10 Accord-
ing to Welsch, we are experiencing two forms of aesthetici-
sation. The shallow one—“Oberflächenästhetisierung”—is 
marked by the beautification of the living environment 
and the creation of neologisms such as shopertainment, 
eatertainment, edutainment, and infotainment.11 Deep 
aestheticisation—“Tiefenästhetisierung”—constitutes the 
loss of a reliable perspective on reality as we know it from 
the experience of art.12 This kind of epistemological aestheti-
cisation—“epistemologische Ästhetisierung”13—is the most 
serious and effective form of aestheticisation; Welsch traces 
9 Vattimo is well aware of the fact that the proposed nihilistic—or, as he 
also puts it, “antimetaphysical”—vocation of hermeneutics is itself nothing 
more than interpretation based on a specific western perspective that may 
be rejected as another grand narrative after the end of all grand narratives. 
His offer to solve the postmodern version of Epimenides’ Cretan Paradox 
by understanding the post-metaphysical hermeneutic as the most adequate 
interpretation of modernity does not explain why other, non-western 
cultures should adopt the proposed positive perspective on nihilism. The 
issue to what extent the libertarian postmodern Farewell to Truth (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2011), as the title of a recent book by Vattimo 
reads, is conducted in favour of or in opposition to the oppressed cultural 
paradigms of others remains, as far as I can see, unsolved. 
10 Wolfgang Welsch, “Ästhetisierungsprozesse—Phänomene, Unterscheidun-
gen, Perspektiven” in Grenzgänge der Ästhetik (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1996), 14, 18. 
11 Ibid., 10.
12 Ibid., 10, 21.
13 Ibid., 21.
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it back to Kant (the “transcendental aesthetic” in the Critique 
of Pure Reason), Friedrich Nietzsche, Paul Feyerabend, and 
Richard Rorty and calls it the legacy of modernity.14 In this 
light, the postmodern condition is aesthetic because it is 
epistemologically nihilistic: alienation and deconstruction 
leave the fenced system of art to become the primary mode 
of perception and cognition.
This take on nihilism—that there is no objective meaning 
and universal value—is clearly different from Ray Brassier’s, 
one of the representatives of speculative realism, who declares 
himself a nihilist exactly because he believes in truth. Brassier 
reads meaninglessness as the purposelessness of existence. 
To him, “we understand nature better than we did, but this 
understanding no longer requires the postulate of an under-
lying meaning”; human rationality has abandoned theologi-
cally inflected metaphysics, cognitive progress in intellectual 
history has left us without any “metaphysical narrative about 
the ineluctable forward march of Spirit.”15 Brassier’s nihilism 
is less serious and epistemologically more comfortable than 
Vattimo’s, for it is at least sure of its own foundation.
However, while the “homo aestheticus” certainly has become 
accustomed to the beautification of everyday life, and while 
the iPad and Facebook generation enjoys beautification in 
technology and communication, the question is whether 
one can also cope with the demise of truth. Are people strong 
enough to accept “weak thought” as the new philosophical 
paradigm required by any anti-foundational hermeneutics?16 
Are people ready to be supermen, to apply the common but 
improper translation of Nietzsche’s term Übermensch? Because 
this is what the painful but necessary emancipation from the 
14 Welsch, “Ästhetisierungsprozesse,” 43, 53.
15 Ray Brassier, “I Am a Nihilist Because I Still Believe in Truth,” Kronos 
(2011), http://www.kronos.org.pl/index.php?23151,896 (accessed June 6, 2013).
16 The concept of “weak thought” is Vattimo’s central contribution to the 
postmodern debate. It considers thought incapable of knowing the state of 
being, which is why it cannot determine universal (“strong”) values valid 
for all human beings. 
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illusion of an absolute truth and historic progress requires.17 
The recourse to new or old metaphysical foundations such 
as God, however, means, as Vattimo states in an essay about 
the return of religion, to fail the challenge of Nietzsche’s 
Overhuman.18
A more demanding way of holding on to strong thinking 
and the idea of truth are science and statistics. As the quan-
titative turn in the humanities demonstrates, there is a new 
“longing for evidence” (Sehnsucht nach Evidenz), as the title of 
a special issue of the Zeitschrift für Kulturwissenschaften read 
in 2009. Desire for evidence is the desire to control of which 
Sontag had accused art critics. Postmodern aesthetics—such 
as Jean-François Lyotard’s aesthetics of the sublime in the 
1980s—reacted to this desire by refusing meaning altogether. 
Since the 1990s, however, there has been—as an extrapola-
tion of that refusal rather than a response to it—a return of 
the real in art which in recent years was taken up by digital 
media artists who are developing an aesthetics of statistics. 
Section 2 discusses this development as a precursor to the 
alien aesthetics promoted by Bogost and other advocates of 
speculative realism.
2. Events and Objects in Art, or, Turning Attention from 
Meaning to Materiality
In his writings on aesthetics following his description of 
the erosion of grand narratives in The Postmodern Condition, 
Lyotard focuses on the event and intensity of the moment at 
the expense of message and signification. In “The Sublime 
17 Gianni Vattimo, The Transparent Society (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity Press, 1992), 9-10.
18 Gianni Vattimo, “The Trace of the Trace” in Religion, ed. Gianni Vattimo 
and Jacques Derrida (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 82. Given 
the fact that Nietzsche himself always disdained the masses’ escape into 
hedonism, the hedonism and distraction, characteristic of our society of 
the spectacle can hardly be seen as an answer to the end of truth that faces 
the challenge of Nietzsche’s Overhuman. There is a fundamental difference 
between weak thought and no thought, the latter being closer to strong than 
to weak thinking.
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and the Avant-Garde,” he famously states that “a work of art is 
avant-garde in direct proportion to the extent that it is stripped 
of meaning” and asks: “Is it not then like an event?”19 In an 
interview about the unrepresentable, Lyotard notes: we do not 
consume the occurrence but its meaning.20 As a consequence, 
Lyotard proposes an aesthetics of the sublime that cannot be 
grasped by reason but interrupts control-seeking discourse. 
The sublime artwork is the artistic materialisation of philo-
sophical nihilism and of what Welsch calls epistemological 
aestheticisation. It is the challenge to live without meaning, 
the demand to embrace this challenge like Nietzsche’s Over-
human does. In a sequence that recalls Sontag’s insistence on 
an erotics in place of a hermeneutics of art, Lyotard notes: 
the energy encountered in an artefact will make a noble man 
dance, while a bad (occidental) person will start to talk.21
Lyotard’s aesthetics of the sublime establishes the percep-
tion of incomprehensibility before interpretation. Menke, 
who focuses on the aesthetic experience as crisis through 
interpretation, takes issue with Lyotard’s theory of “asemantic 
effects” and his concept of the artwork as “an epiphany of 
an unarticulatable meaning” and distances himself from a 
19 Jean-François Lyotard, “The Sublime and the Avant-Garde” in The Lyotard 
Reader, ed. Andrew E. Benjamin (Malden: Blackwell, 1989), 210.
20 Jean-François Lyotard, “Das Undarstellbare—wider das Vergessen: Ein 
Gespräch zwischen Jean-François Lyotard und Christiane Pries” in Das 
Erhabene—zwischen Grenzerfahrung und Größenwahn, ed. Christiane Pries 
(Weinheim: VCH, Acta humaniora, 1989), 344.
21 Jean-François Lyotard, Essays zu einer affirmativen Ästhetik (Berlin: Merve, 
1982), 49. Sontag, “Against Interpretation,” 14. In his 1976 essay “The Tooth, 
the Palm,” Lyotard presents his idea of the “energetic theater,” in which the 
gesture of the body is liberated from the duty of signifying; thus the clinched 
fist no longer represents the pain caused by a toothache but stands on its own. 
Lyotard saw the sensual perception of energy transmitted by an artefact in 
its entire presence, as pure intensity, without turning it into a sign subject 
to hermeneutic or semiotic analysis. The “business of an energetic theater,” 
he notes, “is not to make allusion to the aching tooth when a clinched fist 
is the point, nor the reverse.” The tooth and the palm no longer have a rela-
tionship of signifier and signified; they “no longer mean anything, they are 
forces, intensities, present affects.” Jean-François Lyotard, “The Tooth, the 
Palm” in Performance: Critical Concepts in Literary and Cultural Studies, vol. 2, 
ed. Philip Auslander (London: Routledge, 2003), 31, 30.
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perspective on art that promotes the embrace of “pure, mean-
ingless materiality.” As Menke states, the “discernment of the 
vacillation of aesthetic signifiers stands in contrast with an 
unmediated rehabilitation of the material determinations 
of aesthetic objects, as proclaimed, for instance, in Lyotard’s 
model of an affirmative aesthetics.”22 In German aesthetic 
theory, the embrace of pure, meaningless materiality has 
explicitly been advocated by Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht in his 
concept of the culture of presence replacing the allegedly 
dominant culture of meaning or hermeneutics. Gumbrecht 
favours the aesthetic experience as a sensual connection to 
the world, as the experience of moments of intensity such as 
the polyphone complexity of a Mozart aria, the touchdown 
in football, the death blow in bullfighting, or “‘special effects’ 
produced today by the most advanced communication tech-
nologies” as possibly “instrumental in reawakening a desire 
for presence.”23 Gumbrecht’s list reveals how closely affiliated 
aesthetic theory has become with the culture or entertainment 
industry and how affirmative it is towards the status quo.24
The strategy of avoiding the nihilistic vocation of herme-
neutics by turning attention from meaning to materiality 
can also be found in contemporary artistic practice. Here 
a way of dealing with epistemological nihilism is turning 
to the objects to let them speak for themselves. In 1996, US-
American critic Hal Foster announced The Return of the Real, 
discussing “The Artist as Ethnographer,” as one of the book’s 
chapters is entitled.25 In 1997, the exhibition Deep Storage, 
Arsenale der Erinnerung: Sammeln, Speichern, Archivieren in 
22 Menke, The Sovereignty of Art, 153, 270, 45-46.
23 Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, Production of Presence: What Meaning Cannot 
Convey (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), xv.
24 For a detailed critical discussion of Lyotard’s aesthetics of the sublime, 
Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht’s culture of presence as well as similar aesthetic 
theories such as Erika Fischer-Lichte’s and Dieter Mersch’s aesthetics of 
the performative, see my Digital Art and Meaning: Reading Kinetic Poetry, Text 
Machines, Mapping Art, and Interactive Installations (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 2011), 1-26, 208-230.
25 Hal Foster, The Return of the Real: The Avant-Garde at the End of the Century 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996).
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der Kunst in the Haus der Kunst in Munich explored art as a 
collection of objects from the real. In 2002, French curator 
and art theoretician Nicolas Bourriaud noted in his book 
Postproduction that artists today remix what they find rather 
than compose from scratch: “Notions of originality (being at 
the origin of) and even of creation (making something from 
nothing) are slowly blurred in this new cultural landscape 
marked by the twin figures of the DJ and the programmer, 
both of whom have the task of selecting cultural objects 
and inserting them into new contexts.”26 However, refer-
ring to Guy Debord’s Methods of Detournement published in 
1956—which announces détournement as a kind of political 
use of Duchamp’s readymade-concept giving objects and 
situations a different, enlightening meaning by a specific ap-
propriation—Bourriaud also emphasises that the aesthetics 
of postproduction still puts the found objects into a specific 
perspective, making the artist herself present in the object.27 
This situation changes once the objects become data collected 
by the computer.
The exhibition Collect the WWWorld: The Artist as Archivist in 
the Internet Age in Basel in 2012 (Haus für elektronische Künste) 
contained Evan Roth’s “Personal Internet Cache Archive” of 
2010, which presents images his computer automatically 
stored in the cache while Roth was browsing the internet.28 
The collection is not a result of the artist’s deliberate decision 
but rather represents a new form of Walter Benjamin’s optical 
unconscious, showing the images Roth may have seen only 
briefly during his browsing session. Another work in this 
exhibition is Travis Hallenbeck’s “Flickr Favs” of 2010, a book 
26 Nicolas Bourriaud, Postproduction. Culture as Screenplay: How Art Reprograms 
the World (New York: Lukas & Sternberg, 2002), 13. Bourriaud’s examples are, 
among others, Thomas Hirschhorn’s and Rirkrit Tiravanija’s environments 
of objects, though both, as Claire Bishop makes clear in an essay in 2004, are 
quite different in their postproductive art. Claire Bishop, “Antagonism and 
Relational Aesthetics,” October (2004), 110, 51-79.
27 Bourriaud, Postproduction, 35.
28 Evan Roth, “Personal Internet Cache Archive,” http://www.haus-ek.org/
de/content/evan-roth (accessed June 6, 2013).
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which on each of its 315 pages presents 36 images taken from 
Flickr.com.29 In contrast to Christian Boltanski—an earlier 
representative of archive art, who in his work Album de la famille 
D. (1972) composes a specific narrative by a montage of 150 
images taken from the photo album of a friend—Hallenbeck 
does not present a careful choice of images. He has no nar-
rative to convey but lets the randomly chosen images speak 
for themselves. While in the postproductive, ethnographic 
work of artists such as Boltanski, Thomas Hirschhorn, or 
Rirkrit Tiravanija, the return of the real is rather the return 
of the artist to the real, in online based works such as Roth’s 
and Hallenbeck’s, the artist truly withdraws from any creation 
and production and presents the objects—the photographs 
they have not taken—free from human intervention.
In his talk “Seeing Things” at the Third Object-Oriented 
Ontology Symposium in September 2011, Ian Bogost presented 
the “snapshot aesthetic” of the American photographer Garry 
Winogrand as an example of objects speaking for themselves: 
His works are not commentaries, they are precisely the opposite. Garry 
Winogrand makes photographs not to capture what he sees, but to see 
what he will have captured. That’s what it means to take photographs 
to see what the world looks like in photographs.30 
By evoking Winogrand’s photographs as documents teaching 
us “to see the world of things as things in a world, rather than 
our world, with things in it,” Bogost considers Winogrand’s 
work an example of unmediated access to the object itself. This 
way—and suitable to the specific context of his talk—Bogost 
presents an example of overcoming “correlationism.”31
29 Travis Hallenbeck, “Flickr Favs,” www.flickr.com/photos/cosmic_disciple/
favorites (accessed June 6, 2013).
30 Ian Bogost, “Seeing Things,” talk at the Third Object-Oriented Ontology 
Symposium, 15 September 2011, www.bogost.com/writing/seeing_things_1.
shtml (accessed June 6, 2013).
31 Kant’s correlationism is, as Bogost notes in his book Alien Phenomenology, 
the common enemy of speculative realism. Bogost’s own reasoning of this 
enmity—he basically dismisses Kant for not having travelled enough—is 
quite insightful regarding the theoretical rigor of one of the most popular 
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Rather than discussing whether Bogost’s claiming of Wino-
grand for object-oriented ontology is appropriate, I want to 
ask to what extent Bogost’s claim could be extended to the 
medium as such. As Siegfried Kracauer notes in his 1927 essay 
on photography, the medium captures the given as a spatial 
continuum regardless of the meaning it has for us.32 In this 
perspective, photography per se represents the world rather 
than our understanding of the world. Jean Baudrillard drives 
this perspective even further, stating that with photography 
the object can prevail with its “discontinuity and immediacy” 
against the will of the perceptive subject; the “magical eccen-
tricity of the detail” blocks out the “view of the world,” the 
“‘approach’ to things.”33 Since the nature of photography is 
indexical, this medium promises the prevailing of the real—or 
objects, for that matter—over its observer. Baudrillard detects 
an antagonism between, on the one hand, “the philosophy 
of the subject and the contemplating gaze—of stepping back 
from the world in order to grasp it” and, on the other, “the 
anti-philosophy of the object, of the disconnectedness of 
objects, of the random succession of part-objects and details.”34
If Baudrillard were still alive, he may have attacked object-
oriented ontology and considered photography its natural 
medium. He would be as wrong as Bogost is to claim Wino-
grand for his cause. Both neglect the well-established argu-
ment that rather than reality, a photographer documents 
representatives of this new philosophy: “The speculative realists share a 
common position less than they do a common enemy: the tradition of hu-
man access that seeps from the rot of Kant. Even if tales of Kant’s infamous 
introversion are overstated, they are true enough to have birthed this irony: 
the blinkered state of philosophy-as-access arrives on the coattail of a man 
who never strayed far from the Prussian town of Königsberg. For more than 
two centuries, philosophy has remained mousy and reticent, a recluse.” Ian 
Bogost, Alien Phenomenology, or What It’s Like to Be a Thing (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2012), 4-5.
32 Siegfried Kracauer, “Photography,” trans. Thomas Y. Levin, Critical Inquiry 
(1993), 19:3, 421-43.
33 Jean Baudrillard, Photographies 1985-1998, ed. Peter Weibel (Ostfildern: 
Hatje Cantz, 2000), 132, 130.
34 Baudrillard, Photographies, 132. 
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her specific relationship to that reality. There is no escape in 
photography from correlationism, unless photographs are 
taken automatically: by surveillance cameras, Google Street 
View or other devices operating on their own behalf, includ-
ing commercialised intelligent cameras.35 To the extent that 
those devices autonomously take pictures and analyse and 
share them with other devices, they indeed seem to take on 
a life of their own independent of human action. Are they 
becoming players in their own right? Do they imagine us, as 
advocates of the new aesthetic claim? Do they illustrate the 
perspectives of objects, which Bogost notes, under the term 
“carpentry,” as one of the practices of his Alien Phenomenology? 
Section 3 explores these questions by discussing the move-
ment of the new aesthetic and some examples that do or do 
not serve to reveal the secret lives of things. 
3. The New Aesthetic, or, The Secret Lives of Things and the 
Ethics of Cool
The new aesthetic was officially introduced at the 2012 South 
by Southwest conference with the panel “The New Aesthetic: 
Seeing Like Digital Devices”: “Slowly but increasingly defini-
tively, our technologies and our devices are learning to see, to 
35 Cameras with face detection are designed to warn their users when someone 
blinks or automatically take a picture when somebody smiles. Such intelligent 
media, which are programmed according to specific perspectives (that one 
should not blink but smile on a photograph), do not take the human out 
of the equation but the concrete human in concrete situations. As a Time 
article reports, this technology is so undetermined by the specific situation 
that it even becomes racist, e.g., when it interprets Asian people as having 
blinked because the face recognition software is programmed according 
to white peoples’ eye forms. This is especially ironic given that the camera 
accused of such racism was a Nikon. See Adam Rose, “Are Face-Detection 
Cameras Racist?” Time, 22 January 2010, www.time.com/time/business/
article/0,8599,1954643,00.html (accessed June 6, 2013). Jon Rafman’s work 
of 2009 “The 9 Eyes of Google Street View,” which was part of the Collect the 
WWWorld exhibition, presents strange images which Google certainly would 
have discarded if its street view photographing were overseen by people: a 
baby strolling alone along the street, a body on the ground. See http://www.
haus-ek.org/de/content/jon-rafman (accessed June 6, 2013).
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hear, to place themselves in the world.”36 The new aesthetic is 
“striving towards a fundamentally new way of imagining the 
relations between things in the world,” as artist and researcher 
Greg Borenstein states in a blog entry which also links the 
new aesthetic movement to the philosophical movements of 
object-oriented ontology and speculative realism.37 Boren-
stein holds: as much as object-oriented ontology “advocates 
a philosophical process of ‘speculation’ about, as Bogost 
says, ‘what it’s like to be a thing,’” the new aesthetic aims “to 
dig out what it’s like to be a thing born of our contemporary 
technological era ... It’s an attempt to imagine the inner lives 
of the native objects of the 21st century and to visualize how 
they imagine us.”38
The assumption that objects imagine us stands in such 
contrast to traditional perspectives that it ensures this new 
aesthetic the attention it needs. However, this movement—if 
it is a movement at all—has been harshly criticised in Bruce 
Sterling’s “Essay on the New Aesthetic” regarding the inco-
herence of visual objects assembled under the new aesthetic 
banner. To Sterling, the “New Aesthetic wunderkammer” is 
nothing more than a “glitch-hunt,” a “heap of eye-catching 
curiosities [that] don’t constitute a compelling worldview.”39 
36 SXSW Schedule: “The New Aesthetic: Seeing Like Digital Devices.” http://
schedule.sxsw.com/2012/events/event_IAP11102 (accessed June 6, 2013). For 
a report on this panel, see James Bridle, “Report from Austin, Texas, on the 
New Aesthetic Panel at SXSW,” 14 March 2012, http://booktwo.org/notebook/
sxaesthetic (accessed June 6, 2013). 
37 Greg Borenstein, “What It’s Like to Be a 21st Century Thing,” The Creators 
Project, http://thecreatorsproject.com/blog/in-response-to-bruce-sterlings-
essay-on-the-new-aesthetic#4 (accessed 6 June, 2013).
38 Ibid.
39 Bruce Sterling, “An Essay on the New Aesthetic,” 2 April 2012, Wired Blog, 
www.wired.com/beyond_the_beyond/2012/04/an-essay-on-the-new-aesthetic 
(accesssed April 10, 2013). Sterling lists the various works assembled in this 
wunderkammer: “Satellite views. Parametric architecture. Surveillance 
cameras. Digital image processing. Data-mashed video frames. Glitches and 
corruption artifacts. Voxelated 3D pixels in real-world geometries. Dazzle 
camou. Augments. Render ghosts. And, last and least, nostalgic retro 8bit 
graphics from the 1980s.”
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In addition, Sterling addresses the new aesthetic’s implicit 
nostalgia with old dreams about artificial intelligence and 
glorious Turing machines debunking the anthropomorphi-
sation of “thinking machines” as part of the “mental chains 
of the old aesthetic.”40 Computers, Sterling underlines, lack 
perception, intelligence, taste and ethics; they are built and 
programmed by humans who should not project their own 
qualities into their products.
Sterling’s criticism has prompted many comments, some of 
them even harsher towards the new aesthetic than Sterling’s 
essay.41 Among the responses in favour of the new aesthetic, 
not every contribution really supports the cause. If, for ex-
ample, Borenstein lists Adam Harvey’s CV Dazzle—this project 
aims to protect humans against face detection algorithms 
through wearing a set of hair, makeup, and fashion designs 
that disorient the algorithms of computer vision (CV)—as 
the quintessential new aesthetic project, he actually draws 
attention to humans’ relationship to objects rather than to 
objecthood itself.42 This is exactly what Bogost takes up in 
his article “The New Aesthetic Needs to Get Weirder”: “The 
New Aesthetic stops short of becoming an object-oriented 
aesthetics partly by limiting itself to computational media, 
and partly by absconding with the lessons of object-aesthetics 
into the realm of human concern.”43 To Bogost, the concern 
of a new aesthetic should not be the impact objects have on 
us but “paying attention to the secret lives of things”: “we 
40 Sterling, “An Essay on the New Aesthetic,” n.pag.
41 See comments assembled in The Creators Project Staff, “In Response To 
Bruce Sterling’s ‘Essay On The New Aesthetic’,” 6 April 2012, The Creators 
Project, http://thecreatorsproject.com/blog/in-response-to-bruce-sterlings-
essay-on-the-new-aesthetic (accessed June 6, 2013).
42 Borenstein, “What It’s Like,” n.pag. For CV Dazzle see Adam Harvey, “CV 
Dazzle: Camouflage from Face Detection,” April 2010, http://ahprojects.com/
projects/cv-dazzle (accessed June 6, 2013).
43 Bogost, “The New Aesthetic,” n.pag. Bogost critically refers to Borenstein’s 
notion that new aestheticians “want to know what CCTV [Closed Circuit 
Television, i.e., surveillance cameras] means for social networks, what book 
scanning means for iOS apps, and what face detection means for fashion.” 
Borenstein, “What It’s Like,” n.pag.
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have to resist drawing the conclusion that they exist for our 
benefit—even if we ourselves created them.”44 How can we 
think objects without thinking of them in relation to us?
An ironic example of the secret lives of things may be The 
Secret Lives of Numbers (2002) by Golan Levin, which presents 
a graph of every number from zero to one million, showing 
the popularity of each number according to statistics gathered 
from a Google search. The work undertakes an anthropomor-
phisation of numbers and suggests that we see the ranking of 
numbers not according to their natural ordering system but 
rather their “fame.” The Secret Lives of Numbers is an ironic 
example of what Bogost is looking for, since it does not re-
ally reveal the secret life of things but the secret or rather 
unconscious perspectives humans have on things or numbers 
respectively. The secret lives of numbers are determined by 
human culture, i.e., the paradigm of ranking, which Levin ad-
dresses by ranking numbers not according to their numerical 
quality but according to the quantifiable frequency of their 
appearance. Klout Score, which was invented in 2008 and 
represents a person’s online influence as a number between 
1 and 100, reveals post festum how political Levin’s work is.45
To Bogost, however, a really new aesthetics does not concern 
itself “with the way we humans see our world differently when 
we begin to see it through and with computer media that them-
selves ‘see’ the world in various ways.” A really new aesthetics 
rather “ask[s] how computers and bonobos and toaster pastries 
and Boeing 787 Dreamliners develop their own aesthetics.”46 
Such alien aesthetics, as Bogost coins his version of the new 
aesthetic, is not centred on the human perception of objects 
44 Bogost, “The New Aesthetic,” n.pag.
45 Another work detecting the secret life of non-human objects in relation 
to human perception is Christian Nold’s Bio Mapping, which started in 
2004. People go for a walk wearing a biomapping device that measures their 
galvanic skin response as an indicator of emotional arousal in conjunction 
with their geographical location. The resulting maps visualise where people 
feel stressed and excited and hence present reality depending on how it is 
perceived. See Christian Nold, “Bio Mapping / Emotion Mapping.” http://
biomapping.net (accessed June 6, 2013).
46 Bogost, “The New Aesthetic,” n.pag., original emphasis.
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but rather the other way around. Bogost illustrates his idea 
referring to Tableau Machine (2007) by Adam Smith, Mario 
Romero, Zachary Pousman, and Michael Mateas, an artwork 
that interprets, through the use of overhead video, activities 
in its environment and expresses, based on a set of design 
grammars, its interpretation of these activities by displaying 
a sequence of abstract images. This “non-anthropomorphic 
system” illustrates distinctions with distinct outputs which 
are absolutely meaningless to any human observer. Tableau 
Machine is, as the authors state, an “alien artist,” an instance 
of “alien presence”—alien because it does not understand 
human behaviour while humans do not understand the 
system’s representation of their behaviour.47
Bogost’s reading of Tableau Machine is not the only possible 
one. He himself implicitly suggests a different, opposite 
reading, stating that “Romero and his collaborators hoped to 
disrupt the assumption that ubiquitous computing is good 
for task support.”48 Disrupting the paradigm of useful data 
processing does not so much point to the secret life of an 
object—or the experience of a home in the case at hand—but 
to a specific relationship humans entertain with computing 
and data. In this light, the foundation of alien aesthetics is 
not an “alien artist” or “alien presence” but the artistic act 
of alienation responding to the phenomenon—and imposi-
tion—of ubiquitous computing.
Ubiquitous or pervasive computing is a model of informa-
tion processing beyond the desktop by bringing it out into the 
47 Adam Smith, Mario Romero, Zachary Pousman, and Michael Mateas, 
“Tableau Machine: A Creative Alien Presence,” presentation at the Associa-
tion for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence, 2008, www.cc.gatech.
edu/~mromero/smith_romero_pousman_mateas_2008.pdf (accessed June 
6, 2013). Such abstract commentary on activity in a room where a machine 
is installed has been programmed before. An example the authors of Tab-
leau Machine mention is AARON, a program developed since the 1970s that 
creates abstract drawings by the British painter and information designer 
Harold Cohen. Another example is Untitled 5 (2004) by Camille Utterback, 
which uses body-tracking software to change an abstract wall projection in 
response to the user’s activities in the exhibition space.
48 Bogost, “The New Aesthetic,” n.pag.
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environmental background of everyday objects and activities. 
It provides tacit information in the environmental background, 
which is why Mark Weiser and John Seely Brown entitle 
their 1996 essay about ubiquitous computing “Designing 
Calm Technology.”49 Examples of such calm technology are 
strings mounted into the ceiling of an office space whirling 
with diverse degrees proportionally to the amount of traffic 
on the internet, or a fountain translating the currency rates 
of Yen, Euro and Dollar in real-time into the water-jet of the 
fountain.50 Although ubiquitous computing exposes humans 
to information less obtrusively, it does so more pervasively. 
Information becomes omnipresent, invisible to perceptual 
consciousness but affective at the level of microsensation, for 
it will move from the background to centre stage the moment 
one turns attention to the object. This is an ethical issue: a 
fountain conveying information on currency rates has lost 
its innocence to the laws of information society.
As long as the output of ubiquitous computing allows 
interpretation and task support, as Bogost puts it, it may be 
an alien way of presenting data but does not represent alien 
aesthetics or phenomenology, to use Bogost’s terms. The mo-
ment it becomes abstract and unintelligible, as in the case of 
the Tableau Machine, calm technology turns cool according to 
Alan Liu who, in his 2004 study Laws of Cool: Knowledge Work 
and the Culture of Information, defines cool as “a ‘way of look-
ing’ at the world of information that exceeds the utilitarian 
sense of either presenting or receiving information.”51 Liu 
bestows this specific “way of looking” with ethical implica-
49 Mark Weiser and John Seely Brown, “Designing Calm Technology,” Power-
Grid Journal (1996), 1:1, www.ubiq.com/hypertext/weiser/calmtech/calmtech.
htm (accessed June 6, 2013).
50 The first example is given by Weiser and Brown; it refers to Natalie Jer-
emijenko’s 1995 work Live Wire, which is placed in the office environment of 
the Xerox Palo Alto Research Center Computer Science Lab. For the second 
example, see Koert van Mensvoort, “Datafountain: Money Translates to Water” 
www.koert.com/work/datafountain (accessed June 6, 2013). 
51 Alan Liu, The Laws of Cool: Knowledge Work and the Culture of Information 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 184.
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tions: as “an ethos of information that is against information, 
the uselessness of useful information, the use of information 
to abuse information.” Cool is the awareness of the informa-
tion interface rather than of the information itself; it is the 
prevalence of the form by which content is presented over the 
content itself; the “eroticism of technique”; it is the replace-
ment of the utilitarian approach to reality by a hedonistic 
one.52 Tableau Machine is an example of such “abusive” use 
of information; just as other works of mapping art such as 
Camille Utterback’s Untitled 5 (2004) and Mark Napier’s Black 
& White (2002) are.53 Rather than presenting an object alien 
to the human perceiver, such works represent the alienation 
of information from human beings through human pro-
gramming. They are not about the secret life of objects but 
about the secret revolt of humans against the imposition of 
the information age. Like photography, they represent not 
reality but a certain relationship to reality. The only way to 
document reality bypassing the human relationship to it is 
the automatic documentation of human action.
52 Liu, The Laws of Cool, 185-86, 183, 236, original emphasis.
53 The online work Black & White reads the 0s and 1s on the CNN server and 
visually translates them into black-and-white patterns moving horizontally 
and vertically over the screen. Thus, Napier sensualises the data retrieved 
into an abstract visual object, a “non-cognitive ‘visualization’” that gives 
up the significance of the source data, to borrow from Richard Wright’s 
article on data visualisation. See Richard Wright, “Data Visualization” in 
Software Studies: A Lexicon, ed. Matthew Fuller (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2008), 
84. For a detailed discussion of Black & White as well as other examples of 
non-cognitive (and cognitive) mapping art, see Simanowski, Digital Art and 
Meaning, 158-86. For my discussion of other artworks—such as the installa-
tions Text Rain (1999) by Camille Utterback and Romy Achituv and Bit.Fall 
(2006) by Julius Popp—in the context of ubiquitous computing and the 
ethos of cool, see Roberto Simanowski, “Text as Event: Calm Technology 
and Invisible Information as Subject of Digital Arts” in Throughout: Art and 
Culture Emerging with Ubiquitous Computing, ed. Ulrik Ekman (Cambridge: 
MIT Press 2012), 191-204.
Speculations V
378
4. Trust in Numbers, or, The Truth of Numerical Narratives
Section 3 ended with the notion that correlationism in pho-
tography can only be overcome by photographs taken auto-
matically. A specific way of generating such photographs is 
data tracking, as promoted in the Quantified Self community 
that is gathering in about 40 groups worldwide, tracking 
data in order to gain self knowledge through numbers—as the 
slogan at quantifiedself.com reads. A famous example of 
such revealing of the secret lives of data is Nicholas Felton’s 
Annual Reports, which presents statistical information about 
his mundane life since 2005: how often he used the subway, 
taxi, bus, airplane, a ferry or a chairlift; how often he visited 
a museum or attended a birthday party; how many hours he 
was in the gym; how many books and book pages he read; 
and how many beers he drank from which countries. Which 
books he read we do not learn, nor what effect they had on 
him. A more prevalent and influential, but also more com-
plex example of overcoming correlationism in relation to 
one’s own actions is Facebook’s Timeline, the “diary” or, rather, 
log book of the twenty-first century that reports and stores 
everything one does online automatically and in real-time 
regardless of one’s own perspective. Other examples of how 
culture is being redesigned on the grounds of statistics are 
the countings of views, likes, shares, and comments online.54
Such data tracking is “photography” to the extent that 
there is a physical correspondence between the signifier 
and the signified. The recorded data of shared links, visited 
videos, and music listened to on the internet are as indexical 
as photography for they directly result from the action they 
represent. From a media ontological perspective, Timeline can 
54 For an early report on the quantified self movement, see Jamin Brophy-
Warren, “The New Examined Life: Why More People Are Spilling the Statistics 
of Their Lives on the Web,” Wall Street Journal, 6 December 2008, http://online.
wsj.com/article/SB122852285532784401.html (accessed June 6, 2013). For an 
extended discussion of Felton’s Annual Reports and Facebook’s Timeline as 
numerical and “photographic” data tracking, see Roberto Simanowski, “The 
Compelling Charm of Numbers: Writing For and Thru the Network of Data” 
in Remediating the Social, ed. Simon Biggs (Edinburgh: ELMCIP, 2012), 20-27.
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be considered textual photography (Textfotografie), to adapt 
the term “linguistic photography” (Sprachfotografie) coined 
by German art critic and media theorist Boris Groys to de-
scribe the fact that the computer does not store the meaning 
of a text but every single word. The main unit of the text is 
no longer the sentence but the word, Groys concludes, and 
he adds that, like in photography, the central element is no 
longer the “visual expression” (der malerische Ausdruck) but the 
object.55 One can even go further and suggest that the single 
letter is the actual object of linguistic photography; because 
not a single one is lost when Timeline stores who shared what 
with whom and when with what comment. This is even true 
for one’s texts, status updates, and comments on Facebook, 
which are equally documented, word by word, letter by letter. 
There is no retrospective entry into the diary giving the gist of 
what one has done or uttered, because now the diary is itself 
what it reports: the event is the report. What now comes true 
is what Bogost incorrectly claimed for Winogrand’s photo-
graphs as examples of unmediated access to the object itself.
To be sure, the results of photographic data tracking can 
be a source of interpretation again, with the implications of 
distortion or appropriation by the specific perspective of the 
perceiver. However, the effect of correlationism comes after 
the recording; the human perception is preceded by algorith-
mic perception. As long as Felton lists how many books he 
read in a year—even if he had documented which books they 
were—he lets data speak for itself. The corruption of this data 
starts when he tries to answer the question what the books 
mean to him, when he starts reflecting and interpreting his 
relationship to the entities and actions of his life.
At the beginning of this essay, I announced my thesis that 
there are developments in aesthetic theory and artistic prac-
tices that try to overcome correlationism by either evading 
interpretation or by turning to statistics. While Tableau Machine 
and the other examples of “cool resistance” to information 
55 Boris Groys, “Der Autor im Netz” in Kursbuch Internet: Anschlüsse an 
Wirtschaft und Politik, Wissenschaft und Kultur, ed. Stefan Bollmann and 
Christiane Heibach (Mannheim: Bollmann, 1996), 385.
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represent the earlier, the data tracking projects by Felton and 
others as well as Facebook’s “photographic” Timeline exemplify 
the latter. These algorithmic analyses of human actions and 
relationships the data tracking represents, this replacement 
of the diffuse self- and world-perception through precise 
and incorruptible numbers is a response to our nihilistic 
situation and epistemological aestheticisation that is quite 
different from the turn to materiality and pure presence. It is 
the response to the end of grand—and small—narratives by 
numerical narratives, as Felton names them.56 It contributes to 
the Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life as Theodor 
M. Porter subtitles his 1995 study Trust in Numbers.57 The trust 
in numbers as well as the trust in algorithmic “dataveillance” 
is the return of truth avoiding the nihilistic vocation of 
hermeneutics by computing. It not only has the “appearance 
of being fair and impersonal.”58 It also takes the human out 
of the equation—as much as this is possible.59 Avoiding the 
human factor in documenting human behaviour, this kind 
of data tracking and textual photography thus embodies what 
speculative realism and object-oriented ontology try to ac-
complish: a kind of anthrodecentric anthropocentrism that 
reverses the “negative privilege” manifest in correlationism 
by a “de-privileging promotion,” reassuring the knower that 
the known really exists. It allows humans to reclaim control 
by letting the objects of knowledge speak for themselves 
or—in the case of pure presence—by altogether avoiding 
56 Nicholas Felton, “Numerical Narratives,” lecture at UCLA Department 
of Design Media Arts, 15 November 2011, http://video.dma.ucla.edu/video/
nicholas-felton-numerical-narratives/387 (accessed June 6, 2013).
57 Theodor M. Porter, Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and 
Public Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).
58 Porter, Trust in Numbers, 8.
59 To be sure, there is human authorship also in data analysis and informa-
tion graphics. Felton is an excellent example here; he avoids any sexual and 
monetary reporting because he finds it “distasteful.” Nicholas Felton, “FAQ,” 
Feltron, http://feltron.com/faq.html (accessed June 6, 2013). In addition to 
the aggregation of data, the specific way of their visualisation and textual 
annotation demands human decisions and follows cultural rules.
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the “experience of crisis” Menke localises in the undertak-
ing of interpretation.60 It is a response to the postmodern 
condition of the contingency and relativity of knowledge 
and cognition that misses both the “nihilistic vocation of 
hermeneutics” Vattimo advocates in Beyond Interpretation 
and the “emancipatory ‘confusion’ of dialects” he welcomes 
in The Transparent Society.61
60 Menke, The Sovereignty of Art, 215.
61 Vattimo, Beyond Interpretation, 39; Vattimo, The Transparent Society, 10.
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Art and Guerrilla Metaphysics
Graham Harman and Aesthetics as First 
Philosophy1
Francis Halsall
National College of Art and Design, Dublin
The room was suddenly rich and the great bay-window was
Spawning snow and pink roses against it
Soundlessly collateral and incompatible:
World is suddener than we fancy it.
World is crazier and more of it than we think,
Incorrigibly plural. I peel and portion
A tangerine and spit the pips and feel
The drunkenness of things being various.
And the fire flames with a bubbling sound for world
Is more spiteful and gay than one supposes -
On the tongue on the eyes on the ears in the palms of one’s hands -
There is more than glass between the snow and the huge roses.
—Louis MacNeice, “Snow”2 
Introduction
MacNeice’s poem shows how beautiful poetry, like beauti-ful philosophy, tells us things 
about the world and our place in it that we might have oth-
erwise overlooked. As Simon Critchley says in response to 
Wallace Stevens’s poetry:
1 I am very grateful for the careful, patient and thoughtful comments made 
by the reviewers (Philipp Schweighauser, Andreas Hägler, Ridvan Askin) on 
earlier versions of this paper. 
2 Louis MacNeice, “Snow,” in Collected Poems (London: Faber and Faber, 
2002), 30.
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At its best, poetry offers an experience of the world as meditation, 
the mind slowing in front of things, the mind pushing back against 
the pressure of reality through the minimal transfigurations of the 
imagination … Poetry increases our feeling for reality by allowing us 
to see it, to focus on that which we normally pass over in our everyday 
activity: the world.3
Critchley’s observation forms the main theme of this essay 
which is about poetry more generally conceived—which I 
identify as the focus of aesthetic reflection and judgment—
and Graham Harman’s version of speculative realism; what 
he calls object-oriented philosophy.4 My argument is that as 
well as employing the aesthetic concept of “allure” Harman’s 
philosophical position in general is underwritten by a tacit 
aesthetics. That is, aesthetic reflection and judgment are 
employed in metaphysical speculation into what a mind-
independent reality might be like. This is a distinct strategy 
within speculative realism which I will identify with an 
aesthetic turn in contrast to the mathematical/objectivist 
strategies exemplified by Meillassoux and Brassier. From 
this follows the claim that art practice can also be a form of 
philosophical speculation; that is, art can be a form of what 
Harman calls guerrilla metaphysics.5
To develop this argument I unpack Harman’s claim that 
aesthetics is first philosophy. In arguing this Harman ex-
plicitly draws on a tradition (starting with Aristotle) where 
first philosophy is used to denote ontology, taken to mean 
the “description of the basic structural features shared by all 
3 Simon Critchley, Things Merely Are: Philosophy in the Poetry of Wallace Stevens 
(London: Routledge, 2005), 88-89.
4 “My first use of the term ‘object-oriented philosophy’ was in the late 1990’s, 
before there was any such thing as Speculative Realism, and long before I had 
heard of Brassier, Grant or Meillassoux. The wider umbrella term ‘Object-
Oriented Ontology’ (OOO) was coined by Levi Bryant in 2009.” Graham 
Harman, “The Current State of Speculative Realism,” Speculations (2013), 4, 26.
5 Graham Harman, Guerrilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the Carpentry 
of Things (Chicago: Open Court, 2005).
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objects,”6 and thus the attempt to describe reality in general. 
My conclusion goes beyond Harman’s use of allure as a theory 
of causal relations in claiming that aesthetic and philosophi-
cal reflections are congruent. There are three dimensions to 
this conclusion.
First, I argue that the phenomenological strategy of ep-
oché, in which the world as it is lived is bracketed in order 
to focus on its givenness to consciousness, is an act of aes-
thetic reflection as well as a philosophical one. I argue that 
Harman begins from this phenomenological starting point 
but, similar to his inversion of Heideggerian hermeneutics, 
focuses on what phenomenology has bracketed, namely the 
world beyond its conscious manifestation. Hence there is, in 
the epoché (and the focus on what it excludes), an aesthetic 
foundation to his whole project.
Second, because in the epoché aesthetic reflection coincides 
with philosophical reflection art (as a socially and historically 
privileged site of aesthetic reflection) can be philosophically 
significant. In short, works of art can provide a means to both 
aesthetic and philosophical reflection. Or, experiencing art 
through aesthetic reflection can be a way into certain forms 
of philosophical reflection on the world and its objects. The 
key point is that certain forms of artistic and philosophical 
practice are comparable in so far as both are open to aesthetic 
judgement.
Hence, third, a flip-side to the claim that art can be philo-
sophical is that certain forms of philosophy are like art. This is 
to say that certain styles of philosophical speculation are also 
creative forms. The content of those forms is: (i) not provable 
empirically because they allude to a world that withdraws 
from consciousness; these forms point towards something 
beyond experience and hence outside empirical verification. 
And (ii), this content is also not verifiable a priori because 
this would lead back to some form of transcendental idealism.
Instead, such speculations are proposed in the spirit of 
our aesthetic judgments; that is, as looking for approval 
6 Graham Harman, “Vicarious Causation,” Collapse (2007), 2, 204.
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or consent by appearing plausible and through appeal to a 
common sense (the Kantian sensus communis), rather than 
resting on empirical or conceptual proofs.
The Mathematical/Aesthetic Axis of Speculation
The implications of my argument are that the well-documented 
differences between positions associated with speculative 
realism might be reconceived along a slightly different axis: 
the mathematical/aesthetic one, reflecting both the commit-
ments of the main players and an ancient philosophical rift 
originating in Plato.
The dual challenge faced by both sides of the mathematical/
aesthetic axis of speculative realism is that we view the world, 
not from a god’s eye view, but from within subjectivity. So: (i) 
there is a paradox that thought must begin from consciousness 
(this is, by necessity, unavoidable for thought) whilst seeking 
to go beyond its horizon into that which exists independently 
of thinking; (ii) we must attempt to explain how conscious-
ness can emerge from the pre- or unconscious world.
In attempting to treat a world independent of minds in a 
philosophically serious manner speculative realists position 
themselves in opposition to the dominant tendencies within 
contemporary philosophy in general and the continental 
tradition in particular. These tendencies are the transcen-
dental aspects of the Kantian tradition, of idealism, and of 
phenomenology, all of which argue that the two starting points 
for philosophy in general and for ontology in particular are 
firstly consciousness, and secondly the relationship of that 
consciousness to the world. These are the traditions of what 
Harman calls the “Philosophy of Human Access”7 and what 
Quentin Meillassoux names correlationism and which rest 
on the apparently tautological statement that we cannot think 
of anything without thinking about it; or, in Harman’s words: 
“If we try to think of a world outside human thought, then we 
7 Graham Harman, Prince of Networks: Bruno Latour and Metaphysics (Mel-
bourne: Re.press, 2009), 102–03.
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are thinking it, and hence it is no longer outside thought. Any 
attempt to escape this circle is doomed to contradiction.”8
There are different (often conflicting) strategies for at-
tempting this move beyond correlationist thinking. However, 
there is some agreement that these strategies can be generally 
characterised by two distinct positions. On the one hand there 
is the position of Quentin Meillassoux and Ray Brassier. This 
is grounded in objectivism or mathematism and attempts to 
rehabilitate the access of thought to the absolute. As Brassier 
says:
[Meillassoux] hopes to demonstrate mathematical science’s direct 
purchase on things-in-themselves … The claim is that mathematical 
thought enjoys direct access to noumena precisely insofar as the latter 
possess certain mathematically intuitable characteristics, to which all 
rational knowledge must conform.9
In short, Meillassoux argues that mathematics offers a way 
of thinking de-subjectivated (and non-correlated) nature on 
the basis of its formal, logical operations. Brassier’s position 
is similar; that is, he defends a scientism which claims that 
the slow but steady work of the sciences will get us ever closer 
to the absolute even if it can never, ultimately, reach its goal. 
This is the mathematical side of the axis.
On the other hand, there is the position of Harman and 
others for which Meillassoux has coined the term “subjectal-
ism” intended to capture a kind of anti-materialism that is 
nevertheless speculative. Of Harman Meillassoux says that he
hypostasizes our subjective relation to things by projecting it into the 
things themselves. [This is a] very original and paradoxical subjectalism, 
since he hypostasizes the relation we have with things that, according to 
8 Graham Harman, The Quadruple Object (Winchester: Zero Books, 2011), 63, 
original emphasis.
9 Ray Brassier, Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 69.
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him, withdraw continually from the contact we can make with them. But 
the implicit form of this withdrawal is given by our relation to things.10
This can be re-cast as the aesthetic side of the axis for the 
reasons given below. 
Harman’s Weird Realism
Amongst artists, critics and curators Graham Harman has 
become the most well-known member of the speculative 
realists. His writing has appeared in magazines like Artforum, 
artists’ catalogues, and in the context of major exhibitions 
such as Documenta 13.11
Harman makes several references to aesthetics in relation 
to his own philosophical work. These include the claims that 
“aesthetics may be a branch of metaphysics,” and “aesthetics 
becomes first philosophy.”12 He has also addressed the rela-
tionship between philosophy and art practices: “Yet what 
if the counter-project [of philosophy as a rigorous science] 
of the next four centuries were to turn philosophy into an 
art? We would have ‘Philosophy as Vigorous Art’ rather than 
Husserl’s ‘Philosophy as Rigorous Science’.”13 By introducing 
“allure” as a metaphysical term Harman argues that “aesthetics 
is first philosophy, because the key problem of metaphysics 
10 Quentin Meillasoux, “Iteration, Reiteration, Repetition: A Speculative 
Analysis of the Meaningless Sign,” trans. Robin Mackay, http://oursecretblog.
com/txt/QMpaperApr12.pdf (accessed July 31, 2012), 7, original emphasis.
11 Graham Harman, “The Best Books of 2011,” Artforum (Dec. 2011); Graham 
Harman, The Third Table/Der dritte Tisch, dOCUMENTA (13): 100 Notizen—100 
Gedanken Series (Ostfildern: Hatje Cantz, 2012); Graham Harman, “Rogue 
Planets” in Woran glauben die Motten, wenn sie zu den Lichtern streben by Ralo 
Mayer (Nuremberg: Verlag für moderne Kunst, 2011), E30-E40; Graham 
Harman, “It is Warm Out There/Il fait chaud là-bas” in Intimately Unrelated/
Intimement sans rapport by Isabel Nolan (Sligo and Saint Étienne: The Model/
Musée d’art moderne de Saint-Étienne Métropole, 2012), 58-95.
12 Harman, “Vicarious Causation,” 221.
13 Harman, The Third Table, 15.
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has turned out to be as follows: how do individual substances 
interact in their proximity to one another.”14 Here allure is 
used to explain “not just a theory of art, but a theory of causal 
relations in general.”15
As with other speculative realists the central focus of Har-
man’s realism is a mind-independent reality that exists beyond 
the correlation of consciousness and world. According to 
Harman, this world is populated by objects which have rela-
tions with one another. Consequently, the philosopher should 
not restrict themselves to talking about the relationship of 
consciousness to world and how we access reality. Instead, 
Harman argues, philosophers should direct their attention 
toward “all nonhuman reality.”16
This is obviously a seductive position for many artists 
because it gives a theoretical support to an attractive propo-
sition: that works of art have an autonomous identity. This 
proposition supports two further beliefs that an artist might 
have: that art objects and their meanings will elude their 
audience; and that an artist is not fully responsible for the 
things they produce.
In certain philosophical circles this has also proved tanta-
lizing because it promises a way out of those philosophical 
trajectories (in both the continental and analytic traditions) 
that lead away from the world and toward forms of transcen-
dental idealism that bracket consideration of any aspect of 
reality which is not available for human consideration.
Harman claims that he “rejects any privilege of human 
access to the world, and puts the affairs of human conscious-
ness on exactly the same footing as the duel between canaries, 
microbes, earthquakes, atoms, and tar.”17 However, as he is at 
pains to point out, this is not merely a naive realism18 that 
14 Graham Harman, “Aesthetics as First Philosophy: Levinas and the Non-
Human,” Naked Punch (2012), 9, 30.
15 Ibid.
16 Harman, Guerrilla Metaphysics, 18.
17 Harman, “Vicarious Causation,” 189.
18 “Adjectives can also play a distracting/masking role, as I’ve said on this 
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generally accepts the existence of reality as it is given (and is 
made available to empirical observation, scientific natural-
ism or physical materialism) without further philosophical 
reflection. Speculative realism speculates on the metaphysi-
cal grounds of a mind independent reality. Harman actually 
claims that his realism is a weird realism: “Philosophy must 
be realist because its mandate is to unlock the structure of 
the world itself; it must be weird because reality is weird.”19 
He is pursuing “a model of reality as something far weirder 
than realists had ever guessed.”20 Here “weird” is a term ap-
propriated from H.P. Lovecraft who explains it thus:
The true weird tale has something more than secret murder, bloody 
bones, or a sheeted form clanking chains according to rule. A certain 
atmosphere of breathless and unexplainable dread of outer, unknown 
forces must be present; and there must be a hint, expressed with a seri-
ousness and portentousness becoming its subject, of that most terrible 
conception of the human brain—a malign and particular suspension 
or defeat of those fixed laws of Nature which are our only safeguard 
against the assaults of chaos and the daemons of unplumbed space.21
In Harman’s appropriation of Lovecraft’s weirdness22 we 
can already see evidence of an aesthetic judgment at play. 
blog before. Accusing someone of naive realism isn’t just invective. It’s also 
a way of masking the true charge: realism. The true charge is that the person 
is a realist. But since the accuser has no good argument against realism, they 
create a distraction by denouncing naive realism, leaving us to assume vaguely 
that the person isn’t so extreme as to hate all realism, but only the ‘naïve’ 
kind, whatever that might be in opposition to the less naive kinds.” Graham 
Harman, “On the Abuse of Adjectives, Scare Quotes, etc.,” Object-Oriented 
Philosophy, http://doctorzamalek2.wordpress.com/ (accessed May 14, 2012).
19 Graham Harman, “On the Horror of Phenomenology: Lovecraft and 
Husserl,” Collapse (2008), 4, 334.
20 Graham Harman, “The Well-Wrought Broken Hammer: Object-Oriented 
Literary Criticism,” New Literary History (2012), 43:2, 184, original emphasis.
21 H.P. Lovecraft, Supernatural Horror in Literature and other Literary Essays 
(Rockville: Wildside Press, 2011), 19.
22 See also Graham Harman, Weird Realism: Lovecraft and Philosophy (Win-
chester: Zero Books, 2012).
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For Harman, his style of philosophy can be judged as having 
more in common with the weird and wild speculations of the 
pulp-fiction texts of horror and science fiction than with the 
accepted philosophical traditions. This is a significant point 
to which I will return later as it acknowledges an equivalence 
between certain modes of thinking and aesthetic activities 
such as fiction writing. For now, I stress that Harman makes 
Lovecraftian weirdness a pervasive and central aspect of all 
of reality, from science fiction to mathematics to speculative 
physics:
Even a cursory glance at the physics literature reveals a discipline be-
witched by strange attractors, degenerate topologies, black holes filled 
with alternate worlds, holograms generating an illusory third dimension, 
and matter composed of vibrant ten-dimensional strings. Mathemat-
ics, unconstrained by empirical data, has long been still bolder in its 
gambles. Nor can it be said that science fiction is a marginal feature of 
literature itself. Long before the mighty crabs and squids of Lovecraft 
and the tribunals of Kafka, we had Shakespeare’s witches and ghosts, 
Mt. Purgatory in the Pacific, the Cyclops in the Mediterranean, and the 
Sphinx tormenting the north of Greece.23
Inverting Heidegger 
Harman’s starting point for his weird realism is an auda-
cious reading and inversion of Heidegger. This strategy of 
inversion, in which he reads Heidegger against the grain of 
his thinking and reception, appears again in the use of the 
phenomenological epoché which is also used in a manner 
contrary to its mainstream application.
In chapter 1 of Tool Being Harman revisits the Heideggerian 
pair of the ready-to-hand (zuhanden) and the present-at-hand 
(vorhanden).24 Harman uses the well-known example of the 
23 Harman, “On the Horror of Phenomenology,” 334.
24 Graham Harman, Tool Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects 
(Chicago: Open Court, 2002), 13-100.
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hammer from Being and Time.25 On the one hand, there is 
the ready-to-hand hammer which is used according to our 
concern for it as a piece of equipment to hammer in nails; 
that is, as a tool enmeshed within a “global system” of human 
uses and human meanings. On the other hand, there is the 
present-at-hand entity of the broken hammer as an inert and 
meaningless thing that has become suddenly present to us 
in its phenomenal particularity.26 But, Harman argues, there 
is surplus to both the readiness-to-hand of the tool and the 
presentness-at-hand of the broken hammer. This surplus or 
excess is what Harman calls the “tool-being” of the hammer 
itself as object that is independent of the system of rela-
tions within which it is positioned. This object withdraws. 
It withdraws from the network of human uses in which it is 
ready-to-hand, and it also withdraws from the condition of 
presence by which it appears as present-at-hand.
In other words, the opposition is not really between tools on one side 
and broken tools on the other, but between the withdrawn tool-being 
of things on one side and both broken and non-broken tools on the 
other. After all, the functioning pragmatic tool is present for human 
praxis just as the broken tool is present for human consciousness. And 
neither of these will suffice, because what we are looking for is the thing 
insofar as it exists, not insofar as it is present to either theory or praxis.27
What Harman proposes, therefore, is a reading of Heidegger 
which draws directly on his critique of the philosophy of 
presence yet which attends to its other side, or that which it 
ignores. Hence, objects become entitled to withdraw into a 
shadowy, occult, weird realm in which they are autonomous 
in three ways: (i) autonomous in respect to systems of hu-
man uses and meaning; (ii) autonomous from presence as 
25 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1962), 98ff.
26 And, “we should emphasize that [Heidegger’s] ‘presence at hand’ has 
multiple meanings, and that all of these meanings ultimately refer to rela-
tionality.” Harman, The Quadruple Object, 52.
27 Harman, The Quadruple Object, 54.
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phenomena; (iii) and also, crucially, autonomous from one 
another.
But, importantly, this does not wall off a noumenal world, 
in-itself, beyond consciousness about which nothing can be 
thought, or said or done. Instead, a speculative realism is pro-
posed in which there is an attempt to speculate about objects 
as they are, independent of human observations. Features of 
this object-oriented philosophy include:
(i) A definition of the object as radically irreducible. This 
definition encompasses simple, complex, composite, actual 
and imaginary entities. Objects in this sense are not reduc-
ible to the instances of their appearance, their qualities, 
relations, or moments. In this, Harman’s philosophy entails 
a substance ontology.
(ii) The claim that “intentionality is not a special human 
property at all, but an ontological feature of objects in general.”28 
This means that objects have intentional relations to one 
another in which neither object is completed, defined or 
exhausted by that relationship alone. The example from Tool-
Being is of a washing machine sitting on a frozen lake. These 
two objects are in a relationship with one another. While the 
machine pushes down on the ice, the ice resists the weight 
of the machine. Yet “the important factor is that the heavy 
object, while resting on the ice as a reliable support, [does] 
not exhaust the reality of that ice,” and the washing machine 
“reacts to some features of the lake rather than others—cut-
ting its rich actuality down to size, reducing that relatively 
minimal scope of lake-reality that is of significance to it.”29 
Harman calls this an intentional relationship.
(iii) The claim that objects relate to one another not di-
rectly, but vicariously; that is, some aspect (the substantial 
inner core) of the object withdraws from the relation. Objects 
interact vicariously because they do so only through some 
aspect of the object entering into the relationship. At the 
heart of every object is a conflict between its real identity 
28 Harman, “Vicarious Causation,” 205.
29 Harman, Tool Being, 223.
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(its withdrawn and inaccessible nature) and its sensual ap-
pearance (the aspect of, or mode by which the object appears 
to other objects). Harman refers to this conflict in terms of 
allure. Allure explains the moments when the relationship 
between the different identities of a thing becomes apparent: 
“Allure is a special and intermittent experience in which the 
intimate bond between a thing’s unity and its plurality of 
notes somehow partially disintegrates”30 as “allure alludes 
to entities as they are, quite apart from any relations with 
or effects upon the other entities in the world. This deeply 
non-relational conception of the reality of things is the heart 
of object-oriented philosophy.”31
Allure, then, is how Harman introduces aesthetics into his 
metaphysical program. Aesthetic reflection attends to the 
alluring elements of an object which can only, qua sensual 
object, be sensually experienced. Aesthetic reflection thus 
reveals how its objects are, in part, abstracted from a system 
of things and meanings:
The eidetic features [or essence] of any object can never be made pres-
ent even through the intellect, but can only be approached indirectly 
by way of allusion, whether in the arts or in the sciences. Copper wires, 
bicycles, wolves and triangles all have real qualities, but these genuine 
traits will never be exhausted by the feeble sketches of them delivered 
to our hearts and minds. A proton or volcano must have a variety of 
distinct properties, but these remain just as withdrawn from us as the 
proton and volcano themselves.32
Thus, aesthetic reflection takes advantage of aesthetic expe-
rience and offers the promise of glimpses of reality beyond 
experience. So, aesthetic reflection provides a means, different 
to that of the formal abstractions of mathematics and logic, 
of thinking beyond the correlation. And artistic practices 
might constitute a guerrilla metaphysics in that they offer a 
30 Harman, Guerrilla Metaphysics, 143.
31 Harman, “The Well-Wrought Broken Hammer,” 187.
32 Harman, The Quadruple Object, 28.
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way into thinking non-conceptually, beyond the correlation 
of consciousness and world.
Thinking beyond the Correlation
The now standard speculative realist position begins from a 
critique of phenomenology in that it exemplifies the problems 
inherent to correlationism and castigates it for philosophi-
cally prioritising questions of human access to reality over 
and above that reality itself. However, if Harman is right 
that “all human relations to objects strip them of their inner 
depth, revealing only some of their qualities to view,”33 then 
we face the problem of how to think beyond the context of 
the system of human relations with the world into which we 
find ourselves flung.
Harman claims that “we never occupy a formless sensory 
medium, but only a landscape of determinate things, even 
if these things seduce us with a full arsenal of what seem 
like kaleidoscopic surface effects.”34 But not only do things 
in the world seduce us; they are meaningful to us as well. In 
other words, we are already enmeshed in a system of objects 
and structures of meaning. The problem with this lies in 
how one might disentangle such claims to meaning from 
the path toward transcendental idealism to which they seem 
to necessarily lead. This problem, Ray Brassier argues, is the 
fundamental problem of philosophy:
That the articulation of thought and being is necessarily conceptual 
follows from the Critical injunction which rules out any recourse to 
the doctrine of a pre-established harmony between reality and ideal-
ity. Thought is not guaranteed access to being; being is not inherently 
thinkable. There is no cognitive ingress to the real save through the 
concept. Yet the real itself is not to be confused with the concepts 
33 Graham Harman, Towards Speculative Realism: Essays and Lectures (Win-
chester: Zero Books, 2010), 124.
34 Harman, Guerrilla Metaphysics, 180.
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through which we know it. The fundamental problem of philosophy 
is to understand how to reconcile these two claims.35
What Brassier points to here is the difficulty, if not impos-
sibility, of ever absenting ourselves from familiar systems of 
human meanings and relations. This becomes unthinkable 
because such absenteeism would seem to require leaving 
consciousness behind. If, as Harman says, “the default state 
of reality is that I am protected by firewalls from the objects 
lying outside me”36 then the implication would seem to be 
that we can only ever peer over those firewalls by which we 
are surrounded to those cold and distant horizons beyond 
but cannot walk amongst these landscapes and explore their 
contours.
Hence, whilst gesturing toward reality, Harman’s object-
oriented philosophy problematically proposes that the world 
withdraws into a shadowy and weird realm beyond human 
thinking. This seems to deny philosophical access to a domain 
of reality where objects reside. Harman’s argument thus has 
the potential to undermine philosophical attempts to provide 
knowledge of a mind-independent reality. Reality might be 
there, but it cannot be fully known through the operations 
of human thought.
For his part Harman does not propose that there is a true 
logic that gives privileged access to reality. This distinguishes 
him from Quentin Meillassoux, who claims that this is pos-
sible via foundational mathematics and set theory. Harman 
instead admits:
nothing can be modelled adequately by any form of knowledge, or by 
any sort of translation at all. In its primary sense an object is not used 
or known, but simply what it is. No reconstruction of that object can 
35 Ray Brassier, “Concepts and Objects” in The Speculative Turn: Continental 
Materialism and Realism, ed. Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman 
(Melbourne: Re.press, 2010), 47.
36 Graham Harman, “Response to Nathan Coombs,” Speculations (2010), 1, 147.
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step in for it in the cosmos … [this has] profound consequences for 
the theory of knowledge, since it implies that no scientific model will 
ever succeed in replacing a thing by listing its various features. Access 
to the things themselves can only be indirect.37 
My response to this problem is to argue that aesthetic prac-
tices offer strategies for such modelling. My claim here is 
twofold. First, that the way Harman arrives at his conclu-
sions is through the familiar phenomenological move of the 
epoché or the bracketing out of the world in order to focus 
on the immediate objects of consciousness (albeit, as we 
shall see, in an inverted form). And second, that the epoché 
is a form of aesthetic reflection. Hence, I hold that after the 
epoché in which the world is put out of action Harman does 
something strange and audacious. He attends to that which 
phenomenological reflection has traditionally ignored: that 
which has been bracketed out. Further, I propose that epoché 
is grounded in an aesthetic act of perceptual differentiation 
and performative disinterest. In other words, the philosophi-
cal move of bracketing involves a form of aesthetic reflection. 
In turn this means not only that certain forms of artistic and 
philosophical practice are similar insofar as both promote 
instances of aesthetic reflection but also that aesthetic reflec-
tion can provide a means of thinking beyond the correlation 
of mind and world.
Epoché
The emblem of Husserlian phenomenology is the epoché, 
the method of philosophical bracketing. For Edmund Hus-
serl, the epoché required the bracketing (to “parenthesise”) 
of judgments, pre-conceptions, beliefs and attitudes toward 
the world:
We put out of action the general positing which belongs to the essence 
of the natural attitude; we parenthesize everything which that posit-
37 Harman, The Quadruple Object, 73.
Francis Halsall – Art and Guerrilla Metaphysics
397
ing encompasses with respect to being; thus the whole natural world 
which is continually “there for us,” “on hand” and which will always 
remain there according to consciousness as an “actuality” even if we 
chose to parenthesize it.38
This would lead back to the fundamental nature or essence of 
things as they appear to consciousness in perception, leading 
to on the one hand a descriptive phenomenology, and on the 
other an “eidetic” reduction concerned with pure essences.39 
The purpose of the reduction is to concentrate philosophi-
cal reflection upon a particular set of concerns in relation 
specifically to consciousness (that is the “phenomenological 
residuum” or “the whole of absolute being”).40 This includes 
a suspension (or putting “out of action”) of both our assumed 
beliefs about the world and the natural attitude. The natural 
attitude is characterised by a belief in a mind-independent 
reality to which we can have access. It thus both underwrites 
and is underwritten by scientific methods and knowledge 
which work on the assumption that the world is knowable.
Husserl says:
Clearly required before everything else is the epoché in respect to all 
objective sciences. This means not merely an abstraction from them, 
such as an imaginary transformation, in thought, of present human 
existence, such that no science appeared in the picture. What is meant 
is rather an epoché of all participation in the cognitions of the objective 
sciences, an epoché of any critical position-taking which is interested 
in their truth or falsity, even any position on their guiding idea of an 
objective knowledge of the world. In short, we carry out an epoché 
in regard to all objective theoretical interests, all aims and activities 
38 Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phe-
nomenological Philosophy, First Book, trans. F. Kersten, (The Hague: Nijhoff, 
1983), 60–61.
39 As Dan Zahavi observes: “It has become customary to say, in the course of 
his writings Husserl introduces several different ways to the transcendental 
reduction: The Cartesian way, the psychological way, and the ontological way.” Dan 
Zahavi, Husserl’s Phenomenology (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 47.
40 Husserl, Ideas, 113.
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belonging to us as objective scientists or even simply as [ordinary] 
people desirous of [this kind of] knowledge.41
For Husserl’s supporters and critics alike the epoché is the 
route into transcendental idealism. Yet even though it begins 
from a position of radical doubt, the epoché is not a strategy 
for radical scepticism. It is, instead, part of a systematic strategy 
to first identify and then exclude that which is not relevant 
to the question of the mind-world relationship. The epoché 
temporarily cleaves consciousness from the world in order 
to focus on consciousness. It positions the world as separate 
from us. In that, it does something which we do not normally 
do, namely attend to the “given-ness” or appearance of the 
world in our experience. Yet as Zahavi observes, this does not 
deny the existence of the world, but rather puts speculation 
on its constitution temporarily on hold:
It is of crucial importance not to misunderstand the purpose of the 
epoché. We do not effect it in order to deny, doubt, neglect, abandon, 
or exclude reality from our research, but simply in order to suspend 
or neutralize a certain dogmatic attitude toward reality, that is, in order 
to be able to focus more narrowly and directly on the phenomenologi-
cal given—the objects just as they appear. In short, the epoché entails 
a change of attitude toward reality, and not an exclusion of reality.42
What Zahavi identifies in his account of epoché is that 
Husserlian phenomenology (at least in its early phase) was 
metaphysically neutral:
it is not difficult to characterize Husserl’s position in Logische Unter-
suchungen. It is metaphysically neutral. To be more specific, Husserl’s 
early phenomenology is neither committed to a metaphysical realism 
nor to a metaphysical idealism … It is exactly this metaphysical neu-
trality which is behind Husserl’s repeated claim that the difference 
41 Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenom-
enology, trans. D. Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), 135.
42 Zahavi, Husserl’s Phenomenology, 45.
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between a veridical perception and a mis-perception is irrelevant to 
phenomenology.43
And hence the controversial Husserlian claim in the Logical 
Investigations that there is no difference between an halluci-
nation or a perception of a book should be read as meaning 
that there is no difference to it as an object of consciousness 
to be examined. This does not mean that both perception and 
hallucination are equally real; but rather that such a question 
of their difference does not fall to phenomenology to answer. 
In other words the primary interest for phenomenological 
research is not the natural world which remains within the 
domain of the natural sciences and the object of empirical 
research. Instead, the interest of phenomenology is particular 
to consciousness and the relationship (or correlation) of mind 
and world. The particular questions addressed by Husserlian 
phenomenology are not ontological ones. Hence, throughout 
his career Husserl claimed an ontological neutrality for 
phenomenology. For example, in the introduction to the first 
volume of his Logical Investigations Husserl distinguishes 
phenomenology from metaphysics and says that “the ques-
tion as to the existence and nature of the external world is 
a metaphysical question.”44 Much later in his career, in the 
Crisis of European Sciences, he makes the related claim that 
“the point [of phenomenology] is not to secure objectivity 
but to understand it.”45
Hence, the critiques of phenomenology as being inherently 
correlationist conflate epistemological questions (regarding 
the knowability of the world) with ontological ones (regard-
ing the existence of the world) which were not part of the 
original phenomenological project. The point here is to 
recognise that strategies of speculative realism on both sides 
of the mathematical/aesthetic axis are not incompatible with 
43 Zahavi, Husserl’s Phenomenology, 40, original emphasis.
44 Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, vol. 1, ed. Dermot Moran, trans. J. 
N. Findlay (London: Routledge, 2001), 178.
45 Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences, 189.
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phenomenology, in much the same way that other activities 
such as science, sociology, painting and cooking are not. They 
are engaged in different activities with different objects of 
reflection. Phenomenology is concerned with the meaning 
of the world for us; speculative realism with the underlying 
structures of that world which lie beyond human meaning.
Inverting Epoché 
Harman’s object-oriented philosophy, by attempting philosophi-
cal voyages into a metaphysical space beyond consciousness, 
is an inversion of what was originally intended as the project 
of phenomenology. It thus reverses the epoché and pays at-
tention to what is left over from its operations in much the 
same way as Harman also does with Heidegger’s hammer 
and its “tool-being.”
In this vein, a comparison can be made between Zahavi’s 
claim that philosophy, in the guise of phenomenology, should 
suspend naivety (which is what the epoché does) and Graham 
Harman’s claim that philosophy should attempt to recapture 
naivety:
Instead of beginning with radical doubt, we start from naiveté. What 
philosophy shares with the lives of scientists, bankers, and animals 
is that all are concerned with objects … Once we begin from naiveté 
rather than doubt, objects immediately take centre stage … But whereas 
the naive standpoint of [this book] makes no initial claim as to which 
of these objects is real or unreal, the labor of the intellect is usually 
taken to be critical rather than naive. Instead of accepting this inflated 
menagerie of entities, critical thinking debunks objects and denies 
their autonomy.46 
Harman, then, whilst beginning from the same methodologi-
cal starting point as phenomenology, namely the epoché in 
which world is bracketed out from mind, moves beyond what 
was ever possible via the phenomenological method into a 
46 Harman, The Quadruple Object, 5-7.
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realm of speculations. His concern is to shift attention away 
from the relation of mind to world to the realms that lie be-
yond this relation and which we can only speculate on and 
creatively imagine. The real can only enter the picture tan-
gentially through allusive and alluring metaphors and poetic 
acts.47 To accept this means to say that some philosophical 
speculation is synonymous with fiction and may be similarly 
mediated through aesthetic judgment.  
Aesthetic Epoché
Maurice Merleau-Ponty outlines what is at stake in the 
phenomenological reduction in the opening pages of The 
Phenomenology of Perception:
The best formulation of the reduction is probably that given by Eugen 
Fink, Husserl’s assistant, when he spoke of “wonder” in the face of 
the world. Reflection does not withdraw from the world towards the 
unity of consciousness as the world’s basis; it steps back to watch the 
forms of transcendence fly up like sparks from a fire; it slackens the 
intentional threads which attach us to the world and thus brings them 
to our notice; it alone is consciousness of the world because it reveals 
that world as strange and paradoxical.48
Whilst Merleau-Ponty famously argues that the phenomeno-
logical reduction is never fully achievable and that “the most 
important lesson which the reduction teaches us is the impos-
47 As Paul J. Ennis observes: “Harman’s object oriented ontology proposes 
that it is language, in particular metaphor, which offers the path of least 
resistance to the ‘things themselves’.” Paul J. Ennis, Continental Realism 
(Winchester: Zero Books 2011), 33, my emphasis. In a similar vein Brassier 
argues: “In actuality, the more closely we try to stick to describing the pure 
appearing and nothing but, the more we end up resorting to a descriptive 
register which becomes increasingly figurative and metaphorical; so much 
so, indeed, that it has encouraged many phenomenologists to conclude that 
only figurative and/or poetic language can be truly adequate to the non-
propositional dimension of ‘meaningfulness’ harboured by ‘appearing’.” 
Brassier, Nihil Unbound, 28.
48 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith 
(London: Routledge, 2002), xv.
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sibility of a complete reduction,”49 he also claims that this is 
no reason to not incorporate it into the phenomenological 
toolbox and that “the incompleteness of the reduction … is 
not an obstacle to the reduction, it is the reduction itself.”50
In short, Merleau-Ponty argues that although a complete 
indifference toward the natural attitude is not possible, the 
attempt to achieve it is philosophically necessary. In this he 
seems to prefigure Harman’s position that philosophy begins 
from seemingly non-philosophical activities like “wonder” 
or naivety. Such claims are also compatible with Husserl’s 
own observations that the philosopher should be creative 
in searching out new ways of experiencing and thinking, 
and that philosophical activities involve forms of creativity 
similar to other aesthetic activities:
Extraordinary profit can be drawn from the offerings of history, in even 
more abundant measure from those of art, and especially from poetry, 
which are, to be sure, imaginary but which, in the originality of their 
forms [Neugestaltungen], the abundance of their single features and 
the unbrokenness of the motivation, tower high above the products 
of our own phantasy and, in addition, when they are apprehended 
understandingly, become converted into perfectly clear phantasies 
with particular ease owing to the suggestive power exerted by artistic 
means of presentation.51  
Hence creative imaginings are a means not only of philoso-
phising but also of communicating that philosophising to 
an audience.
Art as Epoché
I am thus lead to my first conclusion: that aesthetic experi-
ence is a route to a bracketing of the natural attitude and is 
49 Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, xiv.
50 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, trans. Alphonso Lingis 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968), 178.
51 Husserl, Ideas, 160.
Francis Halsall – Art and Guerrilla Metaphysics
403
therefore a way into the two different activities of phenom-
enological reflection and its mirror image (or excluded other), 
speculative metaphysics. Hence my claim: objects and spaces 
of art, as socially and historically privileged sites of aesthetic 
experience, reflection and judgment, have the potential to be 
philosophically meaningful on their own accord.
This account of art as a means to the epoché is consistent 
with the Kantian account of the disinterestedness of aesthetic 
judgement. In the Kantian account, aesthetic judgments are 
not subsumable under a determinate (bestimmend) concept 
yet they are made as if they were so through an appeal to a 
common sense; this is the celebrated antinomy of taste.52 Here 
a certain disinterestedness is assumed by which certain per-
sonal attitudes and determining concepts are put out of action. 
The connection between the epoché and the Kantian account 
of aesthetic reflection is something that Husserl also noticed. 
In the short “Letter to Hofmannsthal” he writes:
For many years I have attempted to get a clear sense of the basic problems 
of philosophy, and then of the methods for solving them, all of which led 
me to the “phenomenological” method as a permanent acquisition. It 
demands an attitude towards all forms of objectivity that fundamentally 
departs from its “natural” counterpart, and which is closely related to 
the attitude and stance in which your art, as something purely aesthetic, 
places us with respect to the presented objects and the whole of the 
surrounding world. The intuition of a purely aesthetic work of art is 
enacted under a strict suspension of all existential attitudes of the 
52 “(1) Thesis: A judgement of taste is not based on concepts; for otherwise 
one could dispute about it (decide by means of proofs). (2) Antithesis: A 
judgement of taste is based on concepts; for otherwise, regardless of the 
variation among [such judgements], one could not even so much as quarrel 
about them (lay claim to other people’s necessary assent to one’s judgement).” 
Kant’s famous solution to the antinomy is that “a judgement of taste must 
refer to some concept or other, for otherwise it could not possibly lay claim 
to necessary validity for everyone. And yet it must not be provable from a 
concept, because while some concepts can be determined, others cannot, 
but are intrinsically both indeterminate and indeterminable.” Immanuel 
Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. Werner Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing, 1987), 211–12.
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intellect and of all attitudes relating to emotions and the will which 
presuppose such an existential attitude. Or more precisely: the work 
of art places us in (almost forces us into) a state of aesthetic intuition 
that excludes these attitudes.53
Here Husserl is proposing that the phenomenological method 
of suspending natural attitudes is analogous to aesthetic ex-
perience in which there is a disinterested focus on the form 
of the object of aesthetic reflection. Both involve a judgement 
following from that reflection: the epoché as concerns the 
object of cognitive judgment; the aesthetic experience as 
concerns the object of aesthetic judgement. This suggests and 
prefigures the complex interconnection of aesthetics and 
philosophy that Merleau-Ponty was to develop, particularly 
in his later work.
Art, as a focus of aesthetic attention, can provide instances of 
strangeness and wonder when the world becomes something 
that can no longer be taken for granted. This happens for 
both the artist and the viewer. Art, in Niklas Luhmann’s terms, 
retards perception; it slows it down and makes it observable:
art aims to retard perception and render it reflexive—lingering upon 
the object in visual art (in striking contrast to everyday perception) 
and slowing down reading in literature, particularly in lyric poetry … 
Works of art by contrast [to everyday perception] employ perceptions 
exclusively for the purpose of letting the observer participate in the 
invention of invented forms.54
The artist can view the world, strategically, as if it were unfa-
miliar (and not through the natural attitude) in order to work 
out the way in which it can be re-presented according to the 
specificities of their medium. And these specificities might 
53 Edmund Husserl, “Letter to Hofmannsthal,” trans. Sven-Olov Wallenstein, 
Site (2009), 26/27, 2; originally in Husserliana Dokumente, Briefwechsel, Band 
7: Wissenschaftlerkorrespondenz (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994), 133–36. 
54 Niklas Luhmann, Art as a Social System, trans. Eva Knodt (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2000), 14.
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be material (such as qualities of paint), technical (methods 
of working) and conventional (protocols and styles).
This is what Merleau-Ponty interpreted in certain early 
modernist painters, namely that they viewed the world as weird 
because they were viewing it according to the specificities of 
the medium of painting. The painter intuitively experiences 
the world as a phenomenologist:
painting thrusts us once again into the presence of the world of lived 
experience. In the work of Cézanne, Juan Gris, Braque and Picasso, in 
different ways, we encounter objects—lemons, mandolins, bunches of 
grapes, pouches of tobacco—that do not pass quickly before our eyes in 
the guise of objects we “know well” but, on the contrary, hold our gaze, 
ask questions of it, convey to it in a bizarre fashion the very secret of 
their substance, the very mode of their material existence and which, 
so to speak, stand “bleeding” before us. This was how painting led us 
back to a vision of things themselves.55
Thus, for Merleau-Ponty, viewers of art are drawn into and 
made complicit in the weirdness of the world. This happens 
even if they are not involved in the technical issues of pro-
ducing the work of art because they look upon what the artist 
has produced. In other words art, “in a bizarre fashion” allows 
us to apprehend otherwise withdrawn substance. The lemons, 
mandolins, bunches of grapes and pouches of tobacco of 
the studio are re-presented as strange and autonomous; as 
withdrawing from us.
Even when something potentially familiar is presented, 
this is done so in a way in which its usual meanings are 
suspended. It is because we know that it is art that we do not 
run on stage and stop Othello from murdering Desdemona. 
It is because we know that it is art that we do not take a piss 
in Duchamp’s Fountain (1917).
The spaces of display for art are spaces of social differen-
tiation, where everyday life appears suspended. For example, 
55 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “Lecture 6: Art and the World of Perception,” 
The World of Perception, trans. Oliver Davis (London: Routledge, 2004), 69-70.
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what Brian O’Doherty calls the “White Cube”56 of the modern 
art gallery (the paradigm of which is MoMA, in New York) is 
designed to provide a privileged and distinct space of display 
and observation. It has white walls that are an abstraction 
from everyday life; and it is regulated by certain accepted 
behaviours (do not talk loudly, do not run etc.). The gallery, 
in other words, is a space apart from other social spaces and 
thus serves a bracketing function in spatial terms.
Works of art are weird objects and we encounter them in 
weird spaces. And we encounter them in weird ways. They are 
probably not something that we encounter in the everyday 
run of events in our lives; and even if they are, when we view 
them as art then we view them in a certain weird way. To be 
clear, works of art are no weirder in themselves than other 
objects of the world. It is rather that when viewed as art (from 
a particularly human perspective) then they: (i) are treated 
as distinct for the cultural and historical reasons that art has 
become recognised as such and (ii) have this weirdness of 
address as part of their meaning. It is because of this weird-
ness that they remain open to interpretation and continue 
to present us with something of a puzzle; that is, how to deal 
with them.
Harman’s position leads to accepting that all objects are 
intrinsically weird because they withdraw from thought and 
from each other. They only ever show their sensual surface to 
whatever other object happens to stand in relation with them. 
Yet, as I claim here, we do not encounter this deep weirdness 
without engaging in philosophical reflection. Art provides 
this, I argue, by promoting a way of thinking about all objects; 
it brings their weirdness into view through implying a hidden 
depth to them which is never fully disclosed.
If there is a philosophical significance to art objects and 
the spaces they occupy, then this significance is not that they 
illustrate certain didactic theories such as how to live a better 
life, or what the role of politics is (even though they might). It 
56 Brian O’Doherty, Inside the White Cube: The Ideology of Gallery Space (Berke-
ley: University of California Press, 2000).
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does not even lie in their capacity for representation as they 
can be weird in themselves. It is rather that the spaces and ob-
jects of art demand of (or perhaps extort from) us a particular 
frame of mind which—when couched in terms of aesthetic 
reflection—is inherently reflexive, perhaps philosophical. 
Philosophy as Vigorous Art
My second conclusion presents another inversion; it is the 
flipside to the first conclusion which proposes a similarity 
in artistic and philosophical practices in that both are medi-
ated by aesthetic reflection and judgment. It is that certain 
philosophical speculations—like works of art—may be judged 
aesthetically. What this means is that the tasks of speculative 
metaphysics and modes of aesthetic reflection, far from being 
incompatible, might actually be mutually reinforcing.
Merleau-Ponty began unpacking the intertwining of ontology 
and aesthetics in his later work. In “The Intertwining—The 
Chiasm” he claims:
Already our existence as seers (that is, we said, as beings who turn the 
world back upon itself and who pass over to the other side, and who 
catch sight of one another, who see one another with eyes) and especially 
our existence as sonorous beings for others and for ourselves contain 
everything required for there to be speech from the one to the other, 
speech about the world.57
However, Merleau-Ponty continues that such speech about 
the world is the language of the world, rather than language 
which represents it in human terms. The role of both philoso-
phy and poetry then, is to capture the origin of meaning. It 
seeks to capture the “wild-being” of the world as it precedes 
human reason. So, if it is to reflect a real world which is weird 
(as Harman claims it is) then its only hope in doing so is by 
gesturing toward it by aesthetic means. In these terms, the 
whole world is an aesthetic object, but one that is revealed 
further through aesthetic reflection:
57 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, 155.
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The whole landscape is overrun with words as with an invasion, it is 
henceforth but a variant of speech before our eyes, and to speak of 
its “style” is in our view to form a metaphor. In a sense the whole of 
philosophy, as Husserl says, consists in restoring a power to signify, a 
birth of meaning, or a wild meaning, an expression of experience by 
experience, which in particular clarifies the special domain of language. 
And in a sense, as Valéry said, language is everything, since it is the 
voice of no one, since it is the very voice of the things, the waves and the 
forests. And what we have to understand is that there is no dialectical 
reversal from one of these views to the other; we do not have to reas-
semble them into synthesis: they are two aspects of the reversibility 
which is the ultimate truth.58 
There are two ways of reading Merleau-Ponty’s claim here. 
The first is as a strong correlationist one in which the world 
is thoroughly enmeshed in human meanings and not know-
able in-itself. A second reading, however, proposes that things 
have a language of their own which we might ventriloquise 
in acts of poetry. Poetry in all its forms, be they visual, verbal, 
gustatory or whatever, is our clumsy, human attempt to speak 
the “drunkenness of things being various.”59
The second conclusion, then, is that Harman’s metaphysical 
speculations into the world populated by countless objects 
which lie beyond the horizon of human knowledge are fun-
damentally poetic. They are a poetry born from an aesthetic 
act of wonder in the face of the world. Such poetry does not 
admit of verification in the terms of other modes of philo-
sophical thinking and standard epistemic procedures. This 
does not mean that it is without meaning, but rather that the 
way in which it is to be judged is through aesthetic judgement 
of taste rather than empirical or conceptual verification.60
58 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, 155.
59 MacNeice, “Snow,” 30.
60 A related argument concerning the validity of art historical judgments is 
made in Francis Halsall, “Making and Matching: Aesthetic Judgement and 
the Production of Art Historical Knowledge,” The Journal of Art Historiogra-
phy (2012), 7, http://arthistoriography.wordpress.com/7-dec2012/ (accessed 
September 26, 2013).
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In the first moment of the Critique of Judgement Kant ar-
gues for the subjective purposiveness of judgements of taste. 
Subjective purposiveness gives us a model for how synthesis 
can be achieved between speculations into a weird world 
beyond human reason and their objects. Importantly, there 
can be no empirical or objective concept, such as truth, that 
regulates the validity of the speculations. Instead a subjective 
purposiveness is at work:
What is formal in the presentation of a thing, the harmony of its 
manifold to [form] a unity (where it is indeterminate what this unity 
is [meant] to be) does not by itself reveal any objective purposiveness 
whatsoever. For here we abstract from what this unity is as a purpose 
(what the thing is [meant] to be) so that nothing remains but the sub-
jective purposiveness of the presentations in the mind of the beholder. 
Subjective purposiveness [is] merely a certain purposiveness of the 
subject’s presentational state and, within that state, [an] appealingness 
[involved] in apprehending a given form by the imagination. Such 
purposiveness does not indicate any perfection of any object whatever, 
[since] no object is being thought through any concept of a purpose.61
In short, like a judgement of something beautiful for Kant, some 
philosophical speculations into a world beyond consciousness 
cannot be proved; that is, they are neither empirically nor 
conceptually demonstrable. They are nonetheless still made 
in the faith of their communicability through appeal to an 
audience that is hoped will agree with them. Certain forms 
of speculative philosophical thought are creative imaginings 
and aesthetic acts in their own right. Here we find a perhaps 
unlikely ally in Meillassoux whom I had placed on the other 
side of the mathematical/aesthetic axis. Meillassoux says:
Philosophy is the invention of strange forms of argumentation, neces-
sarily bordering on sophistry, which remains its dark structural double. 
To philosophize is always to develop an idea whose elaboration and 
defense require a novel kind of argumentation, the model for which 
61 Kant, Critique of Judgment, 74.
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lies neither in positive science—not even in logic—nor in some sup-
posedly innate faculty for proper reasoning. Thus it is essential that a 
philosophy produce internal mechanisms for regulating its own infer-
ences—signposts and criticisms through which the newly constituted 
domain is equipped with a set of constraints that provide internal 
criteria for distinguishing between licit and illicit claims.62
In this sense forms of philosophising like Harman’s guerrilla 
metaphysics are like works of art. They are to be evaluated 
not according to their validity in correspondence with a tran-
scendental set of truth conditions. But rather they are to be 
judged aesthetically. In other words, these speculations can 
never be proved, only contemplated. And their effectiveness 
is to be judged aesthetically, as a matter of taste. 
62 Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, 
trans. Ray Brassier (London: Continuum, 2006), 124.
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Images I Cannot See
Magdalena Wisniowska
Royal Academy Schools
Primary Aesthetics
Confronted with a call for the rehabilitation of the distinction between primary and secondary 
qualities, I cannot help but turn towards the discussion of 
aesthetics, specifically of a Kantian kind.1 The call belongs to 
Quentin Meillassoux, as expressed at the very beginning of 
his seminal essay After Finitude; what is at stake in such a call 
is modern philosophy’s relation to the absolute.2 For we learn 
that ever since philosophy has rejected the “pre-critical” or 
“naïve” distinction between the sensible qualities of an object 
and its more fixed, mathematical properties, there is nothing 
which does not fall under the spell of subjectivation.3 Not 
only is there no outside of the correlation between thought 
and being, the correlate itself—whether this is, according to 
its modern incarnation, language or consciousness—cannot 
be grasped. For fear of substantiation and a fall back into 
1 I am drawing on Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. Werner S. 
Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987).
2 Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, 
trans. Ray Brassier (London: Continuum, 2008).
3 Ibid., 3.
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naivety, philosophy remains in its glass cage, destined to look 
outside while trapped within.
Not only does Meillassoux’s argument seem utterly con-
vincing, there is precious little one could say in response. 
Correlationism does seem to be the dominant mode of think-
ing. This implies that the rehabilitation of the distinction 
between primary and secondary qualities is both urgent and 
necessary. Where then does aesthetics come in? Why would 
anyone wish to turn, at this very moment—to Kant? While 
it is true that the centrality of correlation prevents modern 
critical philosophy from considering the two concepts of 
being and thought independently from one another, there 
is nevertheless one place in which at least the concept of 
thought is confronted in a more direct manner. As Kant’s 
third critique explains, pleasure associated with the beautiful 
is different from the satisfaction derived from the agreeable 
or the good because it consists of the experience of our facul-
ties of thought at work. The aesthetic judgement of taste is 
pleasurable because we feel our faculties, the very faculties 
conditioning the human subject, at play.4
One could respond to this privileging of aesthetic experience 
with scepticism. Indeed, it is far from clear how the sensing 
of the faculties could lift the spell of subjectivation when it is 
the human subject who is doing the sensing. Yet this moment 
of aesthetic pleasure described by Kant gains significance 
once we consider what incites Meillassoux to break with the 
correlationist circle. As modern critical philosophy cannot 
think outside of the central correlation, it cannot think the 
problem of origin, whether this concerns the formation of 
the universe or the emergence of the conditions of knowl-
edge that it seeks to determine; this despite the fact that in 
Kantianism the transcendental subject is always instantiated 
in the empirical body.5 Kant, by ascribing aesthetic pleasure 
4 See Kant’s treatment of the free-play of imagination in Kant, Critique of 
Judgment, 61-64.
5 For Meillassoux, the body is one of the conditions for the “taking place” 
of the transcendental thus rendering the correlationist argument (that the 
problem of the ancestral confuses the empirical and transcendental) invalid. 
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to the feeling of the faculties in free play, takes the first ten-
tative step towards thinking how transcendental conditions 
themselves might be generated. Accordingly, the sensation 
of the quickening of the faculties becomes a key moment 
for generations of post-Kantian thinkers working on this 
problematic.6 In so doing, Kant might also be considered as 
taking the first step towards thinking outside of the critical 
remit, the taste for beauty being something like a taste for 
the unconditioned or absolute.
At this point, a clarification is in order. The above account is 
heavily skewed towards one post-Kantian thinker in particular, 
the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze. Although Deleuze is 
perhaps better known for his critique of representation and 
the broader rejection of Kantian philosophy as a whole, many 
recent studies have nevertheless placed his aesthetics within 
the Kantian context that I have outlined above.7 According 
to these readings, Deleuze’s engagement with Kant revolves 
around the problem of genesis.8 Taking up the post-Kantian 
slogan of “real” and not “possible” experience, his concern 
is not the definition of the transcendental conditions that 
See Meillassoux, After Finitude, 22-26.
6 I am using the term “post-Kantian” very loosely in a Deleuzian sense. Key 
figures would be Salomon Maïmon, Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Friedrich 
Wilhelm Joseph Schelling. See the section on the relationship between Kant 
and Deleuze in Joe Hughes, Deleuze and the Genesis of Representation (London: 
Continuum, 2008), 16-18. 
7 Deleuze’s best-known critique of representation is found in the chapter 
“The Image of Thought” in his Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton 
(London: Continuum, 2009), 164-213.
8 Daniel W. Smith is one of the first to offer this Kantian reading. See for 
instance his short essay “Deleuze’s Theory of Sensation: Overcoming Kantian 
Duality” in Deleuze: A Critical Reader, ed. Paul Patton (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 
29-56. A similar reading is taken up by Joe Hughes in Deleuze and the Genesis of 
Representation and Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition: A Reader’s Guide (London: 
Continuum, 2009) as well as by Christian Kerslake, Immanence and the Vertigo 
of Philosophy: From Kant to Deleuze (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2009). Levi Bryant addresses the question of genesis within a speculative 
realist context in “Deleuze’s Transcendental Empiricism: Notes towards a 
Transcendental Materialism” in Thinking between Deleuze and Kant: A Strange 
Encounter, ed. Edward Willat and Matt Lee (London: Continuum, 2009), 28-48.
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allow for the possibility of knowledge, but to track knowl-
edge’s genetic constitution. In other words, Deleuze asks how 
representation comes about, under what circumstances it is 
generated. One could argue that he rethinks the first critique 
from the point of view he discovers in the third precisely by 
taking up the key moment of aesthetic pleasure: the fact that 
free play occurs prior to determination in judgement and that 
this free play involves the mutual quickening of the faculties.9
The possibility that intrigues me here is that of what I 
would like to call a “primary aesthetics.” If indeed in aesthetic 
experience we confront transcendental conditions directly 
and these conditions are the conditions of real genesis rather 
than the conditions of mere possibility, this would mean that 
we confront a world prior to emergence, that is, we confront 
not the object as it is “for us,” but as it is “in itself,” as true 
substance.
Working with Meillassoux’s distinction between primary 
and secondary qualities, an aesthetics that is primary in na-
ture would thus bring us face to face with the absolute. The 
question is, to what extent is this the case? Does Deleuze in 
his recasting of Kant’s critical project take that tentatively 
offered step and bring us closer to Meillassoux’s absolute? 
Or does Kant’s all-encompassing subjectivity somehow 
intervene? To what extent does the correlationist contract 
stating the primacy of the correlation between thought and 
being stay intact?
In answering these questions, Deleuze’s discussion of Samuel 
Beckett’s television play …but the clouds… in “The Exhausted” 
strikes me as particularly relevant, dealing as it does with 
both the problem of emergence and the extent to which the 
conditions of emergence can be confronted. The play was first 
broadcast by BBC2 in 1977 and published in Ends and Odds 
later in the same year. Deleuze’s essay subsequently served 
as a postscript to the play’s first French translation and was 
republished as “The Exhausted” in the English translation of 
9 Joe Hughes makes a very similar argument in Deleuze and the Genesis of 
Representation, 17-18, and throughout Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition.
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Critique et Clinique.10 Both the play and Deleuze’s discussion of 
it centre on an image of a woman’s face, a close-up “reduced as 
far as possible to eyes and mouth.”11 We learn the manner of 
her appearance from the play’s single male protagonist: that 
she can appear and immediately disappear, that she can also 
appear, linger and disappear and finally that she can appear, 
mouth the words “but the clouds” and then disappear—all 
of which takes place when the protagonist is seated in his 
darkened room. Deleuze describes this moment in which 
Beckett “makes the image” in a unique way, a way that can-
not be found in his other uses of the term.12 The image here 
is “not a representation of an object but a movement in the 
world of the mind.”13 
Beckett makes an image, an image that is “not a represen-
tation” but a “movement,” furthermore “a movement in the 
world of the mind.” He makes such an image through a very 
particular and elaborate process, which Deleuze calls the 
process of “exhaustion.”14 Within the context of the essay, this 
is the logical and physiological exhaustion of possibility, set 
in contrast to the realisation of possibility characteristic of 
everyday life. Whereas the realisation of the possible in the 
everyday is limited to the choices that we might make and the 
aims we might follow, exhaustion rejects any such decisions, 
10 I will be using Gilles Deleuze, “The Exhausted” in Essays Critical and Clinical, 
trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco (London: Verso, 1998), 152-74.
11 Samuel Beckett, “…but the clouds…” in Collected Shorter Plays (London: 
Faber, 1984), 257.
12 Deleuze, “The Exhausted,” 169. The concept of the image appears frequently 
in Deleuze’s work. Notably, he critiques the “image of thought” in Difference 
and Repetition alluding to the subjective presuppositions of Cartesianism. 
There is also the image of Bergsonism, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara 
Habberjam (New York: Zone Books, 1991) and the movement and time images 
of the Cinema Books: Cinema 1, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Hab-
berjam (London: Continuum, 2005) and Cinema 2, trans. Hugh Tomlinson 
and Robert Galeta (London: Continuum 2005).
13 Deleuze, “The Exhausted,” 169.
14 Ibid., 152-54.
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leading us to discover a world that is “prior to birth.”15 The 
image thus is the culminating point of the exhaustive pro-
cess, the moment in which the state of exhaustion is reached, 
“the final word, ‘nohow’.”16 And while we can understand 
this culminating point in a Spinozian way, as following the 
pattern set out by the Spinozian God,17 its Kantian sense is 
equally clear. The world “prior to birth” is the world prior to 
representation: the world before the givenness of sensation 
and before the subject-object distinction that constitutes all 
cognitive experience. The exhaustion of the image is the 
moment in which the conditions of possible (Kant) or, rather, 
real (Deleuze) experience have become manifest.
The Exhausted
Our task then is a simple one. To establish whether Deleuze 
is a speculative realist or not, we must interrogate Deleuze’s 
text—“The Exhausted”—with reference to Meillassoux’s argu-
ments concerning primary and secondary qualities. However 
seductive our reading of the process of exhaustion as a kind 
of reaching out towards the absolute may be, we must first 
establish the extent to which Deleuze’s superior empiricism 
breaks with the Kantian transcendental contract. Does Deleuze 
consider subject and object independently or always relative 
to one another? Does he think the separation of being and 
thought or only their correlation? Deleuze may indeed be 
best known for his critique of representation, but Meillas-
soux has shown that such a critique, however convincing, is 
of itself insufficient to overcome the correlationist bind.18 
Does Deleuze, then, like so many others, fall into the trap of 
15 Deleuze, “The Exhausted,” 152, 156.
16 Ibid., 170.
17 This is the most common interpretation of Deleuze’s essay. See for instance 
Audrey Wasser, “A Relentless Spinozism: Deleuze’s Encounter with Beckett,” 
SubStance (2012), 41:1, 124-36.
18 See for example Meillassoux’s critique of Heidegger in Meillassoux, After 
Finitude, 8.
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correlationism or is he able to avoid what Meillassoux terms 
the “correlationist circle” or “two-step”?19 
Before answering, we must consider the argument of “The 
Exhausted” more closely. I have already mentioned the distinc-
tion with which Deleuze begins his essay (and its Spinozian 
framework). Possibility is either something we can realise or 
something we can exhaust. While we realise possibility con-
stantly every time we choose to pursue one aim over another, 
the exhaustion of possibility occurs only within art. Only in 
art can we grasp all possible aims and goals in their totality 
and at once, in all contradiction, without the accompanying 
need for realising one possibility or another. As we have al-
ready seen, this kind of exhaustion has two aspects. On the 
one hand, there is a logical exhaustiveness associated with 
the construction of “inclusive disjunctions”; on the other 
hand, there is physiological fatigue.20 Of central importance 
is the final of Deleuze’s introductory distinctions. Whereas 
the realisation of the possible is tiring for the subject, the 
fatigue arising from exhaustion is the consequence of the 
objective exhaustiveness of “the combinatorial.”21
In “The Exhausted” Deleuze argues that Beckett achieves 
such a double exhaustion of possibility through his specific 
use of language. Once again a distinction is in order, follow-
ing the pattern set by the first. On the one hand, we have ev-
eryday life where language readies possibility for realisation 
by establishing plans, goals and aims. On the other hand, we 
have art which in contrast seeks to give the possible a “reality 
that is proper to it.”22 In this manner, we have come across a 
crucial point of relevance for our speculative realist inflected 
account of a Deleuzian aesthetics. If, as Meillassoux argues, 
language is one of the two modes through which correlation-
ism dominates modern philosophical thought, we can see 
how exhaustion might be able to offer one way of reaching 
19 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 8.
20 Deleuze, “The Exhausted,” 154-55.
21 Ibid., 153.
22 Ibid., 156.
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outside of the proverbial glass cage. Through his use of lan-
guage, Beckett makes the nature of the correlate that binds us 
visible. At the very least, we know what we are to reach out of.
Deleuze attributes to Beckett a schematic approach, a gradual 
exhaustion of language that takes place in three distinct stages, 
each coinciding with one period of Beckett’s creative output. 
According to this scheme, there is a first language of names 
found in the early novels and plays; a second language of 
voices that dominates Beckett’s work from the Unnameable 
onwards; and finally, a third language of spaces and images 
which, although born in the novel How It Is and present in a 
number of theatre works (Deleuze lists Happy Days, Act without 
Words and Catastrophe), is associated most closely with the 
late television plays: Quad, Ghost Trio, …but the clouds… and 
Nacht und Träume.23 Each of these three languages exhausts 
the possible in its own particular way.
The first of these languages is perhaps easiest to grasp, as 
it concerns the more logical aspect of the process of exhaus-
tion. Deleuze considers the daily task of language to be the 
establishment of aims, goals and preferences that ready the 
possible for realisation. Thus, we can see that the construc-
tion of inclusive disjunctions associated with exhaustive-
ness necessarily impacts the naming function of words as 
numeration replaces language’s more familiar grammatical 
structures. The consequence of the combinatorial is that it 
exhausts its own object, those discrete entities that it so care-
fully enumerates. To refer to the example given by Deleuze, 
Murphy can only “partake” his daily five biscuits “in their 
fullness” when he stops treating them as different sorts of 
biscuit to be eaten and begins to think of all their possible 
combinations, 120 in total.24
The second language carries out this process of exhaustive-
ness one step further by including in the construction of the 
inclusive disjunction all those voices that emit the names of 
language one. With this second kind of inventory, we can see 
23 Deleuze, “The Exhausted,” 159. 
24 Ibid., 153.
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more of the physiological consequences of logical exhaus-
tiveness. While fatigue, or at least weariness, accompanies 
Murphy in his confrontation with the five different sorts of 
biscuit, the decision facing the characters of Beckett’s later 
novels and plays concerns not a distinct set of objects but 
these characters’ very own sense of selfhood. So exhausted 
is Mahood in The Unnameable that he becomes no more than 
Worm—“the unnameable” or “the exhausted one”—at the 
limit of any sense of self.25 Yet the aporia of the play is such 
that we learn of the character of the selfless Worm indirectly, 
through the initial character of Mahood. Language two thus 
confronts us with the bind of the narrator’s voice, the notion 
of the individual subject who speaks.
In the third and final language, the process of exhaustion 
with its logical and physiological aspects is given substance 
in that it becomes self-sufficient. Deleuze describes this 
final language as consisting of spaces and, crucially for my 
argument, “images.”26 Exhaustion here is no longer a logi-
cal process carried out by one character or another; neither 
is it the drawn out process of the character’s physiological 
exhaustion. The respective exhaustions of languages one 
and two allow for the appearance of images (and to a lesser 
extent spaces) which seem to bypass the relation of distinct 
object to individual subject. Deleuze describes these images 
in terms of “the indefinite” or “the singular,” as no more 
than “a woman, a hand, a mouth, some eyes.”27 These images, 
independent of all specifics, are not objects—woman, hand 
or mouth—but processes; or rather, the images in Beckett’s 
work are always in process. The effort required to make an 
image in its indefinite state—the construction of languages 
one and two, the “loosening” of the “grip of words” and the 
“drying up” of the “oozing of voices”—is so great that it is 
impossible to sustain.28 The image, as Deleuze insists, has by 
25 Deleuze, “The Exhausted,” 157-58.
26 Ibid., 158-59.
27 Ibid., 158, original emphasis.
28 Ibid., 159.
Speculations V
420
its very nature only a “short duration”; it lasts for the shortest 
of times.29 Indeed, the prime characteristic of the image is 
the violence with which it explodes. However, it also needs 
to be stressed that there is no one who exhausts or explodes 
this mysterious image. It does so out of its own self-accord.
We can find the best example of this self-dissipating image 
in …but the clouds…, Beckett’s 1977 television work. Here, the 
protagonist attempts to recall the way in which a woman had 
previously appeared to him. We see both his re-enactment of 
his daily routine (coming indoors from the right; returning 
to his chamber to change from his day clothes into his night 
clothes and vice versa; exiting to the left) and the image of 
a woman’s face (which appears and disappears; appears and 
lingers; appears, lingers, mouths the words of W. B. Yeats’s 
1928 poem “The Tower” and disappears). But crucially, the 
woman who appears to the protagonist is not a consequence 
of his active thought. The play begins with the protagonist 
correcting himself. He first states, “When I thought of her, it 
was always night. I came in—.” But very soon he adds, “No 
that is not right. When she appeared it was always night. I 
came in—.”30 The woman is not the object of the subject’s 
thought. She appears, whether the subject thinks of her or 
not. Despite the meticulous detail with which the protagonist 
recounts his daily activities, there is a sense that the woman 
appears whatever action he might take. Deleuze identifies 
this moment of the woman’s appearance as the moment in 
which Beckett finally makes the image.
Movement and Darkness
At this stage in Deleuze’s argument, we reach the key point 
of any comparison between his aesthetics and Meillassoux’s 
speculative realist denunciation of correlationism. For it is 
here that Deleuze describes the image that appears to the 
protagonist of …but the clouds… as “not a representation of 
29 Deleuze, “The Exhausted,” 161.
30 Beckett, “…but the clouds…,” 259.
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an object but a movement in the world of the mind.”31 The 
image is not what we see before us. It is not the face of the 
woman that somehow materialises to the man seated at his 
desk. Instead, it is a movement of the mind, where the term 
“mind” takes on a meaning different to that familiar from 
our discussion of correlationism. Thought here is neither 
the one pre-given faculty nor the ensemble of the Kantian 
pre-given faculties working in harmony. For Deleuze, thought 
belongs to the three passive syntheses, a series of discordant 
and violent impulses and drives which constitute a system 
of the dissolved self.
But before making any such claims, I would first like to 
limit my examination to the argument Deleuze presents 
in “The Exhausted.” First of all, to understand the nature of 
Beckett’s image, we must consider more of “the darkness” that 
invariably accompanies it. When first discussing the nature of 
language three, Deleuze describes the moment of the image’s 
self-dissipation as “a singular darkness.”32 Darkness is also 
a central feature of Deleuze’s analysis of …but the clouds…. 
Once the woman’s appearance announces “the end of the 
possible,” we are faced with “eternal darkness, the dead end 
of the black night.”33 Of this eternal darkness, Deleuze writes:
There is no longer an image, anymore than there is a space: beyond 
the possible there is only darkness, as in Murphy’s third and final state, 
where the protagonist no longer moves in spirit but has become an 
indiscernible atom, abulic, “in the dark … of … absolute freedom.” This 
is the final word, “nohow.”34
Deleuze here once again refers to Beckett’s earlier novel, 
specifically to the chapter dedicated to the justification of 
the expression “Murphy’s mind.”35 In the “riotous potpourri 
31 Deleuze, “The Exhausted,” 169.
32 Ibid., 161.
33 Ibid., 170.
34 Ibid.
35 Samuel Beckett, Murphy (New York: Grove Press, 2011), 107-13.
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of many metaphysical systems”36 that this chapter contains, 
Murphy’s mind is presented as “hermetically closed,” a “hol-
low sphere”37 which nevertheless holds the entire universe 
within. Murphy discovers that in order to move within this 
universe and to enjoy its treasures he must first let his body 
be at rest. Just as exhaustion has both logical and physiological 
aspects, Murphy’s law of inversion involves both the mental 
and the physical. 
In the elaboration of the law of inversion that follows, Beckett 
describes Murphy’s mental acrobatics in more detail, dividing 
the closed and hollow sphere of his mind into three distinct 
zones: the light, the half-light and the dark. When Murphy 
first lays at rest, he travels through a zone that resembles the 
world outside, its mental forms corresponding quite closely 
to the outside’s physical ones for which they act as a kind of 
parallel. Within the zone of light, Murphy has the childlike 
pleasure of manipulating those experiences which in the 
outside world lie beyond his control: he can, for instance, 
reprise a kick he has received. Providing that he rests a little 
bit more, he can enter the second zone of half-light, one step 
further removed from the physical in that it consists of forms 
which have no parallel. This second world he can no longer 
manipulate and the only pleasure available to him is this 
world’s contemplation at a distance. At the ultimate point of 
rest, Murphy reaches the third, most distant and final zone 
of darkness which stands in stark contrast to the other two. 
It contains no forms, whether parallel or otherwise. Indeed, 
Beckett notes that it contains “no elements or states.”38 Thus, 
it cannot be manipulated, nor is it something which Murphy 
can contemplate. Of this last zone Beckett writes:
The third, the dark, was a flux of forms, a perpetual coming together 
and falling asunder of forms. The light contained the docile element 
36 John Fletcher, “Samuel Beckett and the Philosophers,” Comparative Lit-
erature (1965), 17:1, 54.
37 Beckett, Murphy, 107.
38 Ibid.
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of a new manifold, the world of the body broken up into pieces of a toy, 
the half-light, states of peace. But the dark neither elements nor states, 
nothing but forms becoming and crumbling into the fragments of a 
new becoming, without love or hate or any intelligible principle of 
change. Here there was nothing but commotion and the pure forms 
of commotion. Here he was not free, but a mote in the dark of absolute 
freedom. He did not move, he was a point in the ceaseless unconditioned 
generation and passing away of line.39
We can see straightaway that the darkness of …but the clouds… 
and the darkness of the third zone of Murphy’s mind are 
one and the same. But what can we learn from their mutual 
resemblance? What is striking is that both the third zone of 
Murphy’s mind and the equally dark, equally mobile mental 
world of the protagonist of …but the clouds… have no “I” in the 
traditional sense in that they have no one conscious unifying 
force. By this stage in Murphy’s travels, the freedom associated 
with zones one and two—the ability to manipulate and con-
template—is forsaken. Similarly, the exhaustion of language 
has reached a stage in which our ability to realise goals, plans 
and aims through the naming and voicing of possibility has 
been renounced. As Deleuze writes, “something is seen or 
heard” provided that “it is freed from the chains by which 
it was bound”: the image is the consequence of us “tearing 
away all these adhesions.”40 As the protagonist of …but the 
clouds… reminds us, the image is not a product of his active 
thought. But this is not to say that there is no sense of self or 
unifying force within the thought both Beckett and Deleuze 
describe. “Motes,” “atoms” and “points” seem to populate this 
dark and mobile world. What kind of thought, then, is this 
thought without the traditional subject–object distinction? 
Who does the thinking and what does this thought consist 
of? What kind of existence does this thought have?
I would like to argue that Deleuze’s text raises the ques-
tion of the relation of thought to being. Or more precisely, it 
39 Beckett, Murphy, 107.
40 Deleuze, “The Exhausted,” 158.
Speculations V
424
raises the question of how thought comes into being, emerg-
ing from a non-time and a non-space. The problem is, as in 
many of Deleuze’s works, that of thought’s genetic origin: 
this is what in “The Exhausted” Deleuze expresses as the 
Spinoza-tinted “before birth.” In this vein, Deleuze addresses 
the same problem of temporality as Meillassoux, although 
he stages it rather differently. As we have seen the issue for 
Meillassoux is modern philosophy’s relation to the absolute, a 
notion which, together with the distinction between primary 
and secondary qualities, he believes has been cast aside in 
philosophy’s turn towards the transcendental. To point out 
some of the shortcomings of the transcendental turn, Meil-
lassoux formulates the notion of the ancestral, the temporal 
state prior to all “givenness.”41 Very simply, this is the time of 
reference for any scientific statement that attempts to date 
the origins of the universe, the origins of earth, or life on 
earth. He argues that the correlationism dominating most 
forms of philosophy since Kant is incapable of thinking 
the absolute, because it is incapable of taking these kind 
of scientific statements literally. Kantians are incapable of 
thinking a being that is not manifest to us. For correlationism, 
the paradox of “a givenness of being anterior to givenness” 
is insurmountable.42 
Deleuze brings the entire problem of temporality much 
closer to home. The “before birth” of “The Exhausted” does 
not relate to statements concerning our most distant past, 
but to those experiences taking place here and now. As any 
good Kantian knows, before any kind of experience becomes 
possible, certain conditions must be in place. These are the 
forms of sensibility, space and time, the pure concepts of 
understanding and the principles of reason. Where Kantian-
ism falls short however, is in explaining how and from where 
41 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 14. Meillassoux explicitly uses the term “given-
ness,” which can ultimately be traced back to Kant. In the Critique of Pure 
Reason the sensible is “given” as a manifold of time and space. See Kant’s 
discussion of the transcendental aesthetic in the Critique of Pure Reason, 
trans. John Miller Dow Meiklejohn (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1855), 71-104.
42 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 14.
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these conditions have arisen. Notoriously, in the first critique, 
Kant merely adopts his twelve categories of understanding 
from the twelve forms of judgment that logic has inherited 
from Aristotle. Thus, Deleuze discovers another shortcoming 
at the heart of transcendental thought. Not only is Kantian-
ism incapable of thinking statements concerning events 
which science believes took place 13.5 billion years ago, it is 
incapable of thinking its own genetic origin. Just as Kantians 
cannot think the emergence of being generally, they cannot 
think how the principles of their own thought came into 
being. Such are the questions that dominate Deleuze’s work 
from Difference and Repetition onwards: how to account for 
the genetic origin of our thought? What are the conditions 
of “real” and not just “possible” experience?
Whatever account we choose to read,43 in Deleuze, the 
genesis of thought begins with the intensive encounter. 
Every time something is sensed, thought is forced to think, 
precisely because it is confronted with something external 
and independent of it. It is important to understand that the 
sensible here is not the “empirical sensibility” found in Kant, 
but the Deleuzian “transcendental sensibility” consisting of 
discontinuous instants of material impressions, an intensive 
zone whose only rule is discontinuity.44 Thought begins when 
the body attempts to interpret this violence of the intensive 
encounter unfolding the spectacle of the active and passive 
syntheses and thus establishing the representational realm 
of actuality and the sub-representational realm of virtuality 
with the latter grounding the former.45 If we accept that De-
43 In Deleuze and the Genesis of Representation, Hughes shows how works as 
diverse as Difference and Repetition, The Logic of Sense, trans. Mark Lester with 
Charles Stivale, ed. Constantin V. Boundas (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1990) and Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Robert 
Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane (Minneapolis: University of Minne-
sota Press, 1983) all share the same structure. He makes a similar argument 
to include Cinema 1 and Cinema 2 as well as What is Philosophy?, trans. Hugh 
Tomlinson and Graham Burchill (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1994) in Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition, 179.
44 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 176.
45 See chapter two of Difference and Repetition, 90-163 for further details on 
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leuze’s genetic account begins with the initial encounter of 
the sensible and ultimately grounds the active recognition of 
the object on the passive “ideal synthesis” of difference,46 we 
can accept that the “movement” and “darkness” of the world 
of the image refers to this very realm of passive syntheses.
A straightforward comparison ought to make the similari-
ties between the two accounts clear. To first reiterate the argu-
ment of “The Exhausted”: for Deleuze, the image always has 
the status of the indefinite. It is not an object but a process. 
More so, it is a process which is not carried out by someone 
or something. We know that the central characteristic of the 
image is the violence with which it self-dissipates or explodes. 
Such images can be found in Beckett’s late television plays, 
specifically in …but the clouds…, and, to illustrate the nature 
of the image present there, Deleuze alludes to Murphy’s third 
state and the zone of darkness and flux. Let us consider then 
the Nietzschean way in which he describes the third passive 
synthesis in Difference and Repetition:
The system of the future … must be called a divine game since there is 
no pre-existing rule, since the game bears already upon its own rules 
and since the child-player can only win, all of chance being affirmed 
each time and for all times.47
The similarities between the two descriptions—of Murphy’s 
third zone of darkness and Difference and Repetition’s system 
of the future—are pronounced. First of all, in both cases 
there is no question of a distinct object bound by a set of 
rules. Just as the system of the future does not conform to 
any pre-existing rule, the movement of the third dark zone 
follows no set principles. Not only does this final zone bear 
no relation to anything within the actual world; Beckett tells 
this grounding process. Deleuze also refers to the passive synthesis in chapter 
three, 181-183, acknowledging Kant’s “discordant harmony” as a model for 
his system of the dissolved self.
46 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 203-04.
47 Ibid., 142.
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us that those forms that constitute its virtuality continually 
“become and crumble into new becomings without love or 
hate or any intelligible principle of change.”48 Secondly, both 
the mental world of Murphy’s travels and the world of the 
divine game are not presided over by an individual subject 
possessing ready-made faculties. The player of the divine 
game is a child that, in its “innocence and forgetfulness,” is 
synonymous with the new.49 The system of the future is a 
consequence of the dissipation of the first and second passive 
syntheses in the third. The self of this third synthesis is thus 
appropriate to it, cut off from previously established bonds. 
Similarly, Murphy must lose those shreds of agency that he 
held in the brightness of the zone of light and the twilight 
of the zone of half-light. There is freedom in the last zone 
of his mind, but this is neither the freedom to manipulate 
particular events nor the freedom to contemplate forms not 
encountered before. Instead, it is the freedom of continual 
change, which he can only enjoy by becoming a “mote” in 
“the ceaseless generation of line,” that is, a dissolved self.50 
Like the child-player of the divine game or the non-subject 
of the third passive synthesis, Murphy needs to become both 
innocent and forgetful.
If, then, there is a unifying force to the dark and mental 
world shared by both Murphy and the protagonist of …but the 
clouds…, it centres on this child figure taken up in movement 
and flux. Deleuze is famous for multiplying his definitions, 
and even by limiting ourselves to the consideration of Dif-
ference and Repetition we discover a number of synonyms for 
this figure in a variety of contexts: philosophical, scientific, 
psychoanalytic. However, for our purposes, the mathematical 
context of chapters four and five is particularly suggestive.51 
48 Beckett, Murphy, 112.
49 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (New 
York: Penguin Books, 1969), 54-55. See also Hughes, Deleuze’s Difference and 
Repetition, 133.
50 Beckett, Murphy, 112.
51 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 214-329.
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Here, the Nietzschean child-player re-appears as the contingent 
or “aleatory point.”52 In modern day calculus, this point plays 
a comparable role to the child-player in Nietzsche’s divine 
game. Just as the throw of the dice affirms all of chance, the 
aleatory point allows for the progressive reciprocal deter-
mination of differentials to occur. Without this point, the 
differentials may indeed be determinable but their status 
is of the yet to be determined. This aspect of Deleuzian 
thought is particularly relevant to any discussion of primary 
and secondary qualities and the concurrent claim that the 
subject-centeredness dominating modern philosophy renders 
it incapable of taking mathematical statements literally. Ac-
cording to Meillassoux, there is no conceivable property of 
the object in modern philosophy which can be considered 
independent of its relation to the subject. In Deleuze, we 
are witness to a rather remarkable twist. He shows that the 
genetic heart of subjectivity can be presented in objective 
mathematical terms.
Deleuze and Speculative Realism
By way of conclusion, let me engage more systematically with 
some of Meillassoux’s arguments to see if there is indeed the 
possibility of a primary aesthetics. First in line is the claim 
with which Meillassoux ends his opening chapter: that mod-
ern philosophy is incapable of taking scientific statements 
regarding the emergence of being literally. All philosophy 
working in the critical tradition prefers to argue one of two 
things: either that the temporal problem is misunderstood 
as a problem of space, or that the problem confuses its em-
pirical and transcendental levels.53 According to the corre-
lationist, the difficulty of the ancestral event is merely that 
of the unwitnessed or unperceived. The correlationist has 
no wish to discuss how organic bodies have come to appear 
but only how the science of emergence is possible. Needless 
52 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 181, 248-50, 354.
53 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 18-27.
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to say, Meillassoux dismisses both of these arguments. The 
problem of the ancestral is not that of the unperceived but 
of that which is prior to givenness, the non-given event or 
even the absence of givenness. And while it might seem that 
the levels at which the problem is discussed are different, 
Meillassoux insists that the conditions for the emergence 
of organic bodies and the science of emergence are one and 
the same. The human subject, too, needs to be instantiated. 
Hence his rehabilitation of the distinction between primary 
and secondary qualities becomes necessary. We are forced to 
think “outside ourselves.”54 
Of course, Deleuze does not think of events that occurred 
several billion years ago but of a genetic origin immanent to 
nature. Yet I have shown that the temporality in question is 
not dissimilar. In both cases, we are confronted with an event 
prior to givenness, a movement from non-being to being. It 
could be argued that this is precisely what Deleuze first traces 
in Difference and Repetition. The three passive syntheses with 
their productive disruption are his way of thinking how a 
world of representation, in other words, a world of givenness, 
might arise. Prior to such givenness is the Nietzschean system 
of the future with its lack of rules and child-player. It is the 
world of differentials and aleatory points. The affirmation 
of chance or the reciprocal determination of differentials 
explains how the determined develops from the undeter-
mined, the known from the unknown. This emergence is 
also present in Beckett as the making of the image in …but 
the clouds… so clearly shows. The appearance of the woman 
evokes a world in which there are no pre-existing rules and 
no pre-constituted subjectivity. Subjecthood here is a mat-
ter of chance and has all the spontaneity and innocence of 
Nietzsche’s child–player.
In “The Exhausted,” Deleuze affirms the non-being, or 
meontological status, of this dark and mobile world. Let us 
examine the initial distinction between the realisation and 
the exhaustion of the possible one more time. Whereas the 
54 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 27.
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realisation of the possible takes place in the here and now, 
exhaustion returns to a moment “prior to birth.” Within 
this schema, the “possible” is that which “exists.” Deleuze 
confirms, “There is no existence other than the possible.” 
This would mean that the world of exhaustion—the world 
prior to birth—is of a non-existent order. Deleuze implies 
as much when he alludes to exhaustion as “nothing.”55 God, 
defined here as “the sum total of possibility,” is also that 
which “merges with Nothing.”56 The challenge, then, is to 
think Beckett’s constructions of languages one, two and three 
as effecting this “nothing.” After all, we can see the television 
plays clearly enough; the image of the woman is very much 
apparent to the protagonist of …but the clouds…. Yet we are 
told that once the image appears “there is … the end of all 
possibility.”57 At that moment, existence is no more.58
Second in line is the question of correlationism itself. Is 
Deleuze a correlationist or not? Do the “primary aesthetics” 
of “The Exhausted” escape the bind of the correlationist 
circle? Or do they, like so much of modern philosophy, fall 
back into the correlationist double step? 
To discuss fully Deleuze’s take on the relation between 
thought and being is beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice 
it to say that it would require a more careful examination 
of Deleuze’s three passive syntheses than I have provided. 
Specifically, such an examination would have to show how 
the epistemological trajectory that leads from violence of 
the intensive encounter to representation can be interpreted 
ontologically as the story of Being wrested away from beings 
and then restored back to them.59 Central to this project 
55 Deleuze, “The Exhausted,” 153.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid., 161.
58 By existence, I here mean the “given” existence of entities in the order of 
space and time. It is important to note that despite thinking beyond such 
“givenness,” Deleuze does not wish to describe an ontological “leap” from 
non-being to being. See Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 263.
59 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 50-52, 66, 69, 80-81, 113-14, 141-42, 153. 
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would be the definition of two Nietzschean concepts, the 
“will to power” equated with this “world of intensities” and 
the “eternal return,” associated more closely with “thought.” 
If the will to power is understood as that initial intensive 
difference of the encounter, then the eternal return is the “af-
firmation, reproduction, repetition or return of difference.”60 
The eternal return is the thought of our own affection, the 
affection of the self by the self, or as Blanchot put it, a kind 
of sign that signifies only itself.61 
Turning towards the aesthetics of “The Exhausted,” several 
points can be made without further discussing Deleuze’s 
debt to Nietzsche. Firstly, the framework of “The Exhausted” 
is broadly speaking ontological in character. In a kind of 
reversal of Spinoza’s logic,62 the possible is defined as “exis-
tence,” whereas God “merges with Nothing.”63 Yet the image 
towards which exhaustion aims is defined primarily in terms 
of thought. The image is “mental” in nature, encountered 
by the protagonist of …but the clouds… when he is seated in 
his “mental” chamber.64 The tension between the two orders 
of being and thought is striking and reaches a certain kind 
of resolution in the comparison of the protagonist’s mental 
state with the third dark zone of Murphy’s mind.
When Beckett writes, “Here he was not free, but a mote 
in the dark of absolute freedom,” this is suggestive of a very 
particular state of being. In the third zone of his mind, Mur-
phy has no agency. He is not free to manipulate events as he 
was in the light of zone one. Neither has he the freedom to 
stand back and contemplate a new form of the world as was 
the case in the half-light of zone two. Within this third zone, 
See also the summary in Hughes, Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition, 61-65. 
60 Hughes, Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition, 63.
61 Maurice Blanchot, Friendship, trans. Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1997), 173.
62 See the more detailed discussion of this reversal in Asja Szafraniec, Beckett, 
Derrida and the Event of Literature (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 121. 
63 Deleuze, “The Exhausted,” 153.
64 Ibid., 169.
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his freedom is irrevocably dissolved in the absolute freedom 
of movement. Ontologically speaking, there is no distinction 
between his state of freedom and the zone’s absolute freedom. 
He retains determinability—he is, after all, a “mote” on a 
“line”—but his movement, his travels and his pleasure are 
all part of the general flux rendering him fundamentally 
undetermined. As a “mote” he is carried by “the ceaseless 
unconditioned generation and passing away of line.”65
From the above, we can conclude that Deleuze does not think 
being and thought separately, but rather indicates that there 
is a moment at which the two are in fact indistinguishable. 
Within the third zone of darkness, Murphy’s state of being 
is pure thought, and pure thought is being.66
Can we then see Deleuze as a speculative realist avant la 
lettre? His isomorphism of being and thought seems to pre-
clude this. Deleuze’s debt to Kant is undeniable, specifically 
the way in which his superior empiricism builds on the 
relation between the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique 
of Judgement. It is also important to remember that Deleuze 
never wishes to deny the world of givenness and representa-
tion but attempts to explain how such a world might come 
into being. However, Deleuze completes his epistemological 
account by returning to an ontology much more pre-critical 
in flavour. He grounds his system of knowledge in the isomor-
phism between thought and being, Spinoza’s idea of substance 
being one of the models for the third passive synthesis, the 
ideal synthesis of difference. How we interpret this gesture 
remains up for debate. We can limit it to the human mind in 
its conscious and unconscious states, but we can also open 
the transcendental field to being itself.67 
65 Beckett, Murphy, 112.
66 Once more, an in-depth discussion of this relation between thought and 
being would require further study of Deleuze’s reference to Blanchot in his 
formulation of the “aleatory point.” See Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 
249-50 and compare this to Blanchot’s discussion of “the central point” in 
Maurice Blanchot, The Space of Literature, trans. Ann Smock (Lincoln: Uni-
versity of Nebraska Press, 1989), 44-46.
67 See Bryant, “Deleuze’s Transcendental Materialism,” 41-47.
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The question then remains if the rehabilitation of the 
distinction between primary and secondary qualities is both 
urgent and necessary. I would argue that it is, if only to draw 
attention to these aspects of Deleuze’s work which I have 
discussed above: the world “prior to birth,” the non-existent, 
self-dissipating nature of the “image” and the relation of 
thought and being in the murky world of the “system of the 
future.”68 Perhaps only by reading Meillassoux’s critique of 
transcendentalism can we find the absolute hidden within 
a Kantian tradition. And perhaps only then can we see the 
face of the woman appearing to the protagonist of …but the 
clouds… as some kind of an encounter with it. 
68 Deleuze, “The Exhausted,” 152, 156, 169, 170; Deleuze, Difference and 
Repetition, 142.
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Disegno
A Speculative Constructivist Interpretation
Sjoerd van Tuinen
Erasmus University Rotterdam
Speculation and Sufficient Reason
Since the aim of this issue is to stage an encounter between specu-lative philosophy and aesthet-
ics, I should like to begin by distinguishing the concept of 
speculation that I feel most affinity with from other current 
conceptions. In a recent essay I argue why the principle of suf-
ficient reason (PSR) is the speculative principle par excellence 
and not, as Quentin Meillassoux claims, only its irrational 
double.1 Despite his critique of correlationism, Meillassoux’s 
reading of the PSR converges not only with its Heideggerian 
interpretation as the original sin of Western philosophy, it is 
also indebted to the Kantian critique of the ontological proof, 
which culminated in Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics as 
onto-theology precisely insofar as it targets the PSR for saying 
that “this or that entity must absolutely be because it is the way 
it is.”2 Hence, it is only logical for Meillassoux to draw on what 
1 Sjoerd van Tuinen, “Difference and Speculation: Heidegger, Meillassoux 
and Deleuze on Sufficient Reason” in Deleuze and Metaphysics, ed. Alain 
Beaulieu, Edward Kazarian, and Julia Sushytska (Lanham: Lexington Books, 
2014), forthcoming.
2 Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, 
trans. Ray Brassier (London: Continuum, 2008), 22-23, original emphasis.
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is strongest in the correlationist tradition, even if only to turn 
it against itself. What remains of correlationism, in the end, 
is nonetheless precisely the critical, i.e., anti-metaphysical 
treatment of the PSR. Indeed, Meillassoux’s rejection of the 
PSR in terms of the “principle of unreason” or “principle of 
factuality” forms the very core of his double criticist project: 
an investigation of the general conditions of possibility of 
scientific knowledge and of rational ideology critique.
By contrast, a more affirmative concept of speculation based 
precisely on the PSR can be found in Gilles Deleuze and the 
empiricist tradition of Henri Bergson, Alfred North Whitehead, 
John Dewey and more recently Isabelle Stengers—a tradition 
that, despite his occasional references to it, does not seem to 
fit Meillassoux’s epistemological division of contemporary 
philosophy into correlationism, metaphysics or speculative 
idealism, and speculative materialism. After all, already Hume 
disconnected reason from what it grounds not only because 
he was a proto-critical thinker who rejected the presupposi-
tions of a systematic order in nature (Meillassoux refers to 
this rejection as “Hume’s problem”), but also, as Deleuze 
demonstrates so convincingly in Empiricism and Subjectivity, 
because he inquired into how such a system comes about. 
According to Kant, we have universally valid knowledge of 
the world because the transcendental subject’s imagination 
schematises sense experience so that the categories of the 
understanding become applicable to it. By contrast, Hume’s 
“schematism”3 could never be a subjective system rendering 
possible empirical knowledge, as the subject is not an a priori 
ground, but itself an experimental and provisory actualisa-
tion of a virtual schema rooted in the impersonal and pre-
individual intensity of experience. The schematism—or as 
Deleuze later calls it, the “diagram” or “abstract machine”—is 
a speculative system or “image of thought” that is elaborated 
3 Gilles Deleuze, Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume’s Theory of Hu-
man Nature, trans. Constantin V. Boundas (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1991), 65.
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in and through experience.4 As a consequence, sufficient 
reason is neither the ground that lies out there waiting to 
be discovered, nor is it merely a subjective form which we 
impose upon the world. Rather than belonging to an order 
of knowledge, it belongs to an order of production and sub-
jectivation. As was already the case in Spinoza and Leibniz, 
the genesis of the system also implies the material genesis 
of the world “in and through the system.”5
Does this proto-correlationist position, according to which 
anything totally a-subjective cannot be thought, necessarily 
disqualify Hume and his followers as speculative thinkers? 
Or is not the problem rather with Meillassoux and his “intel-
lectual intuition” of the necessity of contingency, which in 
its purely formal “capacity-to-be-other relative to the given” 
risks remaining empty and irrelevant in the face of the here 
and now?6 It is true that Meillassoux fuses absolute logical 
necessity with an equally absolute contingency of being 
and thus radically disconnects the domain of the thinkable 
from concrete experience. Yet while the principle of non-
contradiction may well be sufficient in the hyper-chaotic 
domain of logical possibility, it becomes insufficient as soon 
as we are talking about real possibilities, which, as Kant and 
Heidegger knew well, are bound to temporal experiences. This 
is why Bergson replaces the possible/real opposition with 
that of the virtual/actual. Whereas conditions of possibility 
have a limitative relation to the real (correlationism), or are 
at best meaningless in the face of it (“anything is possible”), 
the virtual conditions of the actual are no less real than the 
actual since they are first of all its unconditioned or unformed 
potential of becoming other. Thus, while Meillassoux denies 
himself all means of accounting for real genesis by discarding 
the PSR tout court, Bergson merely disconnects the PSR from 
4 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (London: Con-
tinuum, 2001), 131. 
5 Gilles Deleuze, Desert Islands and Other Texts 1953-1974, ed. David Lapoujade, 
trans. Mike Taormina (New York: Semiotext(e), 2004), 146.
6 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 58-59.
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the realisation of the possible. He does not seek a foundation 
for what already is, but rather schematises the consolidation 
of present becomings.
The same can be said of Deleuze, who proposes a new 
practical use of the PSR rather than a deconstruction or re-
jection of it. With Deleuze, the PSR is no longer a principle 
of identity, nor is it subordinate to, or in conflict with, the 
latter’s inverse, the principle of non-contradiction. Rather, 
the PSR is the principle of difference. On the one hand, the 
PSR does refer to something necessary, a differential element, 
an intensive ground or necessarily existing milieu: life. But 
on the other hand, precisely because it refers to difference 
instead of identity, it is not a transcendent principle but an 
immanent one. It concerns what really makes a difference 
in life: thought. If Deleuze is indeed a classical metaphysi-
cian, as he often says, this is because he rejects the Kantian 
bifurcation between speculative and practical reason as a 
nominalist illusion. For Kant, ideas have uses that can be 
practical, religious or aesthetic, but no longer speculative or 
metaphysical. Thinking becomes metaphysical when it makes 
epistemological claims about what lies outside experience. 
In this sense, Meillassoux is right to call his attempt to go 
beyond correlationism speculative. But for Deleuze, ideas are 
always both speculative and practical. Even the Platonic idea 
concerns less the theoretical distinction between true and 
false knowledge than the pragmatic or dramatic distinction 
between claims to truth: “The problem of thought is tied to 
… the evaluation of what is important and what is not, to the 
distribution of the singular and the regular, distinctive and 
ordinary points … To have an idea means no more than this.”7 
Put differently, the “speculative and practical object” of phi-
losophy is not the representation of Truth, Justice, or Beauty, 
but their problematic, i.e., the overwhelming presence of their 
multiple immanent becomings.8 Knowing, acting and judging 
7 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 189-90. 
8 Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, trans. Mark Lester and Charles Stivale 
(London: Continuum, 1990), 266.
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are practical solutions that give form to an unformed frenzy 
(Being or Life as the groundless ground or sans-fond).9 They are 
real constructions detected and evaluated by the “speculative 
investment”10 or amor fati of thought and effectuated by the 
difference that forms their ground (the “dark precursor”).11 
Such is the speculative immanence of thought and life, or 
reason and ground: like a flash of lightning distinguishing 
itself from the dark night without the latter distinguishing 
itself from it, “it is as if the ground rose to the surface without 
ceasing to be the ground.”12
It is in a similar way that Isabelle Stengers defines her own 
version of “speculative constructivism”: “The problem is not 
to ground, to define conditions for valid knowledge, but to 
care for the consequences of the event.”13 If to speculate is to 
think about something without knowing it, this means that it 
always involves some kind of risk. Whereas both Heidegger and 
Meillassoux interpret the PSR as the metaphysical principle 
that says that all that exists must be logically accounted for, 
Stengers treats it not as a principle of accountability but as a 
principle of prudence or active responsibility for the practical 
effects of our reasonings, no matter whether these concern truth, 
justice, or beauty. Thus, the PSR again becomes the principle 
of an ethics in the pre-Kantian sense, that is, an ethics of our 
actual becomings. To speculate with the PSR is to believe in a 
dispositional basis for future existence, thought and action 
and to be transformed by this belief. In other words, it is to 
speculate on the virtual becoming of what is actual, i.e., the 
real ideas inherent in the interstices of any actual situation. 
Whether in philosophy, science or art, speculative thinking 
is an art of pure expression or efficacy, an art of precipitating 
events: an art that detects and affirms the possibility of other 
9 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 152-54.
10 Ibid., 238.
11 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 119.
12 Ibid., 28.
13 Isabelle Stengers, “William James: An Ethics of Thought?,” Radical Phi-
losophy (2009), 157, 9-17.
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reasons insisting in a concrete situation as so many virtual 
forces that have not yet had the chance to emerge but whose 
presence can be trusted upon to make a difference.
Disegno: What Does it Mean to Have an Idea?
But let us stop pursuing this intra-philosophical discussion 
any further here. Instead, I want to develop my argument in 
a more practical way, namely by setting up a speculative relay 
within the utterly unfashionable beginnings of modern art 
history and theory of art in sixteenth century Italian manner-
ism—an undertaking typical of what Graham Harman in his 
contribution to this issue refers to as provincial retrieval. For 
it was then and there that the liberal arts began to systematise 
and rationalise their own practice raising the speculative 
question of what it means to have an idea, in other words, what 
the conditions are for the production of the new.14 My aim is 
to propose an alternative to the usual neo-Kantian, humanist 
interpretations of this self-conscious, mannerist questioning 
that is more adequate to actual artistic practice. This is not 
only a way to put to the test the speculative project sketched 
above, including the claim that art is capable of thinking 
speculatively and not just practically by itself; it also enables 
us to better understand the connection between specifically 
artistic problems and their wider material, intellectual and 
spiritual contexts that drove the mannerists into specula-
tion. After all, it was because of this connection that Erwin 
Panofsky in his classic Idea (1924) observed a clear parallel 
between mannerism and modern expressionism, a parallel 
which has to do with their shared interest in artistic ideas: 
Expressionism is related to mannerism in more than one sense, it 
comes with the particular speculation that guides us back to the paths 
followed by the metaphysics of art of 16th century theory, paths that seek 
14 Ernst Cassirer/Erwin Panofsky, Eidos und Eidolon/Idea, ed. John Michael 
Krois (Hamburg: Philo Fine Arts, 2008), 123.
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to derive the phenomenon of artistic creativity from an extrasensory 
and absolute, or as we say today, cosmic principle.15
Mannerism is often said to begin with Michelangelo. Whereas 
Alberti warned artists against placing too much trust in their 
genius, advising them to confine themselves to the great 
model that is divinely created nature, Michelangelo relied 
on his ingegno, the power of his artistic mind to improve 
nature instead of merely imitating it. Nature for him was 
no more than an occasional cause calling forth the ideas 
virtually contained in the intellect. According to his most 
famous sonnet, he held that “the best artist has no concept 
[concetto] which some single marble does not potentially 
enclose within its mass, but only the hand which obeys 
the intellect [intelletto] can accomplish it.”16 Of course, the 
ancient and medieval tradition also knew this distinction 
between two successive stages in artistic creation, conception 
and execution. But even in the Renaissance, rules had been 
developed only for the second stage of the artistic process. 
With mannerism, by contrast, the new intellectual dignity 
of the liberal arts demanded reflection on the conception or 
design (disegno)—meaning drawing but also trained judgment 
and mental synthesis—and on the coordination of the two 
stages. Following the Neoplatonic tradition, the eye judges 
and the hand executes, but each under its own conditions. 
As Federico Zuccaro put it in a well-known passage: “For the 
thought [of the artist] has to be not only clear, but also free, 
and his spirit has to be released from and not limited by a 
mechanical dependence on such rules [of execution provided 
by the ‘mathematical sciences’].”17
15 Panofsky, Idea, 149. This and all subsequent translations from German, 
unless otherwise indicated, are my own. 
16 Michelangelo Buonarroti as cited in Robert J. Clements, Michelangelo’s 
Theory of Art (New York: New York University Press, 1961), 16. 
17 Federico Zuccaro as cited in Elizabeth Gilmore Holt, select. and ed., A Docu-
mentary History of Art, Volume II: Michelangelo and the Mannerists, The Baroque 
and the Eighteenth Century (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1982), 91.
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According to classical humanist interpretations first in-
spired by Jakob Burckhardt and then ratified by Panofsky, 
what unites the eye of the artistic genius and the hand of the 
skilled craftsman is the conjunction of idea and mimesis. For 
Vasari, each of the three arts of design—painting, sculpture, 
architecture—still relied unequivocally on the mimesis of 
the visible perfection of nature. Subsequent theorists such 
as Danti, Lomazzo and Zuccaro, by contrast, sought the 
freedom of art in the imitation of the concetto or idea, which 
becomes the sufficient reason of the work of art. For example, 
Vincenzo Danti in his Trattato delle perfette proporzioni (1567) 
writes that “an artist should not simply copy (ritrarre) visible 
nature but should imitate it (imitare) in its purposes; that is 
to say, he should imitate the perfected intentional form of 
nature.”18 Whereas men such as Alberti and Leonardo were 
anxious to curb the latent artificiality of the idea by insisting 
on natural depiction, the conflict between realistic imitation 
and artificial improvement, objective matter and subjective 
manner now made its full appearance. With the doctrine of 
disegno interno or inward design (Zuccaro)—the drawing after 
an internal design guiding the hand that replaces the disegno 
esterno of external models that dominated Renaissance for-
malism—the idea could emerge as an autonomous standard 
of perfection, eventually becoming a pre-existent concept 
independent of nature and execution. Art thus no longer 
relies on knowledge of reality, but competes with it through 
its self-conscious sapere dell’artifice. It begins to develop its 
own, strictly artistic knowledge that is to be taught in special 
academies, e.g., the Florentine Academy of the arti del disegno 
which transformed art from studio craft into philosophical 
study, accompanied by critical literature on aesthetic problems. 
For the first time, concepts of art, criticism and art history 
are articulated as such and form a kind of closed circuit—a 
discourse—in which artists inspire critics and historians who 
write for well-trained practitioners.
18 Cited in Panofsky, Idea, 121.
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In a paradoxical way, then, the mannerist apology for artistic 
freedom tends to go together with an unequalled emphasis 
on the academic training and rational systematisation of 
creativity. Whereas in the Kantian aesthetic, the faculty to 
know nature would be strictly distinguished from the faculty 
to judge art, rendering the aesthetic Idea transcendent to all 
rational speculation, mannerism sought to unite idea and 
conceptual rule in terms of an “imitation taken to the limit.”19 
On the one hand, this unity of idea and imitation explains 
Kant’s rejection of mannerism in terms of the opposition of 
genius to docile “mannering” or “mimicry” (Manierieren), 
since in the latter the Idea disappears in the unimaginative 
following of the rules set up by the former.20 At the limit of 
imitation, on the other hand, we already discover the aporetic 
tension between the subjective abhorrence of rules and the 
fascination with objective know-how, between irrational but 
creative genius and rational but pedantic craftsmanship. 
This tension may always have been at the core of art, but is 
now made productive self-reflexively for the first time in 
the very perfection by which classical models are twisted, 
deformed and contorted. Panofsky therefore argues that in 
mannerism the idea ceases to be merely a model, as it was in 
Renaissance classicism, and becomes properly plastic: from 
Vasari onwards, we witness not only the birth of art theory 
and art history, but first of all the beginning of reflections on 
the conditions of possibility of artistic creativity in general 
that was to culminate in the Kantian theory of artistic genius.21 
Henceforth, the history of art is able to define itself as the 
auto-movement of a strictly artistic idea of perfection and 
its perfected imitation, the imitazione fantastica.22
19 Panofsky, Idea, 132.
20 Immanuel Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1997), 
§49, 256.
21 Panofsky, Idea, 119-23.
22 Georges Didi-Huberman, Confronting Images: Questioning the Ends of a Certain 
History of Art, trans. John Goodman (University Park: Penn State University 
Press, 2005), 46. “Vasari here becomes the first thinker about art to have 
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Now there are at least two well-known historical problems 
with this account of the mannerist idea that have important 
philosophical consequences. The first is that Michelan-
gelo’s reference to the intellect should not be understood in 
anachronistic subjectivist terms as the artist’s individual and 
private genius. Artists cannot be abstracted from the “spark 
of divinity” (scintilla di dio) or divine sign (segno di dio, Zuc-
caro’s quasi-anagram of disegno) that inspires them. The new 
status of the plastic arts relies on an argument from design: 
“Disegno is nothing other than divine speculation, which 
produces an excellent art; you cannot execute anything in 
sculpture or painting without the guide of this speculation 
and design.”23 Just as originality was not a value in itself and 
replication was an everyday practice in the artist’s workshop 
(if they had one), the notion of ingegno, like that of perfec-
tion and maniera, was first of all used as a compliment that 
referred either to the divinity of the artist’s hand and/or to 
the artist’s social status.24 In pragmatist-philosophical terms, 
this means that any privately enjoyed artistic experience or 
design remains incomplete without public embodiment: 
“What made Michelangelo or Beethoven great, what turned 
questioned the reality of the ‘thing in itself’.” Didi-Huberman, Confronting 
Images, 110. Didi-Huberman summarises Panofsky’s neo-Kantian adaptation 
of Vasarian academism in three “magic words”: “the Renaissance is recast 
in terms of rationalist humanism and its conception of the history of art; 
imitation is recast by hierarchical subordination of figuration to significa-
tion; and the inevitable idea recast in an idealist use of Kant’s transcendental 
schematism.” Didi-Huberman, Confronting Images, xix. Moreover, he regards 
this art-historical academism as definitive for the “humanist conception of 
art in general”: “a conception wherein Mimesis walked hand-in-hand with 
Idea, wherein the tyranny of the visible—the tyranny of resemblance and 
of congruent appearance—had managed to express itself perfectly in the 
abstract terms of an ideational truth or an ideal truth, of a disegno interno 
of Truth or of an ideal of Beauty … all of which ultimately comes back to 
the same thing, namely Sameness as shared metaphysical authority.” Didi-
Huberman, Confronting Images, 88, original emphases.
23 Anton Francesco Doni as cited in Stephen J. Campbell and Michael W. Cole, 
Italian Renaissance Art (London: Thames & Hudson, 2012), 496.
24 See Patricia A. Emison, Creating the “Divine” Artist: From Dante to Michel-
angelo (Leiden: Brill, 2004).
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them into geniuses, was not their genius as such, it was their 
attention to the qualities of genius, not in themselves, but 
in the work.”25
The second problem is that the alleged rationalism of lead-
ing mannerist theorists—although a direct and necessary 
extension of practice—is hardly able to give an adequate 
description of what goes on in mannerist art, or indeed in 
any artistic practice. The question is even whether their 
focus on the imitation or representation of the idea is not 
fundamentally misguided.
It is true that mannerist discourse aims for conceptual 
knowledge about art. It constitutes art as an object of knowl-
edge and thus provides a self-legitimation of art as a coher-
ent and recognisable order of historical progression. Thus 
whereas in Cennino Cennini’s old Libro dell’Arte, disegno was 
first of all a material practice that may or may not occupy the 
painters’ mind, in Vasari it becomes the power of the mind to 
form purely mental pictures which, according to scholastic 
faculty psychology, is the fundamental faculty of judgment 
that relates the fine arts to all rational activities. For this 
reason, historians tend to focus on the epistemological pur-
port of disegno and, as a consequence, take it as a figurative 
form of rational thought, even a metaphysical “system” of 
representation within the horizon of imitation as the final 
aim of art no less than of other, more explicitly knowledge-
oriented practices.26
Yet, as Kant already saw, this epistemological conjunction 
of idea and imitation hardly enables us to cross the gap be-
tween theory and artistic practice. Art becomes philosophical, 
yet philosophy forgets art. Hence Georges Didi-Huberman’s 
25 Étienne Souriau, Les différents modes d’existence (Paris: PUF, 2009), 161, my 
translation.
26 Robert Williams, for example, has recently argued that in mannerism art 
seeks the status of a “metatechne,” “a superintendency of knowledge, a form 
of knowledge, a mode of knowing that necessarily involves a mastery of 
other modes and is distinguished by being potentially, ideally, a mastery of 
all modes.” Robert Williams, Art, Theory, and Culture in Sixteenth Century Italy: 
From Techne to Metatechne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 4.
Sjoerd van Tuinen – Disegno
445
warning: “Imitation in the Renaissance is a credo, but it is not 
for all that a unifying principle.”27 But neither is the quasi-
theological notion of the genius, in whom nature gives the 
rule to art without the artist himself being aware of it.28 For 
the point is not that the speculative idea of art lies outside 
of knowledge, even less that a genius creates ex nihilo (i.e., 
spontaneously and thus without sufficient reason, as the 
Romantics claimed), but rather that knowledge of rules is 
only one aspect of the speculative search for sufficient reason, 
albeit often a necessary and important one. In reality, there 
is always a continuous circuit and indiscernibility between 
thinking, knowing and acting. Neither in artistic design 
nor elsewhere do we find the purely theoretical opposition 
between speculation and practice, conceptualisation and 
execution, genius and work. Creativity is not achieved at a 
single stroke but involves a whole series of translations and 
transpositions from sketch to pentimento to painting or from 
bozzetto to sculpture or building. This means that, as Dewey 
puts it, “wherever continuity is possible, the burden of proof 
rests upon those who assert opposition and dualism.”29 With 
Deleuze, we could add that, inversely, whenever such theo-
retical oppositions nonetheless persist, or even arise out of 
practical problems as so many necessary illusions, the task 
of philosophy is to demonstrate real continuity, even if this 
27 Didi-Huberman, Confronting Images, 74. There is indeed a rational system 
in Vasari, Didi-Huberman argues, but it is a cracked system, or rather, a 
“mended crack” that forever separates knowledge about art from the truth 
of art. What mends the crack is the floating signifier of disegno: “A totem-
word reinvented and reinvested to decline the final, synchronic meaning of 
artistic activity in general understood as imitation.” Disegno “is a descriptive 
word and it is a metaphysical word. It is a technical word and it is an ideal 
word. It is applicable to the hand of man, but also to his imaginative fantasia, 
and also to his intelletto, and also to his anima—as well as, finally, to God the 
creator of all things. It comes from the vocabulary of the studio, where it 
designates the form obtained on a support by the charcoal or crayon of the 
artist; it also designates the sketch, the work in gestation, the project, the 
compositional schema, and the layout of lines of force.” Didi-Huberman, 
Confronting Images, 72, 80.
28 Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, §46, 307.
29 John Dewey, Art as Experience (New York: Penguin, 2005), 28. 
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implies that for once we do not heed the Deleuzian warning 
that philosophers do not listen carefully enough to what 
painters themselves say.30
This aim of demonstrating real continuity pertains espe-
cially to mannerism, in which the breakdown of the classical 
configuration of theory and practice heralds the breakthrough 
of a speculative regime of art. As Giancarlo Maiorino has 
pointed out, the Italian perfettissimo, so often used by six-
teenth century theorists of art, puts the highest standard of 
classicism—perfection—into a superlative quantification 
that is logically redundant, thus pointing the idea-ideal 
toward construction rather than Kantian exemplification. 
From humanist “perfection” to the early mannerist “wholly 
perfect” (perfetissimo, Castiglione, Vasari) to the later manner-
ist “perfectly” (perfettamente, Danti), this hyperbolic excess 
“brought perfection within a ‘modal’ reach at the other side 
of the concept itself. Mannerism returned to the realm of 
practice what humanism had raised to ideal heights.”31 In 
other words, mannerism is based on a procedural excess that 
frees the difference of mimesis from the objective restrictions 
and standards of identity. As Gian Pietro Bellori would write 
a few decades later, it is based on a “fantastica idea appoggiata 
alla pratica e non all’imitazione.”32 In the shift from the noun 
to the adjectival to the adverbial—a shift from idealisation 
to stylisation—it discovers an inventiveness and variability 
beyond measure: “The adverbial mode toned down teleologi-
cal concerns, so that perfection brought out forms of a ‘man-
nered’ understanding of its own potential.”33 Subjective style 
thus becomes a speculative force that thrives upon its own 
precursory dynamics, a repetitive manner that gains strength 
30 Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, trans. Daniel W. Smith 
(London: Continuum, 2004), 99.
31 Giancarlo Maiorino, The Portrait of Eccentricity: Arcimboldo and the Man-
nerist Grotesque (University Park: Penn State University Press, 1991), 20, 3, 16. 
32 Giovanni Pietro Bellori, «Annibale Carracci» in Le vite de’ pittori, scultori 
et architetti moderni (Rome: Mascardi, 1728), 1.
33 Maiorino, The Portrait of Eccentricity, 30.
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or expressivity from its own redundancy and empties out all 
objective matter and content: an “adjectival reduction” by 
which “excess took on itself, reversing matter into maniera.”34
Thus, even if art now comes to need a theoretical legitima-
tion, perhaps even sub specie divinitatis as is the case in the 
gnoseology of Lomazzo (which is based on Neoplatonism 
and Hermeticism) and Zuccaro (which is more Aristotelian), 
we should not mislead ourselves by saying that pre-Kantian 
aesthetics was somehow “rationalist” whereas almost no 
twentieth century philosopher would even consider having 
an idea in art as an intellectual affair. Instead of an episte-
mological interpretation, we should rather reconnect meta-
physical speculation with its actual application in a material 
practice according to a singularising manner. As Zuccaro 
himself stresses throughout his Idea of the Sculptors, Painters 
and Architects (1607), the concept of inward design makes 
no sense when disconnected from practical work and sense 
experience. In art, there is no intellectus speculativus without 
intellectus practicus.35 We can still call the actualisation of an 
idea a rationalisation or a process of speculative reasoning,36 
but that is to say that art generally thinks and is grounded 
directly in images, sounds and sometimes words. No reflection 
is needed to experience this plane of composition. It is true 
that with mannerism, art also begins to think indirectly, i.e., 
through concepts, but this has as little to do with a rationalist 
“aesthetics” in the modern sense as with postmodern concep-
tual art. Its rationality did not arise out of epistemology or 
philosophy, but out of art. As a consequence, whereas artists 
have the speculative ability to visualise things that are not there 
and therefore must have a clear idea of what they are doing, 
it does not follow that this idea must be detailed or distinct. 
The artistic idea is not a matter of rational contemplation 
34 Maiorino, The Portrait of Eccentricity, 27.
35 Zuccaro as cited in Williams, Art, Theory, and Culture in Sixteenth Century 
Italy, 138.
36 Gilles Deleuze, “Pericles and Verdi: The Philosophy of François Châtelet,” 
trans. Charles T. Wolfe, The Opera Quarterly (2006), 21:4, 713-24.
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but of sensible intuition, even if it must now be legitimated 
in terms of conceptual knowledge. It is closer to a confused 
passion or affective transition than to a distinct seeing. As a 
consequence, it is not distributed in whole-parts (clear light 
as synthesis analysable in distinct, but homogenous parts) 
relationships, but among heterogeneous and indivisible in-
tensities, that is, in differential multiplicities. It is not found in 
the evidence of natural light, but in the differentiated light of 
an artificial chiaroscuro. As Leibniz observed, ideas of artists 
are usually clear but confused and thus inseparable from the 
obscure ground of their practice: “painters and other artists 
correctly know what is done properly and what is done poorly, 
though they are often unable to explain their judgments and 
reply to questioning by saying that the things that displease 
them lack an unknown something.”37 Or to put it in Deleuze’s 
terms, artists are “visionaries” or “seers” of ideas, provided 
that thought and action, eye and hand, aisthesis and genesis are 
only the extremes of a continuum of experience and expres-
sion: “Ideas have to be treated like potentials already engaged 
in one mode of expression or another and inseparable from 
the mode of expression, such that I cannot say that I have an 
idea in general.”38
Whether in art or in philosophy, then, thinking is a 
seeking-groping experimentation with the material ground. 
Ideas are always pragmatic, just as their eventual speculative 
conceptualisation always has a practical orientation. Despite 
some art historians’ predilections for written sources over 
actual images, we should not maintain theoretical subjectiv-
ity independent of the objective execution of the work of art. 
37 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, trans. Roger Ariew and 
Daniel Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989), 24. Of course, this chiaroscuro 
rationality proper to sense perception and by extension to art was to be de-
veloped into a full-scale aesthetics by Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten. See 
Jeffrey Barnouw, “The Cognitive Value of Confusion and Obscurity in the 
German Enlightenment: Leibniz, Baumgarten, Herder,” Studies in Eighteenth 
Century Culture (1995), 24, 29-50.
38 Gilles Deleuze, Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews 1975-1995, 
ed. David Lapoujade, trans. Ames Hodges and Mike Taormina (New York: 
Semiotext(e), 2006), 312.
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What matters is not the self-legitimating intellectualism of 
the mannerists, but the practical forces that are relayed by it.39 
Once we apply this lesson of genealogy to the history of art, 
we can effectively reverse Zuccaro’s speculative etymology of 
design from the theological metamorphosis of the physical 
world into a material metamorphosis of the idea—a reversal 
of Platonism. The real problem of mannerism, the intuition 
that forced it into conceptual speculation, is not that it is 
devoid of genius or the artistic idea, as Kant once suggested 
and as is still common sense today, but rather that the idea 
does not exist outside, and has to be found within, its manual 
expressions and its changing material conditions. And do 
we not already recognise in this reversal the Copernican 
revolution to which Deleuze refers as the complex unity of 
difference and repetition, of practice and speculation, one 
being the vehicle for the other, in which the “what” of repre-
sentational content is entirely subsumed by the presentational 
and expressive “how”?
39 Ultimately, the interpretation and evaluation of such forces is what neces-
sitates a speculative approach to art history. As noted by Didi-Huberman, 
however, Panofsky’s later re-edition of Idea features a preliminary warning 
(CAUTIUS!) that should protect his discipline from immoderations in the 
cognitive exercise of reason such as Aby Warburg’s chiaroscuro rationalism. 
It is precisely this fear that led art history to the anti-speculative stance that 
it has consolidated until today: “Panofsky’s CAUTIUS is not only a call for 
prudence; it is the cry of someone who went too far into the shifting sands 
of philosophical idealism, and who found only the worst branch—that of 
positivism, of iconography in a shrunken sense—to prevent his sinking 
and losing forever the singular truth of art images.” Didi-Huberman, Con-
fronting Images, 125, xxv. If Panofsky’s iconography exorcised the very life 
of the image, however, Didi-Huberman’s turn to semiology and the “phe-
nomenology of the gaze” does not suffice to reverse Panofsky’s reduction of 
“the permanence of crystal” to “the chronology of a story.” Didi-Huberman, 
Confronting Images, 16-17, 13. Although it seeks to describe the “efficacy” of 
the visual as a “virtual” appearance or event such as it appears at the junction 
of a proliferation of possible meanings, it only includes the event of art in 
history as subjectively lived experience. Didi-Huberman, Confronting Images, 
18-19. While a speculative approach seeks to actively reconnect with the very 
a-historical creative force in the historical genesis of such an experience, 
Didi-Huberman’s ambition remains historicist and critical, i.e., namely to 
write a “true critique” or a “critical history of the history of art” as opposed 
to a “speculative” one. Didi-Huberman, Confronting Images, xx, 4, 25.
Speculations V
450
Idea and Maniera: From Leibniz to Bergson
If both genius and its ideas do not exist outside their mate-
rial expressions, then it is no longer possible to interpret 
the mannerist theory of mimesis in hylomorphic terms as 
saying that the content lies waiting within the marble for its 
form to be hewn out. Of course, the authority of mannerist 
texts on art has led to precisely such an interpretation, which 
is idealist insofar as it would be the task of the intellect to 
recognise the form of this content and of the obeying hand 
merely to free it from the surrounding mass. It was precisely 
in these Aristotelian terms that Benedetto Varchi, a pupil 
of Michelangelo’s, described the task of the sculptor as an 
inducing of “form” into “matter,” as a drawing forth of “real” 
from “potential” existence. But when he complimented his 
master, “Signor Buonarroti, you have the brain of a Jove,” 
Michelangelo responded “but Vulcan’s hammer is required 
to make something come out of it.”40 The passage from the 
intellectual concetto to the hand that realises it entails much 
more than just a hylomorphic passage from matter to prede-
termined form, because the idea of the whole composition 
must constantly be rehearsed in a painstaking process of 
experimental construction. In the words of Charles de Tolnay 
that describe Michelangelo’s Day and Night (1526-31): 
In a very real way the primitive form of the block had a decisive influ-
ence on Michelangelo’s imagination. As he became absorbed in it, the 
inner image awoke in him; one can actually see how in his sculptures 
and reliefs he always allowed himself to be guided by the primitive 
form of the block, and in his frescoes by the dimension and shape of 
the surfaces at his disposal.41 
More philosophically speaking, if the material work of art is 
not simply conceived in the image of its concept or idea, this 
40 Michelangelo Buonoarroti as cited in Robert J. Clements, Michelangelo’s 
Theory of Art (New York: New York University Press, 1961), 35.
41 Charles de Tolnay, The Art and Thought of Michelangelo, trans. Nan Buranelli 
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1964), 97.
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means that mannerist imitation can no longer be interpreted 
in the classical terms of the real and the possible, the latter 
somehow resembling and limiting the former. In reality, as 
Bergson argues, possibility means only an “absence of hin-
drance,” which the human intellect retrospectively turns 
into “pre-existence under the form of the idea”:42 “For the 
possible is only the real with the addition of an act of mind 
which throws its image back into the past, once it has been 
enacted.”43 In Aristotelian terms: energeia is prior to dynamis, 
the actual is prior to the potential. In order to understand 
what a truly creative act is, we therefore need an alternative 
to classical aesthetics in which thought precedes expression, 
and thus also to its scientific representative, art history or the 
rationalised study of creative processes.
It is striking that Bergson consistently illustrates his critique 
of possibility with examples from art before extrapolating his 
argument to the universe understood as global and continu-
ous creation of unforeseeable novelty:
When a musician composes a symphony was his work possible before 
being real? Yes, if by this we mean that there was no insurmountable 
barrier to its realisation. But from this completely negative sense of 
the word we pass, inadvertently, to a positive sense: we imagine that 
everything which occurs could have been foreseen by any sufficiently 
informed mind, and that, in the form of an idea, it was thus preexistent 
to its realisation: an absurd conception in the case of a work of art, for 
from the moment that the musician has the precise and complete 
idea of the symphony he means to compose, his symphony is done.44 
It is absurd to think that a musician has a precise and complete 
idea of the symphony before it is realised, because in reality, 
creativity knows no retrograde movement, only intelligence 
42 Henri Bergson, The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. 
Mabelle L. Andison (New York: Dover Publications, 2007), 83, 10.
43 Bergson, The Creative Mind, 81.
44 Ibid., 10.
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does.45 Indeed, the more general an idea is, i.e., the more 
possibility it contains, the emptier it is.46 As a consequence, 
whereas “the technique of his art” and “the demands of the 
material” pertain to the knowledge of the artisan or the crafts-
man, about the creativity of the artist—echoing Kant—“we 
know very little.”47 Poetic acts simply cannot be submitted 
to the reversible historical rationality of conditions of pos-
sibility. No Zeitgeist, psychosocial or economic milieu, or 
technical development enables us to predict a priori what 
an act of generation will bring.
However, let us remember that Bergson distinguishes human 
intelligence, as the faculty of a posteriori remembrance, from 
the mind or spiritual life, which is the faculty of intuition (or 
as I am tempted to call it, a priori remembrance) and which 
is historically closer related to the Neoplatonist intelletto. To 
see something is not necessarily to know it. While the eye 
takes its legitimacy from the general idea, the mind takes 
its legitimacy directly from the singular and unforeseeable 
becoming of the visible itself. Intuitive ideas are generated 
in the mind’s faculty of fantasia, a sub-rational but all the 
more speculative faculty of the mind, and therefore lack the 
generality of Platonic ideas. If things exist in time as much 
as in space, as intuition tells us, then we also see in time as 
much as in space. The intuition is the visionary ability to 
contract a multiplicity of abstract tendencies that enables the 
mind to recapitulate the constitutive elements of a concrete 
situation in “a simple thought equivalent to all the indefinite 
richness of form and color.”48 Now, is it not precisely in this 
sense that Lomazzo defined painting as the perfezionatrice 
dell’intelletto? As French cinematographer Robert Bresson 
says, to have a visionary idea is not to see what you are already 
thinking, but to think about what you see and to be the first 
45 Bergson, The Creative Mind, 10-11, 73, 75, 84.
46 Ibid., 81.
47 Ibid., 76.
48 Ibid., 196, original emphasis.
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to see what you see, the way you see it.49 Accordingly, another 
interpretation of mannerist disegno opens up. In his essay 
on “The Life and Work of Ravaisson,” a painter-philosopher, 
Bergson distinguishes the “intellectual intuition” of an idea 
in the mind from sensible intuition: 
This would be to extend the vision of the eye by a vision of the mind: 
without leaving the domain of intuition, that is, the intuition of things 
real, individual and concrete, to seek an intellectual intuition beneath 
the sensible intuition. To do that would be to pierce by a powerful effort 
of mental vision the material wrapping of things and to read the formula, 
invisible to the eye, which their materiality unrolls and manifests.50 
Himself deeply influenced by Neoplatonism, Bergson claims 
that the “idea” as mental vision is simultaneously material 
and spiritual. It is no longer an ideal condition of possibil-
ity, but rather a material condition of reality, i.e., a matter-
function, a virtual condition of the new. To have an idea is 
to move into, or adhere to, the poiesis of reality itself. It is to 
work back “from the intellectual and social plane to a point 
in the soul from which there springs an imperative demand 
for creation … an impulse, an impetus received from the very 
depth of things.”51
So what exactly is this ideal point in the soul that is intui-
tively present in the density of the real itself, i.e., in the depths 
of sensation-matter—or in the words of Michelangelo, “della 
carne ancor vestita”?52 Long before Bergson, Leibniz gave us 
an important hint when in the preface to his New Essays on 
49 Robert Bresson, Notes on Cinematography, trans. Jonathan Griffin (New 
York: Urizen Books, 1975), 25, 57.
50 Bergson, The Creative Mind, 190. This Bergsonist concept of “intellectual 
intuition,” the model for which is art (or as Deleuze argues, the being of the 
sensible manifests itself in art), should be understood in contrast with that 
of Meillassoux, for whom the model is strictly logical.
51 Henri Bergson, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2006), 217.
52 Michelangelo Buonarotti, Le rime di Michelangelo Buonarroti, pittore, scultore 
e architetto, ed. Cesare Guasti (Firenze: Le Monnier, 1863), 216.
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the Human Understanding he invoked the analogy of veins 
in marble both to describe how pleats of matter surround 
living beings held in mass and how innate ideas are present 
in the soul. Leibniz substituted this analogy for that of the 
perfectly homogeneous and even surface of the blank tablet 
(tabula rasa) of Locke, who held that all truths originate in 
the senses. But his analogy also provides an interesting com-
mentary on artistic production:
For if the soul were like an empty page, then truths would be in us in 
the way that the shape of Hercules is in an uncarved piece of marble 
that is entirely neutral as to whether it takes Hercules’ shape or some 
other. Contrast that piece of marble with one that is veined in a way 
that marks out the shape of Hercules rather than other shapes. This 
latter block would be more inclined to take that shape than the former 
would, and Hercules would be in a way innate in it, even though it would 
take a lot of work to expose the veins and to polish them into clarity, 
removing everything that prevents their being seen. This is how ideas 
and truths are innate in us—as inclinations, dispositions, tendencies, 
or natural virtualities [virtualités], and not as actions; although these 
virtualities are always accompanied by certain actions, often insensible 
ones, which correspond to them.53
Again, we must be wary of idealist interpretations. Ideas are 
not transcendental but virtual faculties, since they are never 
separable from empirical processes of actualisation.54 Some 
53 Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, 294, translation modified. See also Gilles 
Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, trans. Tom Conley (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 4, 23, 146n19.
54 In Dewey’s commentary: “An innate idea is a dynamic relation of intel-
ligence and some of its ideas. Intelligence has a structure, which necessarily 
functions in certain ways. Structure is not something ready-made. Rather it 
is the perfectly determined connections and relations which form the logical 
prius and the psychological basis of experience. Innate idea is a necessary 
activity of intelligence as it enters into the framework of all experience, not 
a faculty or potentiality. There is no hard and fixed division between a priori 
and a posteriori truths. They are ‘real possibilities’.” John Dewey, The Early 
Works, 1882-1898, Volume 1, 1882-1888: Early Essays and Leibniz’s New Essays 
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2008), 307-10.
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bodily action always “corresponds” to each minute perception 
in the dark depths of the soul, such that soul and body or subject 
and object are only different aspects or functions—functions 
of form and functions of matter—immanent to a single and 
same psychophysical continuum. At the same time, however, 
this continuum is an intermediary zone of immanence, an 
intensive chiaroscuro diversified by ideas that exceed their 
distribution in quality and extension. This means that, on the 
one hand, ideas constitute what François Jullien has called “the 
propensity of things,” i.e., their implicit disposition to be (un)
folded in a certain way, as if they were already by themselves 
accomplishing what the artist wants and for which the latter 
requires only a minimal force.55 On the other hand, it does 
not follow that these ideas “resemble” their actualisation in 
the end product. If they did, they would be possibles. They 
would not be inclinations and dispositions, but fully developed 
models. In truth, we do not intuit our ideas as readymade 
and neither is there anything “natural” or “concrete” about 
them.56 They are only “genitally innate” such that to invent 
is to find, erfinden, even if perfecting nature means to find in 
it what has never been found.57 In other words, generative 
ideas are the “seeds of eternity” (Leibniz cites Scaliger) that 
do not exist outside of an infinite and continuous movement 
of development and differentiation.58 Combining structure 
and genesis, expression and construction, the development 
of ideas is thus essentially a problem-solving process, not a 
process of modelling: “The virtual possesses the reality of a 
task to be done or a problem to be solved: it is the problem 
which orientates, conditions and engenders solutions, but 
these do not resemble the conditions of the problem.”59 It is 
55 François Jullien, The Propensity of Things: Toward a History of Efficacy in China, 
trans. Janet Lloyd (New York: Zone Books, 1999).
56 L’Abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze, directed by Pierre-André Boutang (Paris: 
Editions Montparnasse, 2004), DVD, I.
57 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 148.
58 Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, 292.
59 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 212.
Speculations V
456
in the same sense that Étienne Souriau defines the mode of 
existence of “work to be made” or “work to be done” (oeuvre 
à faire) as “virtual”: every concretely existing thing responds 
to an abstract power of existence that urges its making as a 
restorative actualisation (action or démarche instaurative).60 
Instead of being distant, the virtual work and the actual work 
coincide or at least overlap in the manner or style in which 
the work is carried out.
However, Leibniz does not yet enable us to distinguish the 
specificity of the artistic conjunction of idea, matter and man-
ner from their interrelation in general. In order to do so, we 
should develop the concept of the psychophysical continuum 
a bit further in terms of Bergson’s Matter and Memory. On the 
one hand, Bergson teaches us that no (natural) perception 
is ever merely virtual, which means that every ideal vision 
is always directed towards some kind of material action and 
must itself be understood as “eventual action.”61 No mental 
intuition of an idea is therefore purely speculative. Rather, 
between vision and proprioception there is a vital intimacy, 
to which Bergson refers as the sensory-motor schema: a 
complex series of perceptions and actions which we know by 
heart and in which goal and movement, subject and object are 
fused together in an “immediate intelligence.”62 On the other 
60 Souriau, Les différents modes d’existence, 200. As Bruno Latour explains, in-
stead of naming a redundant movement from matter to predetermined form, 
the concept of instauration (restoration and instauration have the same Latin 
etymology) describes a “growing existence,” a “doing making (faire faire)” or 
“making exist” in such a way that the choice between what comes from the 
artist and what comes from the work is avoided: “saying of a work of art that 
it results from an instauration, is to get oneself ready to see the potter as the 
one who welcomes, gathers, prepares, explores and invents the form of the 
work, just as one discovers or ‘invents’ a treasure.” Bruno Latour, “Reflections 
on Etienne Souriau’s Les différents modes d’existence,” trans. Stephen Muecke 
in The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism, ed. Levi Bryant, 
Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman (Melbourne: Re-Press, 2010), 304-33. (In 
French the legal term for someone who discovers a treasure is “inventor”).
61 Bergson, Matter and Memory, 22, 17.
62 Just as freedom is not confined to reflective will, but is also made flesh 
through motor habit, Félix Ravaisson argues that “as the end becomes fused 
with the movement, and the movement with the tendency, possibility, the idea, 
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hand, no perception is ever merely actual or material since it 
is always full of memories, i.e., the ideal contractions of time 
that are coexisting with, but independent from, the actual: 
“the past is only idea, the present is idea-motor.”63 Everything 
happens as if every actual perception was reflected in a crystal 
ball in which it communicates with memories, dreams, or 
retrospective possibilities that abstract themselves from the 
present. While these other, wider circuits between past and 
present can usually be discerned from actual perception, it 
is nonetheless necessary that we find both virtual and actual 
aspects of experience even in the smallest contraction of time, 
the one that is “the nearest to immediate perception.”64 It is 
even the very indiscernibility or “coalescence” of objective 
perception and subjective recollection in actual percep-
tion—such that time splits itself in two at each moment 
as present and past, the one immediately chasing after the 
other in their “smallest circuit” (Bergson) or “immanence” 
(Deleuze)—that forms the condition of all other circuits of 
experience.65 Even the most immediate perception has a vi-
is realised in it. The idea becomes being, the very being of the movement and 
of the tendency that it determines. Habit becomes more and more a substantial 
idea. The obscure intelligence that through habit comes to replace reflection, 
this immediate intelligence where subject and object are confounded, is a 
real intuition, in which the real and the ideal, being and thought are fused 
together.” Félix Ravaisson, Of Habit, trans. Clare Carlisle and Mark Sinclair 
(London: Continuum, 2008), 55, original emphases.
63 Bergson, Matter and Memory, 74, 24. Since ideo-motivity is still a too intel-
lectualist notion, however, Deleuze points out that motivity is never based on 
an abstract representation of the idea, but on the repetition of the differential 
idea in real movement. “The movement of the swimmer does not resemble 
that of the wave, in particular, the movements of the swimming instructor 
which we reproduce on the sand bear no relation to the movements of the 
wave, which we learn to deal with only by grasping the former in practice 
as signs … In other words, there is no ideo-motivity, only sensory-motivity.” 
Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 23.
64 Ibid., 127.
65 Ibid., 130; Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson 
and Robert Galeta (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 81. The 
fundamental splitting that constitutes the crystal is the “most fundamental 
operation of time”—and not merely the Heraclitean flow, as Meillassoux 
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sionary or hallucinatory quality to it. Although this presently 
appears only in paramnesia (the illusion of déjà-vu) in which 
the sensory-motor link or the organic linkage between man 
and world is momentarily interrupted, we are all clairvoyants 
in principle. We may be able to see for 100,000 miles when 
blinded sensory-motorically. Thus Bergson agrees with Leib-
niz and the mannerists that there is a “genetic and systematic 
priority of the idea with respect to the sense impressions.”66 
We always see into the moving depth of chiaroscuro which 
constitutes the crystal, a psychophysical field of experience 
of which clear and distinct representation is only the ka-
leidoscopic effect. Subject and object, past and present, the 
possible and the real belong to the same living whole, the 
same psychophysical continuum. The ideal whole of the past 
is invisible, but virtually co-present with the actual, in which 
it appears as a hallucinatory fragment, a fissure or a cut in 
the sensory-motor schema.
But is it not precisely in aesthetic vision as opposed to 
natural perception that the whole of the past rises to its crys-
talline surface and is preserved in itself, i.e., as pure virtuality 
insisting outside all motor consciousness and in time alone? 
In natural perception, the crystalline quality of time appears 
indirectly, in more or less conscious states of recollection, 
imagination or dreaming: virtual experiences that are always 
already actualised for themselves in one psychological state or 
another, objectively mediated by the privileged perspective of 
organic and sensory-motor behaviour which accords them a 
capricious or intermittent allure within a “general system of 
commensurability.”67 By contrast, an aesthetic vision installs 
us in time in an immediate fashion. It is an expansion of 
the mind and of the mind alone, creating a purely temporal 
perspective that is no longer subordinate to an external, 
interprets Bergson and Deleuze. Meillassoux, After Finitude, 64.
66 Panofsky, Idea, 13.
67 Deleuze, Cinema 2, 362 and Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 
trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1986), 32.
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spatial movement which measures and solidifies it but that 
is actual to a purely virtual or inner movement, a strange 
somnambulist thinking-feeling from the inside out. Such a 
vision is the speculative vision par excellence, since it is an 
intuition of subjective genesis and not of objective fact. But it 
is also the practical vision par excellence to the extent that all 
pre-given subjectivity disappears in pure activity.68 A vision 
is not the suspension of all action, but the drawing in of all 
action into an intuitive occurrence that exhausts all means 
to discern the present from the past. This is why Deleuze and 
Guattari refer to it as a “contemplation” or “the mystery of 
passive creation.”69 Passive does not mean that there is no 
more action, but rather that it is no longer the subjectivity 
of the artist that mediates the idea. An artistic vision is the 
ascetic vision par excellence, since it is based on a break with 
the continuum of action-perception that normally hides the 
idea, “so as to let in a breath of fresh air from the chaos that 
brings us the vision.”70 To see is to take up an impersonal per-
spective and to be taken up by it; it is to go through “a curious 
stationary journey” that belongs only to the soul and not to 
68 The simultaneously speculative and practical nature is discussed by De-
leuze as a trademark of structuralism, in which the idea appears as “resistant 
and creative force” that makes the virtual and the actual communicate, as 
the “mutation point [that] defines a praxis, or rather the very site where 
praxis must take hold.” Deleuze, Desert Islands, 191.
69 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, trans. Hugh Tom-
linson and Graham Burchill (London: Verso, 1994), 204, 212.
70 See for example Ahab’s vision of Moby Dick in Gilles Deleuze, Essays 
Critical and Clinical, trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco (London: 
Verso, 1998), 3, 116-17. Or, as Deleuze and Guattari put it elsewhere: “To be 
present at the dawn of the world. Such is the link between imperceptibility, 
indiscernibility, and impersonality—the three virtues. To reduce oneself to 
an abstract line, a trait, in order to find one’s zone of indiscernibility with 
other traits, and in this way enter the haecceity and impersonality of the 
creator. One is then like grass: one has made the world, everybody/every-
thing, into a becoming, because one has made a necessarily communicating 
world, because one has suppressed in oneself everything that prevents us 
from slipping between things and growing in their midst.” Gilles Deleuze 
and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. 
Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 280.
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the acting body, since it connects body and environment in 
a single prosthetic and proprioceptive feeling-system.71 In 
terms of Whitehead, such a vision marks a disruption in the 
organic functioning of the body in “perception in the mode 
of symbolic reference.” The body is no longer the common 
ground between “perception in the mode of presentational 
immediacy,” the absolutely clear and distinct consciousness 
of the extended world divided, spatialised and objectified as 
passive potentiality independent from actuality, and “percep-
tion in the mode of causal efficacy,” the obscure and confused 
awareness of the extensive continuum as real potentiality 
antecedent to but co-functioning with actuality. Instead, vision 
consists of a clear but vague experience of which we are no 
longer sure to which mode of perception it belongs. We no 
longer know what is a symbol and what is a meaning, since 
it is an experience in which the past is lifted into the present 
and the present absorbed in the past.72 Rather, it is a vision of 
time as transversal ground between multiple becomings, as 
an interstitial and nonorganic life in constant asymmetric 
self-distinguishing: “The visionary, the seer, is the one who 
sees in the crystal, and what he sees is the gushing of time as 
dividing in two, as splitting.”73
71 Deleuze, Two Regimes of Madness, 279-80.
72 Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York: The Free Press, 
1978), 61-65, 84-85, 104-09, 121-26, 168-81, 220. Whitehead thus largely agrees 
with Bergson’s analysis of normal perception as a spatialisation of time. The 
difference between Whitehead and Bergson is that for Whitehead, space is 
not just an illusion of the intellect but a real factor in the constitution of 
the well-founded phenomenon. See also Whitehead, Process and Reality, 114, 
209-10, 312.
73 Deleuze, Cinema 2, 81. If there is a break with correlationism in Bergson 
and Deleuze, then it can only be in the intellectual intuition of art, which 
reveals the interiority of the subject to time instead of vice versa: “The virtual 
image (pure recollection) is not a psychological state or a consciousness: it 
exists outside consciousness, in time, and we should have no more difficulty 
in admitting the virtual insistence of pure recollections in time than we do 
for the actual existence of non-perceived objects in space.” Deleuze, Cinema 
2, 80. It is true that we are not only in the absolute, as the absolute may also 
be in us. But it is in us only in the form of a cut. It is a discontinuity, not 
from its own, virtual point of view but from the point of view of our actual 
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Whereas Bergson consistently evaluates speculative vision 
as a pathological threat to vital interests,74 Deleuze makes it 
constitutive of his concept of art as “objective illusion: it does 
not supress the distinction between the two sides [actual and 
virtual], but makes it inattributable.” In aesthetic vision, actual 
perception (objective matter) crystallises as a whole with its 
virtual past (subjective manner) in an “original virtuality” 
such that actual and virtual, perception and imagination be-
come “totally reversible” and appear in all their indiscernible 
composedness. Vision, in other words, is a matter of presence: 
“It is the virtual image which corresponds to a particular 
actual image, instead of being actualised, of having to be ac-
tualised in a different actual image.”75 And as a consequence, 
“the problem of art, the correlative problem of creation is 
the problem of perception and not memory.”76 Only when we 
immediately perceive our own action-movement directly in 
representation of it. In itself, however, it can acquire a new, artificial form 
of subjectivity. With aesthetic vision, we thus move not only from art to 
life (expressionism), but also from life to art (constructivism). Indeed, to 
intuit conditions of real experience is already to materialise them in a new 
process of subjectivation—a process of “self-enjoyment” (Whitehead) or 
“the thinking-feeling of our active implication in the ever-rolling-on in the 
world to really-next-effects.” Brian Massumi, Semblance and Event: Activist 
Philosophy and the Occurrent Arts (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2011), 37.
74 Throughout his work, Bergson consistently opposes speculation to vital 
interest. To give but one example from The Creative Mind: “In this specula-
tion on the relation between the possible and the real, let us guard against 
seeing a simple game. It can be a preparation for the art of living.” Bergson, 
Creative Mind, 86; see also Bergson, Matter and Memory, 281. It should be 
noted, however, that his criticism of speculation is restricted to the Kantian 
understanding of speculative metaphysics: “The impotence of speculative 
reason, as Kant has demonstrated it, is perhaps at bottom only the impotence 
of an intellect enslaved to certain necessities of bodily life.” Bergson, Matter 
and Memory, 241. This could easily be misunderstood as if the body were a 
hindering of the mind. However, as Bergson announces in the introduction 
to Matter and Memory, a non-Kantian understanding of speculation is still 
open: “metaphysics would not have been sacrificed to physics, if philosophy 
had been content to leave matter half way” between Descartes and Berkely. 
Bergson, Matter and Memory, x.
75 Deleuze, Cinema 2, 69, 94, 80.
76 Deleuze, Two Regimes of Madness, 296.
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the mirror-image of the past and all retrospective illusions 
of other possibilities before their mimetic reminiscence 
and realisation are eliminated, are we dealing with “a work 
of esthetic art,” as Dewey says, a work in which everything 
actual is saturated with one virtual idea alone: “Man whittles, 
carves, sings, dances, gestures, molds, draws and paints. The 
doing or making is artistic when the perceived result is of 
such a nature that its qualities as perceived have controlled 
the question of production.”77 Only in art does the immediate 
expression of the idea as virtual past coincide perfectly with 
the hallucination-construction of its own realisation in a new 
image of thought. “The work of art is artistic in the degree 
in which the two functions of transformation [conception 
and execution] are effected by a single operation.”78 Indeed, 
reflecting Bellori’s late mannerist equation of “la maniera, o 
vogliamo dire fantastica idea,”79 Deleuze too argues that art is 
based on the perfect unity of idea and style, the latter being 
“the formal structure of the work of art, insofar as it does not 
refer to anything else, which can serve as unity—afterwards.”80
More than any other intuition, then, the intuition of an 
artistic idea implies a direct devotion to, and caring respon-
sibility for, the inner vitality of the work in the process of 
being made. A purely artistic creation immediately and ex-
clusively determines manner or style, to the extent that the 
latter completely absorbs all objective matter, including pre-
existing artistic styles and traditions. While classicism clearly 
distinguishes manner from matter, form from content, and 
accident from essence, thus guaranteeing the spatial identity 
and intelligibility of images throughout their execution, man-
nerism is interested in ontogenetic images as such—i.e., their 
absolute processuality, “where matter and manner meld.”81 
77 Dewey, Art as Experience, 50, 155, original emphases.
78 Ibid., 78.
79 Bellori, “Annibale Carracci,” 1.
80 Gilles Deleuze, Proust and Signs, trans. Richard Howard (London: Allen 
Lane, 1973), 149.
81 Brian Massumi, “Involutionary Afterword,” Canadian Review of Compara-
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Artistic intuition is like an extremely concentrated mould-
ing of the work of art (manner) as it is struggling out of the 
adamantine block by discarding all the unmoulded shapes 
of foreign realisations (molecular matter) that impede and 
suspend its autonomous completion. Makers immerse their 
perceptive consciousness directly and completely in the real 
itself, not as it is but only as it becomes. Art then becomes the 
clear but confused expression and construction of material 
movements on a plane of composition connecting things 
and events in a singular process of individuation that en-
compasses both artists and their material: “We are carried 
out beyond ourselves to find ourselves … The whole is then 
felt as an expansion of ourselves.”82 Here there is no what, 
only that. In its pure state, an artistic intuition permits no 
recognition. It is rather like a flash of lightning, “a dynamic 
unity that comes in self-exhibiting excess over its differen-
tial conditions.”83 It is a purely speculative event: a sudden 
eruption of the past into a singular act in the present, unde-
termined but always in determination, unformed but always 
in formation, informed by a single generative idea that sheds 
all illusions of other possibilities. From idea to maniera, from 
difference to repetition, from expression to construction, 
art is a non-theological or non-religious spiritualisation or 
animation that absorbs its material in an interior perspective 
cut out of time itself, unbeholden to any external or spatial 
finalities. It is “no longer motor or material, but temporal and 
spiritual: that which ‘is added’ to matter, not what distends 
it.”84 Although unintelligible to our sensory-motor schema 
and natural perception, art is therefore not a breakdown of 
life, but rather its breakthrough into a new, unnatural form: 
it is the very “bursting forth of life,” even “the artist or out-
pouring life” itself.85
tive Literature (1998), 23:3, 2013, http://www.anu.edu.au/hrc/first_and_last/
works/crclintro.htm (accessed July 7, 2013).
82 Dewey, Art as Experience, 50, 195.
83 Massumi, Semblance and Event, 20.
84 Deleuze, Cinema 2, 101.
85 Ibid., 121, 192.
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Manual Diagrams in the Age of Speculation
Let us summarise. According to the Critique of Pure Reason, 
the ideas of reason function as regulative principles in the 
transcendental schematism. Ideas systematise the way in 
which the manifold of sensible intuition is synthesised by 
the imagination into the unity of a particular image in order 
to subsequently make itself objectively recognised under 
the profile of a concept. Accordingly, disegno would move 
from image to concept and back so that the sensible and the 
intelligible, art and science converge in the production of 
art objects.86
From a Bergsonist point of view, by contrast, the idea is 
not outside of intuition, but belongs to it in the same way 
that the manner of its appearance belongs to the imagina-
tion. Firstly, there is neither imagination without intuition 
nor vice versa: “the work in the mirror and the work in the 
seed have always accompanied art without ever exhausting 
it.”87 The imagination (the virtual mirror image of the work) 
is evoked in order to express the intuition of the idea (the 
seed of the work in the process of being made), but the intu-
ition itself is without image. Rather it is the phantasteon or 
imaginandum, “the unformed or the deformed in nature” in 
which the body schema disintegrates and the door is opened 
for new perceptions.88 Only when taken together with the 
imagination (maniera) does intuition (idea) constitute “the 
way of seeing and feeling things as they compose an integral 
whole.”89 Secondly, the imagination, like the intuition, is 
not a faculty but a practice, itself constituted by processes of 
crystallisation, such that in fact “all that matters about the 
crystal itself is what we see in it, so the imaginary drops out 
of the equation.”90 In other words, the self-conscious man-
86 Didi-Huberman, Confronting Images, 130-33.
87 Deleuze, Cinema 2, 75.
88 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 320-21.
89 Dewey, Art as Experience, 278, original emphasis.
90 Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations, 1972-1990, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: 
Columbia University Press), 66. In the imagination, it is the manner of 
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ner of the imagination is inseparable from the material of 
its development, which is constituted by the unconscious 
“motor diagram.”91 Cognitive understanding is therefore not 
a separate faculty, but itself the product of a sensory-motor 
schema that slows down and filters the imagination by de-
limiting different possibilities, thus distinguishing between 
real and imaginary images. While it plays a crucial role in 
natural perception, in artistic vision the habitual perception 
of natural phenomena is reshuffled without detriment into 
the formation of new, unnatural images. These are not just 
capricious fantasies of a disturbed psyche, but real accelera-
tions of spirit. While visible extension is the ordinary schema 
of ideas, the imagination as slowed down by the organic body, 
in artistic vision simulacra fly about in the hallucination of 
new intensities that provide the visionary schema in which 
the ideas of the intuition “shine like differential flashes 
which leap and metamorphose” and the ground rises up to 
the surface in a speculative moment or “spiritual ascension” 
that puts everything at stake.92 From the heavy motor diagram 
imagining that puts virtual ideas and actual cognitions in dynamic and 
creative interrelation. “The imaginary isn’t the unreal; it’s the indiscern-
ibility of real and unreal … [T]o imagine is to construct crystal-images, to 
make the image behave like a crystal … It’s not the imaginary but the crystal 
that has a heuristic role … The imaginary is a rather indeterminate notion. 
It makes sense in strict conditions: its precondition is the crystal, and the 
unconditioned we eventually reach is time.” Deleuze, Negotiations, 66. Or as 
we read in Empiricism and Subjectivity: “Nothing is done by the imagination; 
everything is done in the imagination. It is not even a faculty for forming 
ideas, because the production of an idea by the imagination is only the re-
production of an impression in the imagination. Certainly, the imagination 
has its own activity; but even this activity, being whimsical and delirious, 
is without constancy and without uniformity. It is the movement of ideas, 
and the totality of their actions and reactions. Being the place of ideas, the 
fancy is the collection of separate, individual items. Being the bond of ideas, 
it moves through the universe, engendering fire dragons, winged horses, 
and monstrous giants. The depth of the mind is indeed delirium, or—same 
thing from another point of view—change and indifference. By itself, the 
imagination is not nature; it is a mere fancy.” Gilles Deleuze, Empiricism 
and Subjectivity, 23. 
91 Bergson, Matter and Memory, 136.
92 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 146; Deleuze, Cinema 2, 267.
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of the body to its spiritual transmutation in art, the mutual 
immanence of matter, manner and idea in the complex unity 
of intuition and imagination thus forms the solution to 
“the epiphany of the transcendental schematism of artistic 
production,” while the cognitive intellect or general concept, 
which is adapted to matter alone, only comes afterwards.93
But how and why do we pass from normal or natural im-
ages to visionary images? Just as, psychologically speaking, 
visionary hallucinations are the result of a breakdown of the 
sensory-motor schema of natural perception, the mannerist 
will to speculate is intimately connected with a catastrophe 
in its socio-political grounds. Art will only become abstract 
and gain in aesthetic expressivity if its practical embed-
ding in some wider milieu is somehow disrupted. We never 
speculate at will, as if speculation were some non-binding 
intellectual pastime occupation. Rather, speculation always 
answers a passionate cry, a painful restlessness that makes 
it both impossible and necessary to act. In fact, the clearest 
sign of some crisis of belief in the schema of the world is 
this treacherous tension between subjectivating reason and 
pre-subjective passion. Although traditionally art historians 
tend to associate the mannerists with their own social ideal 
of disinvolved sprezzatura, the grace of effortless accom-
plishment of some frivolous and contrived idea, I side with 
Arnold Hauser, who writes this about the mannerists: “They 
despaired of speculative thought, and at the same time clung 
to it; they had no high hopes of reason, but remained pas-
sionate reasoners.”94 In fact, the mannerist ideal of sprezzatura 
can only appear in response to a catastrophe of established 
schemata, amidst the “rage of disposition[s]” that leads to “the 
contingency of form in relation to the intelligible character 
93 Adi Efal, “Panofsky’s Idea and Auerbach’s Figura, Two Philological 
Iconodulist Experiments,” History and Theory, Bezalel (2009), 14, 2013, http://
bezalel.secured.co.il/zope/home/en/1252746792/1253042837_en (accessed 
June 18, 2013).
94 Arnold Hauser, Der Ursprung der modernen Kunst und Literatur: Die Entwicklung 
des Manierismus seit der Krise der Renaissance (München: C.H. Beck, 1973), 15.
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of the work.”95 Only what has no essence or reason becomes 
a matter of speculation. Situated between the Renaissance 
and the Enlightenment, what is lacking in mannerism is a 
belief in the existing grounds, a preparedness to be involved. 
Of course, this crisis is not yet the modern crisis of belief 
in “human reason” but rather “a crisis and collapse of all 
theological Reason” or a “cry of reason,” as Deleuze calls 
it. Together with the baroque, mannerism is the temporary 
and provisional attempt to reconstitute a sufficient reason 
in the “long history of nihilism.”96 But whether in religion, 
in science, in philosophy, or in art, this is to say that all that 
is left of sufficient reason is a speculative trust in a future 
ground, a vision of “a new earth and people that do not yet 
exist.”97 Instead of referring to the mannerist age as “the age 
of criticism,”98 I therefore prefer to call it “the age of specula-
tion.” The key here is that, as Massumi writes, “speculation is 
entirely active.” Mannerism will only appear as disinvolved 
from a classicist perspective, i.e., a perspective in which art and 
politics are bound by the “eternal return of content,” whereas 
in reality, it is manner that drags content along towards the 
excess invention of a new form of life.99
It is in this sense that I propose a speculative reinterpre-
tation of the mannerist doctrine of the idea. Mannerism is 
not conceptual art. It is more an art of spirituality than of 
ideas. If the idea stands in opposition to material practice, 
spirituality sympathises with it. Instead of residing outside 
of the medium, it inheres within it. Any dematerialisation 
is only apparent, a trap. But this conjunctive immanence of 
95 Robert Klein, Gestalt und Gedanke: Zur Kunst und Theorie der Renaissance, 
trans. and ed. Horst Günther (Berlin: Verlag Klaus Wagenbach, 1996), 90.
96 Deleuze, The Fold, 67-68, 41. See also Sjoerd van Tuinen, “Cinematic Neo-
Mannerism or Neo-Baroque? Deleuze and Daney,” Image and Narrative 
(2012), 13:2, 53-75.
97 Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosphy?, 108.
98 Baxter Hathaway, The Age of Criticism: The Late Renaissance in Italy (Westport: 
Greenwood Press, 1973).
99 Massumi, Semblance and Event, 12, 150-54.
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matter, manner and idea appears as such only in moments 
of crisis. Ideas always rise to the surface as breaks in a mate-
rial process, in other words, as problems, not as solutions. 
“They are not interruptions of the process, but breaks that 
form part of it, like an eternity that can only be revealed in a 
becoming, or a landscape that only appears in movement.”100 
This means that ideas are not outside practical matters, but 
rather form the outside of practical matters, their interstices 
and intervals. Ideas are the very passages of life within them. 
For Leibniz, these passages make up the ideal continuum 
of the universe in its impersonal and pre-individual state, 
a transfinite structure of disharmonious possibility in the 
mind of God;101 for Bergson they constitute the Open Whole 
of the past that is virtually passing through each actuality. 
Either way, to have an intuition or vision of these passages is 
already to make a selection, to touch base with the groundless 
ground of the future itself. Timing is everything. Although in 
mannerism all possible intellectual traditions are mobilised 
to this speculative end, ideas do not yet concern the kind of 
cognitive knowledge which only comes afterwards, but rather 
a faith in something which is not yet there. Although it takes a 
continual practical effort to develop and sustain an intuition, 
this development is purely a matter of cultivation as opposed 
to method. And it is speculative, since it is a risky matter of 
stubborn perseverance and self-certainty about what one 
wants to do without knowing how to get there.
In Deleuze, this speculative conception of the idea as con-
tinuous with manner and matter returns in his concepts of 
the abstract machine as the world’s immanent cause and of 
the diagram as a “state of the abstract Machine” as it returns 
100 Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, 5.
101 This is why the idea is the virtual object of complete determination (dif-
ferentiation), the problematic structure insofar as it is complete but not 
insofar as it is actual since it never constitutes an integral whole, lacking 
the whole set of relations (differenciation) belonging to the actual existence 
of its solutions: “The elements, varieties of relations and singular points 
coexist in the work or the object, in the virtual part of the work or object.” 
Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 209.
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in science, philosophy and art.102 The diagram, Deleuze’s 
transformation of the Kantian schematism, is a map of the 
future. It is not what the artist is the author of, but the set of 
asignifying and nonrepresentational signs which he puts to 
work and on which he relies. It does not specify the properties 
of the component parts of a concrete material assemblage, 
but only the ideal relations by which these free marks and 
traits of expressions could constitute a functional assem-
blage. When interpreted in terms of the diagram, disegno is 
no longer a matter of going back and forth between part and 
whole, as in classical sketch methods. Rather, it is the process-
ing of abstract forces as information, in which the parts and 
the whole interact in a constructive gambling upon the real. 
The whole is not pre-set but emerges in an itinerant fashion, 
in which craft and design, matter and manner immediately 
answer to one another. And it is an open whole, structured by 
confusion, of which the parts are selected bottom-up, through 
their relations instead of the relations through their terms. 
Thus whereas in classical representation the potential idea 
slumbering in a given material is first “seen” by the eye of the 
intellect and then realised in manual work, mannerism—and 
here we should remember that Vasari speaks consistently of 
maniera, which derives from mano (hand), and not of stile—sets 
up a “frenetic zone in which the hand is no longer guided by 
the eye and is forced upon sight like another will.”103 Strictly 
speaking then, a diagram is not even an agent of design, but 
rather of breakthrough. It operates outside of established re-
gimes of imagination. We see the signs of such an outside in 
the famous mannerist ideal of the figura serpentinata, a figure 
produced by a line of infinite variation, but also in the end-
less modulation of light in Venetian oil painting, the infinite 
manipulation of the veins in marble in sculpture, or in the 
constant play with dissonance in the polyphonic madrigal.
As a consequence, the disconnection between the stages 
of conception and execution is not at all a mannerist idea, 
102 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 67. 
103 Deleuze, Francis Bacon, 137, 94.
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but precisely a classical one. Mannerism simply no longer 
ignores or represses the artificiality or constructive aspect 
of the diagrams that may already have been at work in the 
nameless interstices of classicism. Rather, it is a pragmatic-
speculative mode of thinking about what pre-artistic and 
non-artistic technologies and materials can bring in and 
activate. Diagrams are the groundless grounds that need to 
be worked over and worked out in the future, and in their 
eternal return even constitute “the future per se,” the pure 
and empty form of time itself.104 They are the elusive point 
where the innate and the genital, past and future merge in a 
speculative thought that produces that which it speculates on.
Implied in this diagrammatic understanding of mannerism 
as “manual intrusion” is, firstly, that the vision of the idea is 
itself transformed into an artistic vision à la loupe or a “close” 
and “haptic vision.”105 As Michelangelo writes, drawing his 
inspiration from Ficino’s commentary on the Symposium, the 
aim of art is to “make of [one’s] entire body one single eye.”106 
In haptic experiences, there is no a priori division of labour. 
The eye itself now acts as if it were a hand, being no longer 
only a receptive organ but also an active one, whereas what is 
at hand is always close, without any sense of depth or horizon, 
internalised by the body in its entirety. Being neither models 
nor rules, we never meet the ideas as such. They are “artistic 
essences”;107 we only live through them or enact them in art. 
“As we manipulate, we touch and feel, as we look, we see; as 
104 Lars Spuybroek, The Sympathy of Things: John Ruskin and the Ecology of Design 
(Rotterdam: V2 Publishers, 2011), 162, original emphasis.
105 Deleuze, Francis Bacon, 138, 152. Whereas clarity and distinctness form 
the ground of recognition, they explode into the “new clarity” (Deleuze, 
Francis Bacon, 161) or “inspired free vision” (Gilles Deleuze, Spinoza: Practi-
cal Philosophy, trans. Robert Hurley (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1988), 
14) of the “third eye” (Deleuze, Cinema 2, 265) that belongs to the groundless 
ground—an eye that is no longer mine, but that is itself a “vision-effect” 
or “appearance” belonging to the lived abstraction of the event. Massumi, 
Semblance and Event, 17, 51, 55, 72.
106 Michelangelo as cited in Clements, Michelangelo’s Theory of Art, 35.
107 See the chapter “Essences and the Signs of Art” in Deleuze, Proust and 
Signs, 39-50.
Sjoerd van Tuinen – Disegno
471
we listen, we hear … Hand and eye, when the experience is 
aesthetic, are but instruments through which the entire living 
creature, moved and active throughout, operates.”108
Secondly, it follows that the complete execution of a work 
of art is not indispensable. Hence the extraordinary interest 
of Michelangelo’s many drawings (disegni) used as studies 
for his paintings and sculptures. The conceptual character 
of non finito works of art such as the Pitti Tondo (1503-1504) or 
the Prigioni (1525-1530), moreover, reflects the artist’s poetic 
virtuosity insofar as these works are inseparable from the 
manual act that executes them, rather than being reducible 
to some prefabricated idea in general. Indeed, it is precisely 
in this sense that Vasari appreciates the perfect control of 
Michelangelo’s hand in San Matteo (1506): “In its sketched 
state it reveals the perfection to which it aspires and teaches 
all sculptors the manner (maniera) in which one carves fig-
ures from stone without harm.”109 Perfection, then, becomes 
an aspiration, not an endpoint that is already given. Or as we 
can argue with Souriau, Michelangelo’s unfinished sculptures 
are not “failed projects” but “restorative trajectories.” Perfec-
tion is not a question of existence, as this still presupposes 
a well-formed end product, but of more or less existence.110 
Form is constituted by both structure and action. Against 
the Aristotelian notion that form is active while matter is 
passive, we must uphold that forms are tending toward re-
alisation in material processes themselves and that they are 
always between minimum and maximum states. They are 
formed by the “internal mold” of a given flow of matter, not 
as a prescription but as procedure, a motor schema, a digital 
code or genetic script.111 After all, “the essence of a thing never 
108 Dewey, Art as Experience, 51-52.
109 Giorgio Vasari as cited in Paul Barolsky, “The Artist’s Hand,” in The Craft of 
Art: Originality and Industry in the Italian Renaissance and Baroque Workshop, ed. 
Andrew Ladis and Carolyn Wood (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1995), 9.
110 Souriau, Les différents modes d’existence, 204, 207-08, 196.
111 Spuybroek, The Sympathy of Things, 56.
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appears at the outset, but in the middle, in the course of its 
development, when its strength is assured.”112
Maybe this concept of a metastable perfection could also 
shed new light on the mystery of mannerist “resemblances.” 
Both unformed chaos and conditions of the new, diagrams 
are the immanent becomings of the work of art in which the 
relation between model and copy is reversed. They constitute 
both the limit of imitation and its threshold, that is, the agitated 
zone where “the imitation of a primal model” constantly 
passes into “a mimesis that is itself primary and without a 
model.”113 It is in this sense that mannerist works of art are 
one with a virtuosity valued only for itself and judged by no 
external resemblance. In virtuosity lies the perfect unity of 
eye and hand, but also the immanence of matter, manner 
and idea. The mannerist idea does not preside over life but 
becomes coextensive with it. Rather than being general, it is a 
“concrete universal.”114 Perhaps this is the ultimate consequence 
of a truly pragmatist and materialist conception of spiritual-
ity: the mannerist paradox of a Neoplatonist overturning of 
Platonism based not on resemblances, but on manners of 
resembling. It demands an ethics of affirmation that replaces 
imitable models in space with the modulation of simulacra 
and the fictionalising productivity of time. Instead of an 
economy of originals we discover a dynamic pragmatics of 
immanent deviation that subsumes all content and renders 
the work of art a monument of time itself. Such a work is the 
work of the speculative artist par excellence, whom Deleuze 
calls the “forger.”115 For it is with the forger that the breakdown 
of the critical form of the true implies the breakthrough of 
the speculative powers of the false. To speculate or to have 
an idea is to metamorphose, to be done with judgment and 
112 Deleuze, Cinema 1, 3.
113 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 237.
114 Deleuze, Desert Islands, 43. 
115 Deleuze, Cinema 2, 132.
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to manipulate “forces, nothing but forces.”116 Unlike form, 
force has no essence: it has no “what,” but only a “how” and 
a “that.” Thus it also constitutes the expressive and construc-
tive essence of mannerist disegno: “Manipulated chance, as 
opposed to conceived or seen possibilities.”117
116 Ibid., 139 and Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, 134. 
117 Deleuze, Francis Bacon, 94.

